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Introduction
This book can be described as the result of an ongoing research project within 
the International Permanent Seminar for Homeland and Foreign Security in the 
European Union in the era of Globalization� This event has been organized by the 
Institute of Political Science at the University of Warsaw and the Universitarian 
Institute for Homeland Security Research (Civil Guard and the Spanish Open 
University UNED), the Spanish-Polish Network for Scientific Research and the 
Legal Practice School at the UNED Law School�
Our purpose is to offer the reader the less-known comprehensive and unavoid-
able keys to understanding the violent radicalization and terrorism that has been 
labelled by the media, and a considerable portion of the scientific literature, as 
“Jihadism�” We cannot avoid pointing out that both the Spanish and Polish authors 
of this book, as well as the institutions which have promoted it, know and accept 
that the concept of “Jihad” rejects the current terrorist brutality perpetrated in its 
name, as well as in the name of Islam and Muslims�
According to statistics, approximately thirteen million Muslim citizens currently 
belong to a European Union Member States� If we take into account the entire 
European territory, Muslim communities make up a population segment of up to 
forty four million human beings�
A contextualized and precise reading of statistical data allows us to conclude 
that the millions of European Muslims follow a normalized social trend that re-
jects violent radicalization and terrorism of any denomination, and above all, the 
one committed in the name of Islam, the Jihad and Muslims�
Many among us are determined to eradicate the personalization of the ideology 
of hatred� To achieve this goal, European political and social leaders should always 
be assisted by Islamic religious leaders, who preach a moderate interpretation of 
Islamic scripture, effectively severing the link between the concept of Holy War 
and terrorism�
We must abandon the commonly used terms, such as “Islamic terrorism” or 
“jihadist terrorism,” since it is important to avoid the mistake of stigmatizing a 
religious belief such as the real Islam� We believe that repeated use of those terms 
could play into the argumentation of jihadist terrorists, thus turning the situation 
in their favor and creating the counterproductive side effect of reinforcing these 
groups’ false premise of western hostility toward Islam, which would support the 
intent of presenting themselves as victims of the western world for their beliefs� 
The very essence of democratic values in a multicultural society supports and 
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defends freedom, a freedom which is used perversely with criminal intent, lacking 
any true religious purpose, promoting a lawless indoctrination leading to terrorist 
acts, which are perpetrated against the citizens of a democratic society under the 
shelter of its established liberties�
In his speech before the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, Barack 
Obama stressed the urgency of specific codification, not as an issue of political 
correctness, but as a strategic and operational priority� This is considered an una-
voidable option, since certain risks derived from an inadequate codification are 
the wrongful characterization of Islam as a synonym for terrorism, contributing to 
the spread of islamophobia and as a consequence, the risk of neutral or favorable 
reactions and attitudes of moderate Muslims toward terrorists�
The use of terms such as Jihad, with the only definition being “holy war”, or 
Salafism as a synonym for jihadist terrorism, among others, entails accepting and 
legitimizing the ideologists’ digital narrative supporting violent and terrorist radical-
ism� Those ideologists preach an exemplary action according to Islam principles, 
but in truthfulness, they digitally falsify their religion�
This work is encased within this perspective, analyzing the impact of globali-
zation on the creation of new forms of terrorism and radicalization, testing the 
capacities of States, international organizations and the scientific community�
This research delved into the European scene, where jihadism constantly defies 
domestic and foreign security strengths, increases actions within the European 
Union, and strains the already delicate balance between security and fundamental 
rights or individual liberties�
The narrative resulting from this research emphasizes how the conceptual dif-
ferentiation between Domestic and Foreign Security regains new and more precise 
meaning within the context of global strategies designed and implemented by the 
UN and the European Union� Strategic and operational multilateralism, together 
with a cross-disciplinary scientific research, the transfer of knowledge and the 
extrapolation of verified good practices, are imperative priorities in interventions 
against terrorism and radicalization – above all, in operational areas related to 
anticipation and prevention�
In the European Union, the risks derived from radicalization and terrorism 
are attributed to a geopolitical context of conflict, economic crisis, and a surge of 
ideologies of hatred� Along the Mediterranean, the causes are linked to the Arab 
spring, the definition of Libya as a failed state, the fragmentation of Syria and Iraq 
in favor of the expansion of Daesh, and the survival of Al Qaeda and an extensive 
network of its subsidiaries� In eastern Europe, the Russian annexation of Crimea 
and the Ukrainian war design a stage of crisis and instability� The terrorist attacks 
9Introduction
in Madrid, London, Paris, and Copenhagen confirm that the European Member 
States constitute the main staging area for global jihadism� 
Within the frame of this comprehensive context, Polish and Spanish authors 
enlist on an analytic immersion hoping to contribute from the respective fields 
of Law, Political Science, and Social Work to the knowledge and understanding 





Correlating Security and Freedom
1. Introduction
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, which came as a complete 
surprise to the USA and the countries of Europe, indubitably represent a turn-
ing point in the political and academic discourse on internal and international 
security� A number of European states have experienced acts of terrorism in the 
1970s – these were acts of an endemic nature� At the turn of the twenty-first 
century, these crises subsided into the past, attracting insufficient attention in 
the public realm� However, the new threat facing the US, especially its domestic 
security – as the country, at that time, lacked experience in this field, and coupled 
with the shock – instilled a sense of helplessness among its political elites and 
the wider public� This led the US President to announce that his country was in 
a state of war with the new terrorism, the now infamous “War on Terror�” In a 
word, this was a sign that a new form of threat to the security of the state and its 
public was faced by the rule of law democracies and they lacked the knowledge 
on how to deal with it�
What is more, the 9/11 attacks made it abundantly clear that, in the globalized 
and unilateral world we have today, the spheres of internal and external secu-
rity interweave and are closely linked together� This brought a clear message to 
American decision-makers: matters of security and combating terrorism cannot 
be solved with measures hitherto applied� A new type of menace requires a new 
response� President Bush postulated that this new form of threat requires a new 
paradigm of thinking on the right to war�1 The terrorist attacks in Madrid in 
2004 and in London the following year prompted individual countries to step up 
efforts to find solutions to the growing danger, placing that subject on the top of 
their political agenda�
1 Memorandum from the US President G� Bush, Human Treatment if Taliban and al Qaeda 
Detainees, available at http//www�fidh�org/IMG/pdf/memo11, accessed 21 December 
2015�
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2.  Security and Terrorism Discourse in the  
Wake of 11 September 2001
As already mentioned, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a sig-
nificant watershed in academic research� Prior to these attacks, the investigation 
of terrorism was the sole domain of expert centers, government administration 
advisory bodies and the secret service while the main focus was on leftist, ethnic 
and sectarian terrorism� The terror attacks of 2001 shifted attention to the prob-
lem of international terrorism, generating increased funds for research, including 
academic investigation�
At the same time, the September attacks represent a turning point in the his-
tory of international terrorism� Violent, fear-inspiring attacks are, after all, an old 
phenomenon, but it is only the 9/11 that maps out a new stage on the path of its 
growth� The specific nature and size of these attacks introduced into public and 
academic discourse a new type of terrorism, one that is linked to Islam� Thus, after 
2001 Islamic terrorism becomes an object of attention� Over the years, it gained a 
strong religious legitimation, which was created – according to Gilles Kepel – in the 
process of grass-roots “re-islamization” across the Arabic world and in the Islam-
ized areas of Western Europe�2 It must be added, of course, that this constitutes an 
abuse of Islamic religion and a highly instrumental approach to its religious tenets�
The phenomenon of Islamic terrorism is partly a consequence of global mod-
ernization which sees a clash between the traditional life-style (based on religion) 
and modernity (identified primarily with the Western culture)� What is new about 
this type of terrorism is that it is not a method of reaching specific political goals 
but rather a strategy against a specified enemy� Certain new and hitherto unseen 
features seem to define it� Firstly, it is motivated by a strong religious message� 
Secondly, the perpetrators include mainly suicide bombers bent on killing and 
maiming the most number of people� Thirdly, they have at their disposal an effec-
tive system for generating vast funds� Fourthly, and most importantly, they have 
a new organization structure that is a flexible and global network�
The post 9/11 terrorist attacks had a mobilizing effect on Western states to 
undertake various counter measures� Among them were primarily the moves 
to change internal law in respect of state security and cooperation with other 
countries in order to combat terrorism� At this time, an international legal system 
comprising of procedures and institutions has been developed to safeguard against 
and to fight terrorism� It is made up of rules and regulations within the UN, the 
2 G� Kepel, La revanche de Dieu. Chretiens, juifs et muslumans la reconquwete du 
Monde, Editions du Seuil, Paris 2003�
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Council of Europe and the European Union� What makes these regulations unique 
is the fact that they stress the need to comply with the basic standards in human 
rights protection, even with regard to the perpetrators of such acts�3 However, 
despite the considerable legal output of the international community tackling the 
new threats a single definition of terrorism acceptable to most states is yet to be 
written� The lack of such a definition makes the undertaking of counter-terrorism 
measures by states more difficult, especially where it concerns human rights and 
liberties� And without it, addressing international terrorism has more in common 
with politics and political deference than with international law�
As can be expected, this makes for a highly complex situation in Europe� Hu-
man rights and liberties entrenched in the constitutional and legal tradition of 
the West – won in a long historical process in opposition to a strong state – have 
been an incontestable and inviolable canon of the political system� And it is the 
system which, in turn, underpins provisions in international law� Rights and liber-
ties have become common in democratic states ruled by law, whereas threats to 
security have never been considered with due attention� In Europe, the Hobbesian 
Leviathan, symbolizing a strong state, was constrained by the constitution and 
resigned to the primacy of law and freedom�
Western states, in the understanding of Giovanni Sartori, have become con-
solidated democracies, in other words they are no longer in danger of reverting to 
authoritarian rule� In fact, Western states have gone even further� As advocates of 
the expansion of democracy, following the perspectives of Samuel Huntington and 
Francis Fukuyama, they believe that it is necessary and justified to overthrow des-
pots in the name of freedom in other parts of the world� But not enough thought 
is given to the strategic or even tactical consequences of such moves� Warnings 
that the endemic anarchy, practically unavoidable, could be worse than the re-
gimes of secular despots were largely ignored� Thus, one cannot but agree with 
the view held by the British theoretician of liberalism, John Gray, claiming that 
states should be free to choose their course of development and, as long as they do 
not represent a threat to others, even undemocratic regimes should be tolerated�4
3 T� Aleksandrowicz, Terroryzm międzynarodowy, Oficyna Wydawnicza Łośgraf, Warsaw 
2008, pp� 89–90�
4 J� Gray, Heresies: Against Progress and Other Illusions, Granta Books, London 2004, 
p� 91�
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3.  Liberties and Security in the Catalogue of  
Constitutional Rights
The new type of threats that emerged in the wake of 2001 represented a serious 
challenge to the democratic states of Northern America and Europe� In this new 
situation, states not only wanted but also had to strengthen their power and the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures� The tenet which says “rights and 
liberties as much as possible while security as little as necessary” as a political 
directive in the fight against terrorism has become untenable� Terrorist threats 
necessitate more state power, among other things, in order to make state policies 
effective� But expanding state power does not conform to the liberal tradition 
upheld by democratic rule-of-law states� This creates a tension – a conflict between 
measures aimed at increasing safety and the ingrained tradition of the sanctity of 
rights and liberties� Thus, the question arises: what should be done (and in what 
way) in order to guarantee security to our citizens without a recourse to limiting 
their rights and liberties? In these circumstances, can a balance be maintained 
between liberty and security? Do we require liberty at all cost? On the whole, the 
question of how to maintain an appropriate proportion between freedom and 
security has been a primordial one, raised by political philosophy, by governments 
and the governed as well�
After 2001, these questions have found their way into mainstream political 
thought� In the legal, constitutional and political discourse the concept of security 
collided with the issue of individual, group, social and national freedom� Freedom 
has always been firmly embedded in the constitutional landscape of democratic 
states under the rule-of-law; the same cannot be said about security, although 
in modern constitutionalism, security is frequently treated as the constitutional 
right of an individual�
The connection between liberty and security was noted by Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, who maintained that security was the precondition of liberty�5 John 
Stewart Mill, in turn, claimed in his philosophical work On Liberty that the power 
of the rulers, if uncontrolled, can give rise to tyranny and for this reason he placed 
a higher premium on freedom�6 Benjamin Franklin is credited with saying “Those 
who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve 
neither�” This statement, much as a host of other views voiced by many political 
5 H� von Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenze der Wirksamkeit des Staates 
zu bestimmen, in, Menschenbildung und Staatsverfassung. Texte zur Rechtphilosophie, 
Freiburg 1994, p� 94�
6 J� M� Mill, On Liberty, Kaplan Publishing, New York 2009�
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thinkers, illustrates the complex nature of the relationship between freedom and 
security� But does this interdependence necessarily point to a hierarchy between 
the two? It transpires that this relationship is a highly complex one� Firstly, at a 
certain stage of state development both security and freedom have become the 
state’s basic objectives� Secondly, the two notions are essentially diverse and often 
opposing� Thirdly, security is associated with the lack of threats, while freedom – 
with the generation of threats� And fourthly, the fulfillment of state tasks in terms 
of freedom is of an individualized nature, whereas tasks in terms of security – are 
implemented collectively�7
The opposition between the aims of fulfilling freedom and that of security 
within a state can produce a paradoxical situation� A state which aims to imple-
ment full security, needs to be omnipotent in all matters, thereby undermining 
freedom and, in this sense, indubitably, arousing the opposition between freedom 
and security�
From today’s perspective, we are dealing with freedom when coercion is absent, 
and with security – when our life, body, privacy and freedom are not endangered� 
To guarantee security in freedom today means decidedly more than to effectively 
guarantee public order� What is more, fulfilling these tasks in the area of security 
should take place in such a manner so as not to curb the rights and freedom of 
the people� Security without freedom leads to authoritarian or totalitarian rule� 
Freedom, however, requires a certain dose of security: in order to live in freedom, 
we need security� Currently, the relationship between freedom and security is yet 
more complex than before, making Benjamin Franklin’s opinion untenable, as 
the two values are difficult to hierarchize� With this in mind, let us turn to Karl 
R� Popper who believed that we can achieve security through freedom: “We must 
plan for freedom, and not only for security, if for no other reason than that only 
freedom can make security more secure�”8
The complex relationship between freedom and security is evident when the 
two values are implemented in governance� However, it is worth noting that in the 
process of their implementation the state behaves differently� In terms of security, 
state tasks would amount to protecting legal goods in the area of private relations 
and on preventing the interference of other agents into the citizens’ matters� This 
implies an active role of the state and its institutions as expressed in its legislative, 
judiciary and administrative activity�
7 Ch� Gusy, Gewährleistung von Freiheit und Sicherheit im Lichte unterschiedlicher Staats- 
und Verfassungsverständnisse, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen 
Staatsrechtslehrer, Berlin 2004, p� 155�
8 K� R� Popper, The Open Society and Its, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994�
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From the perspective of freedom understood mainly in negative terms, the state 
is not required to be particularly active – it should just refrain from reacting, or 
act in such a way so as not to interfere into or restrict the activity of members of 
the public� But even if the law allows for imposing limits on our freedom, these 
limits inherent in the provisions in place should not constrain the very essence of 
freedom� In the latest interpretations, the so-called doctrine of positive obligations 
requires state organs to act while at the same time maintaining a balance between 
individual and collective interests in terms of exercising their right to freedom� 
States are obliged to facilitate the effective use of the rights and freedoms that the 
individual is entitled to by creating an appropriate legal system�
The history of the development of modern states has noted periods of excep-
tional tension between the guaranteeing of security and freedom� The expectation 
that the state would achieve both goals was met with varying degrees of success� In 
practice, more often than not, states would subordinate everything to security� In 
other words, we are dealing with the primacy of security over other areas of public 
life� The deviational nature of this superiority becomes evident in authoritarian 
and totalitarian regimes�
The problem of a relationship between the two values reemerged in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks but this time it was approached differently� Exacerbating the com-
plexity of this relationship is the fact that human rights and liberties are addressed 
by almost all state constitutions whereas security is sometimes overlooked� It is often 
difficult to speak of the right to security, and when it does take place it needs to be 
drawn from a broader interpretation of constitutional regulations�
Historically speaking, security as a right appeared for the first time in docu-
ments defining the natural rights of a human being arising from the human be-
ing’s innate dignity� The need to protect this right was the motivation behind the 
authors of the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen� Article 2 of the French Declaration reads: 
“The goal of any political association is the conservation of the natural and im-
prescriptible rights of man� These rights are liberty, property, safety and resistance 
against oppression�” Subsequently, security as a right and a certain value was 
included in the French Constitution of 1793� Ideas embedded in the American 
Constitution and French Declaration have profoundly influenced European 
constitutionalism� In European liberal constitutional thought of the nineteenth 
century, the issue of security, next to freedom, was vitally important� It has to be 
underlined, however, that security at that time was interpreted as legal security 
which was to guarantee protection against the abuse of power and individual 
freedom� An outstanding Polish researcher, Brunon Hołyst, frames the matter 
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unequivocally, when he states that security is a basic human right, but at the same 
time adds that it can be fulfilled only as long as there is social and political un-
derstanding of the ethical and moral responsibility of both the state and society�9
Currently, in many European states constitutional or legal rules refer to secu-
rity as an obligation of state authorities and, at the same time, as individual or 
people’s rights� We must note, however, that this is not rendered expressis verbis 
in all basic laws� Often the right to individual security must be derived from a 
wider interpretation of constitutional provisions�
In the Polish 1997 Constitution, we find the concept of security in several ar-
ticles� Article 5, for instance, speaks of the security of the citizens, which is seen 
as one of the state’s basic tasks; and in Articles 26 and 126 – of the security of the 
state – as the general social weal, for the protection of which limits on the rights 
and liberties of individuals are allowed�
But as Dariusz Dudek rightly notes, “the security of a state has only prima facie 
higher value over the value of a human being’s individual existence; this does 
not imply, that in each and every case and in all conditions it deserves absolute 
protection as a matter of utmost importance� On the contrary, the matter should 
be weighed carefully and responsibly�”10 Article 135, in turn, refers to the National 
Security Council, an advisory body to the President, competent in matters re-
garding the state’s internal and external security� It is worth noting also, that the 
provisions of the Polish Constitution mention ecological security� In line with 
Article 74 Polish public authorities are required to pursue policies which ensure 
ecological security� As an aside, let us note, that the constitutionalization of secu-
rity in Poland has a long tradition: the Government Act of 3 May 1791, Chapter 2, 
reads as follows: “Above all, we desire to preserve and do preserve sacred and 
intact the rights to personal security, to personal liberty, and to property, landed 
and movable, even as they have been the tide of all from time immemorial…”
The Constitution in force in Spain, in line with Articles 9(3) and 17(1) guarantees 
the right to security as well as legal security to its citizens� It is also worth pointing 
out that the preamble of the Spanish Constitution sees security as the basic prem-
ise, value and objective guiding the Spanish sovereign in establishing the political 
system� In the constitutions of Austria, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands, security is ad-
dressed as a task and duty of public authorities� The Dutch Constitution of 28 March 
9 B� Hołyst, Bezpieczeństwo. Ogólne problemy badawcze, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 
2014, p� 12�
10 D� Dudek, Bezpieczeństwo Rzeczypospolitej jako wartość konstytucyjna, in: Bezpieczeństwo 
Polski. Historia i współczesność L� Antonowicz, T� Guz, M� R� Pałubska (eds�), Wydaw-
nictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, p� 183�
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1814, Article 20(1) states that the security of the existence of its population is in the 
care of the authorities� In the Federal Constitutional Law of the Republic of Austria 
of 1 January 1930, one can read that the laws and implementation in terms of secu-
rity and public order lie in the competences of the Federation� The Constitution of 
the Republic of Bulgaria of 12 July 1991 states that the security of the individual is 
the supreme political principle (Preamble), and national security is the goal of its 
foreign policy� Security as a right was encapsulated in the Constitution of Finland 
on 11 June 1999� Article 19 says that the citizens have the right to social security, 
and Article 7, that everybody has a right to life, personal freedom, inviolability and 
security� The Portuguese Constitution, likewise, formulates the right to freedom and 
security in Article 27(1)� Similarly, in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus of 
16 August 1960 (Art� 11(1)), in the Constitution of Romania of 21 November 1991 
(Art� 23(1)), and in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia of 23 December 
1991 (Art� 34)� In the Constitution of Malta of 21 September 1964 (Art� 32(a)), it 
is specified that everybody has a right to freedom and personal security� The well-
known German constitutionalist, Josef Isensee is of the opinion that the German 
basic law of 1949 frames security as a basic right – Grundrecht auf Sicherheit�11 This 
is not an interpretation that is shared across the board as it is not stated explicitly 
in the Basic Law� Let us mention, however, that in the original version of the Basic 
Law presented by the Parliamentary Council, in Article 3, the term “security” was 
used in connection with a discussion on safeguarding basic rights�
4.  Counter-Terrorism Policies: The Clash Between Freedom 
and Security 
Rights and freedoms are constructed in such a fashion so as to protect citizens from 
the interference of state organs� Nonetheless, counter-terrorism measures undertak-
en by the state, especially the indirect ones, consist in laying a legal groundwork for 
enabling this very interference� Accordingly, freedom in the negative sense (freedom 
from something), the protection from state intervention into individuals’ private 
sphere, as well as freedom in the positive sense (freedom to), understood as the pos-
sibility to act freely (often called participatory freedom) are both undermined� In 
the face of a terrorist threat, the state is obliged to act effectively not only indirectly 
but also directly� Thus, a specific dependence occurs between freedom and security� 
Under the rule of law, this connection between rights and liberties on the one hand, 
11 J� Isensee, Das Grundrecht auf Sicherheit. Zu den Schutzpflichten des freiheitlichen Ver-
fassungsstaaten, De Gruyter Verlag, Berlin 1983�
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and security on the other, makes the undertaking of measures with a view to pre-
venting and fighting terrorism by state organs and institutions extremely complex�
The nature of the measures undertaken by governments boils down to the 
change of regulations defining the competencies of the secret service and police 
with regard to collecting and storing personal information� This calls for amend-
ing the law in accordance with the constitution� However, we must remember that 
in a democracy this is a particularly sensitive issue, as it places a state’s internal 
security and the question of freedom on the top of the political agenda�
For the most part, the support and acceptance of the public for anti-terrorism 
measures depends on the time and degree of the terrorist threat� Fear and a sense 
of peril immediately after a terrorist attack generate social support for more in-
tense anti-terrorism measures and procedures� As more time elapses after the 
attack, the public is more reluctant to support these moves� Those voters who 
are unequivocally convinced about the primacy of freedom over security will 
continue to believe that the measures and procedures of control and surveillance 
over society carry important risks� They tend to be in favor of maintaining rights 
and liberties and against subjecting them to limitations�
The public is ready to support regulations defining special measures with re-
gard to the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attack, but to a 
lesser degree approves of such regulations which directly deal with people: for 
instance, baggage checks, wiretapping or being profiled in the public realm� The 
measures and procedures employed in countering and fighting terrorism are noth-
ing but the scanning of the public by means of various criteria� The knowledge and 
information thus acquired is vast and dangerous� On the one hand, it enables the 
police and secret service to interfere in politics� On the other hand, the world of 
politics is tempted and often yields to the desire of acquiring and taking advantage 
of the stockpile of information in their struggle for power or in their attempt at 
maintaining their grip on it�
Still, another element must be taken into account: namely, the fact that ter-
rorism and the fight against terrorism are two mutually exclusive categories� 
Etymologically, the term terrorism is derived from the Greek, treo – to tremble, 
to be afraid, or the Latin terror and terreo – fear, trepidation and instilling fear� 
Contemporary media amplify concerns about the terrorist threat causing even 
greater fear and shock� Terrorism defines the threatened majority and profiles 
the individual or minority as a threat� If anti-terrorism measures and procedures 
undertaken are constructed on the principle of exclusion following the criteria of 
ethnic, religious, racial or cultural profiling, this may lead to the discrimination 
of certain communities, and in consequence to the radicalization thereof� Even 
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though state organs need authorization for taking up effective counter-terrorism 
measures, the definition of these measures and their application requires the ut-
most equanimity as this effectiveness may breed new unwanted risks�
Governments apply a broad and general concept of terrorism, as the term is 
not precisely defined� In these circumstances counter-terrorism measures at the 
disposal of governments can have a wide range of usages� For instance, they can be 
employed to prosecute political adversaries or they criminalize activities designed 
to implement the right to self-determination� An example of the instrumental use 
of these measures was the conduct of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar’s govern-
ment in Spain when following the 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid, right before the 
general election, it attempted to put the blame on ETA, despite the fact that the 
intelligence service had information pointing to members of the Al Qaeda as 
the perpetrators of the act�
All these elements together affect the proper relationship between freedom 
and security� For the most part, it is because changes to terrorism laws have yet 
to catch the public’s attention� Although the amendments introduced to existing 
laws are of a temporary nature the expiry date is being put off by governments, 
without being debated publicly� When these legal changes finally spark off a public 
debate, it turns out that understanding complex legal issues, which refer to intri-
cate technical matters, is very difficult for somebody not well versed in these mat-
ters� Besides, there is not enough transparency surrounding the changes to laws 
with regard to countering terrorism� More often than not, the debate resembles 
a discourse between the government coalition and opposition, or a professional 
discourse between academics and experts� The quality of the discourse among 
professionals, including representatives of science, administration or the secret 
services is often not of the highest quality� As for the political debate, it frequently 
provokes violent conflicts between the participants but they concern general is-
sues rather than the complex legal details, which are necessary for the police and 
other special forces to undertake anti-terrorism actions�
In the legal proposals put forward by governments in the area of fighting ter-
rorism diverse solutions can be found� They usually come in the form of complex 
packages of amendments concerning several laws, which should be analyzed to-
gether� In Germany the updating of the law in this regard included seventeen acts, 
several regulations, together encompassing more than a hundred provisions�12 
In Poland, likewise, a dozen or so acts were amended� Polish politicians have for 
12 B-S� Kreitz, Innere Sicherheit – Das ideale Wahlkampfthema?, Universitätsdrucke 
Göttingen, Göttingen 2012, p� 70�
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many years been announcing plans for the enactment of an anti-terrorism law and 
another one concerning the control over police operations, but so far no specific 
bills have been put forward�
Judging by the practice in many countries so far, amending terrorism law 
legislation usually goes too far and touches on issues concerning the political 
system� This was the case with the first and second anti-terrorism packages in 
Germany, where critics concluded that, the changes amounted to a rejection of the 
rule of law and were moving the country in the direction of a preventative state 
(Präventionsstaat)�13 In Poland, a similar amendment drew a critical judgment 
from the Constitutional Tribunal, while the most recent attempt at adjusting the 
same law attracted a wave of criticism from the opposition�
It transpires that only rule-of-law democracies with their constitutional courts 
are in a position to assess whether the means and procedures suggested by govern-
ments and approved by parliaments fall within the constitutional norms which 
regulate human rights and liberties� Both the German and Polish constitutional 
courts deemed many regulations to be at odds with these norms and recom-
mended appropriate amendments to some of them� In the same way, the European 
Court of Human Rights found that the Terrorism Act 2000 in the UK allowed 
for measures that were incompatible with human rights and infringed on the 
right to privacy�14 Generally speaking, however, international institutions find it 
difficult to adjudicate in these matters on account of the already mentioned lack 
of a precise definition of terrorism� In the same way, the potential for reacting to 
acts of terrorism on the part of international institutions is much curtailed, as is 
their ability to pass judgments on counter-terrorism measures that states employ�
Thus, as can be seen, counter-terrorism measures undertaken by governments 
touch on the specific relationship between freedom and security, which in a way 
resembles a self-regulating system� A correlation between freedom and security 
would amount to the following: offering more entitlements to one side is accom-
panied by more or less entitlements on the other side�
5. Conclusion
To conclude, one may accept that freedom and security in the context of combat-
ing terrorism do not necessarily have to conflict with each other� Freedom and 
13 S� Huster, R� Karsten (eds�), Vom Rechtsstaat zum Praventionsstaat, Suhrkamp Verlag, 
Frankfurt am Main 2008�
14 Gillan and Quinton v� United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights, ap-
plication no 4158/05, 12 January 2010�
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security in a democracy are among its most treasured values and important tasks, 
and as such they should mutually complement each other�
In order to maintain an appropriate relationship between rights and freedom 
versus security in the context of fighting terrorism the appropriate conditions 
should be put in place� Firstly, the quest for adopting a definition of terrorism in 
international law should be encouraged� Secondly, drafts of internal law amend-
ments addressing the fight against terrorism should be more transparent� Thirdly, 
constitutional courts in rule of law democracies should adjudicate whether these 
amendments comply with the constitution� Fourthly, civil supervision over an-
ti-terrorist measures employed by the police and intelligence service should be 
ensured� The best guarantee of preserving the correlation between freedom and 
security is the operation of accountability in political systems�15
All things considered, however, it must be underlined that these measures are 
only designed to counteract and fight terrorism but do not in any way stamp out 
the causes of terrorist acts� The eradication of terrorism is a much broader and 
complex matter� It would require instituting global policies and the cooperation 
between states to remove the material and subjective conditions contributing to 
the emergence of terrorist activity� John Gray rightly notes that in this respect a 
coalition of like-minded states must necessarily include Islamic states�16 We must 
prevent the further drifting apart of the Islamic and Western worlds, as well as 
the continuing radicalization of the relationship between the two on the political, 
economic and cultural arena� Only a broad-based alliance between the two worlds 
can provide the underpinnings of a new international order, whereby different 
cultures and political systems would coexist free from terrorist threat�
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Fanny Castro-Rial Garrone
An Updated Approach to the  
Study of Terrorism
1.  Introduction: The Progressive Reality of the  
Jihadist Terrorist Threat
An updated approach to the study of jihadist terrorist action requires an extensive 
terminological specification, which compels us to frame jihadist action within the 
phenomenon of terrorism,1 while singling it out due to its specific connotations� 
Thus, it can be differentiated either in terms of its ideological approach or by 
determining its action strategies, since one of its most defining characteristics is 
metamorphosis, understood as the capacity of different forms, in which the threat 
can act, to evolve and transform, as observed in the emergence of new figures, 
such as lone wolfs, foreign fighters, and returnees�
We must therefore abandon the commonly used terms “Islamic terrorism” or “ji-
hadist terrorism”,2 since we should avoid the mistake of stigmatizing a religious belief 
such as the true Islam, which does not necessarily entail any violent connotation�3
It is our belief that the repeated use of those terms can contribute to the argu-
mentation of jihadist terrorists, thereby turning the situation in their favor and 
creating a counterproductive side effect of reinforcing these groups’ false premise 
of Western hostility toward Islam, which would support the intent of presenting 
themselves as victims of the Western world intolerant to their beliefs� On the 
contrary, the very essence of democratic values in a multicultural society supports 
and defends freedom of speech, a freedom which is used perversely with criminal 
intent, to safeguard their proselytism, which is incidentally free of true religious 
purpose, promoting a lawless indoctrination leading to terrorist acts, perpetrated 
under the shelter of the existing liberties of a democratic society in an attempt 
against the safety of its citizens�4
1 L� de la Corte Ibañez, H� Hristowa Gergova, El terrorismo como objeto de estudio: 
algunas notas introductoria, “Studia” no� 14, 2011, pp� 29–43� 
2 J� Jordán, P� del Pozo (eds�) Terrorismo sin fronteras. Actores escenarios y respuestas en 
un mundo global, Aranzadi, Pamplona 2010� 
3 J� R� Thackray, Dictionary of Terrorism, Routledge, London 2004� 
4 P� Wilkinson, Terrorism versus democracy. The liberal State response, Frank Cass, London 
2005�
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“Terrorists are attacking our way of life, in an attempt to spread fear and sow 
divisions in our societies� There are no quick and easy ways to resolve these issues� 
As the holder of the EU Council Presidency, it is incumbent on the Netherlands to 
help the EU find common solutions in these turbulent times� Unity and resolve are 
needed at all levels� The effective combination of European and national measures 
will form an important basis for those solutions�”5
There is a need to act within the framework of a free society committed to de-
mocracy, but in the way which avoids easy judgments or a convenient do-gooder 
attitude�
The origins of the Daesh movement can be traced back to the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq� What is of special importance, however, is that it has ef-
fectively transformed the reality of the Middle East and international politics in 
the summer of 2004 through the abandonment of traditional war techniques, 
the return to guerrilla war, and the proliferation of terrorist attacks, as well as 
by extending its territorial scope of action� This extended scope was evidenced 
by the terrible terrorist attacks in Paris, which have shaken Western democratic 
conscience, or by the fatal attack against the Spanish embassy in Kabul, causing 
the death of two Spanish policemen and an Afghan security agent, as well as by 
the more recent terrorist attacks perpetrated in Istanbul, Malaysia, Burkina Fasso, 
and Brussels�
These acts are not just contrary to democratic principles; they also articulate 
terrorist politics and actions� The appearance of the international jihadist move-
ment initially shared its goals with the terrorist movement of Al Qaeda� However, 
it has to be taken into account that there is no single doctrine of hierarchical 
unity in these terrorist groups, since the emergence of ideological conflicts be-
tween their members can be noticed, dividing them with regard to both their 
objectives and doctrines� The term “jihadist terrorism” can be no longer applied 
to extremist orthodoxies, since this usage may lead to an erroneous perception 
which depolitizes the conflict�
Currently, jihadist terrorism has equipped itself with an ideology which per-
fectly encapsulates the concept of “totalitarian ideology�” It is clearly antidemo-
cratic, because it systematically encourages attempts against the lives of those 
5 J� Jordán, El terrorismo yijhadista en España: evolución después del 11M, 2009, available 
at http://www�realinstitutoelcano�org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOB-
AL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/programas/terrorismo+global/publicaciones/
publ-amenaza+espana/dt7-2009, accessed 9 November 2015�
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opposing it�6 The goal of the terrorists is broadly political, as they seek to destabi-
lize the societies in which they act� The political action of jihadist terrorism aims 
to subvert the established rule of law in order to implement Islamic law� It thereby 
becomes the foremost exponent of terrorist action focused on a “far enemy�”7 Their 
religion is not as important as their submission to the above mentioned ideology� 
We should therefore underline how, in the execution of their terrorist policies, the 
highest number of victims are fellow Muslims� It is a mistake to ground jihadist 
terrorism exclusively in a fanatical interpretation of Islam�8
This has been evidenced by a recent operation by the EU judicial coopera-
tion, which in November 2015 enabled 15 simultaneous arrests in Italy, Norway, 
the United Kingdom and Finland, dismantling a terrorist cell composed mainly 
of Kurds� Once their intentions were clarified, one could see that they not only 
strived to carry out terrorist acts, kidnapping diplomats on the Norwegian soil, 
but also aimed to overthrow the Iraqi Kurdistan government and substitute it for 
a caliphate ruled by the Islamic law, also known as sharia�
It is necessary to approach this phenomenon, taking into account its aim of 
re-Islamizing society through the creation of real political structures (as it was 
made clear in their statements after proclaiming the Caliphate, the Islamic State, 
the claim on Al Andalus, particularly relevant to Spain due to the existence of the 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla)�9
It also seems advisable to separate the phenomenon of radical individual 
perception,10 due to the proliferation of movements nurturing radicalization, as 
a result of the social crisis, which acts as a breeding ground, without a doubt 
6 I� Bremmer, How terror could kill the European project, “Time” vol� 186 no� 22–237, 
2015, p� 11�
7 R� Bjarnason, A Report from the democracy incubator hackathon, World Forum for 
Democracy 2015, 21�12�2015, available at https://www�opendemocracy�net/wfd/rob-
ert-bjarnason/world-forum-for democracy-2015-report-from-democracy-incubator-
hackathon, accessed 12 January 2016�
8 K� Malik, Europe’s Dangerous Multiculturalism. Why the Continent Fails Minority Groups, 
2015, available at https://www�foreignaffairs�com/articles/western-europe/2015-12-08/
europes-dangerous, accessed 18 December 2015�
9 B� M� Juergensmeyer, Terrorismo religioso. El auge global de la violencia religiosa, Siglo 
XXI, Madrid 2001�
10 M� Crenshaw, The psychology of political terrorism, in: Policital Psychology. Key readings 
J� T� Jost, J� Sidanius (eds�), Pshicology Press, New York, 2004�
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enabling the strengthening of violent stances�11 Radicalization is not a sufficient 
motivation for terrorist acts, although it can elicit terrorist actions�12
Simultaneously, the emergence of a so-called “new terrorism,” exercised by 
those who are ready to assume a fanatical interpretation of Islam, coexists with 
other radical religious orthodoxies� It is indeed true that jihadist terrorist action 
thrives in the shadow of an idealization of the Caliphate in opposition to the loss 
of values in Western society, which, in turn, assists the recruitment of young 
European citizens and, particularly, the adherence of women; for, as the research 
of García Calvo shows, they are targeted by propaganda13 (her study provides 
evidence of how 75% of all individuals arrested on charges of jihadist terrorism 
in Spain are female)�
The study of recent acts of jihadist terrorism allows us to simultaneously verify 
that we are facing a phenomenon which is not static, but undergoes constant 
evolution� That is why it is reasonable to consider any research as “unfinished�”
Our aim, then, is to articulate the notion of protecting the security of our so-
ciety against the proven vulnerability of the State, considering this phenomenon 
from an all-encompassing perspective, which cannot ignore social movements, 
and stressing the phenomenon of radicalization and new actions of foreign fight-
ers, since this phenomenon “concerns violent radicalization and follows recent 
terrorist attacks by foreign fighters in Europe” and “appropriate and concrete 
responses to the phenomenon of radicalization and the solutions to deal with this 
common challenge” are searched� It was expressed in these terms in the Conclu-
sions of the Council approved on 16 June 2015, which pay particular attention to 
the radicalization in prisons and a preventive approach to antiterrorist action�14
The current approach adopted by the Commission, which prioritizes “com-
batting radicalization, marginalization of youth,” has been combined with the 
European Fundamental Rights Agency to promote respect, non-discrimination, 
fundamental rights, freedoms and solidarity� The Commission is currently 
11 B� M� Juergensmeyer, Terrorismo religioso. El auge global de la violencia religiosa, Siglo 
XXI, Madrid 2001�
12 F� Foley, Políticas antiterroristas en Europa, available at http://fundacion�unirioja�es/
formacion_cursos/view/312/sub:2354, accessed 7 December 2015� 
13 F� Reinares, C� García Calvo, Terrorist network and organisations aspects of the current 
jihadist mobilisation in Spain, available at www�realinstitutoelcano�org/wps/portal/
Web/rielcanoes/contenido?WCMGlobal-context, accessed 9 January 2016�
14 Council of the European Union, Response to foreign terrorist fighters and recent ter-
rorist attacks in Europe available at http://www�consilium�europa�eu/en/meetings/
jha/2015/06/15-16/, 2015, accessed 21 January 2016�
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implementing all-encompassing initiatives (education, culture, sports, employ-
ment, welfare, security) and a new policy on how to use education to prevent 
radicalization�15
While Al Qaeda’s attacks against American interests started in the twentieth 
century against the diplomatic sites in Kabul and Tanzania, or against the US 
Destroyer Cole in Yemen, those attacks have been repeated in the current century 
in New York, London and many other cities� The terrible actions of Daesh and 
the Paris terrorist attacks represented a turning point in the awareness, inspiring 
a holistic approach to the issue�16
The evolutionary reality of the jihadist terrorist threat is embodied in the in-
crease of their indoctrination policies� The responsive action of our security forces 
can be seen in the Spanish case� These terrorists are Muslims, and many among 
them are converts� We can point to the recent investigations conducted by Spanish 
Police in the Spanish city of Ceuta (December 2015) and the Spanish enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla,17 but it was in Barcelona where the arrests took place�
This recent reality of the “foreign fighters”, whose actions as returnees constitute 
a serious security risk in Western countries, has also contributed to increase the 
perception of it as one of the most serious threats to global society�18
According to General Joseph L� Votel, at the “Counterterrorism: Unconven-
tional Approaches to an Unconventional Threat” conference19, the lesson to be 
learned from 9/11 was the lack of imagination to envision that a group of terror-
ists could learn to operate large commercial passenger airliners and then fly them 
into tall buildings where thousands worked� In his view, it was also this lack of 
imagination, that has led us to collectively dismiss intelligence reports pointing 
in that direction�
15 M� Sageman, Understanding terrorism networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 2004�
16 United Nations Strategies UN 2006 Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2015, available 
at http://www�Un�org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism�shtml, accessed 9 Novem-
ber 2015�
17 J� Jordan, Evolución organizativa de la militancia jihadista en España, 2014, available at 
http://www�realinstitutoelcano�org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari12-2014-jordan-evolucion-
organizativa-militancia-yihadista-espana, accesed 9 November 2015�
18 European Council, Conclusions of European Council meeting 15 October 2015, available at 
http://www�consilium�europa�eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/16-euco-conclusions/, 
accessed 20 January 2016�
19 F� Reinares, C� García Calvo, Terrorist network …op�cit�
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2. The Surge of Home-Grown Terrorism in Spain
While we are fully aware that the Spanish case is still far from the situation in 
other European nations, it is reasonable to assume that our country lacks the 
jihadist mobilization issues, which are at work in countries such as Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, and Denmark� It is worthy to discuss the opinion 
of experts Fernando Reinares and Carola García Calvo, researchers at the Elcano 
Royal Institute, a think tank for international and strategic studies, who have 
had the opportunity to present the paper Terrorists, network and organisations: 
aspects of the current jihadist mobilisation in Spain at the III Forum organized by 
the Royal Institute on Terrorism and which has acquired particular significance 
after being exposed to unfortunate coincidence due to its proximity to the Paris 
terrorist attacks�20
The authors defend the existence of a home-grown and endogenous jihadism 
in Spain� This vision is founded on ascertaining that 45% of arrested individuals 
in Spain for Islamic radicalization motives are Spanish nationals, and 40% were 
born in Spain�
The study is of indubitable value, as it allows us to delve deeper into the profile 
of the radicals established in our country� We now have the opportunity to verify 
their course of action, which does not correspond to the usual profile of the lone 
wolf, since it includes collaborating with other, newly or previously established 
groups� Their ties to the organization and jihadist terrorist networks are also 
clarified: they are related mostly to the Islamic State, followed by the Al Nusra 
Front (27�6%), MUYAO (12�2%), Harakat Sham al Islam (11�2%) or AQMI (7�1%)�
Once this has been ascertained, the orientation of the functions assumed 
by these terrorists is clarified as mainly focused on tasks of proselytism 65�3%, 
fundraising 60%, carrying out technically operative actions 42�1%, and train-
ing 29�5 %�
Based on the work of Fernando Reinares and Carola García Calvo, we can 
sketch the basic features of the Spanish jihadist: a man of around 28 years of age, 
born in one of the two big cities where jihadists are usually natives: Ceuta and 
Melilla (almost 76%)� Their actions are reported mostly in Catalonia, since it is 
there where the profile is located and where most of the arrests take place� In 
20 Real Instituto Elcano, III Foro Elcano sobre Terrorismo Global, 2015, available at http://
www�realinstitutoelcano�org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/actividad?WCM_GLOBAL_
CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/calendario/actividades/iii-foro-elcano-terrorismo-
global, accessed 10 January 2016�
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terms of nationality, the researches concluded that the number of jihadists born 
in Spain is 7�3% lower than that of the residents in Spain (47%)� 
This research allows us to pinpoint their provenance from the region of Tan-
giers-Tetuán-Alhucemas (every four in ten arrested individuals came from there), 
as well as the primary provenance of 75�8% of all arrested individuals, who were 
born in Ceuta and Melilla, followed by Morocco (37�4%), Tunisia (5�2%), Algiers 
(3�5%) and France (2�5%)�
The ten arrests carried out between 2011 and 2015 have taken place in Tangiers, 
Tetuán, Alhucemas (four in ten arrests), and within the peninsula, 5% in Barce-
lona and 2�4% in the following A Coruña, Almonte Cádiz, Ciudad Real, Granada, 
Sant Boi de Llobregat, Sant Feliú de Guixols, and Tarragona�
It is necessary to focalize policies in these areas, implementing “strategies in the 
environment where they grow, with a significant work in the Internet and social 
media, are important ways of radicalization�”
3.  Awareness within EU Institutions and  
International Response
The fact that six of the most significant terrorist attacks of 2015 were perpetrated 
on the European soil evidences the challenge faced by the security forces of the 
Member States, as well as the loss of individual response capacity to confront 
them� The evolution and current increase of the threat has raised awareness within 
the EU’s institutions� The EEAS, EU Agencies and Interpol finalized last May a 
first set of common risks indicators�
Such is the conclusion to be extracted from the statement: “les attentats ter-
roristes perpétrés… n’ont fait que renforcer notre détermination à poursuivre 
notre lutte sans concession contre le terrorisme�”21 This is also apparent in the 
European Council Declaration of 12/2/2015, as well as in the Conclusion of the 
Council from 20/11/15, and in the periodical undertaking by the European Coun-
cil of the defense of its values and the efficacy of convened action� For their part, 
Juncker’s Commission has set European security as one of its priorities, including 
an “upgrading” process in the security program for 2015� In terms of priorities 
for immediate action, these are:22
21 European Commission, Commission Work Programme 2016, available at http://
ec�europa�eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2016_annex_i_en�pdf, accessed 20 January 2016�
22 Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on the Renewed European 
Union Internal Security Strategy 2015–2020, 2015, available at http://www�consilium�
europa�eu/en/meetings/jha/2015/06/15-16/, accessed 21 January 2016�
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1� Tackling terrorism and preventing radicalization� 
2� Disrupting organized crimes� 
3� Fighting cybercrime� 
The European Council stressed on February 12th, 2015 the urgency of adopting 
measures reinforcing the cooperation between national security services across 
the EU� Although the primary responsibility has to be assumed by the States, they 
are urged to improve the information exchange in order to deepen the combined 
operational analysis of the terrorist threat� “The present proposal is without preju-
dice to responsibilities incumbent on the Member State with regard the mainte-
nance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security in accordance 
with Article 72 TFEU�”23
The ultimate objective in facing these new challenges is indubitably the defense 
of “universal values,” preserving a plural society, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality, taking into account the threat of free circulation 
within the European territory, fostering the movement of terrorists using it as 
a mere transit to reach the conflict areas in Iraq, Syria, etc�24 The new approach 
assumes the insufficiency of the European action deployed and the current defi-
ciencies as well as the need for a “full use” of the instruments already in place that 
are underused at the moment� There are means which should be better employed, 
in particular the Europol Counter Terrorism CT, Eurojust, PrUm, SIS II, Eurodac 
and Interpol� It would be also advisable to develop a better interaction by the EU 
Coordinator for the fight against terrorism with the Commission and the High 
Representative, considering the fact that they are also required to inform the Eu-
ropean Council, which has repeatedly urged the Member States to improve the 
quantity and quality of information they share on terrorist suspects�25
At any rate, all measures to enhance security must implement the obligation 
of respect of fundamental rights� Any measure should be in accordance with 
principles of necessity, proportionality and legality, with appropriate safeguards 
to ensure accountability and judicial redress (Article 6)�26
23 European Parliament, Preventing radicalisation in the EU, 2015, available at 
http://www�europarl�europa�eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/571342/EPRS_
ATA%282015%29571342_EN�pdf, accessed 15 December 2015�
24 European Commission, COM (2016) 230 final, Brussels, 20�4�2016�
25 Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2015, available at https://www� 
europol�europa�eu/content/european-union-terrorism-situation-and, accessed 14 Janu-
ary 2016�
26 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council of the European Union 
and of the Member States meeting within the Council on enhancing the criminal justice 
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The EU is a rule of Law Community� Any limitation is subject to the conditions 
described in Article 2 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, namely to the 
principle of proportionality that will be respected in limiting the scope of the of-
fenses to what is necessary to allow for the effective prosecution of acts that pose 
a particular threat to security�
Among current priorities is a better use of information, whether through the 
exchange of information between national authorities responsible for the fight 
against terror, which in the Schengen cases would give way to a second generation 
of data related to foreign fighters, or through a systematization of the information 
exchange regarding terrorists also linked to organized crime, including citizens 
of third countries in “ECRIS”�
A better interaction between Eurojust and Europol should be promoted� The 
implementation of the SIENA system (Information Exchange Network Applica-
tion) and the “Europol System” were particularly helpful, as well as the so far un-
finished “EIS” for Counter-terrorism� Strengthening the exchange of information 
within Eurojust by virtue of the Council Decision 2005/671/JHA) and Article 13 
of the Eurojust Decision is of particular importance�
As such, “Member States will ensure that national authorities enter systemati-
cally data on suspected foreign terrorist fighters into the SIS II, in particular under 
Article 36� 3, carry our awareness raising and training on the use of the SIS and 
define a common approach to the use of the SIS II data relating foreign fighters�”27
The operationalization of this common risk as the “New Border Package” con-
veys Frontex’s support of awareness-raising training in the Member States� The 
European Border Guard and the Smart Borders initiative planned to implement a 
more effective control over the EU’s borders by tracing the third-country nationals 
movements across the EU’s external borders�
Particularly relevant is also the interaction regarding cybercrime� Since last 
March, the European Centre of Excellence, the EU Internet Referral Unit (EU 
IRU), has actively searched the Internet for terrorist materials, helping to reduce 
the rising volume of terrorist materials available and supporting competent au-
thorities� Europol urged to coordinate and share the identification task (flagging) 
response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism, 2015, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/20-conclusions-radi-
calisation/, accessed 18 December 2015�
27 Council of the European Union, Draft Conclusions of the Council of the EU and of the 
Member States meeting within the Council on Counter-Terrorism, 2015, available at http://
www�statewatch�org/news/2015/nov/eu-jha-20-nov-draft-conclusions-14298-15�pdf, ac-
cessed, 4 December 2015�
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of terrorist, violent or extremist online content with relevant partners� As its main 
objective, the EU centre (IRU) assesses the material and confirms whether it has 
breached the terms and conditions of the companies, in order to remove that 
material from websites and pass their URL’s to the host companies� This “Check 
the web initiative” allows Europol reports on the evolution of the threat, helping 
national authorities and taking into account the potential of the technological 
evidence due to its new characterization compared to the classic one, its endur-
ance over time, the machinability, volatility, and mass� Thus, the “e-evidence” of 
terrorist networks, in light of the Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, forces the State 
Parties to exchange information in investigations, prosecutions and convictions� 
They already use a reserved but transcendent report which makes it possible to 
approach to the case-law of State Parties in order to improve the good practices, 
as well as to develop a deeper insight into the phenomenon� The Paris attacks 
evidenced the need to improve the efforts at external borders, both perfecting the 
FTF register included in the SIS II and checking the SIS II and Interpol databases�
For this reason, the work at Eurojust tends to develop the legal frame of re-
cruiters and facilitators, and must be coordinated with the control of foreign 
fighters through the “Europol Focal Point Travelers”, enforcing the November 
2015 conclusions, which demand: “Member States will make the maximum use 
of these capabilities to improve the overall level of information Exchange between 
CT authorities in the EU� Member States will ensure that the relevant national 
authorities significantly increase their contributions to Focal Point Traveler at 
Europol reflect the threat and connect to relevant Europol information exchange 
systems�”28
Regarding the action deployed by Europol and on its behalf, the Centre for 
the fight against terrorism has to support the action of Frontex through the co-
operation between its main partners� Eurojust indeed possesses two valuable 
instruments: on the one hand, “Liason Prosecutor,” and, on the other hand, the 
agreements with 37 non-Party States (MENA), reinforcing cooperation with those 
in North Africa, Near East, Western Balkans, and Turkey�
The idea of granting more efficacy to the European action – and consequently, 
the preventive nature of the EU’s activities – demands as an essential tool the 
interconnection of the Europol countries, which, together with the Secure In-
formation Exchange Network Application (SIENA), should devise and operate 
within a specific anti-terrorist area, enabling bi- and multilateral communication 
through cooperation agreements, including national authorities from third party 
28 Council of the European Union, Draft Conclusions of the Council…op�cit�
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countries outside Europol� Since not all State Parties have used EIS, there is still 
a long way to go on the path toward a more effective control of foreign fighters�
4. Toward a New Framework Directive on Terrorism
The 2016 action program by the Commission includes reviewing the Framework 
Directive on terrorism from a teleological perspective�
The legal frame currently in effect is being reviewed, as captured in the current 
proposal for a “Directive on Terrorism�” The regulation reform is ambitious, as it 
tries to replace the framework currently in effect, that is, the Framework Deci-
sion 2002/475/HA, whose contents are nowadays considered insufficient to create 
the intended response to the current European challenges, and do not reflect the 
global approach� For this reason, its contents need to be adapted both to the cur-
rent reality and to the already established international parameters�29
“The purpose of the reform is to replace the Directive in effect from a tele-
ological perspective which will criminalize travel for terrorist purposes, under-
taking terrorist training as well as support activities conducted by networks and 
recruiters, as well as a tighter control of firearm trafficking, which demands an 
increase of international cooperation, while improving preventive action against 
radicalization�”
The COSI on 16 September 2016 will be focused “on firearms, strengthen-
ing border controls, information, terrorist financing”, provided that within the 
current perspective on criminal justice, the dissuasive purpose prevails over the 
traditional punitive intent� The aim is to create a new “common response” with 
“specific” measures, conceived for the concerted European fight against terrorism�
As it was already foreseen for 2015, we cannot postpone the supervision of 
current legislation if we wish to improve and facilitate the exchange of “loyal” 
information, reinforcing the “traçabilité,” and harmonizing the “marquage” with 
common regulations in order to neutralize fire arms�
It is precisely because of the intensification and acceleration of terrorism, that 
the adoption of common and more adequate legislative measures seems of para-
mount importance, as it was graphically stressed in several statements (by the 
29 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council of the European Union 
and of the Member States meeting within the Council on enhancing the criminal justice 
response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism, 2015, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/20-conclusions-radi-
calisation/, accessed 18 December 2015�
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President and Vice-president of the Commission), which went as far as to an-
nounce the creation of a “preventive arsenal�”
It is therefore indisputable that there is a need within the legal frames both to 
harmonize the domestic laws of the Member States and to predict the adaptation 
of pre-established international parameters, since various “pre-existing” obliga-
tions can be deduced from them, such as the exchange of information between 
competent national authorities,� That is why the simplifying of the 2006 Frame 
Decision was foreseen and accompanied by the intelligence task in the execution 
of the law between the EU Member States�
This new perspective30 brings to the table a new classification within the Direc-
tive project to regulate new cases� The main aim is “to approximate the definition 
of terrorist offenses in all Member States by introducing a specific and common 
qualification of certain acts as terrorist offenses�” It considers the motivation of 
the offender, taking into account two elements: the objective element, as “it refers 
to a list of serious criminal conducts” whose definition is made by reference to 
national law, and the subjective element, “as these acts are deemed to be terrorist 
offenses when committed with a specific intent�”
States should criminalize the direction of, or participation in, the activities 
of terrorist groups, considered “by themselves” as independent criminal acts, 
which should be prosecuted as terrorist offenses (for example, the “attempt of 
recruitment and training, travel abroad with the purpose of participating in the 
activities of a terrorist group, and the financing of the various terrorist offenses”)� 
These acts are also defined in the text of the Directive proposal (articles 3 and 4, 
Titles II and III)� Such offenses do not require to be committed (article 15); the 
intent or knowledge of the perpetrator or potential perpetrator as to his conduct 
having a potential to lead to the commission of or the contribution to terrorist 
offenses are also included� The proposal is also focused on elements that should 
be proven in accordance with domestic law and, moreover, in accordance with 
the acquis on procedural rights and guarantees of the fundamental right to fair 
trial as enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights�
In this vein, and as a response to one of the main concerns, stands the global 
regulation against the so-called “foreign fighters”, traveling abroad for terrorism� 
The act of traveling is considered under some conditions, and with the intent and 
30 Council of the European Union, Enhancing counter terrorism capabilities at EU level: 
European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol and counter terrorism related 
information sharing, 2015, available at http://www�statewatch�org/news/2015/nov/eu-
council-europol-ECTC-14244-15�pdf, accessed 17 December 2015�
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purpose of participating in activities of a terrorist group, or to provide or receive 
training for terrorism� The provision uses the term “organization” in order to cover 
every conduct related to practical arrangements connected with the traveling and 
is completed by the term “facilitation” with the aim to cover any other conduct 
that does not fall within the term “organization,” such as assisting the traveler in 
reaching his destination�
A further innovation of the proposal is the provision against “the financing of 
traveling abroad for terrorism,” as stated by article 5 of the Additional Protocol 
and N�5 Recommendation of FATF� Financing terrorism is criminalized even 
when there is no specific link to a specific terrorist act� States are now bound in 
some of the terrorist related offenses because the proposal considers terrorist 
activity irrespectively of whether a terrorist offense has been committed� Under 
this provision, States must take measures to ensure that preparatory acts for these 
offenses are criminalized in domestic law�
In order to ensure the fight against the dissemination of messages through the 
Internet encouraging the commission of terrorist offenses or providing for ter-
rorist expertise, art� 3 (1) of Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA was introduced, 
also to implement Articles 5 and 6 of the Council of Europe Convention on the 
prevention of terrorism� New offenses have been included in order to implement 
the Additional Protocol of the above-mentioned Convention� The proposal covers 
not only the offenses of receiving training or terrorism and traveling abroad for 
terrorism but also the receiving of training enabling the recipient to carry out or 
contribute to the commission of terrorist offenses� Furthermore, in line with Ar-
ticle 3 of the Protocol, it holds that a reception of training could take place either 
in person or through electronic media, that the use of the Internet for training 
should be considered as an offense, and that the perpetrator must normally take 
an active part in the training� However, the forms applicable to criminalize such 
activities remain in the domestic law “self-study�”
Adapting regulations is a response to the carrying out of international engage-
ments, through the Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) regarding foreign ter-
rorist fighters and its Protocol� On a regional level, the regulatory efforts made by 
the Convention to prevent terrorism and recommendations of the action group 
concerning the financing of terrorism are prompted within the Council of Europe�31 
The adaptation rests on two nuclear ideas: a global approach and the consolidation 
31 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standars on combating money lau-
dering and the financing of terrorism & profileration, 2012, available at http://www�
fatfgafi�org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations�
pdf, accesse 24 November 2015�
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of the acquis� The approach now required is necessarily “global”, also in consonance 
with the new notion of security, as regards the existing loopholes and an effective 
response in the fight against them, taking advantage of the favorable climate of 
consensus regarding the heightened risk due to the crossing of borders� This nuclear 
idea is not foreign to the convenience of reaffirming, on a European level, the acquis 
in this matter, also guaranteeing its “accessibility”, which is materialized through 
simplification� At the same time, the said proposal aspires to consolidate the acquis 
developed during the last thirteen years of application�
For this reason, both the Council and the Parliament agree on the articulation 
of legislative measures, which, according to the European Justice Council in its 
meeting in Riga, could allow “a common understanding of terrorism offenses 
in light of UNSCR 2178(2014),” or, as the text adopted by the Parliament on 
February, 11th last stressed, “the need to harmonize criminalization of foreign-
fighter-related offenses and avoid prosecution gaps by updating the Framework 
Decision on Terrorism”, which demands “a more coherent, comprehensive and 
aligned national criminal law provisions… across the EU to be able to effectively 
prevent and prosecute foreign terrorist fighters-related offenses and to respond in 
an appropriate manner to the increased cross-border practical legal challenges�”32
Also in this spirit, the Commission, in its report justifying the Directive, 
deemed it a a a first step which should open the path for further developments, 
since it mirrors a more ample engagement, which “will pave the way for the con-
clusion of the Additional Protocol and the Convention”� Thus, it is also linked to 
the prevention of radicalization, which can develop into violent extremisms or 
even terrorist acts�
The Commission itself had already carried out very positive research in this 
area, stemming from the “Communication Preventing Radicalization to Terror-
ism and Violent Extremism, Strengthening the EU’s response�”33 The High Level 
Conference in October 2015, whose purposes were to explore options in European 
criminal systems for dealing with foreign fighters, returnees and other violent 
religious extremists with terrorist motives, and to exchange experiences on appro-
priate responses to the phenomenon of radicalization in a prison context, as well 
as the possibility of integrating rehabilitation into the criminal justice response to 
foreign fighters/returnees� The 13 Justice Ministers and deputy justice ministers/
32 R� Harry, W� Richardson, P� Gordon, J� E� Moore, The economics cost of and consequences 
of terrorism, University of Southern California, New York, 2007�
33 European Commission, Preventing Radicalisation to terrorism and Violent Extrem-
ism: Strengthening the EU’s Response, 2015, available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2013:0941:FIN, accessed 29 October 2015�
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state secretaries of the 17 EU Members State and the EU policy-makers agreed 
to join forces to find more concrete responses and solutions to deal with this 
common challenge: “preventing radicalization to violent extremism with special 
focus on prisons” is now considered essential, because the radicalized people in 
prisons have a considerable impact in terms of the risk of security� They suited 
the “Council of Europe Guidelines for prison and probation staff,”34 with the crea-
tion of an Excellence Centre linking “practitioners” and establishing a “network” 
which, according to the current Commission report, will facilitate the exchange 
of good practices and cement the “know how�”35
The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) acts as a think tank for EU 
countries, gives support to priority third countries, and influences policy-making� 
As the legislation and the prison and probation systems differ between EU Mem-
ber States, its recommendations provide an oversight of current lines of thinking 
amongst prison and probation practitioners, and give support to decision-making 
processes�
In her Opening Speech at the October High level Ministerial Conference, 
V� Jourova, the EU’s Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equal-
ity urged “to move on together identifying concrete actions… Key questions 
included how to reconcile prison and de-radicalization, how to reconcile pre-
vention with repression and rehabilitation, and how to best detect early signs 
of radicalization�”36 She also believed that the adaptation in question should be 
complemented by specific attention to the diversification of actors and the modi-
fication of their modus operandi�
Particular attention must be paid to the so-called “foreign terrorist fighters”� 
Even if we acknowledge that they are not a new phenomenon, their current per-
centage is quite noteworthy and “unprecedented”� Special attention is attached to 
actors traveling to the conflict areas, whether Syria or Iraq, either to take part in 
the combat or to receive training� A cohesion with the remaining EU policies is 
34 Council of the European Union, Enhancing counter terrorism capabilities at EU level: 
European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol and counter terrorism related 
information sharing, 2015, available at http://www�statewatch�org/news/2015/nov/eu-
council-europol-ECTC-14244-15�pdf, accessed 17 December 2015�
35 FRONTEX, Annual Risk Analysis 2014, 2015, available at http://frontex�europa�eu/as-
sets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014�pdf, accessed 3 November 
2015�
36 European Commission, High-Level Ministerial Conference Criminal justice response to 
radicalisation, 2015, available at http://ec�europa�eu/justice/events/response-radicali-
sation-2015/index_en�htm, accessed 17 November 2015�
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sought, since the relevance and interconnection both for European security poli-
cies and the internal security of the Union itself has been proven� According to 
Europol, since 2014 the information exchange has been favored, which should ad-
ditionally be increased, since, by the end of November 2015, 1595 foreign terrorist 
fighters have been registered in SIENA (Secure Information Exchange Network 
Application) by virtue of the information provided only by EU Member States, 
5 third parties, and Interpol�
The “complementarity” of the measure with those adopted is needed in order to 
freeze assets belonging to terrorists and said organizations by virtue of the Council 
Regulation of 2008 executing the Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR 1267 
y 1390), as well as in relation to the so-called autonomous measures by the EU, 
adopted with regard to Al Qaeda� It was also stressed how the Directive regard-
ing terrorist financing 2015/849/EU shows a preventive nature�37 Further on this 
line of reasoning, we can find the text of the specific Communication concerning 
Syria and Iraq returnees�38
The idea of focusing the current common effort on identifying the legal frame 
of this reality is clearly due to the proliferation of individuals acting in an isolated 
fashion� It now needs to reflect the reality of the so-called “home-grown terror-
ists,” that is, radicalized lone attackers and “frustrated” terrorist travelers� The 
phenomenon has increased considerably over the last years, and they should be 
considered as future terrorists – perhaps, not now, when they are “plots” but in 
the future, when they might take part in tragic terrorist attacks�
We must pay utmost and specific attention to the changes in their modus op-
erandi, which is increasingly worrying because of the shift from an essentially 
individualistic action to another, now arranged between groups or cells, whose 
actions can evolve in such a way that will magnify and transform the very scope 
of the attacks� This combination of means of action of several operative groups is 
more than predictable, even though it has not yet been generalized, because the 
attacks carried out in 2014 follow the formula of other attacks by “individual ter-
rorists�” The latest actions by France and Belgium have awoken the fear that such 
an orientation will be promoted in the near future, together with the circulation 
to other Member States� This risk must be carefully considered, as well as their 
very permanence in the European Union�
37 European Commission: Feasibility Study for an European Travel Information and 
Authorisation System (ETIAS) Final Report 16 November 2016�
38 European Commission, Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well 
as the Da’esh threat, 2015, available at http://ec�europa�eu/echo/files/news/20150206_
JOIN_en�pdf, accessed 19 November 2015�
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For this reason, the Directive Proposal’s contents need to be adapted to the 
current reality� At the same, they should be adapted to the already established 
international parameters� The UN Security Council’s view of terrorism in our day, 
as a threat to peace and security creates certain obligations for the States, which 
should adapt their behavior to the international agreements and standards, com-
bining the duty of mutual respect of Human Rights and the rule of law�
The isolation of detainees has been criticized due to concerns that it will not 
be circumscribed to cases characterized by an urgent need to avoid dire conse-
quences which can put in danger the life, freedom or physical integrity of a person, 
or by an urgent need for swift action by the court to avoid seriously compromising 
a criminal procedure� The national effort in the fight against terrorism should be 
also related, according to UN parameters, to the idea of efficacy with the adoption 
of instruments and measures facilitating investigations, with particular attention 
paid to the evolving nature of this phenomena� This may lead to a legal and posi-
tive obligation to guarantee, in their respective legal systems, a classification of 
different crimes linked to traveling to third party countries with different purposes 
related to terrorist activities� Article� 6 of the Resolution 2178 (2014) includes: “a) 
travel or attempted travel to a third country with the purpose of contributing to 
the commission of terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of training; b) the 
funding of such travel; c) the organization or facilitation of such travel�”
The question is therefore to ensure the prosecution of such acts and their cur-
rent modus operandi, avoiding the existing loopholes in criminal law (which we 
should remember are a by-product of already assumed international legal agree-
ments)�
The provision adequately addresses the purpose in Article 6 of the UN Resolu-
tion, since the 2015 Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Prevention of 
terrorism complements the classification of the Convention text itself, broadening 
the events alluded to in the universal resolution, as it includes: participation in an 
association or group or the purpose of terrorism (Article 2), receiving training 
for terrorism; traveling or attempting to travel for terrorism purposes (Article 4), 
providing or collecting funds for such travels (Article 5), and organizing and facili-
tating such travels (Article 6), although it also specifies the obligation to reinforce 
the occasional exchange of information between the State Parties (Article 7)�
Regarding the current European legislation, whose alteration we are currently 
discussing, we should first of all remember that the EU has ratified both texts from 
the Council of Europe’s Convention and Protocol, which also brings up the need to 
perfect the 2002 European regulation� The framework decision encompassed only 
certain terrorist acts, although it did pay particular attention to the participation 
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in terrorist groups, in whose regard it incorporated financing, recruitment and 
training as well as laws concerning “aiding and abetting, incitement and attempt 
of terrorist offenses�”
At the same time, these changes in legislation were expedited by virtue of 
the rising awareness of the true seriousness of our current situation, which also 
leads Member States to meet their individual obligations� The defense of rights 
and of the security of the citizens itself was necessary, according to the Directive 
2012/29/EU�39
The momentum was started by the terrorist attacks of 13th November in Paris, 
which “tragically illustrated that the risk can materialize, hence the need to scale 
up the EU-level response by adapting it to the threats�”40
However, as distinct from the UN’s text, the European text 2002/475/JHA 
which determines the need for “criminalization of terrorist financing to the extent 
that funding is provided to a terrorist group”, is not as explicit and rigorous, since 
the Convention Protocol of the European Council already describes all crimes 
linked to terrorism, be it recruitment or travel with terrorist purposes, and stands 
in contrast to the European text, which does not require trips to be typified as 
having a terrorist intent: it “does not explicitly require the criminalization of being 
trained for terrorist purposes�”
The obligation to control the said groups originates in the Convention regard-
ing Terrorist Financing, developed in the Recommendation on the criminalization 
of the terrorist financing Nº5 adopted in 2012 by The Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF)� The interpretative development of this text has allowed us to consider 
the financing from both sides, that is to say, both in terms of direct financing of 
the crime and in terms of indirect assistance in its perpetration� The clarification 
included traveling to the State of origin or residence with the purpose of “the 
planning or preparation of terrorist acts, as well as the providing or receiving of 
a terrorist training�”
39 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2012, 
Minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 25 March 2001 (OJ L 315, 
14�11�2012), 2012, available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?u
ri=CELEX:32012L0029&from=EN, accessed 27 November 2015�
40 European Commissions, Proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism combating terrorism, 
2003, available at http://ec�europa�eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we do/policies/europea-
nagendasecurity/legislativedocuments/docs/20151202_directive_on_combatting_ter-
rorism_en�pdf, accessed 3 December 2015�
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The ultimate objective is correct in that it attempts to maximize its power of 
deterrence through legislative measures, which would allow to fill in the currently 
detected loopholes, which demand control of financing, organization and ease of 
travel, including material and logistic support, as well as procuring fire guns and 
explosives, shelter, means of transportation, and other wares�
The complexity of proving their belonging to a terrorist organization in prac-
tice, particularly if the individual has not had direct or physical contact with the 
organization itself, is undeniable� In the previously mentioned Seminar held in 
Madrid, the work of the Guardia Civil in creating their “Forensic Intelligence 
Reports,” also called “Information Analysis reports,” was greatly valued�
It does seem reasonable to assume that the lack of both gun and explosives 
control have made committing those crimes easier, and therefore the need to 
avoid access to fire arms and explosives, as well as access to gun dealers, becomes 
apparent�
Such measures, in turn, would require for the European Union to adopt an ef-
fective and necessarily joint response, since nowadays it is a well-known phenom-
enon and we must not forget that we are beyond the point of reacting to a novel 
phenomenon� The transient nature of activists implies a high number of countries 
being affected and calls for an effective response from multilateral forums�
Battling the terrorist threat is a European challenge that requires a European 
answer� The Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Vera 
Jourova, at the opening of ECLAN’s 10th anniversary, stated her priorities in Euro-
pean criminal justice and urged EU Members to tackle serious cross-border crime 
on various fronts, being careful to strike the right balance, fighting all forms of 
crimes (including jihadist terrorism and radicalization), combatting hate speech 
and hate crime, preventing the anti-Muslim hatred to spread� Another objective 
is to improve judicial cooperation between the criminal justice authorities of all 
Member States, with judicial cross-border cooperation, expanding the exchange of 
information on past criminal convictions to third country nationals and stateless 
people� She is launching infringement proceedings against Member States that 
have not yet transposed the three Framework Decisions on detention or ECRIS�
Among the issues still to be addressed by the EU’s law is the conflict of jurisdic-
tion on the transfer of proceedings and digital evidence� Also the digitalization of 
national legal systems to extract relevant data must be provided�
Those objectives are to be completed with packages on victims’ rights, improv-
ing the procedural safeguards related to pre-trial detention� Another objective is 
to improve detention conditions and fight radicalization both inside and outside 
prisons�
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The text also reflects the particular situation of the victims themselves, who 
have a right to protection, since these attacks can affect everyone regardless of 
nationality� Security is indeed a primary responsibility of the State, and it has 
a margin of appraisal to adopt specifically relevant measures for safeguarding 
national and foreign citizens, and if applicable, for the protection of terrorism 
victims, which grants it an “added value,” although it should include their com-
pensation� The 2012/29/EU Directive assigned them a singular protection, and 
for this reason the current purpose is to incorporate specific dispositions to give 
substantial support to the victims in the guarantee of their rights� This effort must 
be started though a higher regulatory precision, establishing common definitions 
of terrorist action ex ante and ex post� Various “preparatory” actions should be 
included, such as those deemed necessary for committing the crime, as well as 
“material assistance” and “complicity;” also a posteriori actions should be taken 
into account, such as providing a necessary material help (e�g� transportation of 
the perpetrators of terrorist attacks) and financing the attacks�
5. Conclusion
The supervision of current legislation will harmonize domestic laws, allowing 
States to adapt their behavior to preexisting international obligations and pa-
rameters� The Proposal hardens offenses classified as recruiting, training, and 
distribution of propaganda� In an innovative stance, it indicts behaviors linked 
to terrorist activities, elevating to the status of offenses the possible movements of 
foreign fighters, as well as financing and aiding of movements within or outside 
the Union�
The increasingly stronger link between internal and external challenges re-
quires meeting common objectives� It is therefore indisputable that it demands 
an effective and integrated use of the EU’s broad range of instruments to give an 
effective response in the fight against terrorism, harmonizing criminalization to 
prevent and prosecute foreign terrorist fighters� The States also commit to inves-
tigate training activities which could lead to terrorist acts, improving relations 
between international organizations by active diplomatic efforts on the part of 
the High Representative and the Member States, involving all government agen-
cies at different levels, reinforcing cooperation, and responding in an appropriate 
manner to the increasing cross-border practical challenges� Simultaneously, the 
action plan improves gun and explosive (as well as substances involved in their 
manufacture) traffic control,s as it restricts fire gun purchases�
In order to accomplish these objectives, the EU must embark on a dialogue on 
security with key strategic partners and neighboring countries� The future action 
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should be linked to the EU’s financial instruments maximizing the added value 
of the EU’s measures for information exchange, and operational cooperation�
The lessons drawn from the past must help us to tackle this new phenomenon, 
deepening our knowledge through a necessarily holistic approach� The abilities 
sadly acquired through the Spanish experience should contribute to the develop-
ment of international cooperation in the common fight against terrorism�
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Sebastian Wojciechowski
Reasons of Contemporary Terrorism.  
An Analysis of Main Determinants
1. Introduction1
When analyzing the reasons for terrorism, a few key questions need to be asked� 
What makes terrorism escalate? Is it possible to identify one or several main 
sources of terrorism? Are certain reasons for terrorism characteristic (specific) 
of only a given historical period or region? Is there a single universal model 
(classification) of sources of terrorism, and what elements should it encompass?
The fundamental objective of this text is an attempt to answer the above ques-
tions, together with:
A�  Discussing the reasons for terrorism as presented in the literature on the sub-
ject (through an analysis of selected examples)�
B�  Presenting a handful of classifications of the sources of terrorism (including 
one proposed by the author)�
C�  Presenting the hybridity of causes of terrorism which emphasizes the mul-
tiplicity and complexity of sources of terrorism and indicates the mutual 
relations between them� The key role is played by three main groups of deter-
minants, namely ideological, socio-economic and psychological reasons, as 
well as their mutual interactions�
It should be stressed that the discussion that follows does not aspire to be an ex-
haustive analysis of the reasons behind terrorism, but it rather aims to contribute 
to the ongoing discussion on the subject in question� It also involves the presenta-
tion of a new concept and its components�
2. Causes of Terrorism
The reasons for terrorism are an example of the so-called system of communicat-
ing vessels� This means that they are a sum total of a plethora of different elements, 
their mutual relations and the conditions that influence them� Therefore, they are 
1 This article is the revised and updated version of the analysis included in the book: 
S� Wojciechowski, The Hybridity of Terrorism. Understanding Contemporary Terrorism: 
Logos Verlag, Berlin 2013� 
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a “system” coupled with other elements of terrorism (such as tactics, strategies, or 
the consequences of terrorist activities)�
The literature on the subject reveals significant disparities when indicating 
the main reasons for terrorism� P� Wilkinson, for example, names the following 
generators of terrorism: ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts, poverty, negative 
aftermath of modernization, injustice, revolutionary sentiments among society, 
weak governments or an internal power struggle� He refers to an extensive range 
of determinants from various categories of political, social, economic, cultural, 
and psychological nature�2 Similar factors are pointed out by H� Hall, who sees 
the sources of terrorism in the political, religious and ideological realms, or in 
response to violence�3
Another list has been compiled by C� Sterling, who indicates the following 
motives for terrorist activity:4
‪ Initiative taken on one’s own behalf or on behalf of a certain group;
‪  A desire to attract attention to oneself or to draw the public’s attention to cer-
tain issues;
‪  Demonstration of an aversion to and disrespect for the existing legal order, the 
principles of social coexistence, or the principles of a given political or religious 
group;
‪ Attempt to undermine the authorities and their political role;
‪ Attempt to coerce government to behave in a certain way;
‪ Revenge for a certain activity of government or its representatives;
‪ Justification of the attack with a certain ideology�
In the opinion of M� Crenshaw, there are four key motives for terrorist activities:5 
the hope to change the status quo, the need to belong to a group, the attempt to 
improve social status, and the desire to obtain material reward�
2 P� Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, Macmillan Press, London 1974� 
3 H� Hall (ed�), Terrorism: Strategies for Intervention, The Haworth Press, Binghamton 
2002, p� 2�
4 C� Sterling, The Terror Network, The Secret War of International Terrorism, Henry Holt 
& Co, New York 1981�
5 M� Crenshaw, An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism”, “Orbis” 
no� 29, 1985, pp� 465–488�
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3. Taxonomy of Reasons
Even on the basis of the several selected examples that are presented above, one 
can observe the considerable diversity of the sources of terrorism� This calls for 
some order to be introduced� In the opinion of certain specialists, it is difficult 
to develop a single, universal model of reasons for terrorism to encompass dif-
ferent forms and geographical regions� An example is provided by F� Gross, who 
identified a separate mechanism of terrorism emerging in democratic societies 
in contrast to the mechanism present in autocratic states� The former applies to 
the United States, among other countries, and focuses primarily on the terror-
ism generated by Muslim groups, including Al Qaeda� Among the factors that 
apply here, F� Gross mentions the pressure of US global domination, the “holy 
war” syndrome, or undermining of American supremacy� The latter model refers 
primarily to Eastern Europe, where the key form involves individual terrorism 
aimed at the representatives or promoters of the democratic system�6
In an attempt to classify the sources of terrorism, one can divide them into 
simple and complex ones� The former group characterizes only selected instances 
of terrorism, where a single, clearly defined motive predominates, for instance, 
the attacks executed by Ted Kaczynski, or the so-called anti-abortion terrorism� 
The latter group involves complex reasons, where various motives, e�g� religious, 
ethnic, political, overlap� This applies to a majority of cases of terrorism, as ex-
emplified by Palestinian or Northern-Irish terrorism�
In the opinion of A� Cronin, all reasons for terrorism can be divided into four 
levels� The first one is the individual level� The main point of reference is pro-
vided by external factors that lead an individual to become involved in terrorist 
activities, and the personal traits making such involvement more or less likely� The 
second level is of organizational nature� It is related to a group dynamics and the 
issues of group identification� Shared ideology, belief systems, and the activities of 
a given group are of key significance� The third level is related to the activities of 
the state and the need to analyze the different ways in which states take advantage 
of terrorism� Finally, the fourth level is focused on the international system and 
6 F� Gross, Violence in Politics: Terror and Political Assassination in Eastern Europe and 
Russia, Mouton, Hague 1972, cit� after A� Schmid, A� Jongman, Political Terrorism. 
A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, Trans-
action Publishers, Amsterdam-Oxford-New York 1988, p� 124�
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refers to Samuel Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations, or the transfor-
mations that accompany globalization, secularization, etc�7
The experts from the National Research Council of the National Academies in 
Washington also emphasize that it is necessary to comprehensively analyze the 
reasons for terrorism, claiming that the separate analysis of individual reasons is 
erroneous�8 They justify this both by their multiplicity and variety, as well as the 
complexity of the mutual relations between different reasons� In their opinion, 
two levels of reasons for terrorism can be distinguished� One concerns historical, 
social, political, and cultural conditions which facilitate the escalation of ter-
rorism� The other refers to direct determinants, such as motivation, group, and 
ideological or organizational factors that culminate in terrorist activity�
Another division of motives for terrorist activity has been designed by J� Horgan, 
who identified three groups of factors:9
A�  Injustice� The sense of injustice and harm is one of the strongest psychological 
conditions� This may concern an individual, group or a given situation, and 
so on, leading to various responses, including the use of violence� The signifi-
cance of the “sense of injustice” is also stressed by J� Rossa, who distinguishes 
economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious and social harms�10
B�  Identity� The sense of identity is considered to be a significant element of 
human existence� In their search for identity, or as a consequence of an “un-
derestimated” level of identity, some individuals begin to identify with radical 
groups, including terrorist groups, as exemplified by the numerous members 
of Al Qaeda, IRA, Hamas and many other, similar organizations�
C�  Membership� The sense of membership is another significant element of hu-
man personality� R� Luckabaugh emphasizes it, observing that “the true reason 
7 A� Cronin, Sources of Contemporary Terrorism in Attacking Terrorism, in: Elements of 
a Grand Strategy A� Cronin, J� Ludes (eds�), Georgetown University Press, Washington 
2004, pp� 19–43�
8 F� Mitchell (ed�) Terrorism. Perspectives from the Behavioral and Social Science. Washing-
ton: Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, Center for Social 
and Economic Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2002�
9 J� Horgan, The Search for the Terrorist Personality, in: Terrorists, Victims and Society. 
Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequence A� Silke (ed�), John Wiley 
& Sons, London 2003, pp� 3–26� 
 J� Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, Routledge, London-New York 2005� 
10 J� Rossa, Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism, ,“Journal of Peace Research” 
1993, no� 30, p� 326�
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to become terrorists is the need for membership of some group of people�”11 
A terrorist organization can become the main, or sometimes the only com-
munity a potential terrorist can identify with�
However, A� Wejkszner divides the reasons for modern terrorism into the follow-
ing categories�12 One source is cultural� A broader analysis is founded on numerous 
concepts, including those developed by S� Huntington, E� Staub, F� Moghaddam, 
O� Roy� In this approach, terrorist organizations use violence as a consequence of 
isolation, finding violence an efficient means of social destabilization, a “war of cul-
tures,” or the so-called “cultural shock�”13 Another group of factors distinguished by 
A� Wejkszner involves politico-organizational determinants� On the one hand, they 
concern the issue of state sponsorship of terrorism, on the other, they concentrate 
around the issues that allow the preparation or execution of specified terrorist ac-
tions in the most efficient manner�14 The third group of conditions that influences 
the escalation of terrorism involves socio-economic factors� The elements discussed 
here include globalization, neocolonialism, or consumerism� Another group of 
sources of terrorism concerns technology� Technical progress has an indisputable 
influence on the majority of social phenomena and processes in the modern world, 
including terrorism� What is meant here is mainly its influence on the strategy and 
tactics employed by terrorists as well as by the formations that combat them�
Can technical progress provide a direct stimulus for terrorism, though? If 
so, how is it done? J� Adamski, for example, explains this dependence in the fol-
lowing way: progress “stimulates the development of terrorism in its practical 
aspect,”15 i�e� in terms of access to modern technology or advanced weapons� Thus 
it has a direct impact on the efficiency of terrorist activities and generates new 
kinds of terrorism, such as cyberterrorism� Other authors point to the unequal 
11 R� Luckabaugh, J� Cangemi, C� Kowalski, Terrorist Behavior and US Foreign Policy. Who 
is the Enemy? Some Psychological and Political Perspectives, “Psychology” no� 34, 2007, 
pp� 1–15�
12 A� Wejkszner, Ewolucja terroryzmu motywowanego ideologią religijną na przykładzie 
salafickiego ruchu dżihadu, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i 
Dziennikarstwa UAM, Poznań 2010, pp� 40–46�
13 O� Roy, Terrorism and Deculturation, in: The Roots of Terrorism. (Vol� 1 Democracy and 
Terrorism) L� Richardson (ed�), Routledge, New York –London 2006; S�P� Huntington, 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone, New York 1997�
14 D� Byman, Deadly Connections, State that Sponsor Terrorism, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2007, p� 40�
15 J� Adamski, Nowe technologie w służbie terrorystów, Wydawnictwo Trio, Warsaw 2007, 
p� 7�
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opportunities concerning the use technological progress and the fact that this 
makes social divisions even more acute�
An extensive classification of the sources of terrorism has been proposed by 
R� Kosta, who divided them into four basic groups: socio-economic, historico-
political, sociological, and psychological�16 The first category is related to such 
phenomena as economic crises, social tensions, instances of ethnic or social dis-
crimination, and the disparity between reality and what the media show� Terror-
ism may also result from economic backwardness, illiteracy, demographic growth, 
social disproportions, aggressive policies of large companies, as well as globali-
zation or reduced social spending� The range of factors presented above is thus 
quite extensive and varied� The second group of sources of terrorism indicated 
by R� Kosta concerns historico-political conditions� Their origins can be found in 
the demands that human rights be respected, among many other factors� In the 
opinion of M� Brewer, the analysis of historico-political sources of the activities 
of such organizations as the Red Army Faction or the Tamil Tigers17 should also 
be perceived in relation to postcolonial conflicts and respect for the rule of law�
Another category deals with sociological reasons� R� Kosta couples them with a 
so-called “atmosphere of violence�” This atmosphere is particularly observable in 
some Muslim states (e�g� Algeria, Afghanistan), but also in Europe (Northern Ire-
land, former Yugoslavia) or South America (Columbia, Mexico, etc�)� The fourth 
group embraces psychological sources� To a large extent they are a consequence 
of serious psychological imbalances in the perpetrators, including excessive self-
esteem� This point of view is also shared by R� Robins and J� Post, when they 
emphasize that a charismatic leader with paranoid traits can frequently persuade 
people with similar views to share certain ideas�18
A slightly different method for classifying sources of terrorism is presented by 
the authors of International Encyclopedia of Terrorism,19 who distinguish three ba-
sic kinds of sources of terrorism� The first concerns various ideas of a nationalist or 
fundamentalist nature� The second category results from the intention to execute 
or maintain certain social changes� This can be based on anarchist, left-wing or 
16 R� Kosta, Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI 
wieku, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2007, p� 23�
17 M� Brewer, Kryteria typologii terroryzmu, in: Encyklopedia terroryzmu, Wydawnictwo 
Bellona, Warsaw 2004, pp� 190–192�
18 R� Robins, J� Post, Paranoja polityczna. Psychopatologia nienawiści, Wydawnictwo 
Książka i Wiedza, Warsaw 1999, pp� 185–186�
19 M� Crenshaw, J� Pimlott (eds�), International Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Routledge, 
London-Chicago 1998, pp� 189–190�
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right-wing approaches� The last category involves psychological determinants that 
characterize both terrorists and their victims�
T� Bjørg divides the reasons for terrorism into four groups:20
A�  Structural reasons, which, in his view, include demographic imbalance, glo-
balization, modernization, urbanization, migration and social changes, among 
other things�
B�  The so-called “accelerators,” which are not the primary reasons, but which 
nonetheless stimulate interests in terrorism or make it easier to use terrorist 
means (e�g� weakening of state structures, or easy access to weapons)�
C�  Motivational reasons, involving for example a sense of injustice that may mo-
tivate some individuals to take specific steps�
D�  “Detonators” that provide the initial spark for terrorist activities both on an 
individual and group level (e�g� Bloody Sunday in Ireland in 1972)�
Yet another method for categorizing the sources of terrorism is their division into 
six categories, devised by this author: A� Religious and cultural sources; B� Ter-
ritorial and ethnic sources; C� Socio-economic conditions; D� Politico-historical 
reasons; E� Psychological sources of terrorism; F� Other selected reasons�
A. Religious and cultural sources. Various surveys and analyses show that 
over the years the role of religious factors that inspire terrorism is increasing� For 
example, in the 1980s only a small proportion of terrorist attacks in the world 
stemmed from religious motivations� At present, this proportion is globally high21� 
Its precise level depends inter alia on the geographical region; being high in the 
Middle East or in Asia and relatively low in, say, Latin America� Escalation of 
terrorism motivated by religious factors is a result of Al Qaeda and ISIS activities 
and other related organizations� A significant factor leading to the escalation of 
terrorism can be related not only to cultural differences (cf� Huntington’s clash of 
civilizations theory)22 but also to the fear that they may “disappear” and different 
cultures will become somewhat universal�
B. Territorial and ethnic sources. There are approximately 200 recognized 
states in the modern world, and around 3,500 large nations�23 This means that 
20 T� Bjørg, Root Causes of Terrorism. Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, Routledge, London-
New York 2005�
21 RAND Corporation and St� Andrews University in Edinburgh, available at http://www�
rand�org, accessed 2 February 2016� 
22 S�P� Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations…op�cit� 
23 E� Gellner, Nation and Nationalism, Nations and nationalism (2nd ed�), Blackwell Pub-
lishing, Oxford 2006� 
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only a few nations have their own states, which produces a series of different con-
sequences� While a majority of nations have accepted the fact of being deprived 
of their own state, there are groups that use various measures (ranging from 
negotiation to terrorist activities) to change the situation and win or regain their 
statehood (e�g� some Basques, Kurds, Chechens, Palestinians, etc�)� We are faced 
here with a classic conflict of interests that involves territory, ethnic identity, and 
other (e�g� political or ideological) factors� This is reflected in the activities of ISIS, 
Hamas, Hezbollah, IRA, ETA, and so on�
C. Socio-economic conditions. Experts disagree on the importance and influ-
ence of specific economic factors concerning terrorism� This can be well illustrated 
by the issue of poverty (destitution) as a trigger of terrorism, or the relations 
between terrorism and profound financial disparities present in a given territory� 
Another issue is that of financing of terrorism�24
D. Politico-historical reasons. Considering the various factors that generate 
terrorism, one needs to emphasize the importance of historical conditions� The 
memories of injustices suffered (whether real or imagined), disputes rooted in his-
tory, and a range of animosities can stimulate the emergence and escalation of 
radical attitudes, terrorism being one of them� Whether in the past or present, 
terrorism has frequently been connected with the policies of great powers, such as 
Ancient Rome (the terrorist acts of the Zealots or Sicarii), Russia (Narodnaya Volya), 
Turkey (Kurdish or Ormian radicals), Austria-Hungary (Serb nationalists), Great 
Britain (Irish nationalists), and so on� At present, this is illustrated by the attacks 
of Al Qaeda (aimed against US interests), Chechen terrorists (against the Russian 
Federation) or Urghuy terrorists (against China)� Another significant historical 
factor that has profoundly influenced the escalation of terrorism has been the col-
lapse of the communist system� It has brought about a rapid and radical change in 
international relations, but has also made it easier for various extremist organiza-
tions, including terrorist ones, to operate, which has stimulated increased activity�
E. Psychological sources of terrorism. The process of the emergence and 
formation of terrorism is to a large extent related to psychological factors, and 
it is strictly coupled with issues of hatred, prejudices, familiarity and alienation, 
intolerance, injustice, retaliation, trauma, and so on� We frequently deal with 
terrorism when a certain individual or group considers a given idea or approach 
to be ultimately the highest value that all other issues should be subordinated to, 
including one’s own life and the life of a person’s nearest and dearest� A range of 
24 C� Clarke, Terrorism, INC. The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare, 
Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara 2015�
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psychopathic attitudes also plays an important role here, as is well exemplified 
by Anders Breivik25 and numerous suicidal terrorists� J� Horgan presents it in the 
following way: “We can easily quote the arguments that support the theory of 
psychopathy as a likely feature of terrorist behavior� Terrorists intentionally get 
involved in a destructive activity resulting in suffering, death and other conse-
quences, and they willingly assume responsibility for such activity�”26
F. Other selected reasons. Apart from the above-presented sources of terror-
ism there is also a range of other factors that can contribute to the manifestation 
or escalation of terrorism� The following sources are among them:
 –  Globalization and its consequences. Some experts include globalization, and 
the processes that accompany it, among the factors that influence terrorism� 
In this case globalization can be seen as a threat to the interests, values or 
attitudes of individuals or groups� This is emphasized by M� Stevens,27 who 
points to three main threats to local communities posed by globalization� One 
concerns the weakening of the position of the community, which follows from 
the economic burdens imposed on its citizens, or the introduction of social 
transformations that may bring about frustration or aggression, which finds 
its expression in terrorism, among other things� Another concerns the fact that 
globalization can threaten local societies, posing a threat to such elements as 
their local identity� The final threat pertains to a scenario where globalization-
related processes, including the furtherance of individual rights, among other 
things, can stimulate conflicts on an inter-group or inter-cultural level�
 –  Activities of leaders and elites. Terrorism can be generated “downwards,” as it 
were, when it is inspired by political, social or religious leaders� It may provide 
a means to overthrow authorities or win power, serve as a pretext to reject re-
sponsibility for problems, and so on� Thus it can serve the implementation of 
both immediate goals and long-term objectives� State authorities may constitute 
another factor generating terrorism� Their role can be quite varied� Primarily, 
they play a positive role, combating given manifestations of terrorism� However, 
a state can also be a negative factor, supporting or actually running terrorist 
activities itself� We can see an interesting relation here, where the potential of a 
25 E� Humphrys, G� Rundle, T� Tietze (eds�), ON UTØYA: Anders Breivik, Right Terror, 
Racism and Europe, Elguta Press, London 2011�
26 J� Horgan, The Search for the Terrorist…op�cit�
27 M� Stevens, The Unanticipated Consequences of Globalization. Contextualizing Terror-
ism” in: The Psychology of Terrorism (Vol III� Theoretical Understandings, and Perspec-
tives) S� Stout (ed�), Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport 2002, p� 39�
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state or its institutions can be used by terrorist organizations, but also where ter-
rorist organizations can be a tool for state structures� This has been exemplified 
by Iraq, Iran, South Korea, Sudan, Syria or Libya, which have all collaborated 
with terrorist organizations at some stage� In his analysis of the different reasons 
for terrorism B� Hoffman emphasizes the desire for power� “Terrorism is present 
wherever politics and violence overlap in a hope to rule� Terrorism is always 
about striving for power: the power that is necessary to dominate and coerce, 
threaten and control, and eventually implement a radical political change�”28 
Striving for power can have more than a political or religious dimension, and it 
can involve the psychological sense of being in power and the desire to dominate, 
and enjoy the splendor, and so on that accompanies power�
 –  Migration processes. Mass migration processes and all their negative conse-
quences can constitute a significant source of terrorism, as well as result from 
it� Such a situation can be observed as a result of the migration crisis which 
tackles Europe� This is not only the case in Europe, though, as evidenced by the 
situation in the US, Canada, or Australia, and so on� The inflow of immigrants 
or the presence of huge immigrant communities is frequently taken advantage 
of by terrorist organizations seeking new recruits, logistic or financial support, 
and so on� On the other hand, immigrants and the institutions supporting 
them more and more frequently become the targets of attacks, which can be 
exemplified by the 2015 events occurring in many EU countries�
 –  Domino/avalanche effect. The domino (avalanche) effect is another determi-
nant that generates terrorism� It consists in the fact that an escalation of terror-
ism in one state may be coupled with similar events in neighboring countries 
(to take the example of the narcoterrorist organizations in Latin America)� 
One variation involves a mechanism in which terrorism within one nation 
is transferred to some members of the same nation living in other states (e�g� 
Basque, Chechen, Kurdish, Northern Irish extremists, etc�)�
 –  The role of the media. Another issue that is frequently examined is the influ-
ence the media exert on terrorism, its forms, evolution, or reasons, and so on� 
The media are often recognized as an indirect determinant that influences the 
presence and escalation of terrorism in different ways and to various extents� 
This opinion is shared by some academics, politicians, and journalists� To some 
degree, W� Laqueur expressed this view saying that “terrorists need the media, 
and the media find all the components of an exciting story in terrorism�”29
28 B� Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, London 1998, p� 174�
29 W� Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, Little Brown, Boston 2007, pp� 16–18�
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It can be observed on the basis of the above examples that academic descriptions 
refer to an extensive range of reasons for terrorism and their classification� A 
certain similarity of approaches can be noted among some, which offers a good 
starting point to develop a more comprehensive concept of the sources of modern 
terrorism�
4. Hybridity of Reasons
Hybridity of causes of terrorism is understood as the criss-crossing, complementing 
or combining of numerous different sources of terrorism, such as political, ethnic, 
religious and economic aspects, and so on� These processes occur to varying degrees 
and depend on geopolitical conditions, the type of terrorism, the period concerned, 
and so on� Therefore, hybridity considerably influences not only the nature or range 
of modern terrorism, but also how it can be understood or defeated�
The following assumptions can form the fundamental elements of the hybridity 
of causes of terrorism:
4.1. Not only do the multitude and diversity of reasons for terrorism need to be 
taken into account, but also the direct and indirect relations (interactions) that 
occur among them affecting the range, force or significance of their influence� In 
this understanding, the reasons for terrorism are treated as a part (a subsystem) 
of a terrorist system� The same factors frequently influence terrorism (to different 
degrees) over the long term and in many cases they are likely to occur also in the 
future, as is the case with ethnic or religious determinants� 
More than once the sources of terrorism are characterized by the dynamics 
with which they occur� This concerns, among others: the strength of impact of a 
given source; the geographical territory where a given reason for terrorism occurs; 
the relations between individual sources of terrorism�
4.2. To investigate the issue of the reasons for terrorism in depth calls for a detailed 
analysis of the following components:
a – reasons for terrorism (e�g� x, y, z,…),
b – relations among the reasons for terrorism,
c –  factors that are not directly linked to terrorism, but can influence its sources, 
e�g� economic situation, wars and conflicts, and so on� 
However, a question arises of whether the above elements are sufficient to reach a 
comprehensive understanding of the sources of terrorism? Is an analysis presented 
in this manner possible in the first place? Perhaps, this model should be expanded 
to include one more element, “d” – the relations between these reasons and the other 
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elements of terrorism (e�g� types of terrorism, its manifestations, features, or conse-
quences), which are related to the sources of terrorism to a greater or lesser extent�
4.3. The hybridity of causes of terrorism assumes the presence of four principal 
classifications of reasons for terrorism� They divide the sources of terrorism in 
terms of the following:
A� territorial range,
B� subjective reasons,
C� time of occurrence,
D� the evolution of the reasons� 
A� The following reasons can be distinguished with respect to their territorial 
range:
a�  Local reasons for terrorism� They occur only in a given location and are 
related to the local political or social situation (as is the case of the Zapatista 
National Liberation Army (EZLN), the People Versus Gangsterism and Drugs 
(PAGAD) organization, or the Tamil Tigers)�
b�  Regional reasons for terrorism� In this case the same factor, or a group of 
factors, results in the escalation of terrorism in several, separate geographical 
locations� The examples include Kurdish or Palestinian terrorism� 
c�  Global reasons for terrorism� These are the cases when the same reason, or a 
group of reasons, affects many different parts of the world, as is the case with 
Muslim fundamentalism�
The above division is not always clear-cut� There are sources of terrorism that are 
difficult to classify unanimously� For example, the terrorist activity of the “Un-
abomber” (T� Kaczynski) falls under the category “A” described above, but it can 
also be classified as a manifestation of radical alterglobalism�
Figure 1: Division of reasons for terrorism due to their territorial range
LR – local reasons for terrorism 
RR – regional reasons for terrorism 
GR – global reasons for terrorism 
LR RR GR
Source: Author’s concept�
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B� Another classification concerns the subjective reasons for terrorism and can 
be presented in the following manner�




P – polical reasons 
E – economic reasons  
R– religious reasons 
Ps – psychological reasons 
H – historical reasons 
S – social reasons 
Si –single-issue reasons 
O – other reasons 
Source: Author’s concept�
C� The next classification divides the reasons for terrorism due to the time of their 
occurrence and includes the following:
a�  Timeless reasons, that is those that have accompanied the phenomenon of 
terrorism since its beginnings (such as religious or political conditions) – per-
manent reasons for terrorism�
b�  Sources of terrorism that accompany it only at a certain developmental stage 
(over a shorter or longer period of time) – temporary reasons� They involve 
certain ideas or the activities that follow from these ideas (e�g� the ideology of 
assassins)�
c�  Cyclical reasons, which disappear or wane after some time, but after a shorter 
or longer pause they can start to play some role again, e�g� anarchism as a 
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source of terrorism at the turn of the 19th century, and again after WWII, and 
in the first decade of the 21st century30�
Figure 3: Division of reasons for terrorism due to the time of their occurrence
a) Permanent reasons (PR) 
b) Temporary reasons (TR) 
c) Cyclical reasons (CR)
Source: Author’s concept�
The fourth distinction concerns the evolution of individual reasons, which can 
be divided into:
a� sources of terrorism undergoing continuous change; 
b� reasons undergoing occasional change; 
c� factors that do not change�
The first category is illustrated by the influence of technology on terrorism� Cat-
egory “b” is characterized by ideological concepts, e�g� nationalism, anarchism, 
and so on, and their transformations, while the third one is reflected in the as-
sumptions of anti-abortionist terrorism�
Considering these four classifications of the causes of terrorism, a relatively 
broad range of their manifestations or kinds can be appreciated, yet they do not 
account for all the possible scenarios� The theoretical character of this analysis 
is also a drawback, as is the less than thorough presentation of the interactions 
between the classifications�
30 Examples include the attacks on the embassies in Athens and Rome carried out in late 
2010 and early 2011, the responsibility for which was assumed by anarchists�
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4.4. There are three main determinants that generate or escalate modern terrorism 
according to the hybrid of causes of terrorism:
A.  Various ideas/ideologies, such as political, ethnic or religious ones, and so 
on that terrorists identify with, e�g� separatism, nationalism, racism, anti-
Semitism, chauvinism, religious fundamentalism, alterglobalism, and so on�
B.  Selected socio-economic conditions. These concern a variety of socio-eco-
nomic issues occurring on a large scale, such as widespread poverty, financial 
crises, gigantic and rapidly increasing disparities between individuals, states 
and between the rich and rapidly developing “North” and the significantly 
poorer “South�” All these problems can generate or intensify various radical 
attitudes, including terrorism, directly or indirectly� 
C.  Various psychological processes and factors. They are mainly related to the 
issues of prejudices, stereotypes, hatred, hostility, intolerance, the sense of injus-
tice or threat, retaliation, trauma, and so on� They very often assume the form 
of psychological disorders inducing e�g� suicidal attackers to commit extreme 
acts�
The above three elements dovetail and complement one another, entering into 
mutual interactions between one other and with a range of other factors� They 
produce a mechanism described as the so-called triad of terrorist motivation�
Figure 4: Three principal groups of reasons for terrorism (the triad of terrorist motivation)
X
Y
X - external factors having influence 
      upon reasons of terrorism
Y - internal factors influencing reasons
      of terrorism












A. Various ideas/ideologies. Sources of terrorism need to be sought not only in 
the presence or furtherance of various, frequently highly destructive, ideas, or 
ideologies, but also in their mutual contradictions or confrontational character� 
In this context, terrorism is treated as a highly radical reflection of certain opin-
ions, attitudes or beliefs� It is also a consequence of a conflict of interests and is 
frequently an attempt to achieve a certain goal ‘at any cost’, whatever the material 
damage or human toll� It can also serve the purpose of achieving certain goals or 
obtaining some gains, such as a change in the political situation, furtherance of 
specified principles or values, and so on� 
The importance of ideological factors finds an excellent illustration (using the 
example of ETA’s activity) in the statement made by G� Jackson in the article Why 
they kill, when he observed that acts of terror are frequently “committed by people 
who are not the product of suburban violence, who do not come from homes 
where they were mistreated by older family members or bad neighbors, who are 
not victims of permanent unemployment, wars of drug pushers, or racism, or re-
ligious persecutions (…)� There is only one possible answer to the question ‘Why 
do they kill?’, namely: a mixture of nationalism, racism, and mystified history has 
become a justification for terrorism�”31
B. Selected socio-economic conditions. There are numerous criteria of differ-
ent kinds that can help in the analysis of the range of socio-economic problems 
experienced by individual states or regions� One of them involves the presentation 
of developmental disparities between the so-called “rich North” and “poor South�” 
This distinction is not as much geographical as economic and geographical� It 
shows that approximately 14% of the global population live in “the North” in 
contrast to 86% living in “the South�” This juxtaposition becomes particularly ex-
pressive if the above figures are accompanied by certain economic indicators, e�g� 
the share of global capital� The difference is very meaningful here, with “the North” 
and “the South” possessing 75% and 25% of global capital respectively� It should 
also be stressed that these two indicators (but many others as well) are not static, 
but dynamic� Even over quite short periods of time, they clearly change, most 
often to the disadvantage of the underdeveloped states� The above example shows 
that, on the one hand, the proportion of people living in “the North” is falling, 
while, on the other hand, the share of “the North” in global capital is increasing�
Another important issue that is not addressed too often is the presentation of 
the interdependence between the economic situation in a given territory and the 
emergence of terrorist attitudes� In some states we are faced with a situation where 
31 G� Jackson, Dlaczego zabijają?, „Forum” no� 7, 2000, pp� 10–11�
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on the one hand they are global leaders in terms of posing a terrorist threat, while 
on the other they are significantly backward in terms of economic development� 
This is corroborated by the annual reports published by the National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism� The Global Terrorism In-
dex 2015 states that “two countries, Iraq and Nigeria, account for 53 per cent of all 
deaths from terrorism in 2014” and “in 2014, 57 per cent of all attacks occurred in 
five countries; Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria�”32 A definite nations 
and their states are in majority among the entities considered by the World Bank 
to be significantly backward in terms of socio-economic development�
This is not to mean that terrorism is a matter exclusively of poor states� After 
all, it occurs also in affluent countries, although the data show that it is not as 
frequent there� Obviously, socio-economic problems do not necessarily have to 
result in violence, terrorism and other radical attitudes, but they can be efficiently 
stimulated by them�33
C. Various psychological processes and factors. In many cases we encounter 
terrorism when a given individual or group considers a certain attitude or idea to 
be of the utmost importance, one which all other matters should unquestionably 
be subordinated to� Another significant factor is the distinction between “us” and 
“them,” which is frequently based on the following assumptions:
•	 maintaining that “my” group is always the most important and the best;
•	  seeking the sources of the said distinction not in reality but in the subjective 
perception of this reality;
•	  admitting the necessity for antagonisms and oppositions between “my” group 
and the “alien” group (e�g� between the so-called West and Islam)�
In the analysis of psychological factors that may influence terrorism the following 
should also be mentioned: a sense of “void” as regards one’s worldview, a sense 
of injustice or oppression, hostility, post-traumatic syndrome, susceptibility to 
aggression, depression, and so on� It is, of course, impossible to present all the 
possible factors in such a brief study, nor is this its purpose� The essential purpose 
32 Global Terrorism Index 2015, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, available at http://www�economicandpeace�org, accessed 
15 February 2016�
33 Other socio-economic issues include: high unemployment, illiteracy, demography, 
famine, insufficient health care, etc� More: World Bank data; F� Llussάand, J� Tavares, 
Economic and Terrorism. What we Know, What we Should Know, and The Data we Need, 
in: Terrorism, Economic and Political Openness P� Keefer, N� Loayza (eds�), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp� 233–254� 
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of this part of the book is to emphasize that, according to the concept of hybridity, 
some psychological determinants can constitute significant sources of terrorism�
Despite the multitude and diversity of the above theories, none of them com-
prehensively explains the emergence and escalation of terrorism� They point, 
however, to how numerous and different the potential factors are� These theories 
are frequently interdisciplinary and combine elements of psychology, as well as 
sociology, pedagogy, economics or philosophy� 
5. Conclusion 
It should be emphasized that the hybrid concept of reasons for terrorism (its five 
main assumptions) presented in the present study is not a complex model� It 
should be viewed as the author’s attempt to analyze the complex research issue of 
the reasons for terrorism� Thus it is only a starting point for further considerations 
that may concern the following issues, among other things:
5.1. In the analysis of the sources of terrorism the mechanism of the “fuel of ter-
rorism” is worth taking into consideration� This notion signifies the entirety of 
key factors that escalate terrorism� In the hybrid concept of reasons for terrorism 
presented in this paper these factors fall into three groups: radical ideologies and 
the attempts to implement them, the consequences of selected socio-economic 
problems, and specified destructive psychological processes� This is not to mean 
that the above factors fully exhaust the range of reasons for terrorism� Therefore, 
one may speak about the so-called complementarity of the reasons for terrorism, 
which means that its sources are typically varied and consist of several parallel 
factors�
5.2. Another interesting research issue is posed by contradictions or misconcep-
tions concerning the reasons for terrorism� One example is the assumption that 
increased financial income (for example from the extraction of oil) in some states 
has increased social disparities and consequently intensified radical sentiments, 
including terrorist attitudes�34 A different example concerns the scenario in which 
the number of educated people and members of the middle class has rapidly in-
creased in some Muslim countries as a result of a modernization or liberalization 
processes� Paradoxically, this has actually won supporters for the fundamentalists, 
34 J� Esposito, Un holy War. Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford University Press, New 
York 2003�
Reasons of Contemporary Terrorism 67
since a part of this group supports their views�35 In another example, unexpected 
situations result in terrorism� One such instance involves the attempt to detonate 
explosives in the USA in early 2011, which was explained by the perpetrator, who 
had been detained, by his dissatisfaction with the markings of local highways� A 
misconception regarding the sources of terrorism is illustrated by the relatively 
common opinion that one of the main reasons for terrorism in the European 
Union is religious fundamentalism�36
This, however, finds no confirmation in the detailed statistics of e�g� Europol, 
which point to the clear prevalence of ethnic (separatist) motives�
Table 1: Failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2014 per member state and per affiliation
Member State Religiously 
inspired
Left-wing Not specified Separatist Single issue Total
Belgium 1 0 0 0 0 1
France 1 0 1 50 0 52
Greece 0 6 1 0 0 7
Italy 0 6 5 0 1 12
Spain 0 1 0 17 0 18
UK - - 109 - - 109
Total 2 13 116 67 1 199
Source: TE–SAT 2015, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Europol, available at, www�europol�
europa�eu, accessed 1 February 2016�
5.3. It is also important to perceive the reasons for terrorism in a broader perspec-
tive, that is, in terms of factors that influence also other disintegration tendencies 
(such as fundamentalism or separatism)� A question arises here of whether there 
is a “repertoire” of sources common for all disintegration phenomena, or at least 
for the majority of them� Do individual factors (e�g� a religious or ethnic factor) 
influence terrorism in a different manner than fundamentalism or separatism? 
Are the mechanisms of their emergence similar? Is it then possible to work out 
a single, universal model of the reasons shaping the above trends, where certain 
factors will predominate depending on the situation? For example, the role of 
35 R� Paz, Islamists and Anti-Americanism, “Middle East Review of International Affairs” 
no� 4, 2003�
36 In 2015 the number of islamic-rooted terrorist attacks in the EU rose� In previous years, 
their level was low, for instance: in 2012: 6, 2013: 0, 2014 – 2, available at http://www�
europol�europol�eu� 
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ethnic factors would be larger in nationalism while the role of religious ones is 
more important in fundamentalism�
5.4. It is impossible to eliminate the sources of terrorism entirely� The primary 
objective should therefore not only be to confine them to the maximum extent 
possible, but also to get to know them better in order to minimize the terrorist 
threat� A good example is financing of terrorist organizations, which very often 
poses significant fundings� ISIS is the clear leader in this category, which makes 
this organization especially dangerous�








Source: International Business Times, MoneyJihad, CNN, The Guardian�
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An Approach to the Economic and Financial 
Dimensions of Radicalization and Terrorism
1. Introduction: Doctrinal Approach
An analysis of the capabilities of the European Union and its Member States 
regarding the fight against the financing of terrorist organizations and radical 
groups does not belong to the classical theoretical dilemma: European functional-
ism – European federalism�1
And nor can it be linked to an axiom opposing the concept of national sover-
eignty, despite its limitations and inadequacy to the era of globalization and new 
technologies� These two variables have a positive influence on the diversification 
and relocation of financial sources, their distribution channels and their final 
beneficiaries: radical and terrorist organizations who preach and practice the 
ideologies of hatred�
Empirical evidence suggests that the discourse and practice of national sov-
ereignty, together with an uncompromising zeal of the European governments, 
create considerable barriers in the design of a comprehensive European policy 
regarding the eradication of the sources and circuits of funding of radical and 
terrorist movements�
Our analytical approach relies on verifiable evidence� The weaknesses affecting 
the capabilities of the European Union in this field also affect many other political 
scenarios that are closely connected to the internal and external security of the 
European Union� In this regard, we can argue that more noticeable and important 
evidence of the weaknesses affecting the intervention capabilities of the European 
Union are the Syrian refugee crisis and immigration�2




2 Persecution, conflict and poverty have driven a staggering one million people to seek 
safety in Europe in 2015, according to estimates by the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR 
and the International Organization for Migration, IOM, available at http://www�unhcr�
org/5679451d6�html, accessed 19 January 2016�
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This crisis could be one of the financial sources of the Daesh and other criminal 
organizations, as well as a strategic and operational resource of military and politi-
cal nature that could facilitate the undercover infiltration of terrorists, weapons 
and explosives in the flow of refugees and immigrants heading to Europe�
The axiomatic approach, which we employ in order to analyze the capabili-
ties of the European Union, with a reference to Spain, falls within the vision that 
Francisco Aldecoa,3 Professor at the Complutense University of Madrid, called a 
process of intergovernmental federalism, which started with the Laeken Declaration 
of 2001 and is currently supported by the Treaty of Lisbon�
We believe that intergovernmental federalism can be defined as a mechanism 
of adaptation of the national sovereignty to the demands imposed by globaliza-
tion and the impact of the new technologies in the strategies and effectiveness of 
radical and terrorist organizations along with their sources of funding, circuits 
for the distribution of resources, intermediaries, direct and indirect beneficiaries, 
and final recipients of the financed resources�
The aforementioned adaptive process recognizes the validity of the State as 
a leading player in the internal and external security policy, while allowing the 
European Union to expand and strengthen its capabilities in this field�
In conclusion, the approach of the European Commission aims to overcome 
the current limitations of the intervention capabilities of the European Union and 
its Member States� Against this backdrop, it is appropriate to express the follow-
ing hypothesis, which is, to a considerable degree, a reasonable one: all national 
policies dissenting from the positions adopted by the European Commission are 
bound to be ineffective�
2.  Axiomatic Premises for the Analysis of the Economic and 
Financial Connections Between Radical, Terrorist and 
Criminal Organizations
The economic and financial links between organized crime, radical movements 
and terrorism are no novelty, nor they are an innovation� These economic, finan-
cial, social and political interrelationships are a historical tradition, even within 
governments� The purpose is to establish, by means of terror, a state of impunity 
and to prevail over the State and the rule of law� However, radicalism, terrorism 
and organized crime are not concepts with the same meaning�
3 F� Aldecoa, Unión europea…op�cit�
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Radical and criminal organizations do not necessarily have to be terrorist or-
ganizations� Not all terrorist organizations are engaged in typical activities of the 
organized crime, and not all radical organizations perform activities typical of 
the organized crime and terrorism� However, the coincidence or convergence of 
common interests and purposes determines an organization to widen its range 
of action so as to perform simultaneous types of activities, of organized crime, 
radical or terrorist nature� This phenomenon has been addressed by both the Con-
vention of Palermo4 and the Convention of Vienna5 According to the classification 
made by the investigator Edgardo Buscaglia,6 we can analyze the connections 
between organized crime and terrorist organizations and proceed to making the 
following distinctions:7 
‪ Organized crime groups unrelated to terrorism�
‪  Organized crime groups engaged in terrorist activities such as the Medellín 
cartel or the Italian Mafia, which turned to terrorism in the pursuit of impunity�
‪  Terrorist groups that engage in criminal activities to finance their deviant po-
litical purposes�
‪ Terrorist groups that exchange goods with the organized crime�
‪ Terrorist organizations funded by other means than those of crime�
3.  Axiomatic Premises for the Analysis of the Political Players
Three roles that represent the positions of the European Union Member States 
governments can be identified� The bipolarity is represented by Chancellor An-
gela Merkel, and her proposal of giving a European solution to an international 
problem is ignored by the members of the European Council� At the other end, 
4 United Nations, Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols 




5 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the law and teatries, 1980, available at https://
treaties�un�org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-Eng-
lish�pdf, accessed 9 January 2016�
6 E� Buscaglia, S� González, S� Fumarulo, C� Prieto, Delincuencia Organizada y corrupción. 
Delincuencia organizada y terrorismo. Su combate a través de la Convención de Palermo, 
2004, available at https://www�unifr�ch/ddp1/derechopenal/temas/t_20080528_83�pdf, 
accessed 9 January 2016�
7 Ibid�
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the Hungarian President Viktor Orbán is an icon of the new isolationist pop-
ulism, characterized by applying reductionism and biased measures as long as 
they contradict neither the original8 nor the secondary acquis communautaire, 
nor the International Law subscribed to by Hungary�
Between these two extremes, one can identify a variety of government positions 
characterized by ambiguity and a political discourse articulated in the rhetoric 
of correction and lacking a material engagement consistent with the magnitude 
of the problem�
The result of all these contradictions has been the following: the Schengen area9 
is considerably affected and this is not unrelated to the anti-terrorism policies, not 
even in the field of funding of these organized crime groups�
Community politics and state policies dealing with the eradication of the fund-
ing of radical movements and organizations are still in time to avoid the damage 
suffered by Schengen� The risks are important, since the economic structures, 
sources of funding, money laundering networks and distribution channels of 
the financial resources are the backbone of criminal organizations, also of those 
defined as radicals and terrorists�
In fact, the distinction between criminal, terrorist and radical organizations 
leads to confusing interpretations, since these three signifiers have an unmistak-
able meaning, which in some cases, such as the Daesh and the groups that fall into 
its range of influence, is: organized crime, internationalization and diversification 
of illicit economic activity and ideology of hatred�
This is an economy based on a clear expression of the ideology of hatred� The 
difference between the Daesh and other criminal organizations lies in their dis-
guise as a theocratic State� The resemblance between this terrorist organization 
and other criminal organizations is the pursuit of profit and financial resources 
destined to the privileged figures of its oligarchy and to guarantee the loyalty of 
their followers and the consolidation and expansion of the organization� All this 
justified in the name of a distorted interpretation of an invented, caricatured 
Islam� This Islam preached by the Daesh never existed in the historical10 and 
8 The Orbán Effect: EU Conservatives Have a Hungary Problem, “Spiegel”, 2013, available 
at http://www�spiegel�de/international/europe/hungarian-government-puts-european-
conservatives-in-tough-spot-a-902620�html, accessed 7 January 2016�
9 The Schengen area and cooperation are founded on the Schengen Agreement of 1985� 
The Schengen area represents a territory where the free movement of persons is guar-
anteed� 
10 G� Kepel, La yihad: expansión y declive del islamismo, Peninsula, Barcelona 2001�
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social11 reality� The Daesh version is the extreme, and hence deformed, version 
of the Saudi Wahhabism, an Islamic movement that emerged in the last third of 
the nineteenth century in the Arabian peninsula�12
4.  Actions Taken by the European Union and  
Its Member States
The economic and financial aspects outline a key scenario of the fight against ter-
rorism�13 The European Union is supporting new measures for the fight against 
terrorist organizations�14
The European Commission developed a package of measures to be analyzed 
by the Council of Ministers of Economy and Finance of the EU of January 2016� 
However, the Community decision-making method is slow, even in those sec-
tors which benefit from a reinforced cooperation, and especially in those stages 
in which the European measures have to be extrapolated to the national laws of 
its Member States�
Following the attacks that took place in Paris in November 2015, twenty-eight 
Member States of the EU made substantial progress in areas related to the rate 
of financial transactions, the Banking Union, tax arrangements and other instru-
ments for combating tax base erosion� Another European priority is to achieve a 
quick extrapolation of the fourth directive of combat against money laundering15 
and of the regulations regarding the information that should be included in the 
transfers of funds�
11 R� Torres, L� Ponce de León, Reislamización digital y yihadismo europeo: claves com-
prensivas para la intervención social comunitaria, “Sistema”, no� 240, 2015, pp� 101–116�
12 G� Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2003� 
13 FATF Financial Action Task Force, Recommendations are recognised as the global 
anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard, 2012, 
available at http://www�fatf-gafi�org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/
FATF_Recommendations�pdf, accessed 17 January 2016�
14 European Commission, Commission takes steps to strengthen EU cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime, available at http://europa�eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-15-4865_en�htm, accessed 17 January 2016�
15 Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, amending Regulation, available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2015:141:FULL&from=EN, accessed 7 December 
2015�
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However, the meaning of the concept of acceleration in the European deci-
sion-making processes depends on the legislative decisions taken by national 
governments and parliaments, and thus the planned package of measures could 
be implemented in June 2017� This period of time is too long to deal with a 
contingency that requires the suppression of the sources of funding of terrorist 
organizations�
The weaknesses in the European Union’s capabilities come from state resist-
ances whose ideological foundation is based on a concept of national sovereignty 
which is prior to the phenomenon of globalization, and therefore ineffective in 
taking action in due time at a European and global scale: Here and now�
The alternative monetary circuit through which the electronic money flows, 
virtual currencies and prepaid cards are evidence showing the European weak-
nesses� The lack of legal, institutional and administrative European tools is ob-
viously hindering the intervention in a sector which is, in itself, refractory and 
evasive to all kinds of public intervention, both at the state and global levels�
The problems experienced by the European Union come from state actors, 
who respond to global issues, especially to those regarding the financial world, 
under the cloak of an anachronistic ideology of national sovereignty, and who 
are reluctant to go beyond and overcome the limited coordination mechanisms 
existing between the states and agencies� The financial sector is ungraspable due 
to several reasons, including an opacity that helps promoting the financial sources 
and channels of distribution of radical and terrorist organizations�16
The Daesh and global jihadism are consequences of a phenomenon that is not 
new, and that has challenged the internal and external security of the European 
Union and its Member States� Its origins date back to the attacks of 9/11 and of 
1973, when the oil crisis helped multiplying the revenues of Saudi treasuries, and 
when an unprecedented expansion of the Wahhabism took place� The latter is a 
hermeneutic movement of the Islam that has no roots in the schools and move-
ments of this religion, and is imprisoned by an out of the context, hermeneutic 
literality and other demands which are inevitable for the Muslims themselves, 
such as the role model represented by Muhammad, the first Umma and the Quran� 
However, the oil revenues helped the worldwide expansion of the Wahhabism�
16 United Nations, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, 1999, available at http://www�un�org/law/cod/finterr�htm, accesses 19 December 
2015�
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The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on May, 1st 1999, is a major 
legal instrument of the European Union in the fight against organized crime�17 
The Framework Decision expressed by the Council of the European Union one 
week after the events of 9/11 and Directive 97 of December 2001 regarding the 
restriction of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, 
were strong milestones in the European anti-terrorism policy�
Other important achievements include rules set by the Council by which cus-
tomized restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities have 
been established, with the aim of fighting against terrorism� The initiatives were 
completed in December 2001, when the European Commission commenced to 
publish a list of terrorists and terrorist groups�
By acknowledging this positive development, we must stress that the internal 
and external security of the European Union18 represents the security of its Mem-
ber States and their citizens� This is an urgent matter and we cannot wait until 
2017 for the implementation of a European mechanism of freezing of assets, and 
for the application of other measures regarding the fight against the illegal trade of 
cultural goods; control of prepaid cards; creation of centralized national registers 
of bank accounts in each Member State, etc�
The European weaknesses in this area can be observed from a comparative 
perspective� The United States has the SWIFT system,19 while in the EU the im-
plementation of a European Monitoring System of the Financing of Terrorism is 
still a pending issue�
5. France and Spain as References
For the aforementioned reasons, it is necessary to focus our attention on the in-
struments employed by some of the Member States of the EU, as well as on their 
current actions regarding the war against terrorism in the financial field�
17 Treaty of Amsterdam, at http://europa�eu�int/eur-lex/es/search/search_treaties�html, 
accessed 4 December 2015�
18 European Commision, Proposal Council Regulation on specific restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating international 
terrorism, 2002, available at http://www�law�kuleuven�be/iir/nl/onderwijs/terrorisme/
COM2001e713�pdf, accessed 3 December 2015�
19 Bank Codes, SWIFT or BIC, Codes that identifies financial and non-financial insti-
tutions and is mainly used for international wire transfers between Banks, available 
at http://www�bank-codes�com/country/united-states-usa#ixzz43NtZ51xS, accessed 
4 January 2016�
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The attacks that took place in Paris in November 2015 seem to have revived the 
French leadership, as suggested by the initiatives regarding the strengthening of 
the powers of the Financial Intelligence Units20 in order to ease the access to bank 
details, without the need for a prior report on a potentially suspicious transac-
tion� France also calls for improvement in the mechanisms for the exchange of 
information�
State legal constraints are not the same in all Member States of the EU� In the 
case of Spain, the Sepblac intelligence service, can undertake operations of greater 
scope and depth than the corresponding agencies of other Member States of the 
EU� Therefore, it can be argued that the development and improvements made in 
the Spanish regulatory framework have reached a satisfactory level in comparison 
to the limitations experienced by other Member States of the European Union�
The Spanish legislative acquis is faithful to the international and European 
lines of thought,21 while also being affected by the weaknesses in the capabilities 
of the EU in this field�
The positive evolution of the Spanish legislation is confirmed by its current 
state of development, supported by the validity of the Royal Decree 304/2014 of 
May 5th, by which the Law 10/2010 of April 28th on the prevention of money laun-
dering and terrorist financing, is approved (BOE 05/05/14)� Its legislative starting 
point is represented by the Law 19/1993 of December 28th, which includes certain 
measures for the prevention of money laundering (BOE 29/12/93)�
The Spanish legislative journey is based on an extrapolation of the Directives 
2006/70/EC22 and 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 
October 26th, 2005,23 and is consistent with the theoretical provisions of these 
20 UK-Parliament, Money laundering and the financing of terrorism, 2008, available at 
http://www�publications�parliament�uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/132/132ii�pdf, 
accessed 9 January 2016�
21 Royal Decree 304/2014 of My 5th, 2014, approving the regulation developing the Law 
10/2010 of April 28th, 2010 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorism 
financing, Official State Bulletin 110, 06�05�2014, pp� 34775�
22 European Commission� COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 
laying down implementing measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council as regards the definition of ‘ politically exposed personand the 
technical criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures and for exemption on 
grounds of a financial activity conducted on an occasional or very limited basis, 2006, 
available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:320
06L0070&from=ES, accessed 9 December 2015�
23 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 26th, 
2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
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European standards and of other similar standards included in the acquis com-
munautaire�
The current legislation, under development by the European Union, includes 
the obligations, actions and procedures necessary to prevent and impede the use 
of the financial system and other areas of economic activity for the purpose of 
money laundering and financing of radical and terrorists groups and organiza-
tions� However, these capabilities and the available instruments of public interven-
tion have to be adjusted to the real scale of jihadist funding, which is characterized 
by diversification and effectiveness�
6. The Global Economy of Terror and Its Underlying Causes
Contraband oil; the trafficking in arms, antiques, and human beings; taxes; the 
forgery of documents; donations; the trade in agricultural products; toll charges; 
kidnappings and slavery – these form the structure of the global economy of ter-
ror� The Daesh aspires to be a State, and acts as a State in Iraq and Syria, where 
Baghdad and Damascus are unable to impose their authority�24
International actors have contributed irregularly to this unprecedented 
scenario,25 and thus the hypothesis laid out by researcher Noam Chomsky in his 
book 9–11: Was There An Alternative? seems to be confirmed: current empirical 
evidence suggests a partial but significant revision of the geopolitical strategies 
of regional and international political actors, mainly because the list of theaters 
of terror has expanded from the Middle East to the Western European cities, and 
to other cities all over on the planet�
The current war against terrorism and the public interventions against radi-
calization are defined by relocation, a feature that can also be observed in the 
field of funding of these criminal organizations and of other radical organizations 
operating at the borderline of what is legally and politically acceptable�
laundering and terrorist financing, at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=URISERV:l24016a&from=ES, accessed 12 December 2015�
24 L� Napoleoni, El fénix islamista. El Estado Islámico y el rediseño de Oriente Próximo, 
Editorial Paidós, Barcelona 2011�
25 N� Chomsky, Once de Septiembre, RBA, Barcelona 2011�
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7.  The Financial Flows of Radicalism. Report of the  
National Intelligence Centre (CNI). Spain
Financial flows also support activities related to radicalism, which is considered 
to be the precursor of terrorism� The CNI26 warns, according to the El País news-
paper27 which refers to secret CNI reports, that there are six Muslim countries 
that support Islam�28 A report of the CNI points out that these donations arrive in 
the hands of radical organizations� This document of the Spanish CNI,29 declares 
according to the aforementioned source, that six Arab-Muslim countries are sup-
porting the Islamic communities in Spain� Among the purposes of these donations 
is the aim to gain control of them, usually with little discernment�
This report of the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) provides an analysis of 
the funding and support offered by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates (EAU), Libya and Morocco to the Muslims in Spain�
The verdict of the CNI identifies a tendency that affects other countries of the 
European Union as well: there is insufficient control of she financial flows gener-
ated by the donations and financial aid that other countries send to the Islamic 
community in Spain, and a lack of attention to the risks of financing individual 
needs�
The aim of the Spanish government is to make the oil monarchies support only 
the projects presented by the Muslim communities to the Islamic Commission of 
Spain (CIE), the official interlocutor, which is currently undergoing developments 
in order to be more representative� Only applications approved by the CIE would 
have the chance to be financed by grantors�
According to the report of the Spanish Intelligence Service, Kuwait is the coun-
try that, by means of the Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage (RIHS), paid 
for the construction of the Torredembarra and Reus mosques in Catalonia, where 
a religious interpretation discouraging the integration into Spanish society and 
supporting the separation and hatred toward non-Muslim groups is preached�
The Kuwaiti RIHS was included in 2008 by the Treasury Department of the 
USA, and later by the United Nations, in the list of organizations that finance the 
Al Qaeda-affiliated groups� The main beneficiary of their aid and an administrator 
26 I� Cembrero, El CNI alerta de que seis paises musulmanes financian al islamismo, 
“El PAIS” 31�07�2011, available at http://politica�elpais�com/politica/2011/07/31/ac-
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of Saudi money in Spain could be, according to the Secret Service, the Dutch 
Salafist of Moroccan origin Abdelhamid el Hyat� On the mid term, the RIHS 
intends to open a local office in Spain�
Qatar seems to donate preferentially to the Islamic League for Dialogue and 
Coexistence in Spain, which is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, ac-
cording to the CNI, and which controls, for example, the Catalan Islamic Cultural 
Centre�
In contrast, Sharjah, one of the United Arab Emirates, has a preference for the 
Spanish converts gathered in Al Morabitun, whom it paid for the construction 
of the Albaicín mosque of Granada, and is willing to offer support for another 
mosque in Seville�
The Spanish secret services have reported some isolated financing actions, such 
as the 300�000 euro paid by Qatar to remodel the Catalan Islamic Cultural Center� 
However, it is common to use alternative channels in order to deliver such dona-
tions that go beyond the control of the authorities of the Spanish financial system�
Saudi Arabia is the most important net contributor� In addition to the direct 
donations made by the royal family, we can consider those made by its Embassy 
in Madrid and by a large number of not entirely official charitable associations� 
However, it is worth mentioning that the mosques and centers that benefit from 
the Saudi funding are not defined by their high level of radicalism, according to 
the CNI, despite the fact that they are totally submitted to the Saudi directives�
The CNI report warns that among the recipients of these donations are also 
individual actors who grant themselves with an improper representation� The 
Spanish intelligence service notes that some of the trips to the Arabian Peninsula 
for collecting subsidies are carried out in the utmost secrecy and without the 
knowledge of the Islamic community in the name of which they are requested� If 
the financial resources are obtained, they do not always serve the official purpose 
for which they were requested�30
Donors
Private wealthy donors and Islamic charitable organizations in the Middle East – 
particularly of Saudi Arabia and Qatar – were the initial source of income� Donors 
have sought to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al Assad, who belongs to the 
Islamic Alawite sect� A part of these donations covered the transportation of 
foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq� Currently, the Daesh has reached significant 
levels of self-financing�
30 Ibid�
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Oil
The Treasury Department of the United States estimates that in 2014 the Daesh 
could have won up to several million dollars per week, adding up to a USD 
100 million in total from the sales of crude oil and refined products� The products 
were sold to local retailers, who in turn smuggled the goods in Turkey and Iran, 
or sold them to the Syrian government� The Daesh does not want to destroy the 
energy sources obtained by military conquest�31 Their aim is to use the earnings 
for the construction of the Islamic State or Caliphate�
Theodore Karasik, of the INEGMA centre (Dubai) and Robin Mills, author of 
the book The Myth of the Oil Crisis, estimate that the Daesh spends USD 1 billion 
per day on the exploitation of Iraqi oil�
Researchers argue that by adding the benefits in Iraq and Syria they could 
reach the figure of USD 100 billion per month� Before the falling in the price of 
oil, the Daesh sold a barrel for USD 30 through the retailers in Turkey and Syria 
who introduced them on the black market�
In the case of Syria, a study32 carried out at the Analysis Centre of the European 
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) shows that while the military component is 
unavoidable in the fight against the Daesh, it will not be successful so long as it is 
not included within a more complex strategy� A late inclusive diplomacy should 
be the immediate priority of the European governments� An approach that over-
emphasizes military action will let a great opportunity pass by and will run the 
risk of doing more harm than good�
Kidnapping, robbery, looting, extortion
Kidnapping was the source of at least USD 20 billion in ransom payments in 2014� 
Foreign journalists risk to be kidnapped the moment they set foot in cities close to 
the border with Syria� Kidnapping is a financial resource and, to a greater extent, 
a valuable tool of propaganda�
The Daesh wins several million dollars a month from the extortion of those 
living in the areas found under their total or partial control� These financial re-
sources come from toll payments for using transportation channels; for allowing 
commercial activity and the belonging to other religions; for offering a protection 
31 M� Aguirre, ¿Cómo se financia el Estado Islámico?, BBC, El Mundo, 14�08�2014, available 
at http://www�bbc�com/mundo/noticias/2014/08/140825_estado_islamico_como_se_
financia_ch, accessed 20 December 2015�
32 J� Barnes, D� Levy, S� Diplomacy, From Vienna to Raqqa, ECFR, 27�11�2015, available 
at http://www�ecfr�eu/madrid/publi/de_viena_a_raqqa_necesidad_de_una_diploma-
cia_inclusiva_en_siria, accessed 3 December 2015�
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service to the residents and neighbors of a town� They also come from bank at-
tacks, looting, trafficking and sale of antiques; from theft; from the control over 
the sales of livestock and crops; and from slavery�
Taxation on the right to exist of other religions, kidnapping, sexual exploitation, 
trafficking in human beings and slavery
The Daesh forces religious minorities to pay a special tax, called jizya� Last year, 
a statement was announced in the mosques of the Iraqi city of Mosul, calling on 
Christians to either convert to Islam, pay the jizya or face death unless they left 
the city� The sale of girls and women kidnapped in order to be turned into sex 
slaves appears to be a common situation�
In the town of Sinjar of northern Iraq, the Yazidí religious minority report-
ed that thousands of their women and little girls were captured and that many 
were used as sex slaves� Kidnapping is a business that relies on spies, informants, 
kidnappers, guards and negotiators who reach agreements to free some of the 
hostages�33
The investigation suggests that the Daesh and other armed groups are imple-
menting a tax system in the areas they conquer, while promoting illegal activi-
ties such as stealing the financial reserves of provincial banks, cars and weapons 
smuggling, kidnappings and roadside checks�
8. Conclusion
The European Union is a major actor in the global Strategy of the United Nations 
against terrorism�34 The aforementioned strategy relies on a working Group to 
examine the various components of the measures taken to prevent the financing 
of terrorism and submit proposals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the 
implementation of international rules, including the special Recommendations 
on terrorist financing made by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF-GAFI)�
In October 2009, the FATF issued a Report that included 35 findings and 
45 recommendations aimed to assist Member States of the EU in increasing the 
effectiveness of their measures of combat against the financing of terrorism�
33 J� Bartlett, En la millonaria máquina de secuestrar de Estado Islámico, BBC, El Mundo, 
15�09�2015, available at http://www�bbc�com/mundo/noticias/2015/09/150922_testi-
monio_secuestros_estado_islamico_lav, accesed 25 Septiember 2015�
34 United Nations, Guia legislativa del régimen jurídico universal contra el terrorismo, 
2008, available at https://www�unodc�org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Legis-
lative_Guide_Universal_Legal_Regime/Spanish�pdf, accessed 18 October 2015�
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Five topics were addressed: 
‪ classification as a crime of terrorist financing; 
‪ strengthening national and international cooperation; 
‪ value transfer systems; 
‪ non-profit organizations; 
‪ and freezing of assets�
Based on the findings and recommendations of this Report, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) drafted an Action Plan with proposals for the implementa-
tion of these recommendations, to be considered by the members of the Financial 
Action Task Force� Most of the entities that took part in the Financial Action Task 
Force have already integrated parts of these recommendations into their own work 
programs� After an examination of their findings and recommendations carried 
out by multidisciplinary experts, the FATF completed their Report in October 
2009� The Report includes 36 findings and 45 recommendations aimed to assist 
the Member States of the EU in increasing the effectiveness of their measures of 
combat against terrorist financing�
The global Strategy of the United Nations against terrorism,35 adopted by the 
General Assembly on the 8th of September 2006, serves as a common platform, 
putting together the efforts of the entities of the United Nations that address issues 
related to the fight against terrorism in a common, coherent and more precise 
framework� There are different activities that can be categorized as transnational 
organized crime, such as drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in 
human beings, money laundering, trafficking in arms, counterfeiting, crimes 
against the environment, crimes against intellectual property and heritage, and 
even some aspects of the so-called cybercrime�
Monitoring the flow of money not only helps preventing the attacks but can 
also provide useful information for further investigations� The Member States of 
the EU are also members of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime�
It is also worth mentioning The International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism – on April 23rd, 2006, the Convention had the sup-
port of 153 State Parties� This means an increase of 149 states since the attacks of 
35 United Nations, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment, 2010� available at https://www�unodc�org/documents/data-and-analysis/
tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res�pdf, accessed 19 December 2015�
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the 9/11, although 38 Member States of the UN still has not joined the Conven-
tion until recently�
The European Union encouraged the financial sanctions regime of the United 
Nations� This is an important instrument for ensuring the effectiveness of the 
measures against the financing of terrorism� The Member States of the EU are 
developing their acquis under this international trend, approved by the European 
legal framework�
In 1998, there were less than 20 terrorist websites� Experts estimate that in 2015 
the figure exceeded several thousand� In fact, it seems that some of the major at-
tacks were based on information obtained by means of the Internet�
The EU slowly reinforces its border controls, especially in developing countries� 
The World Bank supported the reform and modernization of border management 
systems, facilities and institutions at the national, regional and international levels�
The Member States of the European Union have encouraged the international 
community to adopt a series of important measures aimed at providing a solid 
legal basis for common actions of combat against the promotion of terrorism, 
especially through the ratification of 13 universal instruments related to the pre-
vention and suppression of international terrorism, as well as the Security Council 
resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1566 (2004) and 1624 (2005)�
In order to strengthen the authority of the Security Council and its role in this 
field, the Council bodies dealing with terrorism will need to develop standards of 
compliance and accountability and use them to evaluate the work of individual 
States in order to differentiate between States that are considered able but unwill-
ing to fulfill their obligations and States that lack the capacity to do so�
The internal and external security of the EU seems to develop the required 
capabilities in all required fields, even though this effort is neither consistent nor 
synchronic with the scale of the problem of financing the global economy of ter-
rorism, radicalization, and organized crime� 
Various organizations of the United Nations and its partners, especially the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, and the Interpol are working in order ensure the States have the 
necessary laws and institutions to fully comply with the international standards 
and obligations regarding the fight against money laundering and financing of 
terrorism� The European acquis, together with its instruments and intervention 
capabilities, are an essential reference for the international community�
The cost estimate needed to fight threats posed by terrorist organizations like 
the Daesh is high and difficult to break down� It is estimated that in 2014 the global 
economic costs of terrorism reached 52�900 billion USD (49�000 billion EUR), 
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and a total economic impact of 105�800 billion USD� These figures have been 
calculated using the IEP methodology of the economic cost of violence,36 which 
measures the direct and indirect costs generated by the loss of life, destruction of 
property and ransom payments�
The quantification of the total global economic costs of terrorism is compli-
cated� Direct costs include direct loss of life and damage to property caused by a 
terrorist attack� The estimation of indirect costs is less tangible and precise�
The direct global costs of terrorism added up to a total of 52�900 billion USD 
in 2014� This means an increase of 61% over the previous year’s total, which was 
of 32�900 billion USD; this figure that has multiplied by more than 10 since 2000� 
The vast majority of these costs arise from injury and death�
Since 2000, there has been a growing trend toward smaller-scale bombings and 
explosions, and a decrease in large-scale attacks against property, which cause 
damage worth more than one billion dollars� Losses caused by terrorism added 
up to 52�900 billion USD in 2014, as opposed to 1�7 trillion USD lost as a result 
of violent crimes and homicides�
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Jesús Pérez Viejo and Ángeles Martínez Boyé
An Analysis of the Psycho-Social Factors 
Involved in Jihadist Radicalization Process  
and Terrorist Violence
1. Introduction
Jihadist terrorism generates a profound debate on how a free and peaceful so-
ciety should face a threat of these characteristics� The global situation points to 
this social problem as something structural, which will continue into the future 
without being solved in the short term�1 To face it, it is necessary to combine the 
efforts of a whole society in looking for solutions�
Mankind is facing extreme violence of proportions that are very different from 
what we have seen historically in parts of the world threatened by terrorism and 
violent movements� A differentiating element of jihadist terrorism is the act of 
suicide� It also shares similarities with other forms of extreme violence whose 
objective is the control and domination of all humanity: theoretically, looking for 
benefits for society, but actually, causing serious harm to not only non-Muslims 
but to the Muslim culture in general�
The jihadist radicalization process has not grown spontaneously, or recently� 
In fact, it has been growing and consolidating for many years, developing its uses, 
becoming ever more sophisticated to increase its power of attracting new recruits� 
The messages of terrorist groups occupy an important place in this process� These 
groups persistently send messages favoring a certain education and instructing 
their recruits to do everything within the parameters which they dictate� They 
send seductive messages that appeal to most urgent personal needs, or threatening 
messages which set out the boundaries of behavior, thought and attitudes which 
are permitted or allowed: messages generating ambivalence, misleading, exclud-
ing, cheating and shrouding, messages that, in addition, invite the use of extreme 
violence for the attainment of certain objectives that they consider legitimate�2
1 J� Victoroff, Suicide Terrorism and the Biology of Significance, “Political Psychology”, 
no� 20, 2009, pp� 397–400�
2 L� Veres, Imagen, terrorismo y argumentación, “Revista Iberoamericana de Argumen-
tación”, no� 4, 2012, pp� 1–14�
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We do not have enough information about psychological and social factors af-
fecting this process, even when we try to isolate the characteristics differentiating 
a person who is committed to radicalism and violence from those who are not� In 
fact, the reactions that an individual can reproduce when facing a certain social 
pressure are very broad� Some of them opt to fight to maintain their freedom, be-
ing attacked, while others join the terrorist cause� Therefore, the psychological and 
social variables must be studied to understand the complexity of the process and 
to be able to stop it and fight against it� Studying them poses great difficulties 
and a huge challenge when strategies are established to permit the understanding, 
prevention and eradication of this social scar�3
One of the collateral effects of the problem with Islamic terrorism is the general 
confusion that is provoked regarding the perception of Muslim culture� It has 
generated a feeling of hate against Muslims in Europe, increasing the negative 
perception already present before the jihadist threat�4 A link between Jihadism and 
Muslim society has been created, based on ignorance, which has created a general 
social image far from objective reality� Actually, jihadist terrorism is a minority 
of the society that it claims to represent, creating an image that mistakenly links 
a culture with the concept of violence and terrorism� In spite of this unfortunate 
link, it is no more violent than any other might be� 
This article intends to establish the causes and factors related to the jihadist 
radicalization process, the social and psychological factors and the role played 
by the different spheres of society and culture, through personal, political and 
religious socialization, through family, school, social movements, the media and 
so on� Its goal is to complete an analysis allowing us to draw conclusions to build 
the necessary strategies to be implemented by peaceful societies intended to fight 
against Islamic terrorism, and to prevent the radicalization of individuals�
2. Violence and Terrorism
2.1 Aggression and violence
To be able to deepen the understanding of terrorist violence, we first need to ask 
whether violence is a natural or cultural phenomenon� It is in this debate that the 
3 H�M� Trujillo, Hacia una mejor comprensión psicológica del terrorismo: reclutamiento, 
ideología y violencia, “Revista de Psicología Social”, no� 24, 2009, pp� 163–181�
4 Z� Strabac, O� Listhung, Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: a multilevel analysis of survey 
data from 30 countries, “Social Science Research”, no� 37, 2008, pp� 268–286�
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difference between the concepts of violence and aggression becomes particularly 
relevant�
Aggression is a biological feature that can be found in every living being and that 
serves to increase the biological efficacy of the species� Therefore, it is not necessarily 
a negative characteristic; it is acquired through evolution, if we believe in an adap-
tive response which is a part of the facing strategies present in all human beings�5
The World Health Organization defines violence as, “The intentional use of 
physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or 
against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of 
resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation�”6 
The definition includes interpersonal violence, suicidal behavior and armed con-
flicts� It refers not only to perpetrated violence but also to acts intended to gener-
ate damage, such as threats or intimidation� It highlights the importance of the 
consequences not only at the physical level but also at the psychological one: 
psychical damage, privations, development impairments, which are less visible 
but highly damaging for the people’s wellbeing�
Violence is a perverse configuration of aggressiveness with a destructive char-
acter over people; it is a social dysfunction, as it means a loss of its adaptive 
character� It is useless from a biological point of view and deliberate from a psy-
chological point of view�7
We can talk about aggression as something innate, biological, inevitable and 
able to be molded by culture, and about violence as something human, avoidable, 
non-biological and cultural� Violence is useless from a biological point of view 
and the result of the interaction between natural aggression and culture� In this 
way, violence is molded by different psychological, cultural and social factors�8
Violence is specifically human, being a product of culture and socialization�9 It 
is an intended behavior destined to obtain domination and control, using force in 
an explicit or implicit manner, with the aim of obtaining from a person or group 
5 J� Sanmartín, Agresividad y violencia, in: El laberinto de la violencia. Causas, tipos y 
efectos (ed�) J� Sanmartín, Ariel, Barcelona 2004, p� 21�
6 World Health Organization, Violence: a public health priority. Global Consultation 
on Violence and Health, available at http://www�who�int/violence_injury_prevention/
violence/world_report/en/introduction�pdf, accessed 6 January 2016� 
7 E� Echeburúa, P� De Corral, Raíces psicológicas del fanatismo político, “Análisis y modi-
ficación de conducta”, no� 30 (130), 2004, pp� 161–176�
8 P� Imbusch, The concept of violence, in: International Handbook of Violence Research 
W� Heitmeyer, J� Hagan (eds�), Kluwer, Netherlands, 2003, pp� 13–39�
9 J� Sanmartín, La violencia y sus claves, Ariel, Barcelona 2000�
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of people what they do not want to freely consent to� Research has already shown 
that it is a product or co-occurrence in time of several interrelated factors�10
Johan Galtung11 points out three types of violence:
•	  Direct violence, which refers to physical and/or verbal violence, which is the 
most visible type and the one referred to by most people; it is the one where 
we can identify victims and also killers� 
•	  Structural violence, which is a part of the social structure and its mechanism� 
It is easy to identify the victims but not the killers, as the origin is not in spe-
cific people� 
•	  Cultural violence refers to the group of values, ideas and convictions used to 
justify or legitimize structural or direct violence, and is the one that gives the 
perception of normality in its exercise�
Galtung suggests that these three types of violence are intimately related, in the 
fact that both the structural violence and the cultural violence are detonators 
for the diverse manifestations of direct violence� This approach has political and 
analytical consequences� Regarding jihadist terrorism, for instance, it forces us 
not only to analyze the attacks and their victims, but also to challenge the struc-
tural and cultural tendencies sustaining terrorism� In light of this approach, to 
eradicate jihadist terrorism is to change the educational and the cultural norms 
which maintain it�
2.2 Terrorist violence
Not all violent acts are acts of terrorism, but all terrorist acts are acts of violence� 
What makes the difference between terrorist violence and other kinds of violence 
is generally the intention behind them� Violence is aimed at achieving ideological 
objectives –religious, ethnical, political – that serve as a support and justification, 
and that are based on control, impulsiveness and hate�12
Speaking of terrorism implies highlighting the existence of two important 
characteristics, the first one is that it is directed toward people, and the second 
one, that this violence intends to influence people’s perception to incorporate 
them, by their own will or not, to the terrorist cause through fear and violence�13 
10 R� Borum, Psychology of terrorist, University of South Florida, Tampa 2004�
11 J� Galtung, Cultural Violence, “Journal of Peace Research” no� 27(3), 1990, pp� 291–305�
12 H�M� Trujillo, Hacia una mejor comprensión psicológica del terrorismo: reclutamiento, 
ideología y violencia, “Revista de Psicología Social”, no� 24, 2009, pp� 163–181�
13 K� Aulestia, Historia general del terrorismo, Aguilar, Madrid 2005�
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Jihadist terrorism is a global terrorism having as its target everyone who is not 
a follower of that particular strain of Islam, including those who follow other 
tendencies of Islam�
Ideology is a key aspect in understanding terrorist violence, which in the field 
of psychology becomes a model to explain terrorist behavior and the dichotomy 
of the moral filter used by terrorists, allowing them to commit atrocities for a 
“good cause�” We consider ideology to be a group of accepted norms following 
an individual’s beliefs, values, principles and purposes,14 that allow the justifica-
tion of violent behaviors� In the terrorist’s mind, the conviction remains that his 
actions are justified as a means to obtain what is deemed fair�15 In studies linking 
extremist ideology with terrorism,16 we see that an environment characterized by 
the extreme radicalization of the ideas is, without doubt, a trigger for terrorism�
Terrorist violence has grown and evolved over the years and now confronts 
us with a new form of terrorism with very different characteristics to what the 
world had experienced up to now� Considering this evolution, some authors have 
referred to “old terrorism” and “new terrorism”17 applying the first term to the 
groups in search of political power, independence or nationalism, and the second 
to the groups having mainly religious motives�
The value given to human life is a key characteristic of jihadist terrorism, com-
pared with other forms assumed by terrorism, in which the terrorist tries to keep 
his own life� The final objective is to cause as much damage as possible, looking for 
the greatest glory� It is a battle in what is called holy war against the unbelievers� 
For them, the Western countries are not only where the unbelievers live but also an 
unholy land that is not under the protection of their God� This land is yet to be con-
quered� Generally, terrorist movements claim the rights over other territories� For 
the Islamic terrorists, the whole world is their territory because it is the territory of 
their God� It is terrorism with a global perspective, directed against all unbelievers�
In addition, to accomplish their terrorist acts, jihadist groups make use of 
drugs to have enough courage to carry out violent acts� The use of drugs, to-
gether with the process of indoctrination (for example, the de-humanization of 
the victim, the attribution of the fault to the victim, among others), contributes 
to the inhibition of those psychological processes, social values and moral brakes 
14 C� J� Drake, The role of ideology in terrorists’target selection, “Terrorism and Political 
Violence” no� 10, 1998, pp� 53–85�
15 F� Alonso-Fernández, Fanáticos Terroristas, Masson, Madrid 2002� 
16 I� Martín-Baró, Poder, ideología y violencia, Trotta, Madrid 2003�
17 A� Spencer, Questioning the concept of New Terrorism, “Peace Conflict and Develop-
ment” no� 8, 2006, pp� 1–33�
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that work against such destructiveness and violence�18 It is a kind of contrived 
terrorism, with studied and designated targets, which powerfully represents the 
religious act through death sacrifice that, in addition, offers an example which 
others can imitate and to adore� 
The terrorist investigation, in spite of its growth over the last years, has rarely 
been evaluated by means of empirical methods, which is why the challenge of 
expanding scientific methods is now being set up, from a rigorous and systematic 
perspective, for this social problem�
2.3 Suicidal jihadist terrorism
Suicide terrorism constitutes a new phenomenon different from other forms of 
violence and terrorism� It is difficult to understand the process of bringing some-
one to push to an extreme his behavior up to the point of taking his own life as a 
destructive element to cause the greatest possible harm� It would be easy to refer 
to a mental illness to explain such a complex phenomenon, but research shows 
that suicide terrorism corresponds to several complex causes,
Suicide attacks can be defined as a violent, politically motivated acts executed 
by one or more individuals, in which completing the terrorist act depends on 
the death of the terrorist carrying it out� These operations are less expensive, and 
can be easily organized, without having to activate any runaway device� Suicide 
attacks manage to kill four times more people than other terrorist acts, and they 
also have a very important impact on the media that guarantees a great deal of 
attention on the terrorist and his message�19
Islamic fundamentalist groups confer a divine character on the act of suicide, 
considering the dead terrorists as martyrs whose objective was to accomplish an 
order: jihad (understood as the individual necessary effort to successfully achieve 
what you intend to do)� In this way, they are recognized as victims and obtain eter-
nal life in paradise for this sacrifice� Through religious influence, the individual 
can find a sense of satisfaction in his death and later recognition, creating an im-
age which favors the preparation process for a suicide attack� From this point of 
view, socialization, understood as a process for which human beings incorporate 
18 G� LaFree, G� Ackerman, The Empirical Study of Terrorism: Social and Legal Research, 
“The Annual Review of Law and Social Science”, no� 5, 2009, pp� 347–374�
19 M� Torres, El Terrorismo Suicida y sus Desafíos, available at http://www�upo�es/export/
portal/com/bin/portal/upo/profesores/mrtorsor/profesor/1214214328678_suicida_
escaneado�pdf, accessed 6 January 2016�
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rules, values, attitudes and conduct, contributes to generating a concept of death 
which favors suicide terrorism� 
Its novelty and variety makes it difficult to establish a profile that would allow 
us to identify those individuals who might respond to extremist organizations’ 
calls to commit suicide attacks� Besides, we could add how difficult it is to use a 
psychological approach based on hypotheses, as it is not possible to analyze the 
psychological characteristics of those who commit suicidal terrorist acts precisely 
because the perpetrators are left dead in the attack� There is a wide variety of vari-
ables in terms of age, education, nationality, and gender� The meaning, motives, 
and causes of suicide attacks remain unclear�20 They can be related to religion, 
nationality, ideas or revenge� Intense indoctrination and a repressive social and 
political system can be the elements that push an individual toward such an ex-
treme conduct�
3. Radicalization and Recruitment as a Psychosocial Process
Radicalization can be defined as an increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and 
behaviors in support of an intergroup conflict and violence,21 so that individu-
als are prepared for social conflict, modifying elements that justify intergroup 
violence and promote commitment and personal sacrifice in defense of a cause 
deemed just by the radical groups� The violent radicalization process allows cer-
tain individuals to become terrorists, led by factors such as injustice (whether 
perceived or real), social exclusion, religious extremism, social unacceptance or 
discrimination�22
Of course, the radicalization process is driven by the creation of group iden-
tities�23 It is based on cultural and social elements which influence individual 
ideologies� Erving Goffman’s interpretive frames theory offers a good description 
of how shared meanings are built within each group� Goffman defines an inter-
pretive frame as a set of action-oriented beliefs and meanings� The interpretive 
20 D� Gambetta, Making sense of suicide missions, Oxford University, Oxford 2005�
21 C� McCauley, S� Moskalenko, Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward 
Terrorism, “Terrorism and Political Violence”, no� 20, 2008, pp� 415–433�
22 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Council concerning terrorist recruitment – Addressing the factors 
contributing to violent radicalisation, 2005, available at (http://eur-lex�europa�eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1452973247690&uri=CELEX:52005DC0313), accessed 
6 January 2016�
23 E� Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Harper and 
Row, London 1974� 
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frames legitimate and inspire social movement activities, provide meaning to 
participants, and build their personal and collective identity� In this case, the ideo-
logical and cultural interpretive frames would be the ideas, traditions, political 
speeches, language, mental attitudes, symbols, rituals, myths and values� Through 
them, all individuals joining jihadism progressively delegate their own identity 
in the name of the supreme mandate led by the group’s ideology, reinforcing its 
radicalization on a daily basis�
The jihadist’s ideological radicalization is an initial step to performing terrorist 
acts� Even though not all radicals are terrorists, we can affirm that all terrorists 
have gone through a similar process� This process feeds on different psychologi-
cal and social situations like social alienation, racism or discrimination, identity 
problems that mix frictions of Muslim and Western cultures, psychological factors 
such as depression, frustration or family problems� Through the use of sophisti-
cated propaganda systems, the extremists offer a sense of belonging and existential 
meaning, mixed with a promise of salvation� They also claim their movement to 
be Islam’s purest representation�
When analyzing the attraction and recruitment process, it should also be taken 
into account that sometimes extremists offer salaries, which, for some youngsters 
with no future, can be the only option for personal development and subsistence� 
In this way, the Islamic State offers attractive financial incentives crucial for them 
to join the jihadist fight�
Places like mosques, prisons or certain neighborhoods can be breeding grounds 
for terrorist recruitment, especially for those with characteristics more prone to 
radicalization� It is also true that self-recruiting is increasing due to the Internet 
and social networks�24
4.  Analysis of Key Factors Contributing to Jihadist 
Radicalization according to the Ecological Model 
In order to analyze Islamic terrorism one has to determine its etiology and indica-
tors that might be associated with the origin and persistence of the phenomenon� 
Despite the complexity of determining which are the exact motivations that lead 
24 A� Kirby, The London Bombers as Self-Starters: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicaliza-
tion and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques, “Studies in Conflict and Terrorism”, 
no� 30, 2007, pp� 415–428�
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someone to opt for jihadism, the most common factors accompanying them are 
identifiable�25
Terrorist violence can only be understood through the ecological model, since 
it offers a multi-causal explanation of the complex phenomenon and points out 
three different levels: Macrosystem, Exosystem (intermediate), and Microsystem�
The Macrosystem:
The macrosystem implies political, social, economic and even cultural indicators 
that shape the society to which a future radicalized individual initially belongs� 
The belief systems, radical ideas and cultural guidelines which justify and support 
terrorist violence provide the grounds for the acceptance of Islamic terrorism�
Even though this level’s influence on radicalism seems obvious and there is a 
consensus about it, it is not possible to specify precisely which elements would 
allow us to predict with certainty an individual or collective radicalization�26 As 
an example, we can point to the widespread diffusion of jihadist ideology, which 
is necessary at that level to generate a framework for collective alignment, but 
which does not completely explain violence on its own�27
The Exosystem:
The Exosystem includes the context where social relations take place such as work, 
family, school, friends, religious forums, influence of radical leaders, and so on� 
These community referents facilitate or neutralize the emergence of a fundamental 
reference framework that normalizes, promotes and accelerates the radicalization 
processes� The actors and structures at this level allow the macro level factors to 
settle and crystallize in the individual� For example, belonging to a group provides 
great power to transmit norms and behaviors, and even shapes the individual’s 
self-esteem�28 At the same time, messages sent by different agents from outside the 
25 J� Horgan, Psychological Factors Related to Disengaging from Terrorism. Some Prelimi-
nary Assumptions and Assertions, in: A Future for the Young. Options for Helping Middle 
Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization Ch� Bernard (ed�), Rand Corporation, 
Santa Monica 2005, pp� 65–91�
26 J� Jordán, Procesos de radicalización yihadista en España. Análisis sociopolítico en tres 
niveles, “Revista de Psicología Social”, no� 24 (2), 2009, pp� 197–216�
27 J� Waller, Becoming Evil. How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007�
28 O� Roy, El islam mundializado. Los musulmanes en la era de la globalización, Bellaterra, 
Barcelona 2003�
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group, for example non-jihadists, exert much less influence� Alonso and Berlel29 
talk about the risk of loss of individual identity in vulnerable subjects, in favor of 
an increase in group identity� If the estrangement at the macro level is great, the 
exosystem has more influence in the radicalization process�
Risk factors, such as unemployment, social network sites filled with radical 
messages, social isolation, exclusion or absence of integrative programs, or even 
pertaining to homogeneous groups that remain not integrated – for example, 
Muslim migrants amongst others – can lead to facilitating and increasing radi-
calization� This level is of crucial importance in the recruitment of subjects as well 
as in their reintegration� That is why it is necessary to look deeply into it in order 
to work on the prevention and eradication of terrorism�
The Microsystem:
The microsystem relates to the individual part of a person, that is to say, to all 
psychological and biological factors and personal history� It also includes the 
cognitive, behavioral, affective and interactional characteristics, the influence of 
close relationships to increase the permeability of becoming a radical (for exam-
ple, through a partner)�
There are many myths related to the mental health or illness of terrorists, stat-
ing that such acts cannot possibly be perpetrated by mentally healthy people� 
We cannot establish the terrorists’ personality disorders, psychopathy, or mental 
sickness as a cause of jihadist terrorism, since most of these people are not sick; 
they are aware of their acts and take full responsibility for them� However, we may 
talk about a social disease� In spite of the scarce data on this subject and the need 
to further investigate the psychological indicators, we would be facing fanatical 
people who have a biased interpretation of the facts, hostile attitudes, and who are 
convinced that the only way to reach their goals is through the use of violence�30 
This model emphasizes how vulnerable personalities and conductible surround-
ings explain the development of radicalism�
We cannot talk about a radical prototype nor isolate the combination of vari-
ables that guarantee the individual’s radicalization; he can be of any age, nation-
ality, social or cultural level� The experience shows that we should add different 
characteristics to the three levels that together can create triggers of the radical 
process�
29 R� Alonso y S� Berbell, Procesos grupales e intergrupales, in: Psicología de los grupos. 
Teoría y aplicaciones P� González (ed�), Síntesis, Madrid 1997, pp� 759–810�
30 F� Reinares, Perfil del terrorista, in: El laberinto de la violencia. Causas, tipos y efectos, 
J� Sanmartín (ed�), Ariel, Barcelona 2004, pp� 283–290�
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5. Prevention of Jihadism Radicalization
Governments now incorporate the fight against terrorism as a priority� Until re-
cently, they have been primarily reactive to terrorist challenges, but now they 
accept the need to incorporate a proactive vision� It is necessary to review the 
policies that have been developed in the fight against jihadi terrorism and look 
for more global ways to bet on prevention� Prevention can be no longer seen as 
an exclusive prerogative of governments; the whole society has to be involved in 
the terrorism eradication�
There is no doubt that analyzing more effective prevention strategies implies 
knowing, revising, and incorporating the political, social, historical and economic 
factors at an international level, and their influence on jihadist terrorism� Here 
we will focus on analyzing, from a psychological and social perspective, the basic 
initiatives – mainly those involving the micro and meso levels of the ecological 
model – without forgetting that these initiatives have to be put together with the 
macro level measures that will be addressed in other chapters of this book�
Prevention needs to be addressed at three different levels, which we shall now 
discuss�
When the conflict has not yet surfaced, it is necessary to run interventions 
on the population in general, oriented to foster respect, equality, tolerance and 
non-violence, removing social and cultural obstacles that generate hate and dis-
crimination� This dimension needs to be developed within the culture itself and 
directed toward other cultures� 
Education in values is a key aspect when preventing terrorist violence in our 
society� To build a society based in equality and respect, it is necessary to work 
from early schooling through the whole education process� Likewise, we need to 
remove the mechanisms that promote racist situations and violence, to actively 
confront them, favoring cognitive, affective and behavioral changes radically op-
posed to those promoted by terrorism�
The macro strategy to fight terrorism must integrate a perspective on the de-
fense of human rights helping to discover that these problems damage not only 
the more visible victims but also the whole society� It is advisable to stimulate 
among the population the capacity to put themselves in someone else’s place, the 
understanding of universal rights and the ability to use such understanding in 
each and every moral decision, linking such rights with the (also universal) duty 
to respect them� In that sense, religions and religious leaders must be an example 
of peace, integration and tolerance, promoting human rights in the world and 
condemning any violent practice in the name of faith�
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The media are a privileged source of information and influence� They have an 
undeniable capacity to construct reality, transmit ideology and present behav-
ioral models that turn them into a powerful platform to spread symbols, beliefs 
and values prevailing in our society; they also function as an agent or mediator 
in the socializing process� The media’s role is necessary to offer positive and real 
models of peaceful coexistence,31 to transmit values that eradicate religious or 
ethnic discrimination, to give voice to those with strong and motivating ideas 
that discourage individuals away from the radicalization process and generate 
identification alternatives�
Secondary prevention must be addressed to the academic, working, family, 
social, religious and custodial contexts, and must be focused on intervening in 
the social problems that may generate discrimination and social exclusion (unem-
ployment, lack of housing, racism, poverty, discrimination), and on psychologi-
cal and emotional problems (psychological problems and disorders, emotional 
deficit, self-esteem problems)�32 Both the social and psychological dimensions play 
an important role in encouraging the radicalization process� From the personal 
sphere, fostering the construction of one’s own positive identity, that allows teen-
agers to discover what they want to be, and to take adequate decisions that will 
be put into practice in the future, becomes a watertight barrier against extremist 
ideologies�
Finally, the third stage is directed to those already affected by radicalization, 
developing psychological and social intervention processes that enable their social 
reintegration� This would be without diminishing or replacing any legal sentences 
for the consequences of their actions� To that end, new intervention models need 
to be developed to allow the revision of their ideology and the change of their 
strategies in order to deradicalize them�
6. Conclusion
Jihadist terrorism represents a threat against human security on a global scale, 
creating the need for joint global intervention� It grows and evolves acquiring 
singular and unpredictable forms, spreading collective terror and maintaining 
its goal of causing severe damage to the societies where it appears� In order to 
eradicate it, it is important to search for efficient, global strategies that do not 
31 O� Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists. Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 
Routledge, New York 2009�
32 R� Borum, Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models 
and Empirical Research, “Journal of Strategic Security”, no� 4, 2011, pp� 37–62�
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generate more victims or violence and that take into account that any attempt of 
eradication will find strong resistance�
Based on its very definition, and as well as its difference to aggression, we can 
affirm that we are facing extreme violent behaviors, produced and maintained by 
society and culture, unnecessary for human survival, and whose analysis has to 
transcend the specific acts of direct violence perpetrated by the terrorists, to go 
deep into the roots of the structural and cultural violence that justify these acts�
In order to be able to eradicate jihadist terrorism, we need to relate it to other 
forms of violence and to know the role of different social agents, states and even 
society, with the aim of eliminating any escalation in what we might call a spiral 
of violence� To that end, we must incorporate a global peace strategy, introducing 
non-violent elements as the only way to cut the Gordian knot of violence� We must 
not forget that the more harm violence provokes, the more complex it becomes 
to combat it in a peaceful way�
Jihadi terrorist groups use a strong message which is able to create an ideology 
and transmit values that modify thoughts, feelings and attitudes in some people, 
transforming them into radicalized individuals who join their violent cause� Their 
first aim is to stimulate the need to belong to a chosen minority fighting for a 
supreme goal�
Social sciences play a fundamental role in the study of the processes of radi-
calization and recruitment, due to the necessity of incorporating a general vision 
in the analysis� The goal is to provide an answer to the question of how to prevent 
someone’s radicalization� Moreover, it is important to develop a strategy of inter-
vention concerning those who have already become radicalized� It is not possible 
to know for sure which are the elements that influence the radicalization process, 
we have no conclusive certainties that allow us to describe, understand, predict 
and prevent terrorist behavior�
The ecological model applied to terrorism provides an essential global and 
multi-causal vision of the interactions in individual, family, academic, social and 
media contexts that any analysis and proposal for action should keep in mind�
Preventing and reducing terrorist violence implies changing the norms and 
values that tolerate and encourage it, as well as anything reinforcing attitudes 
prone to radicalization� To reduce the impact of this process, it is necessary to 
minimize the scope of the extremist socializing agents and, at the same time, to 
create alternatives resistant to that ideology� The promotion of values incompatible 
with violence and radicalization – respect, tolerance, empathy, and so on – has to 
be at the heart of prevention strategies, intervening at every stage of the person’s 
evolution, especially in childhood education, but also including the development 
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of preventive actions directed at re-educating of adults� Moreover, a clear and 
powerful message must be spread in order to raise people’s awareness and promote 
more peaceful attitudes�
Once we have become aware of the scale of the problem, there is no other op-
tion but to establish a genuine dialogue between cultures and religions, to look for 
peace and harmony among different beliefs and block any ideology that infringes 
upon human rights, searching for spaces to build strengths against any kind of 
discrimination or violence�
The tendency to criminalize Muslim culture as a consequence of its link with 
jihadist terrorism fosters a culture of hate and discrimination� Official doctrines 
must emerge and become visible to point the real and accurate interpretation of 
the sacred texts and provide some distance from extremist interpretations, look-
ing for a greater knowledge, awareness and integration of the different cultural 
and religious perspectives internally and among cultures� Muslim leaders play an 
important role in the neutralization of jihadist messages and in the construction 
of alternatives�
It is necessary to work for the integration of Muslim immigrants’ identity to 
grant them full citizenship access� To that end, we need to analyze the exclusion 
and social vulnerability they suffer� Even though these factors do not completely 
explain the terrorist’s behavior, they represent a risk factor, in the same way that 
the process of social inclusion provides a psychological, economic and social 
balance, contributing to self-esteem, independence and the feeling of being valu-
able� All these factors are important in terms of protection� Working for real and 
effective social inclusion through positive actions represents a strong prevention 
strategy�
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Anna Potyrała
Islamic State – Disputed Statehood
1. Introduction
In June 2014, a terrorist group calling itself “Islamic State” proclaimed itself as a 
caliphate� After seizing large territories of Syria and Iraq, establishing a basis of 
administration and gaining control over the population inhabiting captured areas, 
the group announced a state governed in accordance with the Islamic law by a 
caliph� Reactions of the international community members were easy to predict� 
In official declarations, states, as well as international organizations, notified their 
refusal to recognize statehood of the new entity� Nevertheless, a real problem has 
been faced: how to deal with an entity engaged in terrorist activities, and there-
fore posing a real threat to international peace and security, but at the same time 
claiming to be a sovereign, independent state? Are these claims in accordance 
with international law if the entity has violated principles of territorial integrity, 
sovereign equality and inviolability of borders – all these of a ius cogens character? 
The aim of the analysis is to verify the hypothesis according to which, in case of the 
so-called Islamic State’s proclamation of caliphate, the entity established cannot 
be treated as a state, as it has no legal personality in international law and, accord-
ingly, is not a recognized member of the international community� For this reason, 
the international law criteria concerning statehood will be analyzed in light of the 
determinants of statehood formulated in international practice� Consequently, 
reasons against the IS statehood will be specified� Among them, not only criteria 
of statehood, but references to international response will be formulated� The 
text will not focus on the historical background of the IS establishment, nor on 
military activities of this group, but only on the issue of statehood�
2.  The Criteria of Statehood according to  
International Law and Practice
According to the classical definition provided by Georg Jellinek, a state is char-
acterized by three elements: territory, population living on that territory and 
government exercising authority over the population and the territory�1 The first 
1 See: J� R� Crawford, The Creation of State in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1979, pp� 36–47�
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element is regarded as any area which is subjected to exclusive rights and interests 
of a particular state-entity� Whilst a state can exist if it loses control over its ter-
ritory – as a result of a conflict, for instance – it cannot be proclaimed without 
it�2 The size of the territory, as well as its location, composition (land territory 
with rivers, lakes etc�, the subsoil, the air space, maritime areas in case of coastal 
states) is not relevant� The second element refers to a group of persons subjected 
to a government authority and living permanently in a defined territory�3 The 
last element – government – means an organization or an organ of a political 
and administrative character, able to control all aspects of the state functioning 
and responsible for vindication of rights and obligations of this entity� This is the 
crucial task of government: not only to guarantee territorial integrity and the 
existence of a state but also to control behavior of its inhabitants� According to 
Hans Kelsen, a state: “is the specific union of individuals, and this union is the 
function of the order which regulates their mutual behaviour�”4 Therefore, stability 
and effectiveness are its key characteristics�
Nonetheless, such a three-element understanding has been formulated only 
for the purposes of internal functioning of a state� One must assume that, from 
the point of view of international law and international relations, the above-
mentioned definition should be complemented with two additional elements� 
The reason is that an entity can be treated as a state only so long as it has the 
capacity of being a bearer of rights and duties defined in the international law, as 
well as of acting with legal effect, especially concluding international agreements, 
establishing diplomatic and consular relations, being a member of international 
organizations, being internationally responsible or having privileges and immuni-
ties� Therefore, territory, population and government do not constitute a state in 
the international law and international relations�
Although, there is no universal international agreement pointing out conditions 
necessary to be fulfilled by an entity which applies for an international legal status 
of a state, in 1933 a four-element definition was introduced� According to the Mon-
tevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, apart from a defined territory, 
a permanent population and government, “capacity to enter into relations with the 
2 See: Th� Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 
“Columbia Journal of Transnational Law” no� 37, 1999, pp� 435�
3 “It does not mean that there can be no migration of peoples across territorial bounda-
ries”: M� Dixon, Textbook on International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, 
p� 119�
4 H� Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, “Harvard Law Review” 
no� 55, 1941, p� 44�
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other States” is necessary for statehood,5 for only in relations with other states a given 
state is able to function actively in the international arena and to fulfill its objectives� 
Another crucial element constituting a state in international law and inter-
national relations is sovereignty, defined in accordance with the decision on the 
Island of Palmas as “independence� Independence with regard to a portion of 
the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the 
functions of a State�”6 According to Ludwik Ehrlich, sovereignty can be perceived 
as independence from any other authority both in the internal sense (absolute 
authority, i�e� the authority of a state on its territory is primary, highest, exclusive 
and unlimited) and in the external sense (self-rule, i�e� independence from other 
states, but not from all external factors)� Sovereignty implies a full capacity to 
perform legal transactions in the international arena and the protection of the 
legal status of a State in the form of mandatory standards prohibiting certain ac-
tions against States in their mutual relations�7
And although statehood depends only on meeting the aforementioned criteria,8 
the actual functioning of a state in the international arena is strictly connected to 
international recognition� Without a formal consent expressed by other states, a 
state entity remains a “non-entity�”9 It is difficult for an entity which has not been 
recognized or which has gained recognition only of a limited number of states, 
to exercise certain rights granted to it under the international law; it does not 
participate in international “life” or does it to a limited extent�10 An entity, which 
is not internationally recognized, cannot fully benefit from e�g� being a member 
of international organizations, concluding treaties, the right of legation and the 
right to send and receive consular officers, as well as from privileges and immuni-
ties for its representatives�
5 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, 165 I�N�T�S� 19, Art� 1�
6 The Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), United States of America v. the Netherlands. 
Award of the Tribunal of 4 April 1928, Reports of International Arbitral Awards� Vol� XI, 
The Hague� April 4, 1928 (reprint: The Hague� 2009), p� 838�
7 R� Kwiecień, Teoria i filozofia prawa międzynarodowego. Problemy wybrane, Wydawnict-
wo Difin, Warszawa 2011, p� 123�
8 Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia on 29 November 1991, Opin-
ion no� 1, reproduced in 92 International Law Reports, 1993, point 1, 2�
9 R� D� Sloane, The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of 
Tibet, “Emory International Law Review” no� 16, 2002, p� 116�
10 M� Muszkat (ed�), Zarys prawa międzynarodowego, Vol� II, Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, 
Warsaw 1956, p� 6�
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Until the end of the 18th century, there were no references to state recogni-
tion in international law, and hardly any in international law studies� When the 
recognition became a topic of interest of theoreticians in the second half of the 
18th century, it was treated as an illegal intervention in matters of another state 
or as a unilateral act the need for which could not be justified�11 Only the events 
which led to the declaration of independence by states in American continents 
made members of the international community realize the role of state recogni-
tion� According to the concept of Lassa Oppenheim, international law is the law of 
civilized countries, and the recognition leads to the incorporation of a new state, 
created in accordance to the will of its nation, to the international community� 
In consequence, in the opinion of Oppenheim, the lack of recognition makes it 
impossible for a country to become a part of the family of civilized nations and 
to function in the international arena�
Taking the above into consideration, it became necessary to specify the crite-
ria determining the formal acceptance of newly created states� For the first time, 
conditions for recognizing a state were determined in 1825 by the then Foreign 
Minister of the United Kingdom George Canning� Only a state, whose govern-
ment had declared its independence and exercised the actual authority of the 
state, and which was stable, unified and banned slave trade, could hope to be 
recognized�12 Due to the territorial changes which took place in Europe after 
1989 and to the necessity to harmonize the recognition criteria and adjust them 
11 Such an opinion was expressed, inter alia, by Johann Christian Wilhelm von Steck and 
Georg Friedrich von Martens: J� Ch� Von Steck, Versuche über verschiedene Materien 
politischer und rechtlischer Kenntnisse, Lange1, Berlin-Stralsund 1783, available at http://
www�archive�org, accessed 16 Janury� 2016; G� F� von Martens, A Compendium of the Law 
of Nations founded on the treaties and customs of the modern nations of Europe, Cobbett 
and Morgan, London 1802, available at http://www�archive�org, accessed 16 January 2016�
12 R� Bierzanek, J� Symonides, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne, Wydawnictwo PWN, 
Warszawa 1994, p� 134; More: on the concept of State recognition in the 19th century: 
M� Fabry, Recognizing States. International Society and the Establishment of New States 
Since 1776, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2010, pp� 49–78� It has not 
only been the recognition of a State that causes emotional reactions� The recognition 
of governments which came to power in a non-constitutional manner is equally con-
troversial� In 1951, UK Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison, in his speech to the House 
of Commons, indicated criteria on the basis of which recognition of governments was 
to be performed� They included, inter alia, exercising actual and permanent control 
over most of the State territory� However, in 1980, Lord Carrington – another UK 
Foreign Minister – clearly stated that British authorities would not recognise govern-
ments� Thus, the UK accepted the Estrada Doctrine, elaborated earlier by authorities 
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to the requirements of modern times, on December, 16th 1991 Foreign Ministers 
of Member States of European Communities adopted, at their meeting in Brus-
sels, the Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union� The Declaration comprised conditions 
which had to be met in order to make it possible to recognize a state� They in-
cluded obligations to:
•	  respect the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Final Act of 
the CSCE and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe;
•	  guarantee the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accord-
ance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;
•	  respect the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful 
means and by common agreement;
•	  accept all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation as well as to security and regional stability;
•	 peacefully settle disputes, including disputes related to succession�13
Representatives of Member States of the then Communities highlighted that they 
would not recognize entities created as a result of aggression� Furthermore, they 
emphasized that, before making the final decision, they would take consequences 
for neighboring countries into account� The above criteria reflect not only the 
principles of international law (the obligation to solve disputes in a peaceful man-
ner, the principle of the inviolability of frontiers) constituting its foundation but 
also the ius cogens norms (protection of human rights, respect for the principle 
of sovereign equality of States, prohibition of the use of force or threats to use 
force)�14
Despite the elaboration of the criteria for recognition of new states, it is not 
absolutely clear if territorial changes have been consistent with applicable legal 
of Mexico, which rejects the possibility of recognizing governments� More in D� H� Ott, 
Public International Law in the Modern World, London 1987, pp� 85, 88–89�
13 Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe 
and in the Soviet Union, Letter dated 17 December 1991 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General� 
A/46/804, 18 December 1991�
14 That is the reason why Ch� Hillgruber was not right when he denied the relationship 
between the criteria elaborated within the framework of European Communities and 
the principles of international law� Cf� Ch� Hillgruber, The Admission of New States 
to International Community, “European Journal of International Law” no� 9, 1998, 
pp� 492–493�
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norms� Two, often contradictory, principles of international law are “weighed”: 
sovereign equality of states (respect for the territorial integrity of a state) and the 
nations’ right to self-determination� Sovereignty is a basic attribute of a state� It 
is defined as the absolute, sole, highest and unlimited authority of a state over its 
territory and population living there, and its capacity to act independently in the 
international arena� Sovereignty is important from the perspective of new state 
entities which strive for international recognition and, as a consequence, have to 
demonstrate the independent character of their actions at the internal and exter-
nal levels� Above all, however, sovereignty is an argument used by states to protect 
their territorial integrity� It constitutes a specific protection against attempts at 
secession on the part of national and ethnic minorities living in the existing states� 
Thus, the sovereignty of existing states makes it difficult or even impossible for 
new state entities to declare independence�
The peoples’ right to self-determination became an issue of interest to the inter-
national community during the French and the American Revolutions, when the 
right of a nation to decide about its own fate was emphasized� In the second half 
of the 19th century, national awareness kept growing and thus attention started to 
be paid to nations’ right to self-determination� In 1851, Pasquale S� Mancini, in 
his lecture entitled Nationality as the Foundation of the Law of Nations, presented 
his concept of rights attributed to a nation� He defined nationality as the right 
of an individual and a collectivity to benefit from freedom� As for freedom, he 
understood it as, inter alia, the right to create a separate state, to choose its inter-
nal regime, and to be independent from other peoples�15 After World War I, the 
reference to the existence of the principle of nation’s right to self-determination 
facilitated the acceptance of the new states emerging in territories of defeated 
countries� Self-determination, treated as a political but not legal principle, made 
it possible to achieve temporary political goals� It was American President Wood-
row Wilson who argued for the recognition of the right to self-determination as 
a principle of international law� In his numerous speeches, he pointed out that 
every authority owed its powers to the will of those who were subject to the power, 
and each nation had the right to choose the authority it would be subject to� In 
his speech of January 8th, 1918, Wilson argued that national aspirations should 
be taken into account and the principle of the right to self-determination should 
be a norm in the international arena� He said that Russia should obtain “her an 
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination 
15 L� Dembiński, Samostanowienie w prawie i praktyce ONZ, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsza-
wa 1969, p� 12�
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of ’ her own political development and national policy;” the peoples of Austria-
Hungary “should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous develop-
ment;” nations functioning under the Turkish regime rule “should be assured 
[…] an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development;” and 
the Polish nation should live in an independent Polish state� During the Versailles 
Peace Conference, Wilson underlined that it should be a basic rule in the post-
war world that no government or group of governments should be allowed to 
force free nations to subordination�16 He postulated to add to the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, next to the guarantee of political independence and territorial 
integrity of states, the possibility of territorial transformations in order to execute 
the principle of self-determination� Possible territorial transformations would be 
an effect of changes in racial, social or political relations taking place within the 
population living in a contentious territory and causing an increase in independ-
ence aspirations among the population members� Territorial changes would take 
place also with the approval of 3/4 of delegates of the League of Nations acting 
in the name and on behalf of the interested population�17 The ideas of Woodrow 
Wilson were developed further by Lloyd George who proposed to cover African 
nations living in German colonies with the principle of self-determination but 
those postulates did not gain international support� According to the Covenant 
of the League of Nations self-determination might take place only by means of 
granting nations autonomy within the framework of an existing state,18 not by 
recognizing the right of nations to freely determine their political status� That is 
why, in the interwar period, self-determination functioned as a political principle� 
The opinion on Aland Islands of the Advisory Committee of jurists appointed 
by the League of Nations in 1921 confirmed that self-determination was only a 
political concept, not a principle of international law�19
For the first time the principle of self-determination entered international law 
at the end of World War II� The Atlantic Charter signed in 1941 did not mention 
16 Cited after: A� Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination. A Study 
of United Nations Practice, Sijthoff International Publishing, Leyden 1973, pp� 95–96�
17 M� Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice. The New Doctrine in the United 
Nations, Springer, New York 1982, p� 7�
18 L� Dembiński, Samostanowienie w prawie…op�cit�, p� 17�
19 J� Tyranowski, Integralność terytorialna, nienaruszalność granic i samostanowienie w 
prawie międzynarodowym, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 1990, pp� 187–188; Ö� Öster-
ud, Sovereign Statehood and National Self–Determination. A World Order Dilemma, in: 
Subduing sovereignty. Sovereignty and the right to intervene, M� Heiberg (ed�), Pinter 
Publishers Ltd�, London 1994, p� 23�
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the principle of self-determination in an explicit manner� However, the principle 
was referred to, as it was stated that the signatories of the Charter “desire to see no 
territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peo-
ples concerned” and that “they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form 
of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights 
and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them�”20 
The first international document in which self-determination was expressly men-
tioned was the Charter of the United Nations� In Article 1(2) it was stipulated that 
friendly relations among nations should be developed with respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples� It was highlighted that only 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples would 
allow to create conditions of stability and well-being necessary for the mainte-
nance of peaceful and friendly relations among nations (Art� 55)� The principle of 
self-determination was defined on 14 December 1960 in the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514 
XV)� The emphasis on the inevitability of the process of decolonization guaranteed 
the people’ right to self-determination� Self-determination was defined as the right 
to freely determine the political status and ensure economic, social and cultural 
development� The right to self-determination was attributed, under point 3 of the 
Declaration, regardless of the level of political, economic, social or educational 
development of the peoples� On 14 December 1960, Resolution 1541 (XV) was 
adopted� It determined the ways to exercise the right to self-determination� Under 
provisions of the Resolution, exercising its right to self-determination people may 
create their own independent state, associate with an existing state or decide on 
integration with another state� In each case, the decision on the future political 
status should be the result of a free and voluntary decision of people living in a 
given territory, of their will expressed in a democratic manner�21
In thus defined right to self-determination, its two perspectives need to be un-
derlined� From the internal perspective, the right to self-determination is under-
stood as the possibility to determine the form of government� From the external 
perspective, people have the right to freely determine a political status of their 
20 Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, Art� 2, 3, available at http://avalon�law�yale�edu/
wwii/atlantic�asp, accessed 14 February 2016�
21 A� Potyrała, Prawo do samostanowienia a problem suwerenności państwa, in: Zbroj-
ne konflikty i spory międzynarodowe u progu XXI wieku. Analiza problemów i studia 
przypadków W� Malendowski (ed�), Wydawnictwo Atla 2, Wrocław 2003, pp� 76–80; 
M� Perkowski, Samostanowienie narodów w prawie międzynarodowym, Wydawnictwo 
PWN, Warsaw 2001� 
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state� The latter arose most controversies� Pursuant to Resolution 1541 (XV), the 
political status may be determined in three ways� A nation (people) invoking 
the right to self-determination may decide for a creation of its own independent 
state, an association with an existing state or a separation from an existing state 
and integration with another state� These three ways for exercising the right to 
self-determination did not arise serious concerns in relation to colonial peoples� 
However, applying them to all nations could threaten the sovereignty of existing 
states and the international order� The international community noticed that the 
right to self-determination as a universal law could lead to an intensification of 
separatist movements among peoples invoking the right to self-determination� 
Therefore, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law of 1970 it was 
underlined that the peoples’ right to self-determination should not be understood 
as “authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and inde-
pendent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples” (Declaration 1970)� Thus, the right to 
self-determination could be defined only as a right of peoples to demand and to 
develop autonomy within the framework of an existing state, the territory of which 
is inhabited by a given national group� It was decided that people could not invoke 
the right to self-determination by presenting demands for independence if a state 
acted in accordance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples� Thus, the interpretation of the right to self-determination as a right to 
secession22 of national groups from the authority of existing states was expressly 
rejected� Secession is acceptable only in the case of serious and massive human 
rights violations� Such a view was earlier presented by Hugo Grotius and Emmer 
de Vattel� Thus, members of the international community had no doubts when 
inhabitants of Timor-Leste, Montenegro and Southern Sudan invoked the right 
to self-determination and chose independence in referendums� In these cases, 
the recognition of new countries was a natural consequence of acceptance of the 
peoples’ right to self-determination� However, the chance that a given state or ter-
ritory will gain international recognition is increasingly determined by political 
considerations or objectives� The reason is that the recognition of a state is not 
conditioned by law but by politics�23
22 L� C� Buchheit, Secession. The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, Yale University Press, 
New Haven-London 1978, pp� 43–137�
23 R� Rich, Recognition of States: the Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, “European 
Journal of International Law” no� 4, 1993, p� 36�
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3.  IS Proclaimed Statehood – IL Criteria and  
International Response
Taking the above into consideration, it is necessary to refer the criteria constitut-
ing a state in international law and international relations to the so-called Islamic 
State (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, or Daesh)�
Although the group controls a significant territory in Iraq and Syria and aspire to 
control the Levant region (which includes Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), 
its leadership is effective and dominates over population inhabiting the territories, 
these facts cannot be regarded as the fulfillment of international law criteria for 
being a state� First of all, because there is no sovereignty, either in internal and ex-
ternal sense: the authority is not unlimited and independent from external factors� 
Secondly, because IS lacks capacity to enter into official international relations with 
members of the international community� As it was stated in the first part, the five 
criteria defined in international law must be supplemented by the one, perceptible 
in international practice, which is recognition� This is the final argument why IS 
cannot be regarded as a state� After the caliphate has been proclaimed, it met with 
no positive reaction of international community members who officially refused 
to accept the announcement� The basis for such decisions is a claim that no entity 
established as a result of the ius cogens norms violations can be recognized as a 
legitimate member of the international community� Accordingly, if a new entity 
claiming statehood strives for recognition, it must prove its readiness for compli-
ance with international law� Otherwise, it has no chance of being accepted and 
consequently – no chance of being capable to enter into relations with other states, 
international organizations, etc� Taking into account that territorial integrity and 
internationally recognized borders of two states, Iraq and Syria, have been violated 
as a result of IS offensive, it would be illegal to establish any relations with this entity� 
Moreover, the IS’s terrorist activities violate internationally accepted human rights, 
especially provisions prohibiting genocide, crimes against humanity, tortures and 
other cruel, inhuman treatment� Therefore, any attempt to enter into relations with 
this entity would be regarded as approval of international crimes� 
While analyzing official documents issued by states and international govern-
mental organizations, one can notice that in none there are references defining 
IS as a state� The only qualification of IS is an “entity” and a “terrorist group” or 
“organization”, being a clear proof of lack of consent for the IS statehood and lack 
of approval of the IS’s proclamation of caliphate�
The UN Security Council, responsible for international peace and security, has 
tackled the problem of IS functioning and its activities several times� In resolution 
Islamic State – Disputed Statehood 117
2170 of August 2014 and 2253 of December 2015, pointing out “violent, extremist 
ideology”, “widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international hu-
manitarian law”, “ongoing, multiple criminal terrorist acts” such as among others 
kidnapping and hostage-takings, the Security Council defined IS as a “splinter 
group of Al Qaeda”24� In the resolution 2178 of September 2014, while referring 
to IS, the official term “entity” was introduced by the Security Council25� In the 
resolution 2199 of February 2015, the Security Council confirmed “sovereignty, 
unity and territorial integrity” of Iraq and Syria, refusing to accept conquest as a 
way of acquiring territory by IS�26 Consequently, one of main attributes of state-
hood has been questioned�
A very similar position has been taken by the European Union� In conclusions 
adopted as a result of a special meeting of the European Council in August 2014, 
the qualification of IS as a “terrorist organization” has been made�27 The creation of 
the Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria has been regarded as “a direct threat to the 
security�”28 Such official statement has been repeated in the following conclusions, 
agreed on as a result of the Council of the European Union meetings in October 
2014 and March 2015� The EU decided to condemn acts perpetrated by “ISIL/ 
Daesh and other terrorist groups” and announced its contribution to the inter-
national endeavour to defeat these entities�29 In the same documents, references 
to IS as to a “terrorist organization” have been made�30 In the regional strategy for 
Syria and Iraq, adopted by the Council of the European Union in March 2015, 
there are no references to IS statehood� Instead, the group is called “a cross-border 
24 Resolution 2170 Adopted by the Security Council at its 7242nd meeting, on 15 August 
2014� S/RES/2170 2014, para� 1, 18, preamble; Resolution 2253 (2015) Adopted by 
the Security Council at its 7587th meeting, on 17 December 2015�, S/RES/2253 2015, 
preamble�
25 Resolution 2178 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7272nd meeting, on 24 Sep-
tember 2014, S/RES/2178 2014, preamble�
26 Resolution 2199 Adopted by the Security Council at its 7379th meeting, on 12 February 
2015, S/RES/2199 2015, preamble�
27 Conclusions, Special meeting of the European Council (30 August 2014), EUCO 
163/14, Brussels 2014, para� 14, 17�
28 Ibid� para� 17�
29 Council conclusions on the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/
Da’esh threat, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 16 March 2015, 7267/15 
Brussels, para� 1, 2, 13; Council conclusions on the ISIL/Da’esh crisis in Syria and Iraq, 
Council of the European Union, Luxemburg, 20 October 2014, para� 1, 3, 5�
30 Council conclusions on the EU Regional … op�cit�, para� 8; Council conclusions on 
the ISIL/Da’esh… op�cit�, para� 7�
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phenomenon spanning two sovereign states” what is a clear evidence that military 
actions directed to acquisition of territory belonging to Syria and Iraq are not ac-
cepted by the EU member states� The European Parliament in its resolutions uses 
the term “the so-called ‘ISIS/Daesh’” and “the self-styled ‘Islamic State’” to deny 
IS statehood�31 At the same time, the character of “a terrorist group” or “a terrorist 
organization” is emphasized, and IS is described as an “extremist jihadist group�”32
According to the League of Arab States, IS is an organization responsible for 
international crimes and terrorism� Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion defines IS as a “terrorist group” and an “organization”, as does the Organiza-
tion for Cooperation and Security in Europe� According to OCSE, Islamic State 
is “probably the most effective terrorist organization in using social media�”33 
Such connotations are also noticeable in official statements of other international 
bodies such as non-governmental or organizations define IS as a terrorist group� 
According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, IS was “the most destructive 
terrorist group in 2014�”34 The Global Coalition to counter the Daesh, announced 
in September 2014 by president Obama, composed of over 60 states,35 aimed at IS 
degradation and destruction “through a comprehensive and sustained counterter-
rorism strategy” regards IS as a “terrorist organization�” For this reason, partners 
31 See: European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2016 on the systematic mass murder of 
religious minorities by the so-called ‘ISIS/Da’esh’, European Parliament, 2016/2529(RSP), 
P8_TA-PROV(2016)0051, Strasbourg 2016, para� 1, 2, 4, 7–9, 14; European Parliament 
resolution on the situation in Iraq and Syria and the ISIS offensive, European Parliament, 
2014/2843(RSP), B8-0110/2014, Strasbourg 2014, summary�
32 European Parliament resolution on the situation in Iraq and Syria and the ISIS offensive 
…op�cit�, preamble, point A�; ISIL/Da’esh and ‘non-conventional’ weapons of terror, 
Briefing 2015� 572�806, European Parliamentary Research Service�
33 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Human Dimension 
Implementation Meeting (HDIM), European Foundation for Democracy, HDIM�
NGO/0025/15, 22�09�2015, p� 2�
34 Global Terrorism Index, Measuring and Understanding The Impact of Terrorism, Insti-
tute for Economics and Peace, New York-Sydney-Mexico 2015, p� 38�
35 Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Korea, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Ma-
laysia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States� Additionally, Arab League and Euro-
pean Union�
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have decided about targeting IS with airstrikes, impeding the flow of foreign fight-
ers and disrupting the recruitment, as well as stopping IS’s financing and funding�
4. Conclusion
The rise of Islamic State and the official proclamation of a caliphate, has started 
discussions concerning an official status of IS in international law and interna-
tional relations� Two groups of arguments – legal and practical – have been taken 
into consideration by states, international governmental organizations, as well as 
think tanks and NGOs� After the analysis of six criteria of statehood, as well as 
reactions of the international community members, the only possible conclusion 
is that because of the illegal character of IS’s activities, lack of full independence 
and resistance of the international community members, especially states and gov-
ernmental organizations, it is not possible to treat IS as a state being a legitimate 
actor in the international arena� Not only decisions concerning non-recognition of 
IS statehood have been taken, but also an international coalition has been created 
with the aim to counter IS, being a clear proof that IS is nothing but a “terrorist 
organization” or “group�”
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Woman and ISIS:  
Social Diagnosis and Interventions
1. Introduction 
The question of the so-called global terrorism is an essentially historical, social, and 
political phenomenon, although the present article applies an approach based on a 
social and psychological perspective focused on individuals� One of the key aspects 
to consider in this analysis of global terrorism is that it comes from a manipulated 
interpretation of the Quran� Jihadist terrorists intend to create a single Muslim state 
and to eradicate any form of thinking and living that is different from their precepts� 
Their target are all non-Muslim people as well as Muslims who do not think like they 
do� They constitute a terrorist organization that is expanding by virtue of the global 
access to recruiting young people� They use social networks, new technologies and 
any other public space, mosques, neighborhoods and associations bringing young 
people together, to capture new recruits willing to join their cause�
The present flow of Western fighters departing for Syria and Iraq is one of the 
biggest problems for Western governments because it poses a great threat� Gov-
ernments face the challenge of designing strategies to control the growth of this 
phenomenon and to stop the radicalization processes here, in Western Europe� 
That is the reason why it is necessary to understand and learn in depth how jihad-
ism is penetrating into our society�
Men constitute the central core of the terrorist group� They are given the most 
important and cruelest tasks in the jihadist fight, such us kidnappings, decapita-
tions or immolations� However, we observe a significant increase in the number 
of women joining in combat, which accompanies a lack of information on the 
role they play within the Daesh�
Historically, although they have participated in violent conflicts around the 
world, the role of women has always been related to domestic tasks� Traditionally, 
the role of women in the Daesh was limited to assisting fighters in their needs, to 
educate their children – who would be future fighters – and to taking care of their 
homes� They are also used as a tool to attract more fighters, and there are records 
of real cases in which they have participated in terrorist acts�
The gradual incorporation of women to fight in support of the Daesh is a reason 
for great concern� From an analysis of the multiple discriminations suffered by 
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women (especially of Arab descent) in the world because of their race, religion and 
their status as women, it is observed that this incorporation does not respond to a 
process of equality between men and women, Rather, women are used as weapons, 
which is a form of exploitation and perpetuation of their traditional roles�
Strategies to prevent and block jihadist terrorism need to be designed� This im-
plies the incorporation of disciplines such as social work and other social and legal 
sciences� The starting point needs to be an analysis of radical and terrorist violence 
aiming to apply theoretical information to the practical field and to work on the 
people, families, groups, and communities adding synergies to the fight against 
radicalism�
The aim of this paper is to expound the elements that lead women to make 
incursions into the current terrorism which is preached by the Daesh�1 What are 
the motivations to commit barbarous acts and what kind of processes of manipu-
lation are used to achieve these ends are questions that remain without answers� 
This paper tries to analyze the possible motivations of women and, at the same 
time, to examine the role they play inside these terrorist organizations� In short, 
the aim of this investigation is to get closer to the answers to many emerging ques-
tions about women’s migration to become part of Daesh, and to create efficient 
measures, starting with an intervention of social work to prevent radicalism which 
is the main source of this phenomenon�
2. Islam and Muslim Women
The Quranic revelation brought real changes to women’s way of life in Arabia, as 
it started a dynamic liberalization of women, anchored up until that moment in a 
strictly patriarchal regime� Before the arrival of Islam, the birth of a baby girl was 
considered a disgrace and even a shame in Arabia� Terrible facts such as burying 
them alive by the parents might occur, as they were considered a threat to the fam-
ily’s honor:
And when one of them is informed of [the birth of] a female, his face becomes 
dark, and he suppresses grief. He hides himself from the people because of the ill 
of which he has been informed. Should he keep it in humiliation or bury it in the 
ground? Unquestionably, evil is what they decide (Quran 16:58–59)�2
1 Name received by the self-proclaimed Islamic State, Daesh, in plural dawaesh, means 
fanatics imposing their point of view on the others�
2 The noble Quran, And when one of them is informed of [the birth of] a female, his face 
becomes dark, and he suppresses grief, He hides himself from the people because of the ill 
of which he has been informed. Should he keep it in humiliation or bury it in the ground? 
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Adult women were considered sexual objects that could be bought, sold and 
inherited, ignoring their qualities, their intellectual and personal abilities and 
reducing them to mere instruments for men’s sexual pleasure�
It was even questioned whether women were humans or if they had a soul� 
However, Islam provided this oppressed sector of society with a legitimate place 
in life� From a position of inferiority and legal incapacity, Islam put women in a 
position of great influence and prestige within family and society� Islam proclaims: 
O mankind, indeed we have created you from male and female (Quran 49:13)�3
O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it 
its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah, 
through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed Allah is ever, over you, 
an Observer (Quran 4:1)�4
Men and women are from the same family, and as such, they have the same 
rights and duties as promised by Allah: “Never will I allow to be lost the work of 
[any] worker among you, whether male or female; you are of one another” (Quran 
3:195)�5 The arrival of Islam meant an important change regarding the privation 
of basic and fundamental needs that were provided to women by society� There 
was an evolution leading to involve women in the society at the time� Tribal laws 
were transgressed and women tried to end their humiliating ancestral habits� They 
collaborated arm in arm with the new community; women reclaimed their rights 
and participated in every political act of the time�
Clear examples of evolution, participation and influence are those of Jadiyya, 
A’isha (wives of the prophet Mohammed) and Rabi’a al-Basri (the notable Sufi 
woman), who occupied significant positions at the beginning of Islam� A’isha, the 
prophet’s wife, was a cultured, distinguished woman who transmitted her knowl-
edge, her wisdom and her political sense to generations of Muslim wise men� 
She lived for a long time after the death of the prophet, and her house was like a 
Unquestionably, evil is what they decide, available at http://quran�com/16/58-59, ac-
cessed 4 January 2016�
3 The noble Quran, O you who have believed, do not put [yourselves] before Allah and 
His Messenger but fear Allah. Indeed, Allah is Hearing and Knowing, available at http://
quran�com/49, accessed 4 January 2016�
4 The noble Quran, O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created 
from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women. And fear Allah, 
through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. Indeed Allah is ever, over you, an 
Observer, available at http://quran�com/4, accessed 4 January 2016�
5 The noble Quran, Alif, Lam, Meem, available at http://quran�com/3, accessed 4 January 
2016�
Hallar Abderrahaman Mohamed126
reference centre in the religious sciences� She was an authority herself and came 
to occupy an important place in society� Visitors came from all over the Islamic 
world to ask her and follow her advice� No fact of Islamic history could be valid 
if she would not approve it� At the age of 42, she led an army onto the battlefield�6
We can affirm that Islam recognizes women’s rights to participate in politics, 
to occupy public positions and to take part in legitimate debates, to fraternize 
and to exercise any profession that can be executed by men� But as time went by, 
and as Islam spread across the whole territory, the interpretations that arose by 
the mediation of the imams deteriorated women’s position and manipulated the 
original message, according to patriarchal interest, in order to create the Islamic 
society on a rigid, patriarchal base�
3. Gender Stereotypes
The present phenomenon of women joining up with the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State has grown to thousands, including more than a hundred women of European 
descent� The interest of the scientific community and the society in general to 
learn about the role played by these women and why they are joining the terrorist 
fight has increased�
To be able to understand the role of women in the Daesh, we need to make 
an overall analysis of what are the gender stereotypes, what features do they lend 
to women in general, and to female terrorists in particular� By this we mean the 
group of existing beliefs considered as adequate features of men and women, 
placing women in the private sphere dedicated to their homes and children, while 
men occupy the public sphere� The stereotypical personality traits associated to 
women find them tender, compassionate, sensitive to necessities, loving and sub-
missive, and those who cry easily; whereas the traits associated to masculinity are 
leadership, love for risk, individualism, aggression, strong personality, athleticism, 
selfishness and toughness� These characteristics strongly match what must be an 
authentic terrorist which were lacking in women�7
The same stereotypes are revealed and perpetuated in the militant leaders’ ar-
gument on the role of women in conflicts� This drives the myth which translates 
into a belief that women are not political; as a consequence, the tasks of man 
and women are divided according to physical differences between them, which 
6 H� Padilla, La mujer en el islam, feminismo islámico, Centro de Estudios Internacionales 
para el Desarrollo (CEID), Buenos Aires 2011�
7 M� Lopez, J� Morales and A� Lisbona, Evolution of Gender Stereotypes in Spain: Traits 
and Roles, “The Spanish Journal of Psychology” no� 11 2008, pp� 609–617�
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produces a belief in the capacity of one, and not the other group, to carry out 
certain acts� What is more, it is believed that the purpose and primary function 
of a woman is to be a mother and wife instead of having an identity� The same 
gender stereotypes are found at the root of the conventional wisdom that, even 
when it tends to ignore the role of women as central actors, is quite certain that 
women play support roles in favor of the terrorist groups, as it is understood that 
women are in a better position to provide and keep safe homes, to act as bait or 
to carry out surveillance tasks or be messengers� The gender stereotypes try to 
separate women from the conflict and keep the position of women as guardians 
of civil life, generating the extended belief that women only play support roles 
and are not main actors in the planning and execution of attacks�
An article published by the Institute el Cano about women and the so-called 
Islamic State reflects that the role reserved to women within Daesh has been very 
much discussed and shows the emergence of a feminine jihadist subculture which 
understands jihad as a holy war and in which women are given more operational 
functions, thereby overcoming the established gender clichés, supported in this 
regard by both the traditional Islamic sources and the Salafist ideology lead by 
Daesh� Even if it is true that in some very specific cases tasks given to women 
surpass the domestic environment, it is not less true that, until today, we have not 
been able to affirm that there is a real break with it� 
To understand and learn about the gender stereotypes within Daesh, it is nec-
essary to analyze the process of attraction, radicalization, and the role played by 
women within the organization where they are, once again, discriminated�
4. The Role of Women in Daesh
4.1 Terrorist women profile 
The profile of these women constitutes a typological diversity causing an obsta-
cle when establishing particular features in the case of religious ideology� They 
are young female converts or come from Muslim backgrounds, both practicing 
and non-practicing families, that in principle were not especially devoted to the 
Islamic religion in many cases� It would frequently happen that they would be-
come radicalized after suffering traumas, or as a consequence of a subtle, skilled 
manipulation process by extremist groups�
Regarding education, broadly speaking, the educational level of women recruited 
is low or very low, covering only the most basic education� Except for a few of them 
having higher level studies, some of them reaching university level, the social groups 
to which they belong can be both rural or urban, middle class or disadvantaged so-
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cial and economic environments� This situation makes them much more vulnerable 
to suffer manipulation by insurgent groups, given their lack of culture and the fact 
that many of them had never left the confines of their small world�8
Several studies conclude that the age range of these women is generally be-
tween 15 and 35 years old and in most of the cases their civil situation is single 
in all countries�
In terms of social environment, the recruited girls may have worked in licit or 
illicit professions – sometimes both of them – and had unstructured or normal-
ized lives, having solely a European social-cultural outlook, or this mixed with 
habits from the country of origin� The wide game of sociological features makes 
it impossible to determine a standard profile�9 But despite not having a standard 
profile, we can point to certain psychological and social vulnerabilities, used by 
radicals to guarantee that women join the terrorist war�
4.2 Recruitment Process
To explain the enormous attraction the new global terrorist matrix is causing 
among many Muslim women we need to underline the implementation of a re-
cruitment campaign designed specifically for them� The efforts to recruit women 
to Daesh start with the identification of possible matches undergoing a moment 
of psychological and/or social weakness� Once the woman is located, the or-
ganization makes considerable effort to convince her that these kinds of actions 
contradict neither the Islamic principles nor the usual responsibilities of a Muslim 
woman, which is another clear example of manipulation�
Daesh, aware of the importance of recruiting young women, uses social net-
works like Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, etc� to reach them� Knowing 
that the youngest of these women spend a lot of time on the Internet and it is an 
ideal space to take advantage of disaffection toward Western culture and, at the 
same time, increase the extreme identification with radical ideas�
8 A� Rubin, Woman says she told police about paris attacker’s hide-out, “The New York 
Times” 2008, available at http://www�nytimes�com/2016/02/05/world/europe/woman-
says-she-told-police-about-paris-attackers-hide-out�html?ref=topics&_r=0, accessed 
6 January de 2016�
9 R� Torres, L� Ponce, Reislamización digital y yihadismo europeo: claves comprensivas 
para la intervención social comunitaria, “Sistema” no� 240, 2015, pp� 101–116�
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The Institute for Strategic Dialogue analyses the importance of the romance 
factor as one of the motivations that make young women join a terrorist group 
in the occupied territories�10
Up until 2012, female participation in such activities carried out in the Spanish 
territory was promoted mainly by the attraction of a male (relative or partner) and 
related to support tasks and housework (other tasks such as, legalizing the man’s 
administrative situation), It was not related to the operative’s activities in terrorist 
militancy� From 2013, in the context of conflict in Syria and Iraq, the situation 
has changed: the first cases of mobilized women – motivated by their partners 
and by themselves, after being recruited and radicalized normally through so-
cial networks connected to Daesh – were reported� According to the families’ 
testimonies, most of the times they were seduced by a romantic vision of life in 
the Caliphate, while only a small proportion of them joined with the intention 
to form the first line of combat, something that, in the end, would not happen 
since the active practice of violence is very far from the Daesh idea of what the 
feminist jihad should be�11
In the recruitment process, women play a very important role of recruiting 
other women� As Ramachandran says, the terrorist groups have taken advantage 
of the “martyrdom” of female suicide bombers through an extended use of propa-
ganda, getting more attention and publicity for their cause� The image of young 
women fighting desperately against the powerful (be it Israel, Russia or the USA) 
through the extreme practice of blowing themselves up has an immediate global 
effect� Even though the suicide attacks causes wide condemnation, the vision of a 
woman that sacrifices her life for the Palestinian cause defying traditions, draws 
the attention to the desperation an entire people�12
The Daesh recruitment networks do not miss out on the great capacity of 
women to spread propaganda and recruit new members through their profiles 
in social networks, where tales about the crisis in Western values can be found, 
as well as frustrations from the difficulties in practicing their religion in their 
countries of origin to the satisfaction of living alongside their “sisters” and “liv-
ing honorably under Sharia law”, spreading an idyllic vision of the life project 
10 C� Garcia, Las Mujeres del Estado Islámico, Instituto Elcano 2001, available at http://
www�realinstitutoelcano�org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOB-
AL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/terrorismo+internacional/comentario-
garciacalvo-las-mujeres-del-estado-islamico, accessed 5 January 2016�
11 Ibid�
12 S� Ramachandran, Women Suicide Bombers Defy Israel, “Asia Times”, available at www.
atimes.com/atimes/Middle-East/EJ25Ak02.html, accessed 2 January 2016�
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offered by Daesh, as documented by Carol Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford and Ross 
Frenett, in their empirical work “Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to 
ISIS�” The authors point out that these women support the brutal use of violence 
with the same intensity as their male companions and they manifest it as such in 
their social network profiles, even though only very few of them are interested in 
practicing it in an active way�13
4.3 Motivations to participate
The reasons why they travel are as varied as the women themselves� We could look 
at several reasons that motivate them to go; one of them is ideology – just as men, 
women are convinced that they would go straight to paradise if they die fighting 
for Islam� A new vision of Islam is presented to them in a very attractive manner, 
as the only way to bring themselves closer to God� Theocratic cosmopolitanism 
is another reason, most women express their deep grievances at the treatment of 
Muslims across the world, and deplore the West’s foreign policy, they have feel-
ings of hate for everything they consider foreign, and their only solution is an 
ideal Islamic society built on their strict interpretation of Islamic law where they 
can carry out their practice� The feelings of rejection from the society to which 
they belong but with which they do not identify, the search for an Islamic identity 
and the sense of unity and sisterhood are also key causal factors for women who 
travel�14
Lastly, one possible motivation is the women’s demand for equality that they 
have not had in their place of origin� This struggle for equality is causing women 
to be used by certain groups and people with specific interests� It encourages them 
to give everything for this desired equality that many will probably never reach, no 
matter how many empty promises they receive or how much they try to convince 
them with acts of uncertain temporality� Sadly, the eagerness of these women to 
escape a life predestined to man’s subordination and dedicated to the exercise 
of irrelevant and accessory social tasks, remains a failed attempt� It is clear that 
within these groups women are blatantly discriminated against, and that it is not 
even hidden in the public sphere�
13 C� Hoyle, A� Bradfor and R� Frenett, Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS, 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2015, available at http://www.strategicdialogue.
org/publications/, accessed 4 January 2016�
14 Ibid�
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5.  Proposals for Prevention and Intervention in Radicalization
5.1 Social integration as prevention’s key aspect
Dealing with social integration requires working to make people feel like members 
of the society in which they live, with the ultimate aim to protect them from radi-
cal discourse and influence� It is about providing identity and a sense of belonging 
to the targeted population – especially the second or third generation of young 
people descended from migrants – and providing an answer to their aspirations 
which might otherwise be satisfied by the radicals� 
To make integration possible, there are two conditions which need to be pre-
sent: the social context has to be favorable to this integration, on the one hand and, 
on the other, people must be able to participate in the social, political, economic 
and cultural life of the society� Both are closely related in a way that, if people 
did not have the chance to develop their capabilities and abilities, they would 
not be able to take advantage of their chance to participate� Therefore, they must 
be offered the necessary opportunities, protecting the weak and recognizing the 
right to create, innovate and differ in opinion� The population needs to be pre-
pared to live together, respecting everyone’s dignity, prioritizing non-violence 
and solidarity�
It is necessary to take into account global systemic inequality when analyz-
ing integration processes, to identify and recognize that Muslim and specifically 
migrant women do not hold the same rights and opportunities as the rest of the 
society� It is important to recognize the fact that their gender as well as their racial 
and religious origin deepen their exclusion and hinder their social inclusion� 
One of the common characteristics of many women joining Daesh is that they 
do not feel like members of European society where they live� For them, the only 
community for reference is the one of Muslims in general and, particularly, the 
one of the Mujahidins fighting in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc� Working difficul-
ties, family and social isolation, as well as the absence of opportunities and/or 
incapacity to apply the social rights and not participating in the social, cultural, 
economic and political life, make women contemplate the society and the country 
they live in as enemies� No doubt this affects their recruitment to extremism�
It is true that socio-political integration is not the final trigger in the process 
of radicalization and jihadist recruitment, but it is a factor to be taken into ac-
count since, in the long term, this lack of integration may become a key element 
for socially conflictive identity based on resistance� However, even though it is 
not a definitive factor, the existence of high levels of socio-political integration 
may serve as a radicalization brake and benefit from the management of social 
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problems through peaceful and democratic channels� An effective combination 
of integration measures in the socio-economic and socio-political-cultural areas 
would contribute to preventing radicalism�15
Group empowerment, as a social intervention tool through women’s associa-
tions or organizations, increases people’s self-esteem, their personal networks and 
may become an adequate tool in combating the multiple inequalities that many 
women suffer� From the perspective of the community empowerment, bringing 
women together can foster social collaboration� Furthermore, the group empow-
erment is a fundamental instrument to fight against poverty and social inequality, 
to modify the social contexts in which the problematic situations are generated�16 
There is no doubt that women’s role in the Muslim world, and also in other 
cultures, is crucial when it comes to education based on a transmission of values 
and cultural references� From that perspective, women’s empowerment would 
not only provide them the role they deserve as social actors, but also generate a 
collective profile that exerts positive leadership which would transform structures 
that sustain armed struggle and radicalism, and would allow developing different 
strategies oriented on the integration, development, and peaceful coexistence 
among cultures�
5.2 The role of social work in radicalization prevention
Social work is a profession based on practice and a social discipline that promotes 
change and social development, social cohesion, people strengthening and well-
being� The principles of social justice are human rights, collective responsibility 
and respect for diversity� Backed by the social, human and cultural theories, social 
work requires both the subjects and structures to face problems, necessities and 
risks in a joint effort�17
The intervention in social work is understood as the action organized and 
developed by social workers with people, groups and communities, with the aim 
of generating changes that help satisfying their needs; overcoming physical and 
non-physical difficulties, social problems and obstacles that interfere or limit equal 
15 M� Castells, La era de la información. Economía, Sociedad y Cultura. Volumen II: El 
poder de la identidad, Alianza Editorial, Madrid 1998� 
16 M� Silvestre, R� Royo, E� Escudero, El empoderamiento de las mujeres como estrategia 
de intervención social, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, 2014�
17 Definition of social work adopted by the General Assembly of the International Federa-
tion of Social Workers, Montreal, Canada, July 2000�
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opportunities; increasing people’s capacities; and, finally, contributing to promote 
social integration�
The social worker represents a fundamental bond that contributes in the or-
ganization and functioning of institutions and services for the population’s inte-
gration and social wellbeing� As such, its role as a subject of this article becomes 
especially important�
The lack of knowledge and practical experience in the development of actions 
oriented on the intervention and prevention of radicalism requires expert debate 
by people who, understanding radical and polarized interpretations of Islam, are 
able to analyze and propose strategies that offer a framework to develop social in-
tervention, from the viewpoint of investigation, prevention and awareness-raising�
There is no doubt that the social sciences play a fundamental role in the analysis 
and development of processes for the intervention and prevention of radicalism� 
There is a necessity to possess an integral and multidisciplinary vision on the 
subject to be able to face it and provide answers to the existing challenges� The 
intervention must contemplate three axes: prevention (to avoid the creation of 
conditions favoring the radicalization processes), signaling (of individuals in the 
process of becoming radicals or those promoting extremist ideas) and interven-
tion in the detected cases� 
Social work can contribute to modify the structural factors that explain radi-
calization through integration in the long term, intercultural dialogue and the 
fight against inequality and discrimination� To that end, there is a need to involve 
Muslim communities in the prevention and the fight against terrorism, generating 
a network that makes it harder to present the recruitment offer as attractive� Fur-
thermore, this discipline can contribute to the socio-economic and socio-cultural 
integration of immigrants as they arrive, but even more so to their descendants, 
due to the importance of paying attention to second generations and how they 
integrate in society� The bet must be on a multicultural integrative model that 
respects and integrates the different cultures, and be proactive and propose alter-
natives to reach communities from community social work�
The message used by the recruitment networks could be neutralized by in-
tercultural dialogue and promoting forums for debate, reflection and training, 
mainly in those places where people are brought together, with special attention 
on places like prisons, cyberspace or places dedicated to religious training or 
prayer� It would be necessary to prevent extremist messages from being dissemi-
nated, while, at the same time, generating alternative messages that build objective 
realities regarding the Quran and its interpretations� The voices of the majority 
must prevail over the voices of extremists� From that perspective, the work has to 
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be carried out to promote a better knowledge of Islamic cultural values in Europe 
and improve the perception of Islamic cultures�
5.3 Islamic feminism as a source for preventing radicalism
The religious fundamentalisms stand for a global phenomenon that requires a 
global answer� The resistance offered by the activists of Islamic feminism and 
women rights can provide an answer by virtue of a diverse, transnational and 
consistent action�
Religious fundamentalism is by definition opposed to women’s autonomy; 
the fundamentalists’ projects operate by undermining women’s rights as well as 
human rights in general and their development� Many young people have been 
exposed to a fundamentalist interpretation of religion and do not hold the critical 
resources to analyze radical messages� This can seriously impact women in that 
they may think and feel that they are not entitled to any rights at all, that others 
may influence their decisions regarding themselves, their minds and bodies, and 
even make these decisions for them� This involves accepting that they are second-
class citizens�18
The role of Islamic feminist is crucial, since they are dedicated to combat any 
kind of violence, especially when it is carried out in the name of Islam, like vio-
lent extremism� The network of Muslim women fighting for peace declares: We, 
Muslim women, must reclaim the mantle of cultural, intellectual, and religious 
authority, declaring our opposition to violence with a powerful and unified voice. 
We must announce our Commitment to resisting injustice generally and violence 
specifically through peaceful means and from the unique perspective of women. We 
must speak comprehensively and holistically to a diversity of discourses to effectively 
oppose violence.19
They also express their jihad as fighting against violent radicalism, declaring 
their commitment to compassion, peace and social justice, just like the Islamic 
doctrine says, and aspiring to unite people to create harmony, cooperation and 
collective achievement and prosperity� At the same time, violent extremism breaks 
18 A� Sardá, Las y los activistas por los derechos de las mujeres definen los fundamentalismos 
religiosos, “Shareen Gokal and Saira Zuberin” 2007, available at http://www�awid�org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/las_activistas_definen_los_fundamentalismos_religi-
osos�pdf, accessed 8 January 2016�
19 Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality, Muslim Women Leaders at the 
Frontlines of Change, available at http://www�wisemuslimwomen�org, accessed 4 Janu-
ary 2016� 
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individuals, families and communities, preventing people from completely reach-
ing their potential as social and spiritual beings� It mutilates societies, causing 
them to fall, and creates relationships based on mistrust and intolerance at the 
core of the society� Violent extremism damages the name and reputation of Islam 
globally, spreading flagrant distortions about the Quran and the example of the 
prophet Muhammad�
The feminist fight of Muslim women is structured around the principles and 
values of women’s rights and social justice ordained by the Quran� The emergent 
movement of Muslim women in search for gender equality acts from an Islamic 
perspective to bring about a change of laws and culturally discriminatory or re-
strictive habits, to eradicate discrimination and the patriarchal cultural practices 
contradictory with the Quran, such as ablation, stoning to death, forced mar-
riages, physical punishment, political isolation and social reclusion�
One of the goals of Islamic feminist networks is to highlight the value of the 
gender equality principles from a religious perspective through investigation, 
documentation, information, divulgation and the capacity to create and build stra-
tegic interventions for empowerment, with the aim of achieving gender equality�
6. Conclusion
The conclusions that can be outlined from this chapter can be divided as follows� 
The current phenomenon of women joining Daesh has increased in numbers, but 
their role in it remains the same: it is still concentrated at a domestic level with 
less support and a secondary role compared to that of men� The belief that women 
only carry out supporting tasks corresponds to gender stereotypes that associate 
women with tenderness, compassion, sensitivity, affection, care and submission� 
Stereotyping as with the division of labor between men and women is based on 
physical differences and the different capacities to carry out certain acts and the 
purpose and primary task of a woman is to be a mother and wife instead of having 
an identity� Accepting those stereotypes, female terrorists become an anomaly, 
something irrational� 
Another important point in the development of this research is the profile and 
the motivations of these women� The first is so varied that it becomes impossible 
to determine a standard portrait� In the same way, the motivation they find to 
seek and immerse themselves into the conflict is very wide and there is no pos-
sibility to draw a clear line of argument� We can only conclude that their social 
and psychological vulnerability and religious extremism make the recruitment 
easier and the combination of the two factors is an invitation to radicalization�
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Detachment from Western values and culture and from the way of practicing 
religion by the majority of Muslims become common causes in the minds of these 
women to see Daesh as an idealistic society, where they can develop their strict 
and, at the same time, extreme interpretation of the Islamic law�
One of the saddest conclusions that can be drawn from this work is that the use 
of women to commit suicide attacks is one of the most extreme forms of women’s 
manipulation and exploitation� 
As the above point makes clear, it becomes necessary to develop a system of 
intervention to prevent radicalism, based on the following key factors:
•	  A social community intervention oriented in two ways, to the Muslim commu-
nities and the societies where they are integrated, so that “difference” changes 
from being controversial and a source of mutual mistrust, into being an incen-
tive to mutual social knowledge that would benefit the empowerment process 
of Muslim women�20
•	  Group empowerment from a community perspective related to women and 
gender inequality toward Muslim communities and the societies where they 
integrate� 
•	  The utilization of Islamic feminism as a key prevention point, the European 
Muslim communities and the Islamic feminist movement wish to fill a place 
of full civic and social belonging, associated in a natural way to the values and 
principles of human rights and the European and international judicial herit-
age� The normalized coexistence among cultures and religions in the European 
setting is not an option – it is an inevitable destiny according to the current 
era of coexistence and fusion of civilizations, one of the most benevolent ef-
fects of globalization� The social reaction in favor of diversity requires a com-
munity intervention where social work, an independent scientific discipline, 
can provide solid support, finding the contexts where Muslim women suffer 
discrimination, and taking appropriated actions to end it� We need to develop 
an integrative and holistic perspective of human rights within gender speciali-
zation networks�
Islam’s position is categorical and unequivocal to the acts carried out by these 
people who call themselves Muslims: it categorically condemns terrorism� The is-
sue in question is that the acts perpetrated by Daesh are not Islamist at all� In fact, 
it is offensive to the people professing Islam as the religion of peace� And its acts 
20 R� Torres and L� Ponce, Reislamización digital y yihadismo europeo: claves comprensivas 
para la intervención social comunitaria, “Sistema” no� 240, 2015, pp� 101–116�
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are condemned by the global Muslim community� There is no possible interpreta-
tion of the Quran that can lead to justifying beheadings, murder or torture to the 
people they call enemies� Islam defends and protects in its sacred texts freedom 
of creed and thought� The terrorists, however, go in the opposite direction to what 
Islam preaches� The proof to this categorical conclusion is that 20 billion Muslims 
in the EU and 40 billion in the whole European continent are characterized by 
being a majority which accepts the social and democratic rule of law�
The dimension of full social belonging is an underlying objective in every 
public intervention oriented to Daesh’s eradication� The construction of a fairer 
global system and, inside this one, a European Union that returns to the expansive 
construction of social cohesion, remains an essential part of a long-term solution 
targeting violent radicalization� The social and cultural answer must be as firm 
as the one from the military and police; however, it is not yet visible, as shown by 
the Syrian refugee drama�
One contextual condition unavoidable in eradicating jihadist terrorism is still 
a pending subject: socio-political freedom and the democratization of countries 
with Arab Muslim majority� The geopolitics of Western countries, Russia and 
the countries of the region, create a dimension that has influenced a drift toward 
destabilization, conflict and internal wars, putting an end to the hopes of democ-
racy born after the Tunisian Arab Spring� The result is the fragmentation of Syrian, 
Iraqi and Libyan territory and the return of the political support of dictatorships 
(like the one Egypt) which uphold the status quo�
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Anna Sroka and Katarzyna Trofimowicz
Terrorism and Political Radicalism in the 
Security Strategies of Poland and Spain versus 
Public Opinion
1. Introduction
Since the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the issues of terror-
ism and political radicalism have assumed their place among the leading dangers 
of the contemporary world� While neither terrorism nor radicalism are themselves 
new phenomena, since the aforementioned attack they have assumed a new form, 
becoming associated primarily with the Islamic fundamentalism� However, it 
should be emphasized that the level of threat posed by terrorism and radicalism 
is not uniform� In respect of the extent of the danger posed by terrorist attacks 
and the activities of extremist groups, Poland and Spain, which will be subjected 
to analysis in this article, undoubtedly display significant differences�
For years, Spain has been faced with terrorism by the ETA; it has also been a 
victim of terrorism following the March 11th, 2004 attack carried out by Islamic 
fundamentalists� Additionally, proximity to northern Africa and the number of 
immigrants arriving from that region has a direct impact on growing political 
radicalism grounded in religious fundamentalism� In Poland, however, we are 
faced with a relatively low prevalence of terrorist attacks and radicalism� It may be 
expected that the differences in the concentration of terrorist threats and escala-
tion of radicalism will be reflected in legislation addressing such issues, including 
security planning� Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that the creation of 
security strategies is influenced not only by the scale of the terrorist threat and the 
escalation of political extremism, but also by a broad range of both external and 
internal determinants� These include membership in international organizations, 
alliances, legislative trends, geopolitical position, and traditional military threats 
associated with them (war)�
The objective of the first portion of this article is to analyze the security strate-
gies and other strategic documents of Poland and Spain in respect of the weight 
given in each of them to the issues of terrorism and political radicalism� This will 
facilitate an assessment of the impact of those threats on the state security strate-
gies as a whole� Next, an analysis will be undertaken of selected international 
factors conditioning the shape of security strategies in the analyzed countries� 
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Later on, we shall provide a presentation of the correlation between public opinion 
polling results and changes in legal regulations concerning terrorism and radical-
ism in Poland and Spain�
Structuring the investigations in this manner allows for an answer to the fol-
lowing questions: to what extent do the threats associated with terrorism and 
political radicalism constitute a factor shaping a given state’s security strategy? To 
what degree do external determinants contribute to changes in security strategies 
in the two countries? If they do, to what extent are changes in strategic documents 
regarding national security a response to the increased perceptions among Poles 
and Spaniards of the threat of terrorism and radicalism? The first of the hypoth-
eses to be tested is the following: with consideration given to the greater threat 
of terrorism and political radicalism in Spain when compared to Poland, each of 
these phenomena will exert a greater impact on the shape of security strategy in 
Spain than in Poland� Having regard to the similar geopolitical situation of the 
two countries, it is assumed that the influence of external factors on the content 
of strategic documents dealing with terrorism and radicalism will be comparable 
in Poland and in Spain� In Spain, changes in legal regulations regarding terrorism 
and radicalism are linked to a greater extent than in Poland with public opinion 
polling, which is itself the result of a far more immediate perception of the threat 
of terrorism� The date of September 11th, 2001, marking the beginning of the so-
called “war on terror”, is regarded as a milestone date�
2.  The Issue of Terrorism and Radicalism in  
Strategic Documents in Poland and Spain
Given the space limitations for this article, we shall not engage in an analysis of the 
body of legislation addressing the struggle with terrorism and radicalism� Instead, 
we will focus on national defense strategies and other strategic documents that 
are a sort of emanation of the attitude taken by public authorities toward such 
threats� Furthermore, it is worth adding that neither in Poland nor in Spain is 
there one overarching piece of legislation regulating the issue, and laws regulating 
anti-terrorist efforts are primarily contained in Penal Codes and other statutes 
regulating the activities of particular services�
In Poland, during the period 2001–2015, three national security strategies 
were in effect: the first was adopted in 2003, the second in 2007, and the third in 
2014� Here, it is worthy to recall the first such strategy, adopted in 2000, before 
the attack on the World Trade Center� It was the result of Poland’s accession to 
the NATO in 1999� During the same period, a strategic conception for the Alli-
ance was developed� However, Poland did not make use of its potential to affect 
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the NATO strategy, and its internal document was adopted around a year after it 
joined the organization, based on its conception� This was also a mistake if we take 
into consideration that, during a year of membership in NATO, Poland followed a 
strategy developed in conditions of strategic independence� In Stanisław Koziej’s 
opinion, this was the result of habits formed during the years of membership in 
the Warsaw Pact, when this strategic alliance was superior to national strategies�1
When examining more closely Polish security strategies, it may be observed 
that the issue of terrorism is present, but it is not perceived as one of the primary 
threats� It is generally listed along with other asymmetrical threats such as organ-
ized crime, arms proliferation or “failing states�” There is a fear about the secu-
rity of secret information which can be the target of interest of not only foreign 
intelligence services but also terrorist and extremist organizations�2 Emphasis is 
placed on the necessity of cooperation in the fight against terrorism between the 
armed forces and special services, on the one hand, and civilian authorities, on 
the other�3 What is also underscored is the responsibility resting with the armed 
forces and intelligence services in the context of anti-terrorist activities�4 Because 
of Poland’s membership in NATO, the country is a participant in the struggle 
against international terrorism, which does expose it to the threat of attacks�5 
The threat of terrorism associated with organized crime is also present in Poland 
considering its status as a transitive country�6 Counterterrorism is also a part 
of the European Union’s strategy�7 The issue of protecting the health of citizens 
1 S� Koziej, A� Brzozowski, 25 lat polskiej strategii bezpieczeństwa, „Bezpieczeństwo Na-
rodowe” II no� 30, 2014, pp� 13–14�
2 Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2003, Rada Ministrów 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, accessed 8 February 2016, pp� 2–3�
3 Ibid� p� 5�
4 Ibid� pp� 9–11; Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2007, 
Rada Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, point 95, 97, 99, 102, pp� 23–25 available 
at http://www�msz�gov�pl/resource/7d18e04d-8f23-4128-84b94f426346a112, accessed 
8 February 2016; Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014, 
Rada Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, point 74, pp� 31 available at https://www�
bbn�gov�pl/ftp/SBN%20RP�pdf, accessed 8 February 2016�
5 Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2003…op�cit�, p� 6; Stra-
tegia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2007…op�cit�, point 34, p� 9; 
Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014…op�cit�, point 55, 
p� 25�
6 Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014…op�cit�, 
point 36, p� 9�
7 Ibid� point 47: 13)�
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through combating radioactive, chemical and biological terrorism has also been 
addressed�8 References to terrorist threats in the strategies of 2003 and 2007 are 
diffuse, generally located alongside other threats or in reference to the tasks of 
various security services� Terrorism, as a subject in and of itself, has not been 
focused on, being perceived as a distant threat�
In the 2014 strategy, the issue of terrorism appears in combination with ex-
tremism, radical groups and radicalization of behaviors, all of which should be 
counteracted�9 Extremism is assessed as a threat, particularly in situations when 
it is associated with other asymmetrical threats such as the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction10 and organized crime�11 The issue of cyberthreats is also 
brought up, including cyberterrorism�12 It should be observed that in the 2014 
strategy, more space was devoted to terrorism and extremism than in previous 
documents� They remain classified not as primary threats, but rather as one of 
many potential threats� However, attention is clearly paid to the issue, and it is 
not taken lightly� This is no doubt associated with the growth of the so-called 
Islamic State, frequent terrorist attacks around the world and the fact that, while 
Poland has yet to experience such an attack, Polish citizens did perish in attacks 
in Madrid, London, New York and Bali�13 However, consideration is given to the 
potential for both domestic and international terrorist acts by the so-called “lone 
wolves” or small groups�14
We may observe a similar approach to the issue of terrorism in the Strategy for 
Development of the Polish National Security System 2022, adopted by a resolu-
tion of the Council of Ministers on April 9th, 2013� In this document, terrorism 
is presented as one of several threats, including the proliferation of weapons of 
8 Ibid� point 136: 34)�
9 Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014…op�cit�, 
point 19, 32, 83, pp� 14, 19, 24�
10 Ibid� point 28, p� 18�
11 Ibid� point 30, pp� 18–19�
12 Ibid� point 31, pp� 19�
13 J� Urbanowicz, 17 Polaków zginęło z rąk terrorystów islamskich podczas globalnej woj-
ny z terroryzmem, Polskie Radio 2015, available at http://www�polskieradio�pl/5/3/
Artykul/1402579,17-Polakow-zginelo-z-rak-terrorystow-islamskich-podczas-global-
nej-wojny-z-terroryzmem, accessed at January 2016; Narodowy Program Antyterrory-
styczny na lata 2015–2019, Uchwała nr 252, Rada Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
2014, p� 10, available at www�monitorpolski�gov�pl/mp/2014/1218/M2014000121801�
pdf, accessed 8 February 2016�
14 Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014…op�cit�, 
point 55, p� 25�
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mass destruction, organized crime and cyberattacks� It is also mentioned in the 
context of armed conflicts around the world, and the problem of “failed states�” It 
is described as a threat that does not affect the territory of Poland as much as the 
country’s citizens staying in politically unstable regions, and soldiers participating 
in international missions� However, responsibilities under alliances do increase 
the level of the threat within the country as well� Counteracting terrorism is held 
to be one of the tasks for the special services, and the authors of the strategy direct 
particular attention to the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of 
terrorists�15 In this strategy, the emphasis has been placed on the military aspect 
of national security; this is associated with the fact that it comprises one of the 
documents making up Poland’s long-term strategy of linking security policy with 
policy in the sphere of social and economic development� Other documents ad-
dress issues of energy, social and ecological security, together forming a compre-
hensive picture of national security� The Strategy for Development of the Polish 
National Security System 2022 is the implementation of the postulates from the 
2007 security strategy, whose assumptions included the necessity of preparing, 
maintaining and improving the state’s security system, as well as long-and medi-
um-term development strategies�16
Another document worthy of mention is the 2013 White Paper on National 
Security of the Republic of Poland� This document draws attention to the diffusion 
of anti-terrorist legislation, as well as of means for counteracting terrorism�17 This 
is significant, as the White Paper was prepared on the basis of the Strategic Review 
of National Security, and contains the key conclusions and recommendations re-
garding Poland’s national security policy, including improvements in the security 
system�18 In spite of the continuing minimal terrorist threat in Poland, the country’s 
authorities are aware of the problem; this awareness is expressed in the National 
Anti-terrorism Program for 2015–2019, adopted by the Council of Ministers in De-
cember 2014� It contains a broader diagnosis of the phenomenon of terrorism than 
15 Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022, 
Rada Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2013, pp� 3, 10–12, 23, 33, 49 available at 
https://www�bbn�gov�pl/ftp/dok/01/strategia_rozwoju_systemu_bezpieczenstwa_na-
rodowego_rp_2022�pdf, accessed 8 February 2016�
16 Ibid� p� 4�
17 Ibid� pp� 64–65�
18 Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2013, Biuro Bezpie-
czeństwa Narodowego, Warszawa 2013, p� 9, available at http://www�ank�gov�pl/komu-
nikaty/2013/07/03/biala-ksiega-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-rp, accessed 1 February 
2016�
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in the previously discussed documents, taking into account both the national and 
international dimensions, as well as offering a broad review of the anti-terrorism 
system functioning within Poland, a definition of terrorism-related events, a list of 
legal regulations addressing terrorism, and a description of the anti-terrorist system 
in place� We can also browse a presentation of Poland’s contribution to international 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism�19 The National Anti-terrorism Program 
is the executive document in relation to the Strategy for Development of the Polish 
National Security System� The last document that should be mentioned is the Polish 
Cybersecurity Doctrine, from 2015� This document includes an identification of 
terrorist and extremist organizations as sources of cyberthreats, and cyberspace is 
defined as a field where such organizations can be active�20 The starting point for 
this doctrine can be found in the determinations of the national security strategy 
for cyberspace, as well as the Policy for the Protection of Poland’s Cyberspace and 
the EU Cyber Security Strategy�21
The Spanish authorities have adopted two national security strategies to date, 
in 2011 and 2013� Previously, strategic issues were regulated primarily in National 
Security Directives issued every 4 years, beginning in 1992�22 One of the subjects 
discussed, as can be supposed, was terrorism� Already in 2003, the Strategic Se-
curity Review observed that following the attack on the World Trade Center, 
terrorism had emerged as the most prominent threat to national security, and the 
fight against it was a key issue in the strategy for organizing international secu-
rity�23 In the 2004 National Defense Directive, the first issued during the period 
under review, emphasis is placed on the asymmetrical dimension of terrorism, 
and on the fact that when faced with threats of this nature, a traditional military 
advantage does not play any significant role;24 however, in the next Directive from 
19 Narodowy Program Antyterrorystyczny…op�cit�, pp� 8–34�
20 Doktryna Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Na-
rodowego, Warszawa 2015, pp� 5, 14, available at https://www�bbn�gov�pl/ftp/dok/01/
DCB�pdf, accessed 1 February 2016�
21 Ibid� p� 7�
22 Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, La Directiva de Defensa Nacional 2012, p� 2, 
available at http://www�ieee�es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2012/DIEEEA35-2012_
DDN_IEEE�pdf, accessed 1 February 2016�
23 Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa 2003, Ministerio de Defensa, pp� 39, available 
http://www�defensa�gob�es/Galerias/defensadocs/revision-estrategica�pdf, accessed 
8 February 2016�
24 Directiva de Defensa Nacional 2004, Gobierno de España, pp� 1–2, available at http://
www�centredelas�org/images/stories/adjunts/510_ddn_2004�pdf, accessed 4 February 
2016�
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2008 there is no mention of terrorism or radicalism�25 In turn, the 2012 Directive 
was criticized for failure to address the real threat of terrorism associated with 
jihad� Under this directive, Spain’s national security should be primarily based 
on alliances and membership in international organizations, while the primary 
threat cited is the economic crisis�26
The first Spanish security strategy, “Shared Responsibility,” was confirmed on 
June 24th, 2011�27 The second Spanish strategy currently in force, “Joint Project,” 
was drafted in May 2013� These strategies are characterized by continuity in their 
content and identification of threats� In the new one, the definition of national 
security has been rendered more precise – for the first time it appears in an official 
Spanish document�28
Proceeding to the content of the national security strategy, it should be pointed 
out that a significant amount of space has been devoted to the issue of terrorism� 
First and foremost, it is listed among the most important threats in both strategies� 
Alongside reference to terrorism in conjunction with such threats as organized 
crime, cyberattacks, piracy and arms proliferation, this issue is given considera-
tion in separate sub-chapters�29
It should be pointed out that this issue was given significant attention in the 
2011 strategy, and apart from the general identification of the problem, both in-
stitutional solutions and a strategy for action in the fight with the terrorist threat 




sa_nacional08//archivo, accessed 12 February 2016�
26 D� López Garrido, “El País” 10�08�2012, available at http://elpais�com/elpais/2012/08/07/
opinion/1344351717_982529�html, accessed 8 February 2016; Directiva de Defensa 
Nacional 2012, Presidencia del Gobierno, available at http://www�defensa�gob�es/Ga-
lerias/defensadocs/directiva-defensa-nacional-2012�pdf, accessed 8 February 2016�
27 L� Mestres, The long road to Spanish security strategy, Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 
no� 39, 2011, p� 1�
28 Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2013: Un proyecto compartido, Presidencia del Go-
bierno, available at http://www�lamoncloa�gob�es/documents/seguridad_1406connav
egacionfinalaccesiblebpdf�pdf, accessed 8 February 2016, p� 5–6�
29 Ibid� pp� 25–26; Estrategia Española de Seguridad 2011: Una responsabilidad de todos, 
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are presented� Two types of terrorism are distinguished: the threat from ETA, 
and the threat from jihadist movements (Al Qaeda, Islamic State)� This threat is 
enhanced by such factors as participation in international missions, the presence 
of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Spain promoting radical ideas, including the 
reconstruction of the Islamic Al Andalus,30 proximity to the unsettled region of 
Maghreb, the existence of “failed states,” and the potential for immigrants coming 
to Spain to adopt radical ideologies, including second-generation immigrants� The 
war on terrorism is to be conducted through the following means: simplifying the 
exchange of information among security services, invocation of the EU solidar-
ity clause (Art� 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), the 
functioning of the National Centre for Coordination of Anti-terrorist Activities 
(since 2014 the Intelligence Centre for the War on Terrorism and Organized 
Crime), enhancements to the domestic judicial system and international judicial 
cooperation in terrorism-related cases, participation of the armed forces and all 
of public administration, increased financing and human resources, strengthening 
the National Intelligence Centre, development of a planned response to nuclear, 
radiological, biological and chemical attacks, improved transport security and 
greater effectiveness of external border controls, special penitentiary policy in 
cases of terrorism, and participation in international missions� However, it is 
emphasized that in spite of potential future attacks, terrorists do not have the 
capacity to destabilize the rule of law or democracy as such�31 Attention is also 
drawn to the fact that radical and extremist ideologies can intensify threats to 
national security�32
In the 2013 strategy, less attention is devoted to the issue of terrorism, with only 
a diagnosis of the threat offered� The Spanish government’s priority is to prevent 
terrorists from being able to conduct their activities� It is emphasized that the 
30 Recordings from ISIS have appeared in recent days in which terrorists have discussed 
punishing Spaniards for driving muslims out of Spain, and have expressed the desire 
to rebuild the Islamic Al Andalus, F� Carrión, El IS advierte a Espana que “pagara muy 
 caro” la expulsion de los musulmanes de Al Andalus, “El Mundo” 31�01� 2016, available at 
http://www�elmundo�es/internacional/2016/01/31/56adefc1268e3e5d0d8b4580�html, 
accessed 1 February 2016� 
31 Estrategia Española de Seguridad 2011…op�cit�, pp� 49–52�
32 Ibid� pp� 38–39; R� Alonso Pascual, Ideologías radicales y no democráticas como po-
tenciadores de riesgo para la seguridad nacional, “Cuaderno de Estrategia”, Instituto 
Español de Estudios Estratégicos, no� 159, 2013, pp� 229–268, available at http://www�
ieee�es/Galerias/fichero/cuadernos/CE_159_Potenciadores_de_Riesgo�pdf, accessed 
1 February 2016�
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coordination of responses across all of the state services and society has led to the 
neutralization of ETA� The prime terrorist threat is perceived in the activities of 
jihadist groups, which take advantage of extensive technological capacities and the 
globalized nature of the contemporary world� Potential justifications for Spain as 
a terrorist target are listed, such as proximity to the failed states of the Sahel, and 
Spain’s role in the struggle against international terrorism� Spain’s experiences in 
this battle are referred to� A greater portion of the document is devoted to issues 
of energy, economic and cyber security�33 
This last threat was the subject of separate documents, i�e� the National Cyber 
Security Strategy of 2013 and the National Energy Security Strategy of 2015�34 
These documents constitute an elaboration of the national security strategy in 
the spheres of energy and cyber security� In recent years, these areas have become 
increasingly important, and will continue to do so� They have developed into very 
important elements of the national security picture, with cyber security evolv-
ing into a particularly serious challenge considering the difficulty in predicting 
the targets and impacts of cyberattacks, as well as the constant development of 
information technology�
Lastly, we may recall the National Maritime Security Strategy of 2013, impor-
tant in view of Spain’s geographical location� Terrorism can also be a threat to the 
country’s stable maritime policy, as can piracy, illegal immigration by sea, illegal 
use of maritime resources, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction� 
The hijacking of passenger ships or attacks on transport and navy vessels may be 
used later on to engage in attacks on land�35
33 Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2013: Un proyecto, op�cit�, pp� 25–26�
34 Estrategia de Ciberseguridad Nacional 2013, Presidencia del Gobierno, available at 
http://www�lamoncloa�gob�es/documents/20131332estrategiadeciberseguridadx�pdf, 
accessed 8 February 2016; Estrategia de Seguridad Energética Nacional 2015, Presiden-
cia del Gobierno, available at http://www�lamoncloa�gob�es/serviciosdeprensa/notas-
prensa/Documents/ESTRATEGIA%20DE%20SEGURIDAD%20ENERGÉTICA%20
NACIONAL%20(WEB)�pdf, accessed 1 February 2016�
35 Estrategia de Seguridad Marítima Nacional 2013, Presidencia del Gobierno, pp� 4, 12, 
19, 24, available at http://www�ieee�es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Nacional/
Estrategia_Seguridad_Maritima_Nacional_2013�pdf, accessed 8 February 2016�
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3.  Impact of the International Environment on the Contours 
of Security Strategies in Poland and Spain
The first of the Polish strategies in the analyzed period was developed in 2003, and 
was associated with the emergence of new challenges and threats in the interna-
tional sphere, as well as with a transformation of the security environment� The 
first factor was undoubtedly the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade 
Center� Alliance with the USA and support for that country’s battle with terrorism 
meant that from that time on, Poland also had to contend with the possibility of 
becoming a target for terrorist activities� Not without importance was Poland’s 
participation in war in Afghanistan and Iraq� Membership in NATO required 
that Poland’s strategy be adapted to the conditions of participation in a military 
alliance, consideration for shared interests and challenges� NATO itself under-
went a transformation, expanding and shoring up its cooperation with Russia and 
Ukraine� Poland’s imminent accession to the European Union constituted another 
new context for the country’s security policy� The document’s authors therefore 
felt that the dynamics of the changes required Poland to revise its security strategy 
and policy�36 National security was captured in a holistic manner, as a category 
encompassing all aspects of state security: external and internal, military and ci-
vilian� However, it offered no definition of national interests, which are precisely 
what should constitute the starting point for determining strategic objectives and 
the entire national security strategy� This strategy was consistent with many new 
trends in the spheres of domestic and international security, focused on the most 
prominent issues at the moment� Having said that, one should also be aware that 
it had numerous weaknesses, including that of excessive brevity, which is why 
work on its revision was quickly undertaken�37
Several reasons can be cited for the creation of the next strategy, adopted in 
2007� Apart from the aforementioned weakness of the 2003 strategy and necessity 
of updating it, Poland’s national security situation was subjected to a significant 
change with the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004� Poland’s new 
security strategy was adapted to be compatible with the 2003 European Security 
Strategy, as well as with the assumptions adopted during the 2006 NATO sum-
mit in Riga� This strategy made up for the substantive shortfalls in the previous 
ones, including national interests and strategic objectives, alongside analysis of 
the conditions of security and the opportunities and threats facing it� A holistic 
36 Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022 
…op�cit�, p� 1�
37 S� Koziej, A� Brzozowski, 25 lat…op�cit�; pp� 22–27�
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approach to security was employed, which led to significant amounts of space in 
the document being devoted to its various sectors, such as energy and society�38
The strategy presently in force was adopted in 2014, and experts are generally 
in agreement that this was later than the dynamic changes occurring in the inter-
national arena would have dictated� The first such symptom was the eruption of 
the Russia-Georgia war in 2008� Another factor was the change in the USA’s policy 
toward Russia and withdrawal from the missile shield project in Poland� Work on 
a new strategy was, however, hindered by the intensifying political conflict taking 
place in the country, and by the tragic crash of the presidential plane in Smolensk� 
In December 2010, the order was given to conduct a Strategic Review of National 
Security, completed in September 2012; the year 2013 saw the publishing of the 
White Paper on National Security� The results of the strategic review spurred the 
work on the new strategy� During that period, conflict in Ukraine also broke out�39 
The increased significance of cybersecurity was influential on the development of 
the new national security strategy, as were fears about the security of the country’s 
energy supply� Additionally, work was undertaken within the EU and NATO 
concerning security and a strategic conception� In 2010, the European Union 
Internal Security Strategy was adopted� That same year, the summit in Lisbon saw 
the introduction of a new NATO Strategic Conception, which was later updated 
at the September 2014 summit in Newport, following the outbreak of hostili-
ties in Ukraine� At the time, it was decided that NATO’s eastern flank would be 
strengthened through joint exercises, the establishment of logistics bases, and of 
forces capable of rapidly reaching a threatened territory�40
The Strategy for Development of the Polish National Security System 2022 
arose as the implementation of the provisions contained in the 2007 national 
security strategy, which assumed a more systematic organization of the state’s 
security system, as well as the elaboration of postulates for the country’s medium 
and long-term development� It was also adopted in conjunction with the necessity 
of consolidating the national security system in the face of the challenges listed in 
38 Ibid� pp� 28–32; Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2007 …
op�cit�, p� 7�
39 A� Jagnieża, Nowa Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego w obliczu kremlowskiego eg-
zaminatora, Defence24 2014, available at http://www�defence24�pl/148404,nowa-stra-
tegia-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-w-obliczu-kremlowskiego-egzaminatora, accessed 
8 January 2016�
40 T� Smura, Szczyt NATO w Newport – powrót do podstaw, Fundacja Pułaskiego, Defen-
ce24 2014, available at http://www�defence24�pl/122717,szczyt-nato-w-newport-po-
wrot-do-podstaw, accessed 18 February 2016�
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the document, primarily doubts as to the effectiveness of the international security 
architecture, differences among NATO members, and weakening interest on the 
part of the USA in European matters� The adoption of a strategy through 2022 
results from the need to harmonize its time horizon with executive documents 
concerning defense planning, themselves determined by the NATO planning 
cycle�41 This strategy also determined the creation of the National Anti-terrorist 
Program for 2015–2019� The existence of such a program results from efforts at 
consolidating the functioning of Poland’s anti-terrorist system, which – as has 
been previously mentioned – is quite diffuse� The need to place considerable 
emphasis on the issue of terrorism is the result of the Islamic State’s increased 
activities, as well as the high frequency of attacks around the world� In turn, the 
development of a Cybersafety Doctrine is linked to the rapid development of 
technology, accompanied by highly unpredictable cybercrime, which is becoming 
increasingly dangerous as a result of the ever-expanding presence of information 
technology in every aspect of life�
In respect of the creation of a Polish national security strategy, we may cite the 
impact of membership in the NATO and the EU among the external factors af-
fecting the shape of these documents� Their authors also place strong emphasis on 
the involvement of the USA in Europe� The period in which these strategies were 
drawn up cannot be associated directly with a particular terrorist attack, perhaps 
apart from 9/11; nevertheless, that event itself was not the sole factor influencing 
the adoption of the strategy in 2003; rather, it has stimulated the general change 
in the international situation after the attack� The impact of the international 
situation is clearly visible in documents focused on individual aspects of national 
security� These include a response to the growing threat of terrorism (if not within 
the borders of Poland itself, at least toward its citizens) or of cyberattacks�
In Spain, the army exercised strong influence over politics and played a sig-
nificant role in society, beginning in the 19th century� This continued through the 
next century, as the military dictatorship established during the Civil War by Gen� 
Franco was preceded by the governments of Gen� Primo de Rivera (1923–1930)� 
At present, the armed forces are among the institutions in Spanish society that 
enjoy the highest level of trust�42 This is also why a traditional approach to issues 
41 P� Kmiecik, Nowastrategia�org�pl, Analiza krytyczna strategii rozwoju systemu bezpie-
czeństwa narodowego RP do 2022 roku, 2015, available at http://www�nowastrategia�
org�pl/analiza-krytyczna-srsbn/, accessed 8 February 2016�
42 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Barómetro de Abril 2015, Estudio no� 
3080, pp� 9–10, available at http://www�cis�es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Mar-
ginales/3080_3099/3080/es3080mar�pdf), accessed 8 February 2016� 
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of security was employed, with the issue perceived primarily in military terms� It 
was not until the White Paper on Defense in 2000 that issues associated with new 
challenges in security were captured� Attention was drawn to the globalization 
processes shaping the modern world, as well as the threats and opportunities for 
state security that resulted and the concomitant necessity to engage in global-scale 
strategic thinking�43 A reversal in thinking about asymmetrical threats, including 
terrorism, was brought about by the 9/11 attack� It was one of the factors that con-
tributed to the 2003 Strategic Security Review, in which terrorism was recognized 
as a key threat to countries belonging to international defense-oriented alliances�44
The drafting of Spain’s’ first security strategy was a response to the previous 
lack of a comprehensive strategic conception and the exclusive focus on the mili-
tary aspects of security� Statements appearing in the documents to the effect that 
the Spanish strategy was developed under the influence of similar documents in 
effect in neighboring countries, such as France, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands, as well as the 2003 EU security strategy, indicate a particular trend 
in legislation as one of the roots of the strategy’s adoption�45 Another factor is 
the new NATO Strategic Conception that emerged during the Lisbon summit�46
The strategy’s update in 2013 was most certainly influenced by changes in the 
international situation, such as the Arab Spring, and changes in the USA’s strategic 
assumptions�47 In spite of the significant place occupied in Spain’s security strategies 
43 Libro Blanco de Defensa 2000, Ministerio de Defensa, pp� 29–30, available at http://
www�defesa�gov�br/projetosweb/livrobranco/arquivos/pdf/Espanha%202000�pdf, ac-
cessed 15 February 2016�
44 M�A� Franco García, De las Directivas de Defensa Nacional a la Estrategia de Seguridad 
Nacional: tendencia a la integración de capacidades cívico-militares en el ámbito marí-
timo, “Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos” no� 3, 2014, pp� 5–6�
45 L� Mestres, The long road…op�cit�, p� 1; Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos 
(IEEE), 2010, El contexto de elaboración de la Estrategia Española de Seguridad, avai-
lable at http://www�ieee�es/Galerias/fichero/2010/DA-IEEE_02-2010_EL_CONTEX-
TO_DE_ELABORACION_DE_LA_ESTRATEGIA_ESPANOLA_DE_SEGURIDAD�
pdf, accessed 1 February 2016�
46 Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2011, Análisis comparativo de la Estrategia 
Española de Seguridad «Una responsabilidad de todos», p� 3, available at http://www�
ieee�es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2011/DIEEEA17_2011EstrategiaEspanolaSegu-
ridad�pdf, accessed 1 February 2016�
47 M� Laborie Iglesias, La Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional (Mayo 2013). Documento 
Análisis de Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, no� 34/2013 2014, p� 2, available 
at http://www�ieee�es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2013/DIEEEA34-2013_Estrate-
giaSeguridadNacional-2013_MLI�pdf, accessed 8 February 2016�
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by the issue of the terrorist threat, it was not specific attacks, that influenced the 
updating of documents� The national security strategy was adopted 7 years after 
the attack in Madrid� It has led to practical changes, such as in the structure of state 
institutions – attention was drawn to the necessity of their coordination� On the 
doctrinal plane, the largest influence was had by the attack of 9/11, as it demanded 
a reflection on the new nature of terrorism� 
National defense directives are adopted in accordance with the regular, four-
year cycles of defense planning in effect� Events around the world and at home 
therefore impact the content of the directives, but not the frequency with which 
they are adopted� Defense planning and strategies are developed as forecasts for 
the future, but are prepared in response to events taking place around the globe 
and the evolving geopolitical panorama48� In the 2004 Directive, the following 
factors are listed as influential in the formation of such documents: changes in 
the international strategic situation, the presence of Spain in the international 
arena, the development of society, and successive governments�49 In the case of 
the 2008 Directive, the factors impacting its contours included terrorist attacks 
in Madrid, London and Beslan, on the one hand, and the passage of the National 
Defense Act, on the other�50 These directives reflect the parallel development of 
European security and defense policy, and also invoke references to membership 
in such organizations as the NATO, the EU and the UN as guarantors of security� 
In conjunction with the intensification of migration to Spain, the 2008 Directive 
devotes greater attention to sub-Saharan Africa� The 2012 Directive emphasizes 
the importance of the alliance with the United States�51
Analogically to the situation observed in Poland, three directives have been 
adopted in Spain, which focused on the issue of sectoral security: cyberspace, 
energy and national maritime security� In the case of cyberthreats, the motivation 
is similar to that in Poland – we are facing a highly-developed technology which 
entails not only a great deal of benefits but also threats� One of the ways in which 
the Internet is used by terrorists is in the recruitment of new supports, which must 
be viewed as a potential threat when considering the existence of jihadist cells 
in Spain� The use of cyberspace for criminal activity is also inexpensive, and it 
does not present barriers, such as the necessity of traveling�52 The energy security 
strategy emphasizes the importance of energy resources in the modern world, as 
48 La Directiva de Defensa Nacional 2012…op�cit�, p� 2; 
49 Directiva de Defensa Nacional 2004…op�cit, p� 1�
50 La Directiva de Defensa Nacional 2012…, p� 4�
51 Ibid� pp� 6–8�
52 Estrategia de Ciberseguridad Nacional…
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well as the necessity to diversify sources in order to ensure security stable eco-
nomic growth and social development� Spain is a consumer of energy resources 
and is dependent on their import� Stability of supply is therefore paramount, and 
such stability can be impacted by unforeseen events in exporting states� One of 
the factors influencing the contours of the strategy under discussion is the Arab 
Spring�53 A mention should also be made about the maritime security strategy, 
which is a priority owing to Spain’s geographic situation� Many factors come into 
play here: guaranteeing supplies of energy resources, general trade, piracy, and 
ecological disasters along the Spanish coast�54 All three documents taken together 
constitute the development and implementation of the national security strategy�
In summary, much like in the case of Poland, far-reaching impact on the de-
sign of Spain’s security strategy can be found in the fact of its membership in 
international organizations, as well as the activities of those bodies� The attitude 
of the United States toward the international situation plays a significant role� 
Because of its geographical location, events in the Mediterranean basin, such as 
the Arab Spring, do not go unnoticed in Spain, whose ties with the other coun-
tries in the region are strong and proximity does not allow for indifference� Spain 
is also one of the countries hit hardest by illegal immigration, and has been for 
years� Another factor that can be named is trends in the legislation of neighbor-
ing countries, as well as evolving strategic conceptions of organizations in which 
Spain is a member�
4.  Security Strategies and Public Opinion in Poland and Spain
Is the adoption of a security strategy and other documents related to the issue of 
terrorism and radicalism correlated to some degree with public opinion? Do the 
previously discussed changes in strategic documents comprising the security model 
in place in Poland and Spain constitute a response to increased perceptions of the 
threat posed by terrorism and radicalism in those societies? Analysis of the results 
of Eurobarometer polling from the period 2005–2015 does not allow us to say de-
finitively� It is clear that in the period 2005–2009, Spanish respondents more keenly 
felt the threat of terrorism than did citizens of Poland� In 2005, as many as 46% of 
respondents indicated terrorism as one of the two most important problems facing 
Spain, while only 3% of Polish respondents held the same opinion, and the European 
average was 10%� The situation was similar in 2006, except for the difference that 
10% fewer Spanish respondents than in the preceding year indicated terrorism as 
53 Estrategia de Seguridad Energética Nacional…
54 Estrategia de Seguridad Marítima…
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one of the main issues to be dealt with, while these percentages in Poland and Eu-
rope as a whole remained essentially unchanged� In 2007, as many as 47% Spanish 
respondents declared that terrorism was one of the country’s two most pressing 
issues, while in Poland only 1% did so, with the EU average being 12%� In 2008 
as well the number of Spanish respondents pointing to the issue of terrorism was 
high, reaching 31%, while in Poland it grew by just 1%, and the European average 
dropped to 7%� Beginning in 2009, the number of Spanish respondents declaring 
terrorism to be one of the country’s two most important issues fell dramatically: in 
2009 it was 5%, in 2010 and 201 – 10%, in 2013 and 2014 – 1%, and in 2015 – 5%� In 
Poland, except for 2010 and 2011, the numbers were quite similar to those in Spain: 
in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 – 1%, 2013, 2014 – 2%, 2015 – 5%� In 2012 and 2015, 
these values were identical in Poland and Spain, while in 2013 and 2014 even more 
respondents in Poland felt that terrorism was one of the two most important issues�










Source: Author’s analysis on the basis of Eurobarometer 63, May 2005; Standard Eurobarometer, 
65 March 2006; Standard Eurobarometer 67, April 2007; Standard Eurobarometer 69, March 
2008; Standard Eurobarometer 71, June 2009; Standard Eurobarometer 73, May 2010; Standard 
Eurobarometer 75, May 2011; Standard Eurobarometer 77, May 2012; Standard Eurobarometer 79, 
May 2013; Standard Eurobarometer 82, November 2014; Standard Eurobarometer 84, November 
2015, available at http://ec�europa�eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index�cfm/Survey/
index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD, accessed 1 February 2016�
Analyzing the Eurobarometer results for Poland, we may observe a slight growth in 
the number of respondents pointing to terrorism as one of the two main problems 
facing the country� However, it should be emphasized that in the period 2005–2015 
this number oscillated between 1% and 5%, which puts respondents from Poland 
below the EU average (2%–12%)� When we examine the results of Eurobarometer 
performed in Spain, it is not difficult to see that with the explosion of the economic 
crisis in 2009, Spaniards primarily indicated the economic situation (2009 – 40%, 
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2010 – 51%, 2011 – 50%, 2012 – 61%, 2013 – 50%, 2014 – 36%, 2015 – 29%) and 
unemployment (2009 – 32%, 2010 – 72%, 2011 – 76%, 2012 – 76%, 2013 – 79%, 
2014 – 78%, 2015 – 69%) as the two primary issues facing Spain� Thus, for citizens 
of Spain, the largest challenges to their country were economic issues rather than 
terrorism� This does not necessarily mean that issues surrounding terrorism ceased 
to be of importance, but only that they were not among the two most pressing 
issues faced by Spain�
Domestic public opinion polling gives a better picture of the perception of the 
threat posed by terrorism among respondents in Poland and Spain� In Poland, 
we may come across public opinion polls addressing the issue of terrorism and 
security as a general proposition, while in Spain these polls discuss terrorism and 
political radicalism in the form of Islamic extremism, which makes it difficult to 
compare the two countries� Additionally, one may be surprised by the fact that in 
Spain there is a lack of studies concerning feelings about security or assessments 
of the degree to which state authorities and institutions are prepared to counteract 
terrorist attacks� A small number of polls have been carried out by the public think 
tank Real Insituto Elcano, but none by the most prestigious polling institution 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)�
In Poland, reports of studies by CBOS inform us that in 2010, 32% of re-
spondents felt that there was a real threat of terrorism in Poland, while in 2013 
it was 46%, and in 2015 the number reached 53%� At the same time, the number 
of respondents who felt that the terrorist threat was overstated or non-existent 
dropped: in 2010 it was 30% and 26%, in 2013 28% and 24%, and in 2015 it was 
22% and 8%� Thus, in comparing the growth in the perception of the terrorist 
threat, one may risk the conclusion that successive changes in strategic documents 
concerning security may be correlated with it to some degree� 








There is a real threat of terrorism in Poland
The threat in Poland is exaggerated
There is no real threat of terrorism in Poland
Not sure
Source: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej (CBOS), Zagrożenie terroryzmem, no� 50/2015, Warsaw 
April 2015, p� 1–2�
*Which response best matches your feelings about terrorism in Poland?
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However, when we review responses to the question “Do you personally fear 
terrorist attacks or not?” in other studies conducted by CBOS, this tendency 
does not repeat itself� When analyzing the results of studies carried out on 
ten separate occasions in the period 2001–2015, we may say that the personal 
perception of a threat on the part of respondents remains at a constant level� In 
2001, 39% of those polled responded that they were afraid of terrorist attacks, 
while in 2015 this number was 41%� It is worth adding that in 2010 and 2013 
Poles felt the safest, with 25% and 26%, respectively, in fear of such a threat, 
whereas in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 the largest number of respondents 
expressed fear of terrorist attacks, with percentages in those years of 52%, 64% 
and 56%� Such significant growth in the perception of the threat of terrorist 
attacks should most likely be associated with attacks taking place at the time 
around Europe� 






2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2010 2011 2013 2015
I fear attacks
I do not fear attacks
Not sure
Source: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej (CBOS), Zagrożenie terroryzmem, no� 50/2015, Warsaw 
April 2015, p� 2�
*Are you personally afraid of terrorist attacks or not?
We can therefore observe the absence of correlation between the results of studies 
on the threat of terrorism facing the Polish state and those examining personal 
fears of terrorist attacks� There is a greater degree of cohesion between the results 
of studies concerning the feeling of security and those concerning the personal 
perception of terrorist threats� Summarizing responses to the question of whether 
Poland is a country where one may live safely, a growth tendency can be observed, 
and thus over the preceding few years respondents have responded positively 
to that question with increasing frequency� Analysis of graph no� 4 allows us to 
observe that Poles perceive their country as becoming more and more safe� In 
2001, only 18% felt that Poland was a country where one could live safely, while 
81% expressed the opposite opinion� However, in 2014 these proportions were 
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exactly reversed, as 70% of respondents claimed that Poland was a safe country, 
while only 28% declared different position�






2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Yes, Poland is a safe country to live in
No, Poland is not a safe country to live in
Source: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej (CBOS), Bezpieczeństwo publiczne, BS/63/2013, Warsaw 
May 2013, p� 3; Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej (CBOS), Opinie o bezpieczeństwie narodowym, 
no� 18/2014, Warsaw February 2014, p� 1�
*In your opinion, is Poland a safe country to live in? 
These results demonstrate that over the last 14 years, Poles’ feeling of safety and 
security has grown� This may be the result of a wide range of factors, but there 
can be no doubt that if Poles perceived a large danger of terrorist attack, they 
would not feel so safe� All the more so when considering that in successive opin-
ion polls, they do not provide a favorable assessment of the preparations of Pol-
ish authorities and state institutions to prevent terrorist attacks� In 2013, 28% of 
respondents declared that Polish authorities and institutions are well prepared 
(total of responses “strongly agree” and “agree”), while in 2015 this number was 
even lower, reaching 26%� During the same years, 58% and 55%, respectively, 
were of the opinion that they were not well prepared (total of responses “strongly 
disagree” and “disagree”)�
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Graph 5:  Opinions of Poles concerning the preparation of Polish authorities and state 














Source: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej (CBOS), Zagrożenie terroryzmem, no� 50/2015, Warsaw 
April 2015, p� 4�
*Do you agree that Polish authorities and state institutions are well prepared to prevent terrorist 
attacks in Poland?
As has already been mentioned, in Spain we may only find fragmentary research 
on the subject of perception of the threat posed by terrorism and political radi-
calism� In the period 2004–2011, public opinion polling conducted by Real In-
stituto Elcano contained a question asking respondents to declare the greatest 
threats, including international terrorism, to Spain’s strategic interests� Spanish 
respondents were uniform in their assessment of the significance of the terrorist 
threat (graph no� 6)� When adding together responses indicating that this is a 
“very serious threat” or “serious threat,” it turns out that in the years 2002–2015 
the percentage of such responses oscillated between 84% and 96% (in 2002: 85%, 
2003 95%, 2004 90%, 2005 and 2006 95%, 2007 93%, 2008 81%, 2009 92%, 2010 
96%, 2011 94%, 2012 85%, 2013 84%, 2014 84%, 2015 92%)� The results of this 
poll allow us to state with full confidence that the threat of terrorism is perceived 
as a significant one in Spain�
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2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Not sure Not significant Significant Very significant
Source: Author’s analysis on the basis of Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE) from 
November 2002, November 2003, March 2004, February 2005, Juny 2006, June 2007, June 2008, 
July 2009, March 2010, March 2011, April 2012, February 2013; July 2014, June 2015, available at 
http://www�realinstitutoelcano�org/, accessed 1 February 2016�
The situation is similar with the results of studies concerning the perception of 
the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism (graph 7)� Also here, the number of 
respondents pointing to such a threat is very high; however, it is slightly lower 
than in the case of international terrorism� In 2002, 68% of respondents declared 
that this threat was “very significant” or “significant,” while in subsequent years 
this number was 80%, 73%, 87%, 88%, 84%, 91%, 84% and 78%� Thus, in the opin-
ion of Spanish society, the level of the perception of threats posed by terrorism 
and Islamic fundamentalism is very high� This is consistent with the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs announcing in 2015 that it was raising the terrorist attack threat 
indicator from 3 to 4, and thus the second-highest level on the scale, which was 
also captured in the Plan for Counter-terrorism Prevention and Protection (Plan 
de Prevención y Protección Antiterrorista)�55
55 J� A� Rodríguez, Los niveles de alerta antiterrorista en España y qué suponen, “El 
País” 26�06�2015, available at http://politica�elpais�com/politica/2015/06/26/actuali-
dad/1435333317_728405�html, accessed 16 February 2016� 
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Graph 7:  Social perception of the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism for Spain’s 






2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Not sure Not significant Significant Very significant
Source: Author’s analysis based on Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE) from November 2002, 
November 2003, March 2004, February 2005, June 2007, July 2009, March 2010, March 2011, April 
2012 February 2013, available at http://www�realinstitutoelcano�org, accessed 1 February 2016�
The results cited above are also consistent with successive studies conducted by 
Real Insituto Elcano concerning the threat of terrorism coming from the ETA, 
and international terrorism, implicitly understood as Islamic� On the basis of 
their results, it can be observed that in the years following the March 11th, 2004 
attack, respondents indicated international terrorism as the type posing the great-
est threat to their safety; in 2004, the percentage of people who felt so was 45%, in 
2005 it was 30%, in 2006 as much as 53%, in 2007 31%, after which this number 
declined in 2008 and 2009 to 15%, to again grow in 2010 to 24%, and in 2011 it 
was 34%� At the same time, responses point to terrorism from the ETA fluctuated; 
in 2004 they accounted for 15%, in 2005 it was 30%, in 2006 27%, in 2007 24%, in 
2008 23%, in 2009 34%, in 2010 45%, and in 2011 38%� Also, in the case of answers 
indicating both types of terrorism, it is difficult to discover any universalities as in 
2004 there was a total of 38% such responses, in 2005 27%, in 2006 20%, in 2007 
43%, in 2008 60%, in 2009 49%, in 2010 28% and in 2011 26%� However, if we 
add the category “both types of terrorism are a threat,” in respect of international 
terrorism we obtain an average of 67%, while for terrorism from the ETA it is 66%� 
Thus, what we can conclude from the data presented is that terrorism by the ETA 
continues to be perceived as a threat to security, as does international terrorism� 
It is worth mentioning here that this type of survey was last conducted in 2011, 
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when ETA announced it was laying down its arms� The absence of attacks by ETA 
in recent years, accompanied by the increased activities of Islamic fundamental-
ists, may give rise to different results� 
Graph 8:  Evolution of the assessment of the terrorist threat from ETA and international 






2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Terrorism by the ETA is a greater threat
International terrorism is a greater threat
Both of terrorism are a threat
Source: Author’s analysis on the basis of Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (BRIE) from June 
2004 February 2005, June 2006, December 2007, July 2008, March-April 2009, March 2010, March 
2011, available at http://www�realinstitutoelcano�org, accessed 1 February 2016�
*Which threat is greater, that from the ETA, or that from international terrorism?
Thus, in the case of Eurobarometer results, it is not easy to precisely determine the 
degree to which people feel the threat of terrorism, considering the specificity of 
the study being described and taken together with the outbreak of the economic 
crisis� In respect of Poland, this task is somewhat easier, for terrorism has not been 
and is not the primary problem facing Poland in the opinion of respondents� As 
for the other results from Poland, apart from the study concerning respondents’ 
views on the threat of terrorism in Poland, the remaining ones indicate that the 
sense of this threat is low� Furthermore, even in the case of studies regarding 
opinions on the subject of the terrorist threat in Poland, the highest percentage 
of respondents (in 2015) was recorded at a level of 53%, while in Spain similar 
questions received scores of 84% to 96% in the years 2002–2015� In the case of 
Spain, all of the results from domestic public opinion polls are consistent� There 
is a very high sense of the threat from terrorism and political radicalism in public 
opinion, but this sense remains at a stable level and is not growing�
5. Conclusion
Terrorism and radicalism are among the factors shaping security strategies in 
Poland and Spain� Considering the far more significant threat posed by these 
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phenomena in Spain than in Poland, they occupy a more important position in 
the strategic planning of the former country, and more space is devoted to them 
in strategic documents� Terrorism is listed in Spanish documents as one of the 
primary threats, in both the domestic and the international dimension, while 
the issue of terrorism by the ETA would seem to be resolved for the moment, 
as opposed to Islamic terrorism, which is growing in prominence on a global 
scale� In Poland, the far lesser threat of terrorism means that this issue occupies 
a much less prominent place in security strategies� It is listed alongside other 
types of threats, and generally linked to them� In the case of Poland, dangers 
coming from terrorism are primarily perceived in categories of citizens staying 
in unstable regions or soldiers participating in missions abroad, but not for the 
territory of Poland itself� Thus we may say that the first of the tested hypotheses 
is confirmed, considering the greater threat of terrorism and political radicalism 
in Spain compared to Poland, each of these phenomena exert a greater influence 
on the contours of security strategies in Spain than in Poland�
It is also relatively simple to take note of the impact of external factors on amend-
ments to both countries’ security strategies, such as membership in international 
organizations, these organizations’ activities in the international sphere, relations 
with the USA, and, to a lesser extent, trends in the legislation of the region’s most in-
fluential states� These influences are similar in both of the countries under analysis� 
Changes in the strategic conceptions of the NATO or the EU also exert a comparable 
impact on the security policies of Poland and Spain� Some differences result from 
geographical location and different neighboring countries, which lead to the empha-
ses in strategies also being different – relations with Russia are key for Poland, while 
Spain is most concerned with the situation in the Mediterranean basin� However, 
cyberthreats, inherently of a global nature, exert similar influences on both states� 
Energy security policies also exhibit some shared characteristics – both states are 
importers of energy resources� Another hypothesis has thus been confirmed, that 
the impact of external factors on the contours of strategic documents addressing 
terrorism and radicalism will be comparable in Poland and in Spain�
As for dependencies between changes in strategic documents concerning na-
tional security and growing fears of the threat of terrorism and radicalism among 
citizens of Poland and Spain, they are not so obvious� The hypothesis that changes 
in legal regulations concerning terrorism and radicalism are correlated with public 
opinion polling results to a greater extent in Spain than in Poland, owing to the far 
greater perception of the threat of terrorism in the former country, is only partially 
true� In respect of Poland, we cannot identify a dependency between changes in 
strategic documents addressing national security and growth in the perception 
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of the terrorist threat, as the feeling at the personal level of being threatened 
by terrorism has remained stable for years; this does not, therefore, explain the 
changes to strategic documents that have been made� Thus, Polish security strate-
gies, the Strategy for Development of a National Security System, the White Paper 
on National Security of Poland, the National Anti-terrorist Program, and the 
Cybersecurity Doctrine were not drafted as a result of terrorism being perceived 
as among the greatest challenges facing the Polish state� As for Spain, the feeling 
of threat from terrorism and political radicalism in the form of Islamic extrem-
ism has grown to a small extent, which may be more indicative of a correlation 
between the results of public opinion polling and changes in Spanish legislation�
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José María Blanco Navarro
The Fight against Jihadism in Spain  
Special Mention to the Spanish Civil Guard
1. Introduction: Jihadism, A Global Phenomenon
The data related to the year 2014 published by the Country Reports on Terrorism, 
from the State Departed of the United States, and the database included in the Na-
tional Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism START, 
show a great increase in the number of terrorist attacks that took place around the 
world in that year� The number of attacks during the last two years has increased, 
reaching the levels from the years 2006 and 2007, with a death toll higher than 
30�000 each year� The data partly explain the situation: an accelerated deteriora-
tion of the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan after the long military interventions, 
the rise and push of Daesh and the huge increase of attacks and lethality of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria�
To be sure, jihadism is widely considered as the main security threat, but it 
needs to be put into context: in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and 
Syria it is a daily reality� In Western countries, in turn, it is an important threat 
that is not normally produced�
Different questions help to understand the recent situation: a threat increasingly 
diversified after the break of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) from Al 
Qaeda and the proliferation of local groups, the momentum of Daesh and its capac-
ity for attracting the youth around the world, specially after the declaration of the 
Caliphate in Mosul, a multiplicity of endless conflicts in extreme fragile states, an 
intensification of the conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims, the fragmentation 
of Islam itself with growing extremist visions, the benefit from new telecommunica-
tion technologies – such as the Internet, the darknet or apps – which increase the 
propagandistic effect of the message and the actions of those groups, the creation of 
real “terror armies” in the conflict zones, with the mobilizations of foreign fighters 
who support Daesh and rise of their strategic and tactic capacities, growing connec-
tion between terrorist and organized crimes groups who live together in the same 
conflict environments, the rise of homegrown terrorism in Western countries and 
evolution and adaptation of the modus operandi with an important emulation effect 
José María Blanco Navarro168
(use of firearms, attacks against soft targets, beheadings, vehicle related actions)� 
These tendencies will remain in the medium term�1
All these elements, and others of local character, imply for Western nations an 
important increase of the terrorist threat and the need of adapting the counter-
terrorism operations to the metamorphosis the threat has suffered�
Before focusing on Spain, we need to understand how the situation in Europe 
is evolving� Freedom of movement inside the European Union implies that the 
threat of any of its states could perfectly expand to the rest, which proves the need 
of shared measures�
The Paris terror attacks in January and November, the police operation in 
Belgium in which two alleged terrorists were killed, the attacks registered in Co-
penhagen in February, together with the constant police operations and disman-
tling of presumed complots against multiple European cities, have raised all the 
alarms during 2015�
Within Europe, the effects of the Paris terror attacks are evident and clearly 
negative� The impacts are not only the personal and material damages produced 
directly during the attacks, but also the increase of the social terror, which has 
contributed to a social polarization – the rise of xenophobic actions and Islamo-
phobia, as well as anti-Semitism, with several attacks to mosques or refuge centers, 
or the support of actions of groups such as PEGIDA and its spread along Europe�
The effects have also opened the tricky debate between freedom and security 
and divided the Western vision related to the limits of the freedom of speech, es-
pecially when these expressions offend concrete communities� It has fostered the 
common complaint against the security forces and intelligence services, because 
of the retrospective clarification bias based on drafting an analysis afterwards� It 
has also promoted the beginning of the adaptation process of new legislative and 
police measures, but perhaps without pointing out sufficiently the need of not 
overreacting to the threats� The paralysis of a city such as Brussels and the pro-
longed state of emergency declared in France after the attacks represent a victory 
of terrorism that has determined the lifestyle in Europe and imposed limitations 
on our rights and freedoms�
1 J� M� Blanco, J� Cohen, The future of counter-terrorism in Europe. The need to be lost in 
the correct direction, “European Journal of Future Research” no� 1 (2), 2014, available at 
http://link�springer�com/article/10�1007%2Fs40309-014-0050-9, accessed 20 December 
2015�
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2. Analysis of the Threat in Spain
2.1 Factors involved
After the attacks of March 11th, 2004, Spain redoubled efforts to fight against 
jihadist terrorism, which had previously used Spain as a logistics centre and a 
place to find shelter� The most important historical antecedent was the attack on 
the restaurant “El Descanso” in 1985, near the US military base of Torrejon de 
Ardoz, in which 18 people were killed�
In order to analyze the existent threats for Spain, we need to identify a series 
of factors, which could be quantified, or at least, susceptible of being measured� 
They should allow fixing the needed references to determine if the threat is rising 
or lowering� In that sense, we could distinguish a range of structural and circum-
stantial aspects, following the approach of Reinares,2 who analyzed the dimension 
of the threat in different European countries�
2 F� Reinares, ¿Por qué el terrorismo yihadista afectará más a unos países europeos que 
a otros?, Real Instituto Elcano 2011, available at http://www�realinstitutoelcano�org/
wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/
zonas_es/ari82-2011, accessed 20 December 2015�
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Figure 1: Structural and circumstantial factors in assessing the threat
Structural History
– Al-Andalus
–  Previous experiences with terrorist groups, attacks and counter-
terrorism policies 
Geography
– Proximity to conflict spots�
– Ceuta and Melilla
– Spain, link between continents� 
Social-Demography
– Communities and minorities 
– Multiculturalism and integration
– Fragile Urban Environments 
Circumstantial Threats and mentions to the Spanish state in the jihadist propaganda�
Counter terrorism efforts in Spain
Spanish presence in the international sphere�
Level of acceptance of the Muslim communities and level of social 
polarization�
The number of displaced fighters and returnees from the conflict areas
Specific grievances� Use of veil, caricatures or policies toward mosques� 
Opportunity circumstances� Closeness to the elections, ephemeris, 
religious celebrations (Christmas), celebration of big international 
events� 
Source: Author’s concept�
Among the first set of factors, historical, geographical and social-demographical 
aspects continue to determine greatly the current threat�
The claim of Al-Andalus, or the mention of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, is a 
constant in the jihadist literature� Al Andalus represents the splendor of Muslim 
power and culture and the great future desire� The name describes parts of Spain 
that were occupied by Muslims between 711 and 1492� It constituted a province 
of the Umayyad Caliphate, the Emirate of Cordoba (750–929) and the Caliphate 
of Cordoba (929–1031)�
Taking into account the historical aspects, we need to consider previous attacks 
and antiterrorist measures in the country, even though the past cannot be used as 
a reliable source to predict the future� Spain has fought for many years against a 
cruel terrorist group (ETA) and has demonstrated that the tools of the rule of law 
can end this scourge� The domestic terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
(ETA) has not launched any attacks since it announced a “definitive cessation of 
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armed activity” in October 2011, although the group had not formally disbanded 
or given up its weapons arsenal by the end of 2015�
But jihadist terrorism is a different phenomenon, with new features, which 
have forced Western states to adapt legal and judicial structures and the actions 
of law enforcement agencies� Presently, our societies face a more international 
and diffuse threat�
At the same time, however, the proximity to North Africa, which sets up Spain 
as the main entrance to Europe, is a differential aspect against the backdrop of 
other European nations� As Reinares claims, the distance to jihadist centers is an 
essential aspect to take into account� The existence of close conflict spots, such 
as Libya, Sahel, or the desire of Boko Haram to play in a greater international 
dimension after pledging loyalty to the Daesh – this change is shown in the new 
denomination they have adopted, calling themselves Islamic State in Western 
Africa – constitute clear and present risks�
In this regard, collaboration with Algeria and Morocco are fundamental for 
the national security of Spain against the instability of the Sahel, and especially 
the turmoil in Libya and Tunisia, as well as the connections between the terrorist 
net in Spain and in Morocco� De la Corte,3 analyzing the situation in Ceuta and 
Melilla, establishes a conceptual framework, suggesting to take into account the 
proximity to extremist centers, the existence of shared frontiers, the connection 
between the different migration routes and the terrain�
In the social-demographical aspects, we need to point out the demographic 
configuration, which could feed the social polarization between communities 
and minorities, the existence of marginalization and social exclusion, and the 
creation of urban ghettos� Blanco and Cohen,4 in a drug trafficking analysis in 
Mexico, applied the conceptualization of Sullivan5 about the existence of “narco-
cities,” a local application of the concepts of failed or fragile states� In the present 
3 L� De la Corte, ¿Enclaves yihadistas? Un estudio sobre la presencia y el riesgo extremistas 
en Ceuta y Melilla, “Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional” no� 2(1), 2015, 
pp� 1–34, available at http://www�seguridadinternacional�es/revista/?q=content/%C2% 
BFenclaves-yihadistas-un-estudio-sobre-la-presencia-y-el-riesgo-extremistas-en-
ceuta-y, accessed 20 December 2015�
4 J� Cohen, J�M� Blanco, El crimen organizado y la estabilidad estatal en México, I Con-
greso de Estudios Militares Granada 2014, available at http://estudiosmilitares.es/
comunicaciones/J%C3%A9ssica%20Cohen%20Villaverde%20y%20Jos%C3%A9%20
M%C2%AA%20Blanco%20Navarro.pdf, accessed 20 December 2015�
5 J� P� Sullivan, Narco-Cities: Mexico and Beyond, “Small Wars Journal” 31�03�2014 avail-
able at www�smallwarsjournal�com, accessed 20 January 2016�
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paper, we shall apply this concept to specific zones of cities and regions in which 
we can talk about “fragile urban environments�” In this regard, we may think of 
examples of districts such as Príncipe Alfonso in Ceuta, Molenbeek in Brussels, 
or some banlieuves in the suburbs of Paris, although we can also assume that they 
are subjected to different conditions�
A failed state would be the one which is not capable of providing the basic 
goods and services to its citizens, which cannot guarantee their security against 
armed forces, and which, finally, lacks legitimacy, as a great percentage of its elites 
and society do reject the existing rules�6 Following Max Weber, we can describe a 
failed state as one that does not have the monopoly of the use of force� According 
to the OECD, a fragile state cannot satisfy the expectations of its citizens or control 
the changes in the political process� Sullivan7 classifies examples of “narco-cities” 
as communities with extreme violence rates and conflicts due to the actions of 
different cartels� In their most extreme level, there are several cities with a lack 
of legitimacy and public power, which is occupied by non-State entities, such us 
the organized crime groups�
Blanco and Cohen8 understand as “fragile urban environments” the districts 
or zones of regions characterized by the convergence of several of the following 
aspects: a high inequality rate, great unemployment rates (especially youth un-
employment), high percentage of school failure, extreme poverty or deprivation, 
huge crime rates, difficulties in accessing basic public services – electricity, water, 
healthcare, education or security provisions – or the complex urbanism which 
could isolate a part of a city, among others�
We need to avoid the unfair stigmatization of the resident population, which 
could only create the effect of polarizing the feelings and raising the perception of 
offense� The majority of the citizens who live in those places assume all the rights and 
obligations demandable as a part of a citizenship� They are not violent radicals, nor 
jihadist, and they do not want to travel to Syria� However, there are socio-economic 
conditions for radicalization processes: employment, infrastructure, social services 
and development are the means of action� Professor Luis de la Corte,9 in a report for 
6 C� T� Call, Beyond the failed state: Toward conceptual alternatives, “European Journal 
of International Relations”, US Institute for Peace, Washington 2010�
7 J� P� Sullivan, Narco-Cities…op�cit�
8 J� M� Blanco, J� Cohen, Entornos urbanos frágiles, Diario BEZ, available at http://www�
bez�es/617991634/Tras-los-atentados-de-Paris-III�-Entornos-urbanos-fragiles�html, 
accessed 20 December 2015�
9 L� De la Corte, Actividad yihadista en Ceuta: antecedentes y vulnerabilidades, Real In-
stituto Elcano 19�06�2007, available at http://www�realinstitutoelcano�org/documentos/
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the Real Instituto Elcano, suggested a series of measures, in which the ones of local 
character and socio-political content acquired special relevance�
Among the circumstantial factors to evaluate the threat, the following should 
be pointed out:
1.  References to Spain in the jihadist propaganda, especially in the cases of 
direct threat
Spain continues to appear in the jihadist discourse� Torres summarizes all refer-
ences to Spain in the jihadist propaganda without taking into account the anony-
mous declarations, and allowing to distinguish those which claim historical and 
geographical aspects, from those which call for violent actions�10
In the year 2015, the above mentioned author has found 21 references, while 
in the previous year only 10 references were found�
Figure 2: Spain in the Jihadist propaganda
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Source: M� Torres, Referencias a España en la propaganda yihadista, available at http://www�
seguridadinternacional�es, accessed 20 January 2016�
DT2007/DT28-2007_de_la_Corte_actividades_yihadistas_Ceuta�pdf, accessed 20 De-
cember 2015�




contra-el-terrorismo-yihadista-en-espa%25C3%25B1, accessed 20 January 2016�
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As the figure shows, most of the mentions are based on Al-Andalus, sometimes 
as the greater desired goal, and sometimes together with the desire of taking 
Paris and Roma� However, we can point out two very specific references to Spain� 
The first one was the call for action of the “brothers” of Melilla, with origins in 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in which the Spanish Abu al-Nur al 
Andalusi speaks, but which does not call for action in Spain� The second one was 
an article titled “The Lone Wolves,” published by Al-Khilafah Media Fundation, 
about future terrorist actions in Madrid, London, and Sydney� Later on, in Janu-
ary 2016, in a new video from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Abu al-Nur al 
Andalusi threatens Napoli, Rome and Madrid with future explosions�
A video published in November by Wilayat Dayala, threatening France, used 
Spain as an example, pointing out how Spanish citizens forced the Government 
against the participation in the war in Iraq�
The evaluation of these communications could also consider the broadcast 
and the impact of the channel in which they appear� Spain is mentioned three 
times in Dabiq, the publication of Daesh – on the numbers 7, 8 and 11� It is also 
referenced on the environment of Al Qaeda, as Ayman Al Zawahiri speaks about 
Spain three times: in the jihadist magazine Inspire, in the magazine Resurgence, 
and in a video of AQIM�
The number of references to Spain has soared in January 2016� Torres has de-
tected the existence of at least nine statements, with explicit mentions to Al Andalus, 
Ceuta, Melilla, Canary Islands, Cordoba, Sevilla, Granada and Madrid�11
2. Counter-terrorism efforts
The number of developed operations and detainees could turn into an indirect 
indicator of the jihadist activities developed in the country: in terms of recruit-
ment and indoctrination, financing and communication activities, foreign fighters 
traveling to conflict zones or plans of attacks�
Police operations are also an indicator of violent incidents (there are more at-
tempts, luckily, than performances), susceptible of specific evaluations: the threat 
does not have the same degree in the disarticulation of a propaganda network as 
an attack in an advanced process� In 2015, 102 individuals were taken into cus-
todies with Islamic terrorism charges, 75 in Spain and 27 in other States� Since 
11 M� Torres, La lucha por liderar el yihadismo magrebí aumenta la amenaza sobre España, 
Observatorio Internacional de Estudios sobre Terrorismo (OIET), available at http://
observatorioterrorismo�com/terrorismo-internacional/la-lucha-por-liderar-el-yiha-
dismo-magrebi-aumenta-la-amenaza-sobre-espana/d, accessed 20 January 2016�
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the beginning of our last government in December 2011, 177 individuals were 
detained� Data from 2015 show a great increase over the 46 detainees in 2014, 21 
in 2013 or just 8 in 2012, proving the momentum of Daesh and its recruitment, 
indoctrination and transfer of fighters to the conflict zones� The number of opera-
tions has also increased, reaching a maximum of 36, against the 19 registered in 
2007, with 8 other additional missions in other countries�
Figure 3: Police operations and arrested people
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL
Operations in 
Spain 9 11 9 19 11 10 5 12 5 8 13 36 148
Arrested 








1 10 27 38
Source: Own analysis on the basis of data from Ministry of the Interior of Spain�
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Arrested in other countries
Arrested people
Source: Own analysis on the basis of data from Ministry of the Interior of Spain�
As we shall argue later on, Spain develops an intensive activity in the fight against 
terrorism in all its forefronts, not only in the police field�
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3. Number of returnees and displaced combatants
According to the official information issued by the Ministry of the Interior, there 
would be approximately 139 people displaced to conflict areas from Spain� At 
the end of June 2015, 25 were estimated to have returned to Spain� Some of them 
would have died in Syria, in combats and suicide missions or because of bomb-
ings� At the beginning of December 2015, The Soufan Group12 estimated between 
27�000 and 31�000 people coming from 86 countries to have travelled to Syria 
and Iraq during the last 18 months in order to join Daesh, and it pointed out that 
133 of them came from Spain, a relatively low number compared that of other 
neighboring countries (1�700 from France, 760 from UK and Germany or 470 
from Belgium)� It is estimated that around 10–30% of displaced people, at a global 
level, could have returned to their home countries�
Furthermore, according to data given by the media in November, 301 people 
are being investigated by the National High Court, due to their possible relation 
to recruitment, exaltation, belonging to or collaboration with armed groups� 
4. Spain’s action and its international role, especially in conflict countries
Spain’s exterior action in conflicts like those taking place in Syria, Iraq and Libya 
is currently low, at least in comparison to the main role the country assumed in 
the meeting of the Azores, which was previous to the war in Iraq, after the meet-
ing of the former president José María Aznar with George Bush and Tony Blair� 
The jihadist propaganda of the last months, previously mentioned, published 
the Spanish flag among those of the countries they identify as part of a coalition 
against ISIS�
5.  Degree of acceptance of Muslim communities, social exclusion or oppor-
tunities for social participation, communication lines and representation, 
Islamophobia, hate crimes
Exclusion, inequality and marginalization feelings can favor violent radicaliza-
tion processes� They can be circumstantial situations, but if they are maintained 
over time and in a specific geographical area, they lead to the creation of “fragile 
urban areas�”
12 The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign 
Fighters into Syria and Iraq, 2015, available at http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf, accessed 20 January 2016�
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While Spain’s unemployment rate was 21�6% in September 2015, the Moroccan 
rate was 60%� Ceuta presents an unemployment rate of 30�6% and Melilla 31�4%, 
according to the Labor Force Survey data of the third quarter of 2015� Youth un-
employment is even worse, reaching 47�7% in September 2015 in Spain (90�35% 
in Ceuta or 69�14% in Melilla)�
Additionally, the economic downturn left 720�000 households without any kind 
of income, according to data of the third quarter of 2015 (in comparison to 740�000 
in 2014)� 1�470�000 households have all their members unemployed� 22�2% of the 
population is in risk of poverty, a number which rises to 44�3% in Ceuta� 
Different studies show how Spain is the state of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-Operationand Development (OECD) in which inequality rose the most 
(2007–2011)� 10% of the poorest individuals lost a third of their income between 
2007 and 2010� The Gini coefficient gives Spain a punctuation of 0�347 in 2015, 
the second country in inequality matters of Europe, after Latvia�
On December 31, 2014 there were 1�858�409 Muslims living in Spain, which 
means an increase of 7�2% in comparison to 2013 numbers, according to the data 
shown by the Observatory Andalusí13 and the Union of Islamic Communities of 
Spain (UCIDE)� More than 40% come from Morocco� 218�288 are Spanish, ap-
proximately 40% of the total, 400�286 descendants� This means an increase of 26% 
of the data of 2013� If we classify them by Autonomous Communities, in Catalonia 
there are 509�333 Muslims, 298�152 in Andalusia, 274�907 in Madrid and 194�585 
in Valencia�
A report of PEW Research14 published in 2014 points out that 47% of Span-
ish citizens want fewer immigrants, which is a much lower number than that of 
countries like Italy, France or UK� A report published in 2015 shows that 42% 
has a negative perception of Muslims, in comparison to 52%, which has a posi-
tive perception� A report of Foundation La Caixa points out that the acceptation 
of the immigrants in Spain fell from 70% in 2010 to 57% in 2012, and that the 
rejection rose from 10% to 14%� At the same time, mistrust toward Muslims went 
from a 23% to a 26%�
Spain has made progress in the last two years in registering and addressing 
hate crimes, offering the first statistics since 2013� There were 1�172 hate crimes 
in 2013, increasing in 9�6% in 2014� In both years, sexual identity or orientation 
13 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana, 2015, available 
at http://observatorio�hispanomuslim�es/estademograf�pdf, accessed 20 January 2016�
14 Pew Research Center, Faith in European Project Reviving, 2015, available at http://www�
pewglobal�org/files/2015/06/Pew-Research-Center-European-Union-Report-FINAL-
June-2-20151�pdf, accessed 20 December 2015�
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were the most common incidences (452 in 2013 and 513 in 2014)� 381 racism 
and xenophobia incidents took place in 2013 and 475 in 2014� Through 2015, the 
Ministry of the Interior admitted a rise in the data that are being analyzed this 
year, with 40% of hate crimes related to Islamophobia� 
Figure 5: Hate crimes in Spain
Hate crimes in Spain 2013 2014
Anti-Semitism 3 24
Hate against poor people 4 11
Religious 42 63
Incapacities 290 199
Sexual identity 452 513
Racism / Xenophobia 381 475
TOTAL 1172 1285
Source: Own analysis on the basis of data from Ministry of the Interior of Spain�
6. Specific grievances perceived. Veil, caricatures
Several debates have affected other European states, especially France: the use of 
religious symbols, the Islamic veils in schools or Prophet Muhammad caricatures 
in satirical magazines like Charlie Hebdo� In Spain, there have been no discus-
sions of such intensity and they have not caused direct or explicit threats as a 
consequence of that type of issues�
7. Opportunity criteria
Terrorism is a random event, where intentions and capacities must converge in 
order to materialize an attack against the identified vulnerabilities� This conver-
gence might take place whenever and anywhere in the world, as it depends on 
the decision taken by groups or individuals� The intention might be increased 
thanks to facts like the celebration of especially important events (general elec-
tions, sports or an international summit)� In these cases, the desire to attack raises 
the expectations about the impact it may cause, which is always a part of the 
terrorist objective�
The model that has been set out allows us to analyze the evolution of the threat 
and to make a comparison to other neighboring countries� We can thereby see 
that the level of threat in Spain is lower than in France�
The following chart offers a comparative between Spain and France:
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Figure 6: Threat analysis in Spain and France
Factors Spain France
Historical factors Al Andalus, 
autonomous cities of 
Ceuta and Melilla
Colonial past, history 
of Algeria
Geographical factors Proximity to the 
north of Africa
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Low-medium level of 
grievance perception
High level: Charlie 
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It is of relevance to complement the analysis of objective data presented in the 
previous sections with an analysis of the profiles, activities and motivations of 
some of the individuals arrested in the operations which were carried out� The 
quantitative and qualitative information obtained from this type of analysis can 
help us to know the phenomenon, but not to entirely understand it�
The information about the last police operations allows us to characterize the 
current threat:
•	  Existence of recruitment and indoctrination networks to send people to Syria 
and Iraq� In spite of the low number of displaced people coming from Spain 
regarding other countries, it is still the aspiration of some people�
•	  Coexistence of cells that, regardless of a displacement of some of its members, 
want to commit an attack in Spain�
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•	  Existence of groups susceptive of extremist propaganda, with a possible pro-
gress of the Salafi movement�
•	  An evolution of women’s role in different lines, not only regarding displace-
ment in order to get married and establish in a territory controlled by Daesh, 
but also in active recruitment activities�
•	  A clear change in tendency, with a majority of arrested being Spanish citizens, 
and the increasing phenomenon of the converted people� A homegrown vio-
lent radicalization�
•	  The existence of links among arrested people and networks or extremists previ-
ously arrested� The networks that send combatants connect previous experi-
ences of people already linked to violent extremist opinions with new young 
candidates to Jihad�
•	  The existence of a risk that derives both from the return of people that have 
fought in conflicts and the frustration of those who could not travel to con-
flict zones, increased by the call from Daesh to act in their own area of origin� 
International bombings in Syria, the greater control of passengers in the EU 
and a greater surveillance in Turkish borders can make their journeys more 
difficult, generating the alternative of moving to other conflict zones, like Libya, 
or staying in their countries of origin in order to wait for an opportunity� 
•	  The risk that derives from individual actors willing commit a terrorist attack, 
especially against soft targets�
•	 The cases of explicit radicalization, and the role of social media in this regard�
•	 The existing focus in Ceuta, Melilla and Catalonia�
Researches from Reinares and García-Calvo15 and Jordan16 offer a complete vision 
of the characteristics of people involved in jihadist plots in Spain and the jihadist 
militancy in Spain, through the analysis of people condemned and operations 
developed�
15 F� Reinares, C� García-Calvo, Terroristas, redes y organizaciones: facetas de la actual 




hadista-espana, accessed 20 December 2015�
16 J� Jordan, The evolution of the structure of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe: the case 
of Spain, “Studies in Conflict and Terrorism” no� 37 (8), 2015, pp� 654–673�
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2.3 Evaluation of the threat and alert level
Therefore, the threat would be the convergence of objectives, intentions and 
capacities�
•	  Objectives� Even though there are no objectives declared a priori, unlike in 
France with Charlie Hebdo, the emulation effect of other attacks and the ori-
entation toward soft targets (objectives of low protection) make any action 
possible�
•	  Intentions� The intention is connected to the desire to commit an attack and 
the expectations that it causes� The variables mentioned before and the high 
number of police interventions that have been developed show the existence 
of the desire� The expectations grow when the attack can generate a higher im-
pact, and attract the attention of mass media: indiscriminate and coordinated 
attacks, symbolic targets, number of deaths or coincidence with international 
events�
•	  Capacities� The capacity is determined by the knowledge needed and re-
source availability in order to commit an attack� Capacities are present, access 
to information is easy and resources (basically economic in order to obtain 
weapons and prepare the necessary logistics: rented housing, vehicles) are 
available� In any event, carrying out a sophisticated attack, trying to emu-
late what happened in Paris, increases the cost of the necessary resources, 
implies a larger group of people and, therefore, makes its development more 
complex�
The Spanish system has been modified in 2015 and level 4 has been established, 
considered as high� In the previous months, the existing model for evaluating the 
threat established an activation level 3, which corresponded to a very high threat 
alert, implementing the grade of low intensity�
Moreover, the new level of Anti-terrorist Alert has been made public, available 
on the webpage of the Ministry of the Interior, contributing to transparency and 
avoiding misunderstandings or circulation of unfounded rumors�
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Figure 7: Terrorism alert level. Ministry of the Interior
Source: Author’s analysis on the basis of data from Ministry of the Interior of Spain�
*1� Low, 2� Moderate, 3� Medium, 4� High (current level), 5� Very High�
It would be possible to determine the existence of an endogenous and an ex-
ogenous threat, in spite of globalization present in all areas (economy, politics, 
society or technology), including the globalization of evil�
With respect to the endogenous threat, it reveals the existence of networks, 
cells and radical individuals established in Spain� In fact, even though their objec-
tive is still essentially logistic, especially in what refers to sending combatants to 
conflict zones, we cannot dismiss the fact that any of these structures could revert 
their activity, so that they decide to commit terrorist attacks in Spain, either by 
their own means and motivations, or induced by international organizations, as 
recent attacks in France have confirmed� This situation could also be favored by 
the return of jihadists coming from conflict zones, who could at any moment in-
vigorate actions on the national territory with their new ideological and operative 
capacities obtained in their displacement� We cannot dismiss either the action of 
individual terrorist actors (“lone wolves”), given the increasing effectiveness of the 
extremist propaganda and the existence of radicalization centers in our country� 
Likewise, we would include the risk that derives from the frustrated individuals 
when they try to move to Syria and Iraq, as well as released prisoners after serv-
ing out their sentences�
The exogenous threat is the one that comes from international terrorist or-
ganizations and that could manifest through oriented or coordinated attacks 
from outside, or against Spanish interests abroad, with motivations linked to the 
factors that have been previously mentioned (historical aspects, anti-terrorist 
activity or participation in international missions of Spain)� The threat is fo-
cused on Daesh, not forgetting the continuity of Al Qaeda either, especially 
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through its franchise Al Qaeda at Islamic Maghreb, which is active in calling 
for getting back Al Andalus� 
In this case, as we have previously pointed out, the proximity of conflicts in the 
Sahel and the Maghreb, with states in a situation of huge fragility (Mali), failed 
states (Libya) or states subjected to an important terrorist action (Tunisia)� These 
environments foster the existence of several radical groups, the free movement of 
firearms and the use of organized crime networks for their financing� They become 
logistics, recruitment, and training, as well as dissemination centers of jihadists to 
other parts of the world� Considering the possible return of Jihadists from conflict 
zones, the countries of North Africa present data to be considered (Morocco, Alge-
ria, Tunisia)� The dismantled networks in Spain have shown the existing connection 
with Morocco, which has increased its alert level� 
3. Efforts against Jihadism in Spain
Spain is facing the current threat with a holistic vision and an integrated ac-
tion� In this sense, the year 2015 has been especially important, with measures 
from different spheres, making use of all the resources available in the rule of 
law� When facing an asymmetrical threat (no norms, no values, with plenty of 
resources, opaque and diffuse, resilient and adaptive), the rule of law must have 
the necessary tools to provide measures that can ensure the safety of the citi-
zens and that allows the citizens to exercise their full rights and freedoms� The 
great challenge, as in the rest of European countries, is to achieve security, that 
will never be absolute, which entails the least degree of intrusion into citizens’ 
rights and liberties, provided with the necessary guarantees, and which do not 
involve a change in our way of living� The current risk is to place freedom at 
the service of security�
3.1 Characteristics of the fight against terrorism in Spain
In a review of Frank Foley’s work, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: 
Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past,17 Blanco and Cohen,18 after a bib-
liographical revision, make groups of the criteria that can characterize the fight 
against terrorism of a state:
17 F� Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France. Institutions, Norms and the Shadow 
of the Past, University Printing House, Cambridge 2013�
18 J� M� Blanco, J� Cohen, Reseña obra de Frank Foley, “Cuadernos de la Guardia Civ-
il” no� 5, 2015, available at http://bibliotecasgc�bage�es/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail�
pl?biblionumber=16976, accessed 20 December 2015�
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It makes reference to the structural issues previously 
mentioned
Priorities The fight against Daesh and violent radicalization are the two 
political priorities in terms of security and one of the biggest 
challenges to National Security�
Nature and intensity of 
the threat
The threat is Spain in obvious and is materialized in the 
different intentions from groups or individuals� The intensity 
of it varies over time�
Impact of previous 
events and experiences 
against terrorism
The attacks of May 11th, 2004 had great impact and represented 
an inflexion point� The impact was massive in terms of lives 
and social and political polarization� The fight against the 
terrorist group ETA has been an important experience in the 
fight against this scourge through the intense use of the tools 
that the rule of law provides�
State capacity Spain shows a clear internal capacity to fight against terrorism, 
but not at the international (compared with US or France)�
Existing values As a European model, we do have guarantees to protect the 
rights and freedoms of the citizens� Spain could represent a 
mixed model in comparison to the French one (security above 
all) and the British one (rights and freedoms as the priority)�
Institutions In Spain, we have also experienced the international trend 
toward greater coordination of intelligence services and 
security forces�
Other facts: caricatures 
of Mahomet, veil, etc. 
Low-middle level of damage perception� 
Legal system of the 
State
It is related to the judicial model� In France, the magistrates 
are the ones who guide the investigations� In the UK, the 




The former and current measures form an antiterrorist model 
over time and can have both a positive and a negative impact 
(stigmatization of communities, increase of xenophobia and 
hate crimes, vigilantism or control of ideologies and speech)� 
Other relevant criteria This makes reference to the relevant factors already mentioned: 
opportunity criteria, international agreements, security alert 
and social alarm, party policies, social support…
Source: J� M� Blanco, J� Cohen, The future of counter-terrorism in Europe. The need to be lost in the 
correct direction, “European Journal of Future Research” vol� 2, no� 1, 2014�
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On the basis of these approaches, we can conclude that Spain has an intense 
counter-terrorism system�
3.2 The fight against terrorism in 2015
After the generalized psychosis in Europe, especially after the attacks in January 
and on November 13th, 2015 in Paris and other global actions of Daesh, Spain has 
reacted by developing two basic principles: unity and firmness�
In February 2015, the party in power (Popular Party, PP) and the biggest op-
position party (Spanish Socialist Party, PSOE) signed an agreement in order to 
adopt counter-terrorism measures, showing that certain national policies should 
be above the governments of each period� PP, PSOE, CC, UPN and Foro Astu-
rias in the first place, and Ciudadanos, UPyD, Unió and el PAR, have signed it 
9 months later� The pact is based on eight basic points, and it is especially relevant 
because it represents the political unity in the face of the threats� On the docu-
ment, all the signers agree to modify the Criminal Code in relation to terrorism; to 
apply the maximal penalty of imprisonment for terrorist crimes related to deaths; 
the promotion of legislative measures that improve the framework for action for 
judges, attorneys and law enforcement agencies; to keep alive the memory of 
victims; to provide the means and resources for the fight against terrorism; to 
activate policies against violent radicalization that includes racism, xenophobia 
and discrimination; to boost Spain’s participation in the European Union and 
international institutions and promote initiatives in the Parliament that seek to 
achieve the greater consensus� 
At the normative level, several important measures have been adopted� For 
example, those included in the Organic Law 2/2015, from March 30th that has 
modified the Criminal Code and introduced a new crime and penalty classifica-
tion, with the aim of adapting it to the evolution of the jihadist movement� In such 
way, it has recognized the role of the fighters returning to Spain and the individual 
terrorists (or most commonly known as “lone wolves”)� The Organic Law 13/2015, 
from October 5th, modifies the Criminal Procedure Court, which facilitates the 
interception of communication through new technologies, the introduction of 
trojans for investigative purposes, and the use of secret informatics agents, always 
with a judicial authorization�
A Strategic National Plan against Violent radicalization was published in 2015� 
Different actors participate in the fight against terrorism and this can be shown 
in the plan: Muslim communities, the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and 
Provinces, law enforcement agencies, etc� The process must include private secu-
rity sector, Academia, citizens and the mass media� It implies the development 
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of a culture of security� As we have already mentioned, Spain is developing a 
continuous policing and judicial activity when fighting against jihadist terrorism� 
At the beginning of December 2015, the Ministry of the Interior opened a service 
for citizen complaint against possible radicalization situations that works through 
a web page, a telephone number, an email or an app (AlertCops), and that is a 
part of the plan called Stop Radicalisms� Sources from the Ministry of the Interior 
informed that in less than one month (from December 4th to December 30th), they 
received almost 600 alerts from the citizens, 270 out of which were really relevant 
in the fight against terrorism� The aim of this plan (that ensures anonymity of the 
complainer) is to give a voice to the alerts in cases of radicalization in schools or 
neighborhood, or the disappearance of people suspected to have travelled to Syria 
or Iraq to join Daesh�
Besides, at the end of 2015, the Ministry of the Interior has started to spread 
videos that counteract the jihadist propaganda of Daesh� These videos are pub-
lished in the Internet and social media with the hashtag #DaeshVidasRotas, which 
means “Daesh broken lives�” The videos are in Spanish and in Arabic and are 
produced by the Sawab Centre, an initiative from the USA and the United Arab 
Emirates� However, there is a plan to self-elaborate videos from the Intelligence 
Centre against Terrorism and Organized Crime (Centro de Inteligencia contra el 
Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado, CITCO)�
At the international level, Spanish activity is also remarkable� Spain is an active 
partner with the United States in efforts to track and disrupt transnational terror-
ism� Spain deepened its cooperation with Morocco, Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania 
to combat and contain the threat posed by Al Qaeda (AQ), its affiliates, and like-
minded groups� 
Spain has been an active member and an outspoken supporter of the Global 
Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since its 
inception� Spain is an active member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum�
Spain is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Egmont 
Group, a global association of financial intelligence units� Spain was reviewed 
under the new round of FATF evaluations and found to have “a strong system to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing, with up-to-date laws and regu-
lations and sound institutions for combating these threats�” The evaluation also 
recommended improvements “such as the implementation of targeted financial 
sanctions to allow the freezing of terrorism-related assets�”
Since 2004, Spain has been part of the informal working group on Jihadist 
known as the 5 + 5� The group brings together defense ministers or their design-
ees from five European countries (Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Malta) and 
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five Maghreb countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya)� Its 
mission is to exchange information and discuss the operational implications of 
the threat from violent Islamist extremists in the European theater, including the 
threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters�
Spain’s participation in the G-4 with Portugal, France, and Morocco also has an 
operational objective� The four countries freely exchange tactics and intelligence 
on counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and organized crime/illegal immigration� 
Spain continued its work with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism�
Despite all this, the path of the fight against terrorism will be long and painful� 
This effort would require not only to implement more measures but also to achieve 
equilibrium between privacy and rights and freedoms� 
Therefore, there are still some remaining challenges that should be added to 
those that will come from the evolution of terrorism: increase in social partici-
pation, progress of the culture of security, fight against radicalization in schools, 
attention to hate crimes, engagement of the media in the fight against terrorism, 
implementation of national plants with local police and members of the private 
security sector (as the first action forces in attacks against soft targets), strength-
ening of coordination levels, existence of clear police action protocols at all lev-
els, promotion of knowledge and intelligence in such a complex environment, 
collaboration with a greater number of actors and stakeholders, introduction of 
measures to evaluate the fight against terrorism (evidence based policing), and 
improvement of the police resources, among others�
4. The Efforts of the Guardia Civil against Jihadism
A summer course celebrated in July 2015, in collaboration with the University 
Institute of Research in Homeland Security (IUISI) and Universidad de la Rioja, 
presented different levels of action of the Civil Guard against jihadism�
Currently, the Brigadier leads the Information Department, with the mission of 
fighting terrorism� There is a second authority, the Colonel; the technical area also 
managed by a Colonel and 5 Central Units, managed by the Lieutenant Colonels� 
The Special Central Unit number 1 (UCE-1), is focused on internal national ter-
rorism; the Special Central Unit number 2 (UCE-2) is focused on international 
terrorism; the Special Central Unit number 3 (UCE-3) is in charge of general 
information, labor and social issues, and counterintelligence� There is a Central 
Unit for Logistic Support (UCAL) and the Operational Support Group� 
The UCE-2, within its area of responsibility in fight against global terrorism, is 
the Unit directly in charge of the counter-terrorism activity in the frame of Islam-
ist terrorism� For that purpose, it has two groups, one for obtaining (managing 
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sources of information) and one for elaborating (analysis)� It has also an economic 
investigation section that is focused on the research concerning everything related 
to the financing of terrorism� In almost forty operations of the Unit, nearly 150 
people have been arrested since 2004�
The Information Department acts both at the strategic and operative levels, 
participating in all decision-making organs of the Ministry of the Interior, and 
in collaboration with the Intelligence Center against Terrorism and Organized 
Crime (CITCO)� The Information Department covers all intelligence analysis and 
investigation areas against the terrorist and violent radicalization phenomena, 
such as groups and individuals, activities, propaganda, communication in social 
media or financing�
CITCO is the result of the union, in 2014, of the former National Centre for 
Antiterrorist Coordination (CNCA) and the Intelligence Centre against Organ-
ized Crime, created after the attacks of March 11th, 2004� The Intelligence Centre 
against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO) has an organic level of general 
sub-directorate and is in charge of the reception, integration and analysis of the 
strategic information available in the fight against any kind of organized crime, 
terrorism and violent radicalization, the design of specific strategies against these 
threats, as well as – if needed – the creation of action and operative coordina-
tion criteria of the acting bodies in cases of coincidence or concurrence in the 
investigations�
This growing link between criminal and terrorist activity, already known but 
proved with the recent Paris attacks and the flow of weapons in the EU, makes 
necessary the implication of other units of the Civil Guard, from their different 
fields of activity� The action of a criminal group can lead to the dismantling of a 
terrorist cell� In this sense, it must be remarked how the Civil Guard, through the 
Judicial Police Department, fights all types of organized crime�
Moreover, the international dimension of the Civil Guard is another factor to 
point out when fighting terrorism� The global world in which we live points out 
the importance of the external action of the state� This external action is reflected 
mainly in three areas: cooperation with other police forces and international or-
ganizations, support the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Coopera-
tion (MAEC), and participation in crisis management operations�
The Civil Guard has some features and capabilities that make it perfect to take 
on these responsibilities� The Civil Guard is an ideal tool to be deployed outside 
our borders in support of missions for crisis management, both military and civil-
ian, improving post-conflict stabilization processes, in which the Civil Guard can 
play a key role due to their police and military capacities� 
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This presence is reflected in the ongoing participation of members of Civil 
Guard in international organizations, where decisions are taken at the European 
level and within the United Nations, and where initiatives or strategies are de-
signed in the field of security� It is also common to find civil guards cooperating 
closely with other police forces in operations against terrorism, illegal immigra-
tion and organized crime�
Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Civil Guard sup-
ports the governmental action to strengthen the security of embassies in high-risk 
countries� Civil Guard has aggregates and counselors in several embassies, sup-
porting the external action, while facilitating police cooperation� 
Finally – and with the aim of exploiting the different open sources of informa-
tion, the relations with universities and think tanks, the participation in research 
projects of the EU and the elaboration of future studies about the criminal phe-
nomenon – the Guardia Civil has a Centre of Analysis and Foresight� 
According to the US Department of State, “the National Police and the Civil 
Guard share responsibility for counterterrorism and cooperate well with the 
United States, with strong information sharing and joint threat assessments�”19
The European Commission decided to establish a new European Counter Ter-
rorism Centre (ECTC), launched on January 2016� Mr� Manuel Navarrete Paniagua, 
a high-ranking officer of the Spanish Civil Guard with extensive practical counter 
terrorism experience, will lead it� He was already the head of the counter terror-
ism unit at Europol� Currently, 39 staff members and 5 seconded national experts 
work in the ECTC� Working alongside other operational centers at Europol, such 
as the European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3), the ECTC will be a constituent part of 
Europol, under the general command of its Director, and will serve to augment the 
organization’s capabilities as the EU’s law enforcement agency� It is an evidence of 
the experience and good work done by the Civil Guard against terrorism�
5. Conclusion
After the Paris attacks, Spain has been able to show firmness and unity� No event 
has been cancelled and the lives of the citizens have not suffered any changes� In 
a calmness framework, different measures have been adopted and the level of ter-
rorist alert has been maintained (or only “reinforced”, according to the Minister 
of the Interior)� At the same time, measures have been adopted in every sphere 
as a way of adaptation to this new phenomenon, that is not new, but that evolves 
19 US Government, Country Report on Terrorism 2014, available at http://www�state�gov/j/
ct/rls/crt/2014/index�htm, accessed 20 January 2016�
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and adapts to a complex and changing environment at the political, social and 
technological levels, in an asymmetrical confrontation�
Firmness and unity are the pillars for the counter-terrorism action� Before that 
action, we need to have the best knowledge and intelligence that allow a better 
analysis to support the decision-making process� This process must include long-
term views, so that, step by step, the counter-terrorism activity will stop being so 
reactive and will become much more preventive and anticipatory�
The road will be long� More attacks will occur� It requires an exercise in crea-
tivity and imagination to exploit all the tools that are allowed by the rule of law, 
bearing in mind that the role of a law enforcement agency is, first of all, to guar-
antee the exercise of the rights and freedoms of citizens�
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Damian Szlachter and Piotr Potejko1
Religious Extremism among Islam Believers 
Living in Poland – the Results and  
Conclusions of the Research
1. Introduction2
Radicalization is a process in which individuals adopt an extremist system of values, 
which accepts and supports the use of violence and intimidation� The objective of 
such attitude is to exert strong influence on society, achieve far-reaching changes, 
and even urge the followers to similar acts� The most extreme stage of radicalization 
is reached when terrorist activities are undertaken by a given individual or group�
An important tool of counteracting the phenomenon in dispute in its all stages, 
including terrorist activity, is a full recognition of the sources of extremism threats 
and identification of the most extremist environments – economic, psychologi-
cal, social, political as well as religious factors that foster the development of 
radicalization of opinions� The way individuals perceive themselves and the en-
vironment in which they exist together with the specificity of their beliefs related 
to extremism, are crucial� The threat of radicalization is not only the probability 
of violence or the risk of its use, but also the possible driving force of other forms 
of detrimental impact on society� 
In 2011, in Poland the pioneer research program titled “Recognition, counter-
action and prevention of the phenomenon of radicalization of religious opinions 
1 The team members of a research project titled: “Recognition, counteraction and pre-
vention of the phenomenon of radicalization of religious opinions among Islam be-
lievers living in the Republic of Poland – as an element of national system of early 
detection of terrorist threats” conducted in the framework of the research program 
of the Police Academy in Szczytno titled: “Counteracting and combatting organized 
crime and terrorism in conditions of safe, accelerated and sustainable socio-economic 
development” No� O R00 0040 07)�
2 The research was realised in cooperation with the team of the Institute of Psychology 
at the Polish Academy of Science (pl� IP PAN), composed of: Urszula Jakubowska 
(manager), Janusz Reykowski (consultant), Piotr Radkiewicz, Paweł Boski, Krzysztof 
Korzeniowski, Bogdan Wojciszke� The project was realized in the framework of the 
aforementioned grant no� OR00004007 from the Ministry of Science and Higher Edu-
cation during 2009–2011�
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among Islam believers living in the Republic of Poland…” was conducted� The 
purpose of this project was to measure and assess the scale of radicalization and 
identify the groups exhibiting relatively strongest extremist attitudes� The research-
ers also aimed at indicating psychological factors that foster the development of 
the discussed phenomenon� The key results of the aforementioned research are 
presented below�
2. Theoretical Presumptions of the Research
For the purpose of the research, it has been presumed that religious extremism 
means the co-occurrence of two interrelated categories of attitudes: religious funda-
mentalism and agreement on employing violent actions in order to solve religious 
and socio-political conflicts�3 The first category, fundamentalism, was analyzed in 
individual (psychological) terms as a specific type of religious beliefs, irrespective 
of particular denomination, constituting an evidence of fundamentalist attitudes� 
According to the theory devised by Altemeyer and Hunsberger,4 religious ethnocen-
trism, expressed in the conviction that one’s own religion is the only truth about the 
world and meticulous observance of its rules constitute the condition of salvation�5 
In terms of the second category (the approval of using force in solving socio-political 
conflicts), violent behaviors are treated as a criterion feature for the definition of 
political extremisms,6 including religious terrorism7 and secular terrorism�8 
In the research, it has been assumed that co-occurrence of these two categories 
is evidential for psychological maturity for engaging in a particular situation into 
radical political actions of religious background� In other words, individuals who 
3 U� Jakubowska, J� Reykowski, P� Radkiewicz, P� Boski, K� Korzeniowski, B� Wojciszke, 
Ekstremizm religijny wśród wyznawców islamu mieszkających w Polsce� Raport z ba-
dań(typescript)�
4 B� Altemeyer, B� Hunsberger, Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and 
prejudice, “The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion”, no� 2, 1992, 
pp� 113–133; B� Altemeyer, B� Hunsberger, Fundamentalism and authoritarianism, in: 
Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality R�F� Palotzian, C�L� Park (eds�), 
Guilford Press, New York 2005, pp� 378–393�
5 Ibid�
6 U� Jakubowska, J� Reykowski, P� Radkiewicz, P� Boski, K� Korzeniowski, B� Wojciszke, 
Ekstremizm religijny…
7 B� Bolechow, Terroryzm, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 2010� 
8 J� Horgan, Psychologia terroryzmu, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 2008; D� Szlachter, 
Walka z terroryzmem w Unii Europejskiej – nowy impuls, Wydawnictwo Adam Mar-
szałek, Toruń 2007�
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show high level of both religious fundamentalism and approval of violence in 
solving socio-political conflicts may quite rapidly and easily undertake radical 
actions if they are inspired by external factors such as: strong leader, conflict, a 
lack of ability to fulfill their essential needs� 
What is common for various isolated opinions is the belief that the world is 
unkind, aggressive and threatening� Scientific knowledge9 and the results of the 
research on religious fundamentalism indicate that experience of the world in 
categories of menace stems from the feeling of fear, harm, frustration and threat�10 
Such attitude leads to the need of complete submission to an authority figure�11 It 
as well may be a political or religious leader, as an idea or notion�12
To reach the valid conclusions it is vital to find out what factors make some 
people become religious extremists� It has been presumed that individual dif-
ferences in the level of religious extremism may stem from the configuration of 
specific believes about ourselves and the social world�13 For that purpose, the fol-
lowing variables have been measured in the research: authoritarian personality, 
social trust, legitimization of social order, social cynicism, political cynicism, the 
feeling of collective harm, the number and quality of contacts with people and 
the assessment of the quality of one’s life�
3. Methodology used in the Research
Examined individuals 
In the research, a group of 536 people (295 women and 241 men) was examined�14 
They were purposefully selected according to the criteria of their denomination, 
9 A�T� Beck, Prisoners of hate. The cognitive basis of anger, hostility, and violence, Harper 
Collins Publishers, New York 1999�
10 J� W� Jones, Why does religion turn violent? A psychoanalytic exploration of religious 
terrorism, “Psychoanalitic Review” no� 93, 2006, pp� 167–190; U� Jakubowska, W� Onisz-
czenko, Genetyczne i psychospołeczne uwarunkowania postawy fundamentalistycznej 
religijnie, in: Przekonania w życiu jednostek, grup, społeczności A� Cisłak, K� Henne, 
K� Skarżyńska (eds�), Academica Wydawnictwo SWPS, Warsaw 2009, pp� 31–48�
11 B� Altemeyer, B� Hunsberger, Authoritarianism, religious…op�cit�; 
12 Orthodox system of religious beliefs e�g� see: B� Altemeyer, The Authoritarian…op�cit�
13 U� Jakubowska, J� Reykowski, P� Radkiewicz, P� Boski, K� Korzeniowski, B� Wojciszke, 
Ekstremizm religijny …op�cit�; U� Jakubowska, Ekstremizm polityczny, Gdańskie Wy-
dawnictwo Pedagogiczne, Gdansk 2005�
14 The analysis of the results comprised data form 534 people; results of 2 people were 
rejected because their group affinity appeared to be inconsistent with religious beliefs 
(e�g� Tatar-Catholic)�
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ethnic origin and sex� It was assumed that the compared groups should be rela-
tively equivalent in terms of age, sex and education distribution� The sample con-
sisted of the following subgroups: a) 121 Muslim Poles (including 113 people of 
Tatar origin) and 123 Poles of denomination other than Islam/agnostics; b) 83 
Chechen Muslim people and 85 refugees living in Poland of denomination other 
than Islam/agnostics; c) 62 foreign Muslim students and 60 foreign students of 
denomination other than Islam/agnostics� Table 1 presents characteristics of all 
groups due to sex, education, age and denomination:
Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of the examined groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) N
SEX
 Woman 47 50 71 74 27 25 294
 Man 36 35 50 49 35 35 240
EDUCATION
 Primary 18 - 5 5 - - 28
 Vocational 8 4 6 6 - - 24
 Secondary general 32 39 38 39 5 1 154
 Post-secondary - 11 9 14 2 - 36
 Higher incomplete 2 13 14 8 47 52 136
 Higher 15 17 49 51 8 7 147
AGE
 16–25 13 6 18 21 54 49 161
> 25–35 32 46 21 24 7 10 140
> 35–45 23 28 23 15 - - 89
> 45–55 12 3 17 21 - - 53
> 55–65 2 2 14 17 - - 35
> 65 years 1 - 27 24 - - 52
DENOMINATION
 Christian - 69 - 112 - 33 214
 Islam 83 - 121 - 62 - 266
 Other - 7 - - - 4 11
 No denomination - 9 - 11 - 23 43
(N) 83 85 121 123 62 60 534
Legend: 
(1) Muslim refugees from Chechnya (4) Polish non-Muslim
(2) Non-Muslim refugees (5) Foreign Muslim students 
(3) Polish Muslim (6) Foreign non-Muslim students
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Research conditions and materials
The research was conducted from July to mid-October 2010� It was carried 
out in small groups and individually, with care concerning the anonymity of 
measurement� During the research, the examined people were asked to com-
plete a complex questionnaire consisting of the instruction, particulars and 
measurement scales� In the instruction, there was an explanation of the goal of 
the research and the rules of participation� The specification included questions 
for sex, education level, age and denomination or lack of it� After completing the 
form, participants placed them inside a pile of other forms or they sent it back 
by post� The data was also gathered during the Muslim League congress, after 
the religious ceremonies, in a refugee centre and during individual meetings in 
the participants’ houses� 
Measurement scales applied in the research together with the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of reliability:
Religious extremism
■  Religious fundamentalism�15 12 positions; α Cronbach = 0�91; examples: God 
has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which 
must be totally followed; No single book of religious teaching contains all the in-
trinsic, fundamental truths about life (–4 – I strongly disagree, 0 – I feel neutral, 
+4 – I strongly agree)� 
■  Approval of religious violence (scale formed for the needs of the research)� 
4 positions; α Cronbach = 0�60; example: People who die for the sake of the 
nation are heroes deserving admiration (1 – I strongly disagree, 4 – I strongly 
agree)�
■  Approval of political violence�16 4 positions; α Cronbach = 0�78� The respond-
ents answered the questions it is allowed to, when the intention is good, throw 
eggs at your political opponents and pour on them ill-smelling liquid, set 
bombs in various facilities, imprison or kill people (1 – I strongly disagree, 
4 – I strongly agree)�
15 See: B� Altemeyer, B� Hunsberger, A revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale: The short 
and sweet of it, “The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion”, no� 14, 2004, 
pp� 47–54�
16 U� Jakubowska, Ekstremizm polityczny…op�cit�
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Perceiving oneself and the social world
■  The feeling of collective harm� The respondents expressed their opinions on 
conditions for the development of other denominations in Poland: Catholicism, 
Judaism, Protestantism, Islam and Orthodox Church (1 – best conditions; 10 – 
worst conditions)�
■  Authoritarianism�17 By virtue of this variable it was possible to verify individu-
al’s disposition to uncritical submission to authorities� 6 positions; α Cronbach 
= 0�78; example: Respect should be always paid to those who are in power (1 – I 
strongly disagree, 4 – I strongly agree)�
■  Social trust�18 The variable verified the conviction if people are good by nature 
and if they may be trusted� 8 positions; α Cronbach = 0�72; examples: By 
nature people are friendly and kind-hearted to one another; We may say that 
more good than evil is being done in the world (1 – I strongly disagree, 4 – I 
strongly agree)�
■  Political cynicism�19 The variable measured the lack of trust in social institu-
tions and disrespect for ethical rules in public life� 6 positions; α Cronbach = 
0�60; the respondents had to select one of six pairs of statements that is in their 
opinion closest to the truth, e�g� (A) Governments’ representatives usually say 
the truth vs� (B) We mustn’t believe in majority of statements pronounced by 
government’s representatives.
■  Social cynicism�20 The respondents approved or not of the conviction that 
preserving humanist and pro-social values in life makes no sense� 4 positions; 
α Cronbach = 0�65; examples: People of good (kind) heart are often persecuted 
by others; Engaging in social affairs may bring only trouble to an individual (1 – I 
strongly disagree, 4 – I strongly agree)�
17 See: K� Korzeniowski, O wielowymiarowości autorytaryzmu, in: Demokracja w Polsce. 
Doświadczanie zmian U� Jakubowska, K� Skarżyńska (eds�), Academica Wydawnictwo 
SWPS, Warsaw 2005, pp� 114–123�
18 U� Jakubowska, W� Oniszczenko, Genetyczne i psychospołeczne…op�cit� 
19 See: P�M� Sniderman, A question of loyalty, University of California Press, Berkeley 
1981� 
20 P� Boski, J� Więckowska, M� Biłas-Henne, Cynicism in Love and in Politics, in:, Psycho-
logical aspects of socialaxioms K� Leung, M� H� Bond (eds�), Springer Verlag, New York 
2008, pp� 239–267� 
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■  Legitimization of political system�21 The respondents answered the question 
if the world is well organized and if it needs changes� 8 positions; α Cronbach 
= 0�70; examples: Every person in Poland has a real chance to achieve financial 
success and happiness; Poland is organized in such a manner that the majority 
of people do not get what they deserve (conversely) (1 – I strongly disagree, 7 – I 
strongly agree)�
■  People-to-people contacts�22 5 positions; α Cronbach = 0�81; respondents were 
asked for the accuracy of statements describing their relationships with other 
people, e�g� Relationship with my family/friends give me the feeling of peace and 
safety (1 – strongly inaccurate; 4 – strongly accurate)�
■  Satisfaction from the present life�23 The respondents assessed their own life 
quality in the scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best)�
Cronbach’s alpha values (from 0�60 to 0�91) indicate that the scales of socio-
political attitudes and beliefs applied in the research are characterized by at least 
satisfactory reliability of measurement�
4. Results24
Links among religious extremism dimensions
Compliant to theoretical assumptions of the project, high results in measurement 
scales signify the readiness of an individual to religious extremism� Religious fun-
damentalism and the approval of the use of both religious and political violence 
are the dimensions that shall be independent from one another (have at least small 
positive correlation or even lack of it)� Their intense, positive interaction means 
the inclination to extremist behavior� 
21 See: A�C� Kay, J�T� Jost, Complementary justice: Effects of “poor but happy” and “poor but 
honest” stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit activation of the justice 
motive, “Journal of Personality and Social Psychology” no. 85, 2003, pp� 823–837�
22 See: K� Kaniasty, Klęska żywiołowa czy katastrofa społeczna? Psychospołeczne konse-
kwencje polskiej powodzi 1997 roku, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Pedagogiczne, Gdansk 
2003�
23 See: K� Korzeniowski, O wielowymiarowości …op�cit�
24 Statistical calculations by Ph�D� Piotr Radkiewicz from the IP PAN�
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Figure 1: Relations between religious fundamentalism and approval of religious violence
Pearson’s r values
















The data in figure 1 was gathered from the whole sample and from the sample 
broken into groups� It indicates the correlation of religious fundamentalism with 
the agreement on applying violence in religious affairs� The value of the Pearson’s 
r coefficient amounts to r=0�42 for the whole sample and it is statistically signifi-
cant (p<0�01)� It shows that growing religious fundamentalism goes along with 
the increase in approval of religious violence� Statistically significant relations 
among those dimensions of extremism have been also observed in all groups of 
the examined participants, except for both Muslim and non-Muslim students� 
This may result from the specific nature of this group� Because of their age and 
education, students constitute the most homogeneous group, apparently unable 
to see the direct, functional relation between fundamentalist convictions of the 
superior role of religion in social life and violence resulting from the need to 
observe this ideology in everyday life�
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Figure 2:  Relation between religious fundamentalism and approval of political violence 
Pearson’s r values


















Correlation between religious fundamentalism and approval of political violence 
presented in Figure 2 is statistically insignificant in the whole sample (r=-0�01; 
p>0�05)� The only group that this matter proves to be statistically significant are 
Muslim Poles (r=0�24; p<0�01)�

















The results in Figure 3 show that the relation between approval of violence in both 
religious and political affairs is very poor� It amounts to r=0�16 (p<0�01) for the 
whole sample� In groups the statistically significant relation between these two 
variables can be noticed only among Muslim Poles (r=0�44; p<0�01)�
Damian Szlachter and Piotr Potejko202
The differences in the discussed relations among groups are worth pointing 
out� For students, for example, religious fundamentalism and approval of reli-
gious and political violence form a configuration in which these dimensions are 
completely independent� At the same time, however, in some communities all the 
listed dimensions may be strongly, positively correlated� 
Religious extremism in subgroups 
In the following stage of the results, pairs of subgroups were compared from 
the perspective of the variables defining religious extremism: religious fun-
damentalism, the approval of religious violence and the approval of political 
violence� The examination was carried out with the use of the Student’s t-test 
for independent trials and the mean results for six groups are presented in 
figures 4, 5 and 6�
















    Muslim     non-Muslim
     (Chechens)
POLES
Muslim    non-Muslim
        STUDENTS
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Explanation: Arrows indicate statistically significant differences among groups amounting to 
p<=0�05�
Analyzing the outcome of comparison of all three pairs of groups, Islam fol-
lowers achieve higher mean results on the scale of religious fundamentalism 
than their counterpart group consisting of non-Muslims (Figure 4)� The highest 
level of fundamentalism is clearly seen among Chechen refugees – this group 
shows mean results not only higher than the mean for the non-Muslim refugees 
(M=2�1 and M=-0�7; t=12�6; p<0�01, respectively) but also the highest mean 
values of all other groups� What is worth noticing is the fact that there is a large 
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difference (statistically significant – M=0�9 and M=-1�5; t=6�2; p<0�01, respec-
tively) between Muslim and non-Muslim students� In the latter group, the lowest 
level of fundamentalism was noted� The difference between the group of Muslim 
Poles and its counterpart group of non-Muslim Poles is relatively smallest, but 
still statistically significant (M=0�3 and M=-06; t=4�4; p<0�01, respectively)�
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Explanation: Arrows indicate differences among groups which are statistically significant amounting 
to p<=0�05�
According to data in Figure 5, Chechen refugees are most willing to accept reli-
gious violence� The mean value of the approval indicator in this group is not only 
higher than the mean results in its counterpart group of non-Muslim refugees 
(M=2�7 and M=2�1; t=7�6; p<0�01 respectively), but it is also higher than mean 
values in the other groups� The second position belongs to the students who are 
Islam followers – they show relatively high level of the examined variable�
There is not any statistically significant difference between Muslim and non-
Muslim Poles – mean value of the approval of religious violence for both groups 
is on the same level which is the lowest one in the examined sample and amounts 
to M=1�7�
Mean values presented in Figure 6 indicate that statistically significant differ-
ences in the level of political violence approval among groups do not appear� This 
result shows that in any of the examined samples no more than average level of 
approval of physical violence in political actions (including killing political op-
ponents) has been noticed�
Damian Szlachter and Piotr Potejko204









POLES                                              REFUGEES 
Muslim      non-Muslim 
STUDENTS 
Muslim     non-Muslim
However, the result itself is quite significant� The variance of results in the scale of 
approval of this variable has been unusually small in the examined sample� 91% of 
respondents has not exceeded the mean value of 2, which means lack of consent 
for violent acts� Only 16 respondents (3% of the total) achieved the results showing 
relatively high approval (mean value of the result is equal to 3 and more) and further, 
thorough analyses, revealed that such people were randomly distributed in all the 
examined groups� Minor differences in the results may be linked to the impact of 
social approval of political violence on the respondent� The direct question whether 
we are able to kill, set bombs, etc� makes the respondents deny approval of such acts� 
However, the same question formulated in a vaguer form, for example as a request 
for opinion on suicidal or terrorist bombers, considerably changes the results�
Due to the very low differentiating power of the discussed variable, the ap-
proval of political violence was not taken into consideration in the construction of 
the general indicator of religious extremism� At the same time, however, because 
of quite high correlation of religious fundamentalism with the agreement on ap-
plying violence in religious affairs, it was adopted that the extremism indicator 
may be presented both in the form of continuous variable (indicator I), and cat-
egorical variable (indicator II)�
Religious extremism – indicator I
The first indicator of religious extremism has been formed with the use of fac-
tor analysis� It is a statistical method which examines co-variances of variables 
controlled in the test, leading to determination of basic factors responsible for the 
occurrence of statistical relations (intercorrelations)� By virtue of this method, it 
is possible to calculate numerical values of a superordinate factor (indicator I) 
and to write them in the form of so-called factor results (the distribution of the 
newly formed variable has the mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1)� In this 
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case the factor’s results, signifying the extremism indicator, have been formed on 
the basis of correlation between religious fundamentalism and the approval of 
religious violence� Figure 7 presents differences among groups in the level of this 
indicator expressed in standard deviation units�
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Figure 7 presents the data which confirms that the highest level of religious ex-
tremism has been noticed among the group of Chechen refugees� It is not only 1�5 
of standard deviation higher than the mean in the group of non-Muslim refugees 
(M=1�2 and M=-0�2; t=11�8; p<0�01, respectively), but also much higher than the 
mean in the other groups (all the differences are statistically significant)�
The tendency to extremist opinions is relatively high in the group of students 
who are Islam followers – it reaches value significantly higher both than the mean 
in the group of non-Muslim students (M=0�6 and M=-0�4; t=6�4; p<0�01) and the 
mean in the rest of the groups except for Chechen refugees� A minor (although still 
statistically significant) difference has been observed among Poles – both Muslim 
and Catholic or aconfessional (M=-0�3 and M=-0�5; t=2�2; p<0�05 respectively)� 
Religious extremism – indicator II 
The second indicator of religious extremism is a category variable based on four-
field combination of religious fundamentalism and approval of religious violence� 
Distributions of both of those variables have been divided compliant to the value 
of the median into two categories – high and low intensity� Next they were crossed, 
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resulting in the distribution of one four-category variable (compare Table 2)� Sum-
ming up the number of four groups of respondents formed in this manner, the 
results in the total number (N=490) are lower than the initial number (N=534), 
as some of the participants refused to answer questions of one or the other scale 
(those respondents were excluded form analyses)� 
Table 2: Category indicator of religious extremism (indicator II)
N=488
Approval of religious violence
LOW HIGH
Religious fundamentalism
LOW 172 (35�2%) 82 (16�8%)
HIGH 97 (19�9%) 137 (28�1%)
Two most distinguished groups formed with the use of this method are peo-
ple who got low results in the fundamentalism and approval of religious vio-
lence scales (N=172 – 35�2%) and people with high results on both these scales 
(N=137 – 28%)� These two groups are much more numerous than the remaining 
two (so-called “mixed”), as scales on which the category division was based were 
quite strongly correlated (r=0�42; p<0�001)�
Table 3: Distribution of the category indicator of religious extremism divided into groups

























































Legend: (1) low fundamentalism, low approval of violence; (2) low fundamentalism, high approval of 
violence; (3) high fundamentalism, low approval of violence; (4) high fundamentalism, high approval 
of violence (= religious extremism)�
Table 3 shows the distribution of four categories of the extremism indicator in 
six examined groups� The results only prove the observations from the previous 
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examination� Assuming that the group of people who are most prone to religious 
extremism consists of those with high results on religious fundamentalism scale 
and approval of religious violence scale (category no� 4), we may recognize two 
such groups� They are, first of all, Chechen Muslims (over 80% of them are placed 
in category no� 4) and, to a lesser degree, Muslim foreign students (40% of them 
belong to that category)� In both groups mentioned, people of “increased risk” con-
stitute the dominating category, and the category of “low risk” is the least numer-
ous (1�4% and 8�6% respectively)� The remaining groups are dominated by people 
belonging to the “low risk” category� Their convictions rather exclude tendency 
to religious extremism, except for non-Muslim students, who strongly approve 
religious violence even if reject fundamentalist convictions� 
Feeling of collective harm vs. religious extremism
For the purpose of the research, it has been assumed that one of the most important 
psychological sources of religious extremism may be the feeling of collective harm� 
This feeling stems from the conviction that in the Republic of Poland there are 
unfavorable conditions for the development of a given religion� In order to gain the 
reference criterion for the assessment of this hypothesis, the respondents expressed 
their opinions on conditions for development of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Orthodox Church and Judaism� Figures 8 and 9 present the results of comparisons�
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Explanation: Arrows indicate statistically significant differences among groups amounting to p<=0�05
Compliant to the results presented in Figure 8, the respondents feel that Catholi-
cism may expect the most advantageous conditions for development, while Islam 
besets most barriers�
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Data in Figure 9 presents quite surprising results� Muslim refugees find the condi-
tions for development of Islam in Poland as worse than they are assessed by their 
counterpart group of non-Muslim refugees (M=4�4 and M=5�5; t=-2�6; p<0�01 
respectively)� In Polish Muslims’ opinion, the conditions in dispute are worse 
than Catholic or aconfessional Poles find them (M=5�3 and M=5�8; t=3�3; p<0�01 
respectively)� According to non-Muslim students, conditions for development of 
Islam in Poland are worse than in the opinion of Muslim students (M=3�3 and 
M=5�2; t=-3�9; p<0�01 respectively)� Surprisingly, they assess it on the worst level 
from among all the examined groups�
The following stage of statistical analysis verified the relation between the 
assessments of conditions for the development of Islam in Poland and religious 
extremism with recognition of the quantity indicator (I)� Table 4 presents the 
results:
Table 4:  r-Pearson’s correlation among the assessments of conditions for the development of 






Total -0�15* -0�22** -0�22**
Chechen refugees 0�08 -0�07 0�02
 Muslim Poles -0�16 -0�15 -0�16
 Muslim students -0�07 -0�09 -0�12
Explanation: * p<= 0�05; ** p<= 0�01
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In the examined group of Muslims (N=266), strong feeling of collective harm goes 
together with statistically significant level of religious fundamentalism (r=-0�15), ap-
proval of religious violence (r= -0�22) and religious extremism (r=-0�22)� However, 
what needs to be pointed out, on the level of the group, is that those correlations 
are reproduced with comparable force only in the group of Muslim Poles (however, 
due to smaller numbers they are not statistically significant)� Therefore, the detected 
correlation should not be treated as universal�
Table 5:  Mean assessments of conditions for the development of Islam in Poland in four catego-
ries of extremism indicator (indicator II) – for the combined group of Islam followers
N=266 (1) (2) (3) (4) Total
Chechen refugees 2�0 4�0 6�3 4�2 4�4
Muslim Poles 6�4 5�6 5�4 5�3 5�8
Foreign Muslim students 6�4 6�0 5�6 4�4 5�2
Total 6�3 5�4 5�5 4�5 5�3
Legend: (1) low fundamentalism, low approval of violence
 (2) low fundamentalism, high approval of violence
 (3) high fundamentalism, low approval of violence
 (4) high fundamentalism, high approval of violence
Table 5 comprises a detailed analysis of relations among the assessment of con-
ditions for development of Islam and extremism measured with the category 
indicator� It had been expected that the highest assessment would appear among 
Muslims in the “low risk” category (1) and the lowest (signifying the strongest 
feeling of harm) in the category of “increased risk” (4)� In fact, this type of pat-
tern of results appears in the combined group of Muslims (M=6�3 and M=4�5, 
respectively)� It is also reproduced in two subgroups – among Muslim Poles and 
among Muslim students (in case of Chechen refugees it is difficult to take into 
consideration the “low risk” category, because it comprises only one person)�
Relations between religious extremism and beliefs about oneself and the social 
world
It had been presumed that individual differences in the level of religious extrem-
ism might be strongly related to a group of psychological variables describing 
one’s beliefs about themselves and the world they live in� In the group of those 
variables, the following dimensions are present: authoritarianism, legitimization 
of socio-political system, social cynicism, political cynicism, trust in people, close 
contacts and the assessment of own life quality� 
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To find out which of the aforementioned variables are the predictors of reli-
gious extremism, regression analysis realized with the method of step analysis 
was conducted and its results are shown in Table 6� In the Table values for the 
r-Pearson correlation coefficients are presented together with the standardized 
beta regression coefficients� In the calculation the religious extremism quantity 
indicator was used (indicator I)�
Table 6:  Predictors of religious extremism in regression analysis (indicator I)
Predictors r β
Authoritarianism 0�43** 0�40**
Legitimisation of the system 0�00 -
Social cynicism 0�25** -
Political cynicism 0�07 -
Social trust -0�13** -
Close contacts with people -0�18** -0�10*
Assessment of own life -0�21** -0�09*
Explanation: * p<= 0�05; ** p<= 0�01
Compliant to findings in Table 6, the factors that trigger the growth of extremism 
the most are high level of authoritarianism (r=0�43) and social cynicism (r=0�25)� 
Moreover, it is also related to lack of satisfaction about one’s own life (r=-0�21), 
lack of social trust (r=-0�13) and poor relationships with other people (r=-0�18)�
Because of the fact that the picture of dependences linking religious extremism 
with a group of psychological variables is distorted by their mutual correlation, it 
was necessary to employ multiple analysis of step regression (see: standardized 
coefficients of β regression in Table 6)� This method shows the relations in a more 
reliable manner� Among seven potential extremism predicates, only three are com-
prised in the regression equation: strong authoritarianism (β=0�40), poor human 
relationships (β=-0�10) and negative assessment of own life’s quality (β=-0�09)� 
Altogether they explain 21% of variance of the dependent variable� After excluding 
co-linearity effects, the relations between extremism, social cynicism and trust in 
people turned out to be statistically insignificant, which means that their statistical 
significance on the level of r coefficients constitutes first of all the result of correla-
tion with authoritarianism� 
The analyses have been conducted for the second time with the use of category 
indicator of extremism� Due to the fact that the nominal nature of this indicator 
excluded the application of multiple regression analysis, it was necessary to use the 
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discriminant analysis as the most adequate method� The discriminant analysis is 
a statistical method which allows examining differences among groups of objects 
based on a set of selected independent variables (predictors)� Linear combination 
of independent variables (discriminant function) constitutes its core; it makes 
possible to classify the examined people to one of the groups constituting the 
researcher’s object of interest� The stronger “discriminant power” the variables 
have, the more efficient the model they form is�




Legitimization of the system 0�19 0�07
Social cynicism -0�03 0�52**
Political cynicism 0�09 0�06
Social trust -0�18 -0�31**
Close contacts with people -0�13 -0�30**
Assessment of own life -0�18 -0�42**
Explanation: * p<= 0�05; ** p<= 0�01
If the grouping variable divides the examined people into two groups, one discri-
minant function occurs� If there are more such groups, the number of functions 
grows compliant to the k-1 rule (k – number of groups)� The category indicator 
of extremism breaks down the examined number of people into four groups, 
which means that for its full description three functions are needed� However, 
the mechanism of forming discriminant functions implies the following regular-
ity – first function absorbs the biggest amount of intergroup variance, and every 
further occurring function combines certain amount of variance which was not 
explained by previous functions� In the discussed case, the first function explains 
about 80% of the intergroup variance and this function only comprises adequately 
high resources of information allowing for at least partial explanation of differ-
ences among groups (the remaining functions are not statistically significant)� 
In Table 7, discriminant coefficients specifying the quantity share of particular 
predictors in the first function are shown� The highest independent impact on the 
discriminant function results has authoritarianism (B=0�89), then, in a slighter 
degree, legitimization of the system (B=0�19), lack of trust in people (B=-0�18), 
dissatisfaction with own life (B=-0�18) and poor relationships with other people 
(B=-0�13)� The results of social and political cynicism are marginal�
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Aiming at specification of relations linking discriminant variables with the 
function, it is also possible to verify the structure of the matrix (r) showing the 
size of the correlation among predictors and the function� Conclusions are that 
it shows only partially the results which are already known� Definitely, unusu-
ally strong, positive correlation with authoritarianism (r=0�93) is dominating� 
Negative correlations with satisfaction with own life (r=-0�42) trust in people 
(r=-0�31) and quality of relationships with other people (r=-0�30) are much weak-
er but very clear� Consequently, the impact of political cynicism is also statisti-
cally insignificant� However, one important difference can be observed between 
the two columns of coefficients and it is the role of social cynicism� Standardized 
coefficient for this variable amounts to -0�03 indicating that it has no link to the 
discriminant function� However, the structure matrix coefficient amounts to 0�52, 
suggesting that this correlation is very strong� Attention should also be paid to 
the second noticeable discrepancy – contrary to what is suggested by the value of 
β coefficient, legitimization of the system seems to remain in no relation with the 
function (r=0�06)� Indicating differences among β and r coefficients is important 
in the context of interpretation of psychological impact of discriminant function� 
The β and r coefficients show something different to a certain degree� The β coef-
ficient presents the role of a given predictor in calculating the discriminant result 
at the control of its co-function analysis with other predictors� The r coefficient 
is a simple two-function analysis correlation, irrespective of relations with other 
variables� Due to certain reasons, the description of which may be skipped at this 
point, coefficients of structures are recommended as a better tool of interpretation 
of discriminant function than standardized β coefficients� 
The discriminant function has the nature of latent variable� It is a more general 
dimension, in mathematical manner synthesizing the most important informa-
tion carried by forming it predictors� How should its psychological sense be in-
terpreted? It seems that it is difficult to ascribe one superior label to it� It is rather 
formed by two separate in quality “mental features” (which is certainly to a large 
extent the derivative of this particular selection of discriminant variables)� If the 
absolute value of the coefficient from the structure matrix (r) is very high (about 
+1�0 or -1�0), the function contains nearly the same information as the variable� 
Therefore it is obvious that its basic element is the authoritarian vision of social 
world (hierarchical perception of human relationships, fascination and submis-
sion toward authorities) completed with (both variables correlate on the level of 
r=0�60) social cynicism (conviction that humanist and pro-social values are non-
functional “in life”) and generalized lack of trust in people� The second noticeable 
ingredient of function may be specified as low mental wellbeing, expressed in 
dissatisfaction with own life and social alienation�
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The results in figure 10 indicate that the biggest discrepancies occur between 
people with high level of fundamentalism and the approval of religious violence 
(the value of the function is clearly the highest�– M=0�74) and the group with 
low level of both variables mentioned (the value of the function is the lowest – 
M=-0�46 respectively)� 
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The conclusion of the discriminant function is that the people with the highest level 
of authoritarianism and the lowest mental wellbeing belong to the group that may 
pose the highest threat of religious extremism� Moreover, the distribution of results 
in Figure 11 was easy to foresee� It shows mean values of the discriminant function 
broken down into groups of respondents� As it was expected, the basic components 
characterizing people achieving high results on this function (high authoritarianism 
and low mental wellbeing) are representative for refugees from Chechnya�
5. Conclusion
Islam followers, who stay and live on the territory of the Republic of Poland, often 
declare authoritarian vision of social world, feel alienated because of their cultural 
background and are generally dissatisfied with their own lives� Most of them are 
Chechen refugees� These people constitute the group of potentially highest risk 
of religious extremism� Strong inclination to extremist opinions is also noticed 
among Muslim students, which is particularly disquieting due to their high status 
of education gained in one of the EU countries�
Polish Muslims (mainly Polish Tartars) may present nearly the same level of 
religious extremism threat as Poles who declare to be other than Islam denomina-
tion� In all groups of Islam followers in Poland (including Chechen refugees) the 
acceptance of political violence is insignificant� However, we should bear in mind 
that it does not concern the religious extremism layer, which increase may pose 
a problem in the future (e�g� among refugees from Chechnya)�
The factor (predictor) that might trigger religious violence among the group 
of Islam followers is the feeling of collective harm� In case of the RP it may stem 
from subjective belief that this religion has rather poor conditions for develop-
ment� The attempts to solve the problem by facilitating religious practices for Islam 
followers in Poland could reduce the threat of religious extremism, however, we 
should keep in mind that in countries such as Great Britain or Holland, where 
conditions for the development of Islam were unusually good, radicalization could 
not be avoided and a series of terrorist attacks took place� 
Apart from dissatisfaction with one’s own life and poor human relationships, 
the approval of religious extremism is also fostered by anti-democratic attitudes 
(authoritarianism)� Islam followers perceive the world by the culture and customs 
they were raised in� Needless to say that political systems of that countries are 
far from democratic� Muslims often remain in close contact with the relatives in 
the countries of their origin which may bring the danger of submission to local 
Islam fundamentalists’ influence� This specific socio-cultural layer does not have 
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to have negative impact on the Muslim community in Poland but it may become 
a radicalization factor�
It is commonly known that for all the examined cases there is no one socio-
psychological profile that makes possible to isolate in future threatening individu-
als form the community or allow to reduce factors which draw attention to radical 
slogans� Every such person may be driven by specific motives� However, a certain 
set of factors correlated with various manners may result in higher inclination at 
a given moment of life of such an individual to the ideology of Islam in its most 
orthodox and distorted form calling directly to extreme violence�
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Andrzej Misiuk and Magdalena Dobrowolska-Opała
Terrorist Threats and Mass Events
1. Introduction
The threat of terrorist acts is presently one of the most readily-discussed topics; as 
it is a highly salient media topic, it makes its way easily into print media, the Inter-
net and books� Applying the simplest search algorithm, simply entering the word 
“terrorism” into a search engine, we generate 104�000�000 hits�1 The international 
community, including Poland, keeps track of the information and literature be-
ing produced on both the subject of terrorism itself and activities associated with 
terrorism prevention� Such intense interest, however, leads to ambivalent effects� 
On the one hand, education and knowledge are favorable to prevention, while 
on the other, the spread of their message aids terrorists in pursuing their aims, 
especially those of achieving their badly-needed publicity, generating widespread 
fear, not only in the places where attacks occur� To paraphrase the oft-cited Brian 
Jenkins, it should be emphasized that terrorism is a theatre addressed to those who 
are watching� The direct victims are essentially actors,2 pressed unwillingly into 
provoking fear and trauma among the audience� This characteristic is emphasized 
here for a reason – the theaters of the 21st century are places whose high mediality 
and symbolism are, for terrorists and observers alike, unambiguous� Such places 
undoubtedly include mass events, particularly those organized at stadiums and 
other large structures (congress halls, concert venues, etc�)� They are attractive 
targets, something demonstrated by the most recent attacks in Paris�
In Poland, concern for the safety of mass parties, including with respect to the 
terrorist threat, is visible at the level of domestic regulation, international coop-
eration, and the activities of Member States within the European Union and the 
Council of Europe� Nevertheless, there are serious doubts arising out of the level 
of interest in counteracting potential attacks, and its translation into action plans 
1 As of 28 December 2015� 
2 B� M� Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, in: International Ter-
rorism and World Security D� Carlton, C� Schaerf (eds�), Croom Helm Ldt�, London 
1976, cited by: K� Liedel, Zwalczanie terroryzmu międzynarodowego w polskiej polityce 
bezpieczeństwa, Wydawnictwo Difin, Warsaw 2010, p� 27�
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in the event such attacks occur� While the first stage is measurable, the second 
gives rise to significant uncertainty, and it would be better if the need to imple-
ment them never arose�
2.  Domestic Regulations Addressing Terrorist Threats which 
may arise in Conjunction with Mass Events
In Poland, the most important document concerning safety at mass events is the 
Mass Events Act of 20 March 2009�3 Under the provisions of this act, a mass event 
is a sporting event (including football match) or an artistic-entertainment event 
(including organized, public screenings of television transmissions on screens 
and/or devices facilitating the projection of an image with a diagonal in excess of 
3 meters) at which the number of places made accessible, depending on the type 
of event, is between 300 to 1000� The location of the event is also important, and 
the Act offers the following categorization: site, stadium, other premises which do 
not constitute a building, sports arena and other sports premises�4 The wording of 
the Act does not directly address the issue of terrorist threats, nor criminal acts 
perpetrated by so-called “ultras” or hooligans� In respect of the latter groups, it is 
no great challenge to find normative material designed to reduce the frequency 
of such occurrences� Significantly, a portion of those regulations may also be of 
assistance in countering the threat of terrorist attacks�
The starting point for the divagations to be undertaken in the article are two 
particular statutory provisions� The first concerns the organizer’s responsibility 
for safety of a mass event at its location and for its duration�5 The second imposes 
on authorities – such as mayors and prefects, the provincial governor, the Police, 
the State Fire Brigade, the health service and other appropriate authorities – the 
obligation to secure such an event in the scope set out in the Mass Events Act and 
other relevant regulations�6 However, it should be kept in mind that it is primarily 
the organizer who bears responsibility for the safety of the event’s participants, 
for the protection of public order, and for securing access to medical assistance�7 
3 Ustawa z dnia 20 marca 2009 r� o bezpieczeństwie imprez masowych, Dz�U� 2009 no� 62 
item 504 with amendments�
4 Ibid� Art� 3 (1–4)�
5 Ibid� Art� 5 (1)�
6 Ibid� Art� 5 (3)�
7 Ibid� Art� 5 (2) (1–3)�
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The aforementioned entities are required to support the organizer and comple-
ment its activities by, for example, being active in the public space adjacent to the 
mass event (Police), or by inspecting the site/structure for fire safety issues (State 
Fire Brigade)� The oversight authority given to mayors and prefects is also sig-
nificant, and it includes the right to refuse to issue a permit for a mass event8 and 
to interrupt the event if it is ascertained that the conditions set out in the permit 
are broken� Another important role belongs to the provincial governor, who may 
forbid a mass event from being held with public participation either in an entire 
structure or in specified sectors of it,9 or interrupt the event in the occurrence of a 
threat to human health or life, or to property of significant value�10 In the practice 
of organizing mass events in Poland, particularly those related to sports, the polic-
ing element is clearly dominant, owing to detailed risk analyses and information 
acquired through operational and investigative activities� Unfortunately, there is 
little activity involving factors directly associated with the organizer� For example, 
in Poland there is no official association of safety directors, where people could 
exchange information or undertake systematic cooperation with the Police� These 
types of solutions are in place e�g� in England and Wales, where safety direc-
tors are associated within the Football Safety Officers Association� The FSOA has 
created an Internet platform allowing safety officers to create pre-match, match 
and post-match reports, which include information about incidents involving 
hooliganism, fan behavior, and action taken� This massive database created by 
experts is a source of useful information and viewpoints which frequently serve 
as complements or alternatives to police sources�
The organizer does not independently ensure safety – he/she nominates a 
safety director who represents the organizer in respect of ensuring the safety of 
participants in the mass event11� This director, in turn, exercises authority over 
stewarding and informational services� The first is associated with the use of force 
in ensuring security – its members must figure in the register of qualified physical 
security specialists� Under the Act on Protection of People and Property, an entry 
on that list gives the right to engage in activities related to protection of people 
and property undertaken in the form of direct physical security:
8 Ibid� art� 24, art� 29 (1 and 4)�
9 Ibid� art� 34 (1)(1)�
10 Ibid� art� 34a (1)�
11 Ibid� art� 3 (11)�
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‪ permanent or temporary;
‪  consisting in the continual monitoring of signals sent, gathered and processed 
in electronic devices and alarm systems;
‪ consisting in transport of cash and other valuable and/or dangerous items�12
In reference to the indicated forms of activity which correspond to particular 
experience and skills, the aforementioned requirement of certification should be 
considered appropriate for those engaged in stewarding services, as they func-
tion in service of public safety and order for the duration and in the vicinity of 
a mass event�13
In the majority of cases, this formation is the first line of defense when threats 
arise, including terrorist threats� The second type of service, i�e� information, 
ensures security primarily by providing information to participants regarding 
organizational solutions that have been adopted�14 Both services are obliged to be 
distinguished by signage, and to undergo training whose subject matter is set out 
in the schedule to the ministerial regulation issued pursuant to the Mass Events 
Act�15 The same obligations rest on the safety director� The difference between this 
individual and the services under him relate solely to the scope of training which 
must be undergone, which is naturally far broader for a director: both in terms 
of hours (50 versus 24 for services)16 and subject matter� Significantly, the issue of 
terrorist threats is directly mentioned only in the directors’ training curriculum – 
in module VI titled “Securing mass events”� It lasts only 4 hours and encompasses 
nine subjects, one of which is called “Counteracting terrorists threats”� This is 
accompanied by such important issues as monitoring mass events, the rules for 
threat analysis, and calculation and dislocation of forces and resources� Assuming 
that the individual conducting the training allocates the same amount of time to 
each one, this amounts to 27 minutes per subject� This is not sufficient time even 
for providing the attendees with a general overview of the issue� Other closely 
related issues, which the directors must study, include evacuation of mass event 
participants (2 hours) and tasks of the services at the disposal of the organizer, 
12 Ustawa z dnia 22 sierpnia 1997 r� o ochronie osób i mienia, Dz�U� 1997 no� 114 item 
740 with amendments, art� 3 (1) and art� 26 (1)�
13 Ustawa z dnia 20 marca 2009 r� o bezpieczeństwie imprez …op�cit�, art� 19 (1)� 
14 Ibid� art� 19 (2)�
15 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 30 sierpnia 2011 r� w sprawie wymogów, jakie 
powinni spełniać kierownik do spraw bezpieczeństwa, służby porządkowe i służby 
informacyjne, Dz�U� 2011 no� 183 item 1087�
16 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 30 sierpnia 2011 r� w sprawie wymogów…
op�cit�, schedule no� 1, p� 4 schedule no� 2, p� 2�
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which should include discussion of inspection of participants and search of their 
bags and clothing� These are, however, secondary issues related to a range of threat 
types,17 not dedicated exclusively to the issue of terrorist attacks� Assumptions as 
to the preparation of internal reaction plans taking into account the specificities 
of particular sites and events would seem obvious� It is difficult to say, however, 
to what extent they are professionally prepared and adapted to dynamically oc-
curring changes� Nevertheless, the lack of detailed regulations would seem like a 
clear case of extreme negligence�
One procedure that may be applied in the event of a terrorist-type threat is an 
appeal by the organizer or the safety director to the Police or the Gendarmerie18 
for help� In accordance with the Act, this can occur when activities of the steward 
service, taken within the framework of its authority, are ineffective�19 It should 
be assumed that a terrorist attack may constitute grounds for the Police or the 
Gendarmerie to be handed control� The exceptional nature of the situation and 
the need to employ exceptional force and measures render it necessary to shift the 
burden of providing security from the director to one of the aforementioned enti-
ties� All the more so that the entry of the Police or Gendarmerie allows function-
aries to employ the full range of measures afforded to them under the provisions 
of the Police Act20 and the Act on the Gendarmerie and Military Safety Organs�21 
There is a significant gap in the form of regulation concerning the presence of the 
Police and Gendarmerie in the vicinity of a stadium� As functionaries must be 
able to quickly assume command when a need arises, they should be nearby and 
prepared to engage immediately� Time is of the essence in such situations: rapid 
intervention is crucial in minimizing losses and risk�
Desiring to explore in detail the issue of the Police providing assistance to the 
organizer of a mass event, one should refer to the Police Act, which contains a 
provision allowing for support to be given to functionaries by the Armed Forces 
17 Such threats include fire, panic, attempts to smuggle in pyrotechnics and alcohol�
18 Applying to the Gendarmerie (rather than the Police) for assistance is only possible 
when the mass event is being conducted at sites which are managed by units under 
the authority of the Minister of National Defense� See: Ustawa z dnia 20 marca 2009 
r� o bezpieczeństwie imprez …op�cit�, art� 22 (5)� 
19 Ibid� art� 22 (4 and 5)�
20 Ustawa z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990 r� o Policji, Dz�U� 1990 no� 30 item 179 with amend-
ments�
21 Ustawa z dnia 24 sierpnia 2001 r� o Żandarmerii Wojskowej i wojskowych organach 
porządkowych, Dz�U� 2001 no� 123 item 1353� See: C� Kąkol, Bezpieczeństwo imprez 
masowych. Komentarz, Wolters Kluwer, Warsaw 2012, p� 303�
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of the Republic of Poland� A condition of exercising this possibility is the ap-
pearance of a threat to public safety or public order through the emergence of 
one or more of the threats enumerated therein� These include the danger of com-
mission of a terrorist act or its commission in respect of facilities of particular 
significance for state security and/or defense, or which can threaten the safety of 
human life�22 Units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland may only be 
employed when the Police has proven insufficient�23 The decision on their use is 
taken by the President of Poland by way of a determination issued on application 
by the Prime Minister� In urgent cases, the decision to provide assistance is taken 
by the Minister of National Defense on application from the minister responsible 
for home affairs, who immediately informs of such the President of Poland and 
the Prime Minister�24 The detailed conditions and manner in which units of the 
Police and the Armed Forces may be engaged, coordination of joint activities, 
and the manner in which information is exchanged have been laid down in a 
Regulation of the Council of Ministers, pursuant to the relevant statutory authori-
zation�25 One of its most important provisions is the regulation concerning the 
coordinating authority, who, depending on the area, is: the regionally appropriate 
provincial Chief of Police (in respect of action undertaken by the Police and the 
Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland within the territory of one province) or 
the National Chief of Police (when activity is undertaken in an area covering the 
territory of more than one province)�26
In summary, emphasis should be placed on the generalized character of do-
mestic regulations, which are perhaps not entirely aligned with the rapid changes 
and progressing evolution of the terrorist threat� The Mass Events Act provides the 
organizer and other entities active in that area (primarily the Police) with defined 
procedures� Just the application for a permit to hold a mass event triggers engage-
ment in activities intended to have a significant effect on the safety of participants� 
The legislator’s failure to explicitly address terrorist threats does not mean that no 
measures in that scope have been taken� The Act is intended to address all types 
22 Ustawa z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990 r� o Policji…op�cit�, art� 18 (1)(4)� 
23 Ibid� art� 18 (1)� 
24 Ibid� art� 18 (3 and 5)�
25 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 6 sierpnia 2013 r� w sprawie szczegółowych 
warunków i sposobu użycia oddziałów i pododdziałów Policji oraz Sił Zbrojnych Rze-
czypospolitej Polskiej w razie zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa publicznego lub zakłócenia 
porządku publicznego, Dz�U� 2013 item 1037�
26 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 6 sierpnia 2013 r� w sprawie szczegółowych…
op�cit�, art� 2 (1)(4)�
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of threats, conceived in a generalized manner� In the future, however, at least 
partial regulation requiring organizers to engage in stronger efforts concerning 
this aspect of safety is needed� It is vital and urgent to expand the scope of training 
required for safety managers as well as steward and informational services� The 
issue of terrorist threats should not be taken lightly – they deserve more than 27 
symbolic minutes of consideration�
3.  The EU Regulation Concerning Counteracting Terrorist 
Threats which may arise in Conjunction with Mass Events
European Union law has not developed a single definition of mass event� In par-
ticular documents one may find terms such as “sporting event,” “international 
sporting event,” “international football match�” From 1999,27 the most prominent 
term was “football match of an international character,” until 2010, when the term 
“international football match” was established, with the participation of at least 
one Member State�28 Differentiating football matches results from the popular-
ity of that particular sport, and the concentration of threats associated with the 
activity and the movement of large groups of fans� Of significance were also the 
activities of the so-called hooligans and associated criminality, including organ-
ized crime� EU regulations are not limited to sport matches alone – in the majority 
of cases they are facultative, and can be applied during mass events of an artistic 
and recreational character, as well as other without an international component� 
An exception to this is the Decision of the Council on security in connection with 
football matches with an international dimension29 and its amendments in 2007,30 
which require the creation of a national information point for football in every 
27 This year saw the publication of Council Resolution of 21 June concerning an updated 
handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures 
to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football match-
es with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, 
Dz� U� L C 196 of 13�7�1999�
28 Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recom-
mendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control 
violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international 
dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved, Dz� U� C 165 of 24�6�2010�
29 Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football 
matches with an international dimension, Dz� U� L 121 of 8�5�2002�
30 Council Decision of 12 June 2007 amending Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning secu-
rity in connection with football matches with an international dimension, Dz� U� L 155 
of 15�6�2007�
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Member State� National Football Information Points (NFIP) profile and exchange 
information concerning security of football matches – however, the common 
practice is operating the EU’s systems in conjunction with national databases� In 
Poland’s case, this is the National Information Point for Sporting Events, which 
is part of the structure of the National Police Headquarters�31 The situation in the 
United Kingdom is similar, where the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit is 
the body responsible for such activities as issuing stadium bans and coordinating 
policing efforts for foreign tournaments�32
Under the EU’s regulations, the burden of ensuring security for mass events 
is concentrated on generally-defined threats, and in respect of football matches 
it emphasizes hooligan-related excesses� The existing procedures can, however, 
also be employed against threats of a terrorist nature� Although this is not stated 
explicitly, it should be assumed that information concerning such dangers would 
not go ignored� Networks of cooperating police liaison officers should, as a rule, 
be prepared for receiving and analyzing various types of data� The aforementioned 
suppositions would seem to be confirmed by the newest edition of a handbook 
with recommendations introduced via the Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 
concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international po-
lice cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances 
in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which 
at least one Member State is involved�33 For the first time in the history hand-
books with recommendations, there is a directly-articulated need for selection 
of the appropriate means of communication during exceptional situations that 
is, fighting terrorism� It is proposed that the existing network of liaison officers, 
or a selected, specialized officer as an intermediary� Capturing the issue even 
more precisely, there is also mention made of the present of a Europol liaison of-
ficer� The European Police Office has the authority to support Member States by 
supplying important information and analyses, as well as general assessments of 
31 Krajowy Punkt Informacyjny ds� Imprez Masowych, O punkcie, informational bulletin, 
available at http://www�kpk�policja�gov�pl/kpk/o-punkcie/9,O-Punkcie�html, accessed 
31 January 2015�
32 College of Policing, Policing football, available at https://www�app�college�police�uk/
app-content/public-order/policing-football/, accessed 31 January 2015�
33 Alongside the indicated handbook, the Council previously introduced three handbook: 
in 1999, 2001 and 2006, through resolutions Dz� U� C 196 of 13�7�1999, Dz� U� 22 of 
24�1�2002, and Dz� U� 322 of 29�12�2006� 
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threats concerning serious organized crime and terrorism�34 In circular No� 2 to 
the handbook under consideration a table has been attached with timelines for 
filling orders for the products and services of Europol� They include a General 
Terrorism Threat Assessment, (GTTA) and Updates to the GTTA�
Alongside the network of national informational points for football, coop-
eration between liaison officers, and handbooks with guidelines, an important 
element of European cooperation in tackling the terrorist threat is the Atlas net-
work�35 It brings together central antiterrorist police units from all Member States� 
Among its primary objectives is the continual boosting of the professionalism 
of antiterrorism units through such means as joint training sessions, knowledge 
exchanges, and also support – particularly important in the case of large-scale 
terrorist threats�36 Plans for creating a cooperation platform appeared at the end 
of the 20th century, finally crystalizing after the 9/11 terror attacks in the form of a 
network called “Atlas”� The network acts under the direction of the Police Chiefs’ 
Task Group, which itself is funded and overseen by the European Commission’s 
General Directorate for Home Affairs�37 At present, “Atlas” is home to five Work-
ing Groups: Buildings, Water, Transport, Aeroplanes and Entries� Two fora are 
under them in the hierarchy: Negotiators and Snipers� Their lower status results 
from the more modest funds spent on their activities�38
The “Atlas” Network is also engaged in fighting terrorist attacks which may oc-
cur in conjunction with mass events� In June 2009, three years before the EURO 
2012 football tournament, the National Police Headquarters’ web page wrote of 
plans for joint exercises and workshops focused around the Buildings Working 
Group� The final exercises were held on September 27th–28th, 2011 at the National 
Stadium in Warsaw, as well as at other locations in and around the capital� They 
34 Chapter I of the attachment to the Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an 
updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation�
35 The Polish literature employs the term Atlas task group� See: homepage of the Bureau 
of Anti-terrorist Operations: http://www�policja�pl/pol/kgp/biuro-operacji-antyter/
atlas/41550,Unijna-grupa-zadaniowa-quotAtlasquot�html, accessed 30 January� 2015�
36 Unijna grupa zadaniowa “Atlas”, at the homepage of the Biura Operacji Antyterro-
rystycznych (Bureau of Anti-terrorist Operations), cited above�
37 R� Teichmann, The European Homeland Security State. EU Anti-Terror Drills and Fear 
Campaigns, Global Research, 23 April 2013, available at http://www�globalresearch�
ca/the-european-homeland-security-state-eu-anti-terror-drills-and-fear-cam-
paigns/5332564, accessed 30 December 2015�
38 Unijna grupa zadaniowa “Atlas”, at the homepage of the Bureau of Anti-terrorist Op-
erations, cited above�
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encompassed elements of red tactics,39 acting in conditions of contamination, 
and problem-solving in situations with hostages located in buildings and vehicles 
(coaches)� Participating units came from Austria, Slovenia, Lithuania, Portugal 
and France�40
Poland is represented in the “Atlas” Network by the Bureau of Anti-terrorist 
Operations (BAO), a unit under the command of the Vice Chief of Police�41 In 
respect of its powers and training, the BAO is primarily designed for physical 
reaction to crisis situations, particularly those with a terrorist element� Addi-
tional tasks include training conducted for police forces and other entities (civil-
ians)� The subject matter of training encompasses the issue of terrorist threats 
and counteracting them� In recent years, emphasis has also been placed on social 
prevention associated with raising awareness of how terrorists operate and con-
duct their attacks�42
An Austrian initiative is significant from the perspective of the subject under 
discussion� That country’s efforts led to the December 23rd, 2008 Council Decision 
on the improvement of cooperation between the special intervention units of the 
Member States of the European Union in crisis situation�43 Under this decision, 
Member States can provide support to one another in crisis situations by engag-
ing special intervention units�44 A crisis situation here is defined as any situation 
in which the competent authorities of a Member State have reasonable grounds 
to believe that there is a criminal offense presenting a serious direct physical 
threat to persons, property, infrastructure or institutions in that Member State; in 
particular, the situations defined in Article 1(1) of Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism�45 Permissible forms of 
39 Red tactics is a combination of battlefield medicine with storm tactics� See: B� Serniak, 
D� Rogoziński, Czerwona taktyka, Policja 997, February 2009, p� 1� 
40 M� Piekarski, Polska: ćwiczenia w ramach ATLAS, available at http://www�special-ops�
pl/aktualnosc/id276,polska-cwiczenia-w-ramach-atlas, accessed 30 December 2015�
41 Structure of the National Police Headquarters, at the official webpage http://www�
info�policja�pl/inf/kierownictwo-i-struktu/struktura-kgp/86025,Struktura-Komendy-
Glownej-Policji� html, accessed 30 December 2015� 
42 M� Olechnowicz, Biuro Operacji Antyterrorystycznych KGP, Kwartalnik policyjny, no� 1, 
2015, p� 80�
43 Council Decision 2008/617/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the improvement of cooperation 
between the special intervention units of the Member States of the European Union 
in crisis situations, Dz� U� L 210/73 of 6�8�2008�
44 A special intervention unit is every unit for the protection of public order in a Member 
State that specializes in crisis situation management� See: Ibid� art� 2(a)�
45 Ibid� art� 2 (b)�
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assistance in joint interventions include supplying equipment, know-how, and 
operational engagement, including with the use of weapons�46 The entity provid-
ing assistance is obliged to follow the law in its host state, while the inviting state 
bears the costs of its intervention (unless the states agree otherwise)�47
4. Conclusion
Summarizing the presented legal regulations and initiatives of the EU Member 
States, their general and imprecise nature should be kept in mind� This is required 
both by the specificities of the threat, as well as the undercover manner in which it 
is combatted� Additionally, Poland, as a country relatively free from such threats, 
does not seem to place adequate emphasis on securing mass events in this respect� 
The freedom of movement within the European Union, the migration crisis, and 
the activities of Daesh require and will likely continue to require increased en-
gagement by security forces as well as the development of ever-newer solutions� 
Key in the context of the subject matter under analysis is the issue of raising 
awareness among both organizers and participants of mass events� The organ-
izer and the safety manager must recognize the importance of the role played by 
proper inspection of bags and clothes, specialist monitoring, and development 
and testing of response plans� These plans primarily involve reactions to bags 
left unattended, evacuation in the event of a detonation, and managing panicky 
crowds� Intensification of awareness-raising efforts among participants is vital, as 
well as a more in-depth discussion of terrorist threats in training courses for safety 
directors and members of both steward and information services� It would be 
advisable to conduct exercises at stadiums involving stewards and Police function-
aries, including those from the Bureau of Anti-terrorist Operations� The selection 
and training of stewards is also important, as they are the first line of defense and 
reaction at a mass event when incidents occur� Preparation for potential terrorist 
threats should be given priority treatment with the full involvement of both state 
and private entities organizing and servicing mass events� The example of the 
November 2015 attacks in France demonstrates that terrorists see mass events as 
tempting targets, relatively soft, and efficient in creating shock and awe�
46 Ibid� art� 3 (1 and 2)�
47 Ibid� art� 3 (3 and 6)�
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1. Introduction
The New York, Madrid and London terrorist attacks that took place in the early 
21st century revealed the necessity of a change in security strategy� Those events 
gave rise to a crisis of the concept of security that had been widely used until then� 
After those attacks, terrorism has become one of the greatest threats for both 
national and international Security� Experts in Strategic Studies, State Govern-
ments and International Organizations made it clear: the security policies and the 
security tools created during the 20th century no longer work, as they were devised 
to confront more traditional threats to security� It seems that the “old models” are 
not working in the “new times�” It is time to work on the Security Strategy for the 
Twenty-First Century� Two fundamental ideas must be underlined at the start: 
on the one hand, the types of threats have increased in number, and, on the other 
hand, the unilateral perspective is not enough to guarantee the security of States�
In this context, a new concept of Security is necessary� The need is for a concept 
out of which new strategies can emerge that are suitable for confronting both cur-
rent and future threats� The economic, technological, and social changes have an 
important influence on the contents of Security, both objective and subjective� It 
is therefore essential to bear this in mind when defining strategies and devising 
tools aimed at guaranteeing State security�
In this respect, changes occurring in present-day societies – changes brought 
about or expedited by globalization – are creating new security spaces and new 
models of conflict that coexist with the classic ones� This, in turn, opens new pos-
sibilities for conflict resolution and modifies the conditions and the environment 
in which Security Policies must be developed�1 The design and adoption of any 
Security Policy must be guided by the following idea: “security levels are closely 
related with those sectors that we want to preserve�”2
1 A� Recasens, La seguridad y sus políticas, SA Atelier Libros, Barcelona 2007, p� 19�
2 G� Orozco, El concepto de seguridad en la Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales, 
“Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals”, no� 72, 2006, p� 169�
Claribel de Castro Sánchez232
This need for a new perspective is also evident in the European Union, com-
mon space in which internal security policies are shared, in terms of competence, 
by the EU and its Member States� Moreover, the crisis of refugees from Syria, Iraq 
and Afghanistan and the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, have put 
the EU at the crossroads again�
In this paper, I will try to explore the different concepts of security used in 
history to conclude with an analysis of the European perspective in the field of 
European security policies�
2. Framing a New Concept of Security
2.1 The Traditional Concept of Security 
For centuries, the concept of security has been settled from a national security 
perspective� It has largely focused on aspects closely linked to sovereignty, State 
borders and natural resources� In that context, security was focused on the State 
that had been responsible for the safeguard of its community interests�3 There was 
a close link between National Security and unity and territorial integrity� Unity 
and territorial integrity must be safeguarded, almost exclusively, through military 
capacity� Military advantage over foreign nations was seen as the main element of 
the system:4 the stronger the military power, the higher the levels of Security� In this 
context, two concepts set important political and strategic trends: Deterrence and 
Defense� From this point of view, the State main function in the security context 
was to defend itself and its population from foreign threats –invasions, military at-
tacks- and internal threats – coup d’état, rebellions or national terrorism�
The First World War and, above all, the Second World War radically altered 
this situation� After 1945, unilateral military advantage was no longer enough to 
guarantee, on its own, State Security� It was necessary to forge a new concept that 
goes beyond the national perspective and becomes international in scope� A new 
idea emerged: International Security� The atrocities of the Second World War and 
the need for a new concept finally persuaded the Big Powers to do something new� 
In 1945, the United Nations Organization was created, its main purpose being the 
maintenance of international peace and security�
3 UNESCO, Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frame-
works in Latin American and the Caribbean, available at http://unesdoc�unesco�org/
images/0013/001389/138940e�pdf, accessed 20 January 2016�
4 A� Dastis, Diccionario Lid. Diplomacia y Relaciones Internacionales, LID, Madrid 2005, 
p� 300�
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The concept of International Security Concept was thereby linked to that of 
the International Community and to the idea of preventing a new World War� 
This approach guided the security system created by the United Nations Charter 
as reflected in its Preamble�
To achieve this aim, a system based on three fundamental principles was cre-
ated: the principle of sovereign equality, the principle of non-intervention and the 
prohibition of threat or use of force�5
Therefore, according to this 1945 conception, International Security must be 
maintained through the general prohibition of the use of force and the creation 
of a Security system� Essentially, there were few changes apart from the notion 
that the military advantage must be multilateral� It was necessary to safeguard the 
territorial integrity and political independence of a State in its cooperation with 
other members of the International Community�
Within this new environment, staged by the Cold War, the maintenance of 
security by each State Security depended on the maintenance of the status quo, 
which meant the maintenance of the two “Blocs” equilibrium� As a result, all 
along the Cold War, the biggest threat to Security was an armed attack from 
States belonging to one Bloc against one State belonging to the other Bloc; the 
worst-case scenario was the possibility of a nuclear attack� Threats to the security 
of a State could materialize in armed attacks against its territory or its interests 
in a direct way�
2.2 Security Now and Tomorrow
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, this perspective has begun to change� Gradually, 
“the perception of an absence of direct threats, in a conventional sense, to the 
territory of the traditional powers has drawn attention to conflicts that did not 
directly affect their vital interests� Such a perception fostered the belief that armed 
conflict, in the form of interstate war as known from the Peace of Westphalia to 
the 20th century, was a thing of the past”�6
The new scenario brought about a change in the perception of the causes of in-
security and, consequently, of the instruments to confront them� Internal conflicts 
have replaced the threat of direct foreign military attacks against the territorial 
integrity of a State� During the 90s, many internal conflicts took place in various 
5 C� De Castro, El Derecho de Injerencia Humanitaria en el orden internacional contem-
poráneo: el Impacto de la Operación Libertad para Irak, Madrid, 2005, pp� 19–23�
6 E� Fojón, El análisis estratégico: la vuelta al pragmatismo, 18/03/2009, Real Instituto 
Elcano, available at www�realinstitutoelcano�org, accessed 3 November 2015�
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regions of the world and caused the destabilization of the relative peace achieved 
during the Cold War� It became evident that state security was to be safeguarded 
through lack of interstate conflicts� This idea is still embraced by many� 
In this context, the concept of “New World Order”, a termed that had been 
coined by the President of the United States of America, George Bush, in 1991� 
This notion was based on multilateralism and the role played by the Security 
Council, which was supposed to be the institution representing the International 
Community interests� In this manner, the Security Council became the pillar of 
International Security and, above all, a key actor for State Security� The new situ-
ation favors the reactivation of the Security Council, a body that, until then, had 
displayed few and different peace missions all around the world�
In this new “Strategic Outlook”, one idea became particularly relevant: Interna-
tional Organizations have enough means to maintain Peace and Security and to 
face up to any security problem� As Fojón remarks: “what was a feature belonging 
to the doctrine of internationalism, or trans-nationalism, combining state action, 
multilateral action and cooperation to secure international peace and security, 
rapidly gained importance in its reductionist version: multilateralism, labelled as 
a strategic option, which actually ended up transformed into a panacea applied to 
international security�”7 In short, the prominent role in this new scenario changes 
from national actors to one international actor; it is believed that trough the rule 
of Law a “World Government” will emerge and the Kantian dream of Perpetual 
Peace will ensue� 
However, the NATO intervention in Kosovo had underscored the Security 
Council weakness, as this body had not been capable of adopting the appropri-
ate resolutions to face up to the inevitable threat that Serbian policy posed to 
International Peace� Few years later, the September 11 terrorist attacks were a 
step further along this path, revealing the interdependence between internal and 
foreign threats, on the one hand, and the interdependence among all the States 
of the International Community when confronting this new form of threat to 
international security, on the other�
Thus, it is evident that we are living in convulsed times, with new “threats” and 
new “enemies” to fight against, and the classical concept of security, based on na-
tional security and territorial integrity8 is not fit for the current scenario; today, the 
security “language” must go beyond the defense of Sovereignty and States’ rights�9 
7 Ibid�
8 G� Orozco, G, El concepto…op�cit�, p� 176�
9 J� Ortiz, La doctrina de la seguridad humana en la política exterior canadiense, “Revista 
Cidob D’Afers Internacionals”, no� 60, 2002/2003, p� 53�
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Nor can the concept of International Security, focused as it is on a Collective 
Security System and on multilateral military power, provide the required per-
spective as the internal component must be part of the concept of security� As a 
result, “the military tools, traditionally means of the external dimension, will be 
applied in the internal area of the Security”; in the same way, “Internal Security 
will have a foreign dimension through civil, police and judicial instruments and 
in the context of international cooperation and multilateralism�” In short, “the 
concept of security is closely linked to Peace, being largely a means to this end, 
so that Security implies a stable situation both from a foreign point of view and 
from the internal perspective of the State�”10
3.  The Comprehensive Security Concept as a Premise:  
New models
The changes undergone by the International Society – the end of bipolar con-
frontation, the outbreak of internal conflicts linked to development problems or 
economic stagnation or political emergencies- have entailed the superseding of 
the classical or traditional Security concept, as explained above� This process of 
evolution and “globalization” of the concept has been driven by migratory flows 
and international terrorist attacks� In short, today the concept of Security cannot 
be reductionist and State Security problems cannot be considered to derive solely 
from foreign attacks or internal rebellions� Far from it, Politicians and Academics 
consider, in the same way, that trafficking with weapons, organized crime, inter-
national terrorism, massive migrations, natural disasters, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, human rights violations, or the lack of development and democratic 
principles are some of the most important topics in the World Agenda and fall 
into the realm of Security�11 Therefore, a comprehensive concept of security is 
needed� Today, Security threats are “multiform” and come from very different 
actors; therefore, the instruments and policies needed to guarantee security must 
inevitably be global, in terms of actors and instruments alike�
Following this trend, new models have been designed that take into account all 
these phenomena and are linked to the globalization process� They do not focus 
10 M� A� Acosta, La Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa y la Gestión de Crisis Inter-
nacionales: Las Operaciones Petersberg, Dykinson, Madrid 2008, pp� 37–38�
11 I� Briscoe, La prevención de conflictos y la respuesta europea a los Estados en crisis, 
01�03/2007 FRIDE, available a www�fride�org, accessed 18 October 2015�
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exclusively on the military or economic level, or on the national or regional ground� 
Rather the opposite, these fall into the expansionist Security point of view�12
One of these new tendencies in the Security context considers that States must 
change their points of view in Security, moving from the logic of the national 
thinking to the logic of global thinking; in this context, it can be said that the 
problems of Governments exceed national Agendas� This idea was reflected in the 
UN Management Fee Global Governance Report (1992–1995) that used the term 
“Global Security” to refer to necessities that the International Community must 
bear in mind to protect Peoples� Global Security must be understood as includ-
ing both the traditional concept of state security and those Security of the people 
and the Planet�13 The challenges for Security actors in the 21st century involve, on 
the one hand, protecting States against war and, on the other hand, finding new 
mechanisms to achieve two new objectives: a) to protect the population against 
internal threats of brutality and great hardship and, b) to warrant the integrity 
and viability of the Planet Vital Systems�
Therefore, this new concept means that the Security of the people and the 
Security of the Planet are to be objectives, like the Security of the States, of a new 
Policy for Global Security� Today we need global answers for global problems� 
With all these ideas, a “new thinking about Security” emerged in academic fora, 
in International Institutions and in national Governments14 during the eighties� 
All these approaches recognize that the international system has changed in a 
fundamental way in the last years and the need for an innovative approach to 
identify changes and to respond to new challenges has now become evident� It is 
obvious that today, in a world that is becoming increasingly globalized, the worst 
threats to Security come from situations that involve genocides, international 
terrorism, human rights violations, World epidemics, the Deterioration of the 
environment, Forced Labour and Modern Slavery� The idea is very clear: “the 
main characteristics defining the international system for over half a century 
were transformed by the breakdown of the bipolar order� Furthermore, changes 
in state capabilities and their effects on related matters such as sovereignty are 
12 Ch� Abbott, P� Rogers, J� Sloboda, Respuestas globales a amenazas globales, Seguridad 
sostenible para el siglo XXI, FRIDE, Working Paper 27 September 2006, available a 
www�fride�org, accessed 1 October 2015�
13 G� Orozco, G, El concepto…op�cit�, p� 173�
14 K� Pérez de Armiño, El concepto de seguridad en la Teoría de las Relaciones internacio-
nales, “Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals”, no� 72, 2006, p� 62�
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having repercussions on structural aspects and on the attitudes of international 
actors and the way these are regarded�”15
Another factor that has contributed to this change in outlook where security 
is concerned is the complexity of global problems and their repercussions for 
millions of people� There are now threats very different from that of a military 
attack against one’s homeland, including environmental risks, drug trafficking and 
terrorism� All this entails far-reaching changes in the basic idea of sovereignty and 
shows that national capabilities are inadequate to deal with the main problems� 
The new international context is changing the scale of problems that used to be 
wholly national in character, requiring a new international system where only 
the ability to pool forces will restore to states the ability to generate, jointly with 
other actors, a legitimate order that can satisfy the demands arising at the national, 
regional and world level�
To sum up, the main changes and tendencies in the international system that 
are influencing the way we observe and analyze the new security challenges, and 
that have given rise to a conceptualization which highlights the protection of 
individuals, are associated principally with the following structural and interna-
tional factors:
•	  The end of the bipolar conflict with the breakdown of the Soviet Union� This 
removed the context within which policymaking took place for half a century�
•	  The impact of globalization in different areas, and interdependence� What char-
acterized international relations was the differentiation between the national 
and international spheres, and this is tending to disappear with globalization�
•	  New international actors� New transnational actors are making a forceful ap-
pearance in the new context� Not only are multinational/transnational com-
panies acquiring new capabilities in the conditions of globalization, but also 
nongovernmental organizations� The increasingly important role being played 
by individuals and their views in the form of global ‘public opinion’ is a potent 
factor in the new international architecture�
•	  New power relationships� The consolidation of the United States as a hegemonic 
power is translating into growing unilateralism and difficulties with multilat-
eral policy coordination�
•	  New threats to security� Non-traditional security threats are appearing, most 
of them transnational and non-military in character� Examples include drug 
trafficking, money laundering and organized crime�
15 UNESCO, Promoting Human Security: … op. cit., p� 19�
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•	  Development gaps� There are major difficulties in overcoming poverty and seri-
ous imbalances and inequalities in the distribution of economic resources and 
in national, regional and international decision-making�
•	  Loss of state capabilities� This factor relates to changes in sovereignty� The case 
of world finance most clearly illustrates states’ increasing inability to control 
international flows�
•	  An increase in intra-national conflicts� Interstate conflicts are tending to di-
minish and internal conflicts to increase� The victims of the latter are mainly 
civilians�
All of these factors “design” a new scenario toward a broader concept of security 
whose objectives are peace, international stability and protection for individuals 
and communities� Since the mid-1990s we have seen the concept of human secu-
rity, which emphasizes the protection of individuals, coming strongly to the fore� 
Before this new situation, we can see two different tendencies: on the one hand, 
the necessary adaptation of the international system created by the UN Charter 
to the new reality; on the other hand, the development of a new concept Human 
Security that implies the use of new mechanism to face up the threats�
3.1 A Few Words about the Concept of Human Security
As we have seen, the new international scenario, with a lot and different internal 
crises (linked, however, to human rights violations), permits the appearance of 
the Human Security Concept�
This concept comes from the idea that the unavoidable basis of the security is 
the preservation of the human being and of the necessary conditions for the free 
development of his capacities� From the above, it may be inferred that security 
shall be focused on persons and that the security of persons is threatened not 
only by physical violence, but also by other menaces to their survival in dignity 
conditions�16 It may also be inferred that the human security responses require the 
interaction and the feedback of other actors apart from the State, “such as NGO’s, 
transnational corporations, public opinion (both national and international) and 
multilateral platforms for discussion�”
In short, the Human Security concept refers to the necessity to protect the free 
development of persons in those countries where human rights are threatened or 
violated� It responds to the need to go beyond the traditional concept of National 
16 K� Pérez de Armiño, El concepto de seguridad en la Teoría de las Relaciones internacio-
nales, “Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals”, no� 72, 2006, p� 62�
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Security and reveals the idea according to which the aim of all institutions must 
be to protect human beings� In other words, the focus is shifting from the state 
to individuals; the fundamental issue is the protection of individuals and peoples 
over and above their connection with a particular state�17
Human Security has been promoted by academics, certain international or-
ganizations and even some states as a concept that would provide a better grasp 
of the new security challenges from the perspective of individuals or citizens�18 
Furthermore, we understand that the concept of human security is a necessary 
input in linking security and human rights�
3.2 The European Union and new Security Approaches 
Regional international organizations have introduced the new trends in security 
thought in their Security Strategies� The European Union (EU) can be counted 
among such regional organizations, as it has adopted policies on security that go 
beyond the classical concept of security and are committed to a holistic view, both 
domestically and internationally�
Adopting an international security perspective, the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) was adopted in December 2003� Its title was A Secure Europe in a better 
World. Sharing the new trends referred to above, this document stated that “the 
post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the 
internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked� Flows of trade 
and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy 
have brought freedom and prosperity to many people� Others have perceived 
globalization as a cause of frustration and injustice� These developments have 
also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international af-
fairs� And they have increased European dependence on an interconnected in-
frastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields� On the contrary, 
“in much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering 
and give rise to pressing security concerns�” These arguments lead to the conclu-
sion that “Security is a precondition of development� Conflict not only destroys 
infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, 
deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible� A number 
of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty�” 
In this new environment, “large-scale aggression against any Member State is 
17 S� N� MacFarlane & Y� F� Khong, Human Security and the UN. A Critical History, Indiana 
University Press 2006, pp� 143–225�
18 UNESCO, Promoting Human…op�cit�, p� 25�
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now improbable� Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less 
visible and less predictable�” These new threats are: Terrorism, Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organized 
Crime� Therefore, following the ESS and the documents adopted later, it is clear 
that, for the EU, international terrorism constitutes a threat to its external secu-
rity and that, furthermore, the best way to deal with this threat is through the 
concept of human security in which respect and development of human rights 
for all are an essential element�
3.2.1 Internal Security Strategy
These new trends have been taken into account in the internal perspective too� 
In fact, the Stockholm Program “An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protect-
ing Citizens” (2010) adopts a comprehensive Security Concept and reiterates that 
“internal and external security are inseparable� Addressing threats, even far away 
from our continent, is essential to protecting Europe and its citizens�” In this con-
text, “the European Council emphasizes the importance of the external dimension 
of the Union’s policy in the area of freedom, security, and justice and underlines 
the need for the increased integration of these policies into the general policies 
of the Union� The external dimension is crucial to the successful implementa-
tion of the objectives of this program and should in particular be fully coherent 
with all other aspects of Union foreign policy” (2010/C 115/01: 33)� In essence, 
the aim of the Stockholm Program was to outline the political priorities of the 
Union’s internal security� In order to establish the political priorities, the Euro-
pean Council considers “that the priority for the coming years will be to focus 
on the interests and needs of citizens� The challenge will be to ensure respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms and integrity of the person while guaranteeing 
security in Europe� It is of paramount importance that law enforcement measures, 
on the one hand, and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law and 
international protection rules, on the other, go hand in hand in the same direc-
tion and are mutually reinforced�” There is a clear intention, then, to place human 
rights as an essential concern of the actions taken in this area�
In its Four Point, the document defines the Internal Security Strategy� In this spe-
cific context, the European Council is convinced that the enhancement of actions at 
the European level, combined with better coordination with actions at the regional 
and national level, is essential to protection from trans-national threats� Terrorism 
and organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption, trafficking in human beings, 
smuggling of persons and trafficking in arms, inter alia, continue to challenge the 
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internal security of the Union� Cross-border widespread crime has become an ur-
gent challenge that requires a clear and comprehensive response� Action of the 
Union will enhance the work carried out by Member States’ competent authorities 
and will improve the outcome of their work� The European Council thus calls upon 
the Council and the Commission to define a comprehensive Union internal security 
strategy (2010/C 115/01: 17–18)� 
Moreover, the document The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: five steps 
towards a more secure Europe (COM (2010) 673 final), adopted on November 
22nd, 2010, establishes that “most Europeans are able to go about their daily lives 
in relative safety� At the same time, our societies are facing serious security threats 
that are growing in scale and sophistication� Many of today’s security challenges 
are cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature� No single Member State is able to 
respond to these threats on its own� This is something that worries our citizens 
and businesses�” The document uses a comprehensive concept of security and says 
that “Internal security cannot be achieved in isolation from the rest of the world, 
and it is therefore important to ensure coherence and complementarity between 
the internal and external aspects of EU security� The values and priorities in the 
Internal Security Strategy, including our commitment to promoting human rights, 
democracy, peace and stability in our neighborhood and beyond, are an integral 
component of the approach laid down in the European Security Strategy� As that 
Strategy recognizes, relationships with their partners, in particular the United 
States, are of fundamental importance in the fight against serious and organized 
crime and terrorism�” And, furthermore, the document remarks that “The EU’s 
role in our internal security consists of common policies, legislation and practical 
cooperation in the areas of police and judicial cooperation, border management, 
and crisis management� In striving to reach our security objectives, the contribu-
tion from both EU internal and external policies is crucial�”
In this context, the Commission identifies the most urgent challenges to EU 
security and proposes five strategic objectives� The challenges are: serious or-
ganized crime, terrorism, cybercrime, border security and natural or man-made 
disasters� The objectives are as follows: 1) Disrupt international crime networks, 
2) Prevent terrorism and address radicalism and recruitment, 3) Raise levels of 
security for citizens and business in cyberspace, 4) Strengthen security through 
border management, 5) Increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters� Fur-
thermore, The Commission proposes specific actions for each objective that help 
make Europe more secure�
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At its meeting in June 2015, the Council adopted the Renewed European Internal 
Security Strategy 2015–2020�19 The Strategy has identified three major priorities: 
fighting terrorism (with special attention to preventing radicalization, especially 
the issue of foreign fighters and border controls), preventing and fighting seri-
ous organized crime, as well as cybercrime� In this regard, Luxembourg Minister 
Nicolas Schmit, on behalf of the Presidency of the Council, has emphasized the 
importance of respect for fundamental rights and liberties as a “fundamental prin-
ciple” in the context of the Security Strategy� He has also noted that the Strategy 
constitutes a “comprehensive, multidisciplinary and integrated approach based 
on intelligence,” and that accessibility, availability and exchange of intelligence 
shall remain “crucial” over the coming years�
3.2.2 European Internal Security, Immigration and Terrorism
The creation of an area without internal borders in which citizens can move and 
reside freely has been improved by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007)� As a consequence 
of the creation of a citizenship common area the need emerges to guarantee the 
internal security of the European Union, as a different, but not separate reality, 
from Member States Security� Therefore, the abolition of internal borders of states 
calls for the strengthening of control of the external borders and the establishment 
of common principles and standards for that control� As has been seen above, 
when establishing a common security policy, the EU identifies international ter-
rorism as one of the greatest threats to our security�
Moreover, the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice in the 
EU, inevitably involves the creation of a common immigration policy including 
a common European asylum system� Therefore, from the recognition of the ob-
jective of free movement of persons in the SEA and the subsequent removal of 
internal borders by successive treaties reform, setting common elements for the 
reception of people at risk of persecution has become necessary�
The third vertex of the triangle is illegal immigration, which according to 
international estimates is between 10% and 15% of all international migration 
(CMW/C/GC/2, 28)� In this scenario, Europe is a kind of El Dorado where im-
migrants can have access to a more dignified life, which hundreds of thousands 
of people try to reach at any price� This trend has increased in recent years for 
19 Presidency of the Council, Luxembourg Minister Nicolas Schmit, Draft Council Con-
clusions on the Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015–2020, available 
at http://www�eu2015lu�eu/en/actualites/articlesactualite/2015/07/pe-schmit-strategie-
securite/index�htm, accessed 21 October 2015�
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various reasons including the economic crisis, armed conflicts, climate change 
and human rights violations in the countries of origin� These reasons are and 
will be the strongest factors in the increased migratory pressure (IOM 2012)� The 
refugee crisis affecting Europe since the spring of 2015 is just a sample of this dif-
ficult reality�20 The challenge of the European Union and its Member States in this 
migratory pressure is, both through its policies, and its standards and, especially, 
their common or individual performances, to ensure the safety of individuals, 
and to respect and protect the human rights of irregular migrants trying to reach 
the European dream�
Certainly, the concern for illegal immigration in Europe is not new and already 
during the nineties of the last century awareness was raised on the situation of 
the European countries of the Mediterranean basin as recipients of migration 
flows from Northern Africa� However, it was not until the early 21st century that 
the issue of irregular migration trying to access the EU began to be visible and 
disturbing, essentially for the “border-countries” like Spain and Italy�21 The turn 
of the screw has occurred in 2015 and 2016, when Europe has witnessed the big-
gest human displacement after World War II, with a daily displacement of 42�500 
people fleeing mainly from war or from territories controlled by terrorist groups 
in unstable states� In this situation, it is crystal clear that “in an EU of 28 mem-
bers, in which most of the internal borders have been abolished and people can 
move freely, each country alone cannot manage migration� The cooperation of 
the Member States of the EU is essential to better manage it; so the ISS starts 
from the need for specific actions to address the threat of illegal immigration 
must be carried out both at the EU and at the national and international levels 
(COM(2014) 365 final)�”
In this respect, the situation of the commonly called “refugees” throughout 
2015 is worsening, prompting the Juncker Commission to place immigration 
among one of its priorities� Thus, in May 2015 the Commission adopted the Eu-
ropean Agenda for Migration (COM(2015) 240 final), defining four pillars for 
better management of migration: 1� Reduce the incentives for irregular migration; 
2� Border management: saving lives and protecting the external borders; 3� A 
strong common asylum policy; 4� A new policy on legal migration�
20 Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado CEAR, Informe 2015: Las personas refugia-
das en España y Europa, available at http://www�cear�es/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/
Informe-2015-de-CEAR2�pdf, accessed 6 October 2015�
21 B� Olmos, EU Return Policy and International Human Rights Law: Keeping the balance 
between border security and human dignity, “Spanish Yearbook of International Law” 
no� 18, 2014, pp� 163–164�
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This entire situation has been affected by Islamic terrorism� Terrorist attacks 
occurred in the early years of this century led to the adoption of the EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy in 2005 (14469/4/05 REV 4)� And terrorist attacks in Paris on 
November 13th, 2015 “have heightened fears that terrorist could slip into Europe 
as part of an ongoing influx of migrants and refugees�”22 In addition, worries 
persist about “homegrown” extremist inspired by Islamist propaganda to commit 
violence at home without traveling abroad�
4. Conclusion
First of all, it can be concluded that a new perception of Security has appeared 
in the last years, presenting some common trends: a) the interdependence of the 
new threats that has revealed a close link between Internal and External Security; 
b) the importance of multilateralism and cooperation between the different in-
ternational actors as a necessary means to confront the new threats; c) the role of 
the people, as human well-being constitutes an essential element of the Security�
These new trends have been taken into account in the development of the 
EU’s Security Strategies� Indeed, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in 
the United States and those suffered by Spain and the United Kingdom in 2004, 
provided a catalyst for the culmination of the process initiated in the seventies 
of the last century which resulted first in the TEU through the reform made in 
Lisbon (2007) and, finally, in the adoption of the Stockholm Programme (2010)�
The triad security/immigration/terrorism has now reached enormous signifi-
cance after the terrorist attacks of 13-N in Paris that have killed more than 120 
people� After these attacks, the different positions on how to manage the refugee 
crisis in Europe have become more bitterly opposite� The risk of disrupting the 
European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice based on the rule of law and 
respect for human rights is shown as a possible future reality� But what is the 
goal of security? Does it not guarantee the enjoyment of rights and fundamental 
freedoms? If it does, the EU has the tools to manage, in a safe and respectful way 
for the rights of all citizens, the issue of legal immigrants and irregular migrants 
in Europe� The proper delimitation of the various regulations and, therefore, dif-
ferent legal regimes is a necessary step� There must be also a distinction between 
asylum policy and security policy� European leaders must be capable of doing it, 
and doing it well�
22 K, Archick, P� Belkin, European Security, Islamist Terrorism, and Returning Fight-
ers, Homeland Security Digital Library HSDL, available at https://www�hsdl�org/? 
view&did=788661, accessed 27 October 2015�
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In short, being European does not mean just raising a flag and have rights and 
benefits� It means sharing a project, creating spaces and common systems, and 
applying the values that for many years have been consolidated� Will the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States be capable of realizing the idea of a Europe 
of freedom, democracy and human rights? Will they be able to respond to the 
current crisis with solidarity, humanity and responsibility? Or will this new crisis 
make even more evident the difference of perspectives, interests and values of 
its member states? What impact will the revival of the terrorist threat after the 
terrorist attacks in Paris have on asylum policy? Does the end (of ensuring our 
safety) justify the means? Doesn’t our security depend on the safety of others in 
the last resort? What about linking development/human rights/security? Again, 
the European project is at the crossroads; only the future will show us if it has 
been able to overcome this new crisis�
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Teresa Marcos Martín
Legal Instruments and Specific Actions in  
the EU’s Fight against Terrorism
1. Introduction
Terrorism is one of the key global challenges and one of the priorities of the Euro-
pean Union� It poses a threat to our security, to the values of our democratic socie-
ties and to the rights and freedoms of European citizens� Terrorism is not a new 
phenomenon in Europe, but recent developments impose new perspectives on it� 
In this paper, I shall present an overview of how the EU institutions, in close 
cooperation with the Member States and other international organizations, have 
tried to fight this phenomenon and to grant protection to citizens potentially af-
fected by the activity of terrorist groups�
2. Definitions
Before entering the topic, the author considers it appropriate to review some 
definitions contained in the various legal instruments adopted in the field� Among 
the notions found in the acts adopted by the European Union, I choose those in 
the Common Position 2001/931�1 I believe that, although this legal instrument 
has more than a decade, the definitions may trace back essentially to current 
situations�2
Under this act, for the purposes of this Common Position,3 persons, groups and 
entities involved in terrorist acts4 shall mean: a) persons who commit, or attempt 
to commit, terrorist acts or who participate in, or facilitate, the commission of 
1 Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific meas-
ures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP), available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001E0931, accessed 2 February 2016�
2 The list of persons and entities referred to in the Annexes to this act has been to be, 
however, completed and updated in subsequent legal actions�
3 Although this act, in principle, limits, the concept to its scope of application, I believe 
that we can take it as a reference definition�
4 A� Asúa, Concepto jurídico de terrorismo y elementos subjetivos, in: Estudios Jurídicos 
en memoria de José María Lidón J� I� Echano Basaldua (ed�), Universidad de Deusto, 
Deusto 2002, p� 62�
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terrorist acts; b) groups and entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by 
such persons; and c) persons, groups and entities acting on behalf of, or under the 
direction of, such persons, groups and entities, including funds derived or gener-
ated from properties owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons 
and associated persons, groups and entities�
For the definition of terrorism,5 we choose the one contained in the Council 
Framework Decision6 of June 13th, 2002 on combating terrorism� The mere threat7 
of committing such an offense should be considered a terrorist act�
3.  Action Programs of the European Union in the  
Fight against Terrorism
The attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the frustrated attempts in the 
summer 2006 in Germany, the UK and Denmark, and the failed attacks in London 
and Glasgow in 2007, showed that the territory of the European Union is a target 
for global terrorism linked to Islamic-inspired groups� The European Union and 
the Member States are committed to jointly fighting terrorism and providing 
for the best possible protection for citizens� To that end, in 2005 the Council8 
adopted the EU counter-terrorism strategy,9 which has provided the framework 
for the European Union’s activity in this field� This legal instrument aims to com-
bat terrorism globally, while respecting human rights, to make Europe safer, and 
5 J� Alcaide, Las actividades terroristas ante el Derecho Internacional Contemporáneo, 
Tecnos, Madrid 2000�
 H� P� Gasser, Actos de Terror, Terrorismo y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, “Revista 
Internacional de la Cruz Roja”, Boletín del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos 
2002�
 C� Swinarski, Del terrorismo en Derecho Internacional Público, Derecho Internacional 
Humanitario y temas de áreas vinculadas, Lexis, Buenos Aires 2003�
6 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/
JHA), available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX% 
3A32002F04759, accessed 1 February 2016� 
7 This clarification appears in all acts and strategies� This implies that all notions related 
to terrorism must be interpreted extensively�
8 Among the Institutions, the Council and the European Council have led the way in 
boosting Strategies and other activities but, as will be seen below, the other institutions 
have also made significant contributions to the fight against terrorism�
9 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14467/Brussels, 30 November 2005, available at 
http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33275, accessed 
1 February 2016�
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to allow its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice� It promotes 
democracy, dialogue and good governance to tackle the causes of radicalization�10
The European Union is, as it is recognized in this act, an area of increasing 
openness, in which internal and external aspects of security are intimately linked� 
It is an area of increasing interdependence, allowing for free movement of people, 
ideas, technology and resources� This is an environment which terrorist abuse to 
pursue their objectives�11
In this context, concerted and collective European action, in the spirit of soli-
darity, is indispensable to combat terrorism� This strategy is focused on four main 
actions: prevent, protect, pursue and respond�12 Across these actions, the strategy 
recognizes the importance of cooperation with third countries and international 
institutions� In fact, across the measures adopted, a horizontal feature is the Euro-
pean Union’s role in the world� Through its external action, the European Union 
takes on a responsibility for contributing to global security� Acting through and 
in conjunction with other international organizations, the European Union will 
work to build the international consensus and promote international standards 
for countering terrorism�
The European Union is aware that terrorism remains a threat to the political 
foundations of the European Union as well to life and well-beings of citizens, then, 
political oversight of this Strategy and regular follow-up will be essential� Follow-
ing this idea, contained in the Strategy itself, the European Council adopted in 
2007 the so-called EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism (2007)�13 This legal 
instrument does not contain any relevant developments regarding the strategy� 
By contrast, the EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism (2011),14 which re-
vises the previous one, has a greater interest� This legal instrument is linked to 
the question of potential risk that the phenomenon of foreign fighters poses to 
10 These ideas are the leitmotif of all EU actions against terrorism�
11 F� Ruiz, La estrategia de la Unión Europea contra el yihadismo en tiempos de ISIS, “Bo-
letín del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos” no� 17, 2015, p� 4�
12 I will follow this structure for presenting the panorama of events, actions and activities 
of the EU in this area�
13 EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism� Brussels, 2007, available at http://eur-lex�
europa�eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33275, accessed 1 February 
2016�




the European Union�15 It also includes a section called International Cooperation, 
where the European Institutions express their will to expand the strategic relations 
of the European Union in the fight against terrorism�16
4. Concrete Action Lines
4.1 Prevent
The historical characteristics of Europe’s counter-terrorism approach have been: 
first, to treat terrorism as a crime to be tackled through criminal law; and second, 
to emphasize the need for understanding the root causes of terrorism in order to 
be able to prevent terrorist acts� This idea underlies the acts of the EU institutions 
in recent years�
One of the EU’s priorities in the field of counter-terrorism is to identify and 
tackle the factors which contribute to radicalization and the processes by which 
individuals are recruited to commit acts of terror� Preventive measures aim, then, 
at combating radicalization and terrorist recruitment, identifying the methods, 
propaganda and tools used by terrorists�17 Although these challenges depend on 
the Member States, the EU helps to coordinate national policies, identify good 
practices and exchange information�
Key priorities for the prevention are: to develop common approaches to spot 
and tackle problematic behavior, in particular, the misuse of the Internet; to 
address incitement and recruitment, particularly in crucial environments, for 
example, places of religious training or worship; to develop a media and commu-
nication strategy in order to explain better the European Union’s policies;18 to pro-
mote good governance, democracy, education and economic prosperity through 
Community and Member States assistance programs; to develop inter-cultural 
dialogue within and outside the European Union; to develop a non-emotive lexi-
con for discussing the issues; to continue research, share analysis and experiences 
in order to further our understanding of the issues and develop policy responses�
15 The European Union is concerned, to a great extent, about the phenomenon of fighters 
from Europe traveling to different places to join the jihad and the threat they pose to 
security within the EU on their return� This idea appears in the actions and strategies 
of recent years� 
16 We have already seen that this idea appears in all instruments, but it is the first time it 
is recognized as a separate item�
17 G� Díaz, P� Rodríguez, La UE y el terrorismo islamista,“UNISCI Journal”, no� 39, 2015, 
p� 180�
18 This has been developed in particular, as discussed below�
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These are the measures proposed in the EU 2005 Strategy of the European 
Union to combat terrorism� In furtherance of these points, the Council adopted, 
in turn, the EU’s strategy for combating radicalization and recruitment to terror-
ism� Even before the development of this strategy, the EU had worked to try to 
prevent, as far as possible, the actions of terrorists� I wish to refer to them, before 
presenting the 2005 Strategy and the revised 2014 Strategy, in order to be able to 
assess all European actions in this field�19
Among them, I would like to highlight the common positions 2001/93020 and 
2001/931 PESC�21 In the first one, crime of financing terrorism, refusal to shelter 
suspects, measures to prevent recruitment into terrorist groups and to prevent 
the supply of weapons are contemplated�
The second position encompasses a list of persons, groups and entities involved 
in terrorist acts to which the measures to freeze funds and other financial assets or 
economic resources involved in terrorist acts� Therein lies, in my opinion, much 
of the value of this event,22 especially for the practical approach�
Moreover, these instruments are the result of the necessary cooperation be-
tween International Organizations� In fact, their adoption reflects the desire of the 
EU to implement Resolution 1373 of the United Nations Security Council�23 Also 
the fight against the financing of terrorist activities had already been approached� 
The Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of December 27th, 2001,24 concerning 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a 
view of combating terrorism, aims to prevent and prohibit the financing of terror-
ist acts, that is to say, intentional offenses which, by their nature or context, may 
19 J�R� de Prada Solaesa, Terrorismo: Convenios Sectoriales. Financiación y Blanqueo, Con-
sejo General del Poder Judicial 2013�
20 Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on combating terrorism, available at 
http://eur-lex�europa�eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ�do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:0090:0092:EN:
PDF, accessed 1 February 2016�
21 Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on combating terrorism, available 
at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ�do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:0093:0096: 
EN:PDF, accessed 1 February 2016�
22 Also of great use is the insertion of the glossary on terrorists and terrorist acts, as we 
have seen in the definitions section�
23 Resolution 1373 of the Security Council of the UN, 2001, available at http://www�
un�org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20
Council%20Resolution%201373%20(2001)�pdf, accessed 1 February 2016�
24 Council Regulation (EC) No 2580, 2001, available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ�do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:0070:0075:EN:PDF, accessed 1 February 2016�
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damage a country when committed with the intention of seriously intimidating 
the population, destabilizing the country, etc�
In December 2005, the Council adopted the European Union Strategy for 
Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism� The Strategy sets out 
three general strands for the EU’s action: to disrupt the activities of networks and 
individuals who draw people into terrorism, to ensure that voices of mainstream 
opinion prevail over those of extremism and to promote – yet more vigorously – 
security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all� The Strategy and the accom-
panying classified Action Plan contain both joint standards and new measures� 
While recognizing the primacy of the Member States in the field of radicalization 
and recruitment, the Strategy proposes a set of specific measures to be imple-
mented at the European level� These measures cover all three pillars and require 
close co-operation between the Council and the Commission�
The Action Plan on Combating Radicalization and Recruitment adopted in 2005 
instructed the Council, in consultation with the Commission, to draw up a com-
munication strategy with the purpose of combating radicalization and recruitment 
to terrorism through effective communication of the EU’s values and policies in 
the media� On this basis, the Media Communication Strategy was developed and 
adopted by the Council in July 2006, consisting of three main parts: 1) key messages 
on counter-terrorism; 2) suggestions on how to deliver the key messages to various 
audiences; 3) a common lexicon which has been expanded over time� The strategy is 
designed to use communication of the EU’s values and policies to prevent terrorism� 
However, it is not exclusively concerned with communication on counter-terrorism� 
It should be used in the context of the EU’s communication on a range of topics 
that may have a bearing on processes of radicalization, such as integration, human 
rights, the rule of law, development assistance, etc�
The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator updates the Strategy and the Action Plan 
for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism on yearly basis� Thus, 
in 2014 the Strategy is revised to accommodate the new risk factors that were 
detected in the successive international events affecting the Member States� Of 
particular concern is the phenomenon of terrorists or lone fighters, and recently, 
the growing potential of social networks for mobilization and communication� 
Taking into account these factors, the Council proposes the following measures: 
to promote security, justice, and equal opportunities for all; to ensure that voices 
of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism; enhance government 
communications; to support messages countering terrorism; counter online radi-
calization and recruitment to terrorism; to train, build capacity and engage first 
line practitioners across relevant sectors; support individuals and civil society to 
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build resilience; to support disengagement initiatives; to support further research 
into the trends and challenges of radicalization and recruitment to terrorism; to 
align internal and external counter-radicalization work�
In December 2014, the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs adopted a series 
of conclusions regarding the revised strategy� These guidelines set out a series of 
measures to be implemented by the EU and the Member States�25 They would con-
tribute to the criminal justice response to radicalization leading to terrorism and 
violent extremism� As particular actions, these documents include measures in 
relation to the Structure and organization of detention regimes, alternative or ad-
ditional measures of prosecution and/or detention, integration, rehabilitation and 
re-integration, training and learning from monitoring and exchange of practices�
4.2 Protect
The second priority of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy is the protection of 
citizens and infrastructure, as well as the reduction of vulnerability to attack� 
This includes the protection of external borders, the improvement of transport 
security, the protection of strategic targets and the reduction of the vulnerability 
of critical infrastructure�
In particular, in European Union Strategy includes, as specific measures: to 
deliver improvements to the security of European Union passports through the 
introduction of biometrics; to establish the Visa Information System and the 
second generation Schengen Information System; to develop through Frontex 
an effective risk analysis of the European Union’s external border; to implement 
agreed common standards on civil aviation, port and maritime security; to de-
velop a European program for critical infrastructure protection; to make best use 
of European Union and Community level research activity�
In the action plan on combating terrorism (2007), and especially in the Action 
Plan on Combating Terrorism (2011), these measures are developed, and new 
measures are incorporated, in relation to the Cyber Security26 and the security 
of explosives�27 
25 These Conclusions underline the essential role of the local actors� This is, in my opin-
ion, an added value of this document� 
26 The document underlines the increasing dependency of our society on the internet and 
IT infrastructures, and reminds that the issue of Cyber Security is an area of growing 
concern for state and non state actors�
27 The use explosives remains the main threat when it comes to possible terrorist modus 
operandi within the EU�
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4.3 Pursue
The EU is working to hinder terrorists’ planing and organizational capacities, and 
to bring these terrorists to Justice� To achieve these goals, the EU has focused on 
strengthening national capabilities, improving practical cooperation and infor-
mation exchange between police and judicial authorities (in particular, through 
Europol and Eurojust), tackling terrorist financing and depriving terrorists of the 
means by which they mount attacks and communicate�28
In particular, the 2005 Strategy includes, as its key priorities: strengthening 
national capabilities to combat terrorism; making full use of Europol and Euro-
just to facilitate police and judicial cooperation; inducing a further development 
of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and adopting the European Evidence 
Warrant; ensuring full implementation and evaluation of existing legislation as 
well as the ratification of relevant international Treaties, and developing the prin-
ciple of availability of information possessed by law enforcement agents�
The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism (2011) stresses the need to continue 
and increase the efforts to uncover terrorist networks, to impede communication, 
travel and planning activities of terrorists and their supporters; to cut off funding 
and access to attack materials, and to file them in court� This document includes 
measures in relation to data sharing,29 Passenger Name Records as a key element 
in the fight against international terrorism, and the need of approximation of 
Member States’ criminal law and mutual recognition�30
4.4 Respond
This objective of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy is to prepare (in the spirit 
of solidarity), to manage and to minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack� 
This is done by improving capabilities of dealing with the aftermath, the coordina-
tion of the response, and the needs of victims� Priorities in this area include the 
28 In some documents, the EU itself introduces into the measures of persecution, the 
already mentioned measures against money laundering and financing of terrorism� 
In order to structure my presentation, I prefer to add them to the prevention, since 
I believe, as I have already noted, that the basis for them is to attack structural problems 
related to terrorism�
29 This includes the exchange of Passenger Name Records, the processing and transfer of 
Financial Messaging Data and the exchange of data within the Schengen area�
30 The recommendations centre around the following themes: judicial organization, spe-
cial investigation techniques and terrorist financing, rights of defense, judicial coopera-
tion, international perspective, strategy for EU prosecutions and criminal policy�
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development of the EU’s crisis co-ordination arrangements, the revision of the 
civil protection mechanism, the development of risk assessment and the sharing 
of best practices in terms of assistance to victims of terrorism�
In relation to the civil protection mechanisms,31 the main instruments for 
reaching these objectives are Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom of March 
5th, 2007 establishing a Civil Protection Financial Instrument32 and Council Deci-
sion 2007/779/EC/Euratom of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil 
Protection Mechanism (recast)�33 Both are major elements in the Protect and 
Respond chapters of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy�
The solidarity in the protection of victims of terrorism remains a major con-
cern for European Institutions� The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism (2011) 
underlines that assistance and compensation to the victims of terrorism has to 
remain an integral part of the EU’s policy� The Member States and the Com-
mission shall continue their work and assistance to victims and organizations 
representing victims of terrorism�
5. The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11th, 2004, the European 
Council adopted a declaration on combating terrorism� Among the measures 
included in this declaration was the establishment of the position of a Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator� His/her task, which includes 6-monthly reports on the 
implementation of the various Strategies, can be summarized as follows: coor-
dinating the work of the Council in combating terrorism; presenting policy rec-
ommendations and proposing priority areas for action to the Council; closely 
monitoring the implementation of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy; maintain-
ing an overview of all the instruments at the European Union’s disposal; reporting 
to the Council and following up Council decisions effectively; coordinating his/
her actions with the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council, the Commission 
and the EEAS, and sharing information with them; making sure that the EU plays 
an active role in the fight against terrorism; improving communication between 
the EU and third countries in this area� In fulfilling this mandate, the main task 
of the coordinator is the collaboration in reviewing different strategies� This work, 
31 In my opinion, this is the most useful aspect in response measures�
32 Council Decision of 5 March 2007, available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32007D0162, accessed 1 February 2016�
33 Council Decision of 8 November 2007, available at http://eur-lex�europa�eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32007D0779(01), accessed 1 February 2016�
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as we have seen, is critical because, as recalled in all instruments, strategies shall 
constantly be revised and adapted�
6. Specific Strategies to Fight against the Islamic State
In the Outline of the counter-terrorism strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular 
focus on foreign fighters,34 the European Union redirects the four points (prevent, 
protect, pursue and respond) to this specific scope�35 Regarding the prevention, 
the European Union needs to be sensitive to the differing motivations for travel� 
The European Union should also work with the third countries that are significant 
source of foreign fighters, particularly the Maghreb, or transit countries� In par-
ticular, the Union should aim to provide alternative non-violent outlets, such as 
diversionary activity for those who are attracted to the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts�
Regarding the question of pursuit, the European Union should work with the 
third countries to improve operational co-operation in order to identify and dis-
mantle recruitment and facilitation networks, as well as to identify and prosecute 
foreign fighters� Given the role of kidnapping for ransom in raising funds for 
ISIL/Daesh, the European Union should promote its position on this issue and 
raise awareness of the risks (in particular, in the private and non-governmental 
sectors)� The European Union should consider undertaking appropriate actions 
to strengthen border security (including at airports and other border-crossing 
points) in countries surrounding Syria and Iraq in order to help detect and com-
plicate travel and identify quickly those who may pose a threat� In addition, the 
Union should work to better understand how terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq are 
acquiring their weapons and equipment, and act to prevent weapons proliferation 
(both into, and out of, Syria and Iraq)�
In the field of protection, building capacity regarding aviation security re-
gionally should also be a priority� Containing the threat within the Syrian and 
Iraqi borders must also include actions aimed to prevent advanced conventional 
weapons or weapons-technology from seeping out� Finally, regarding the ques-
tion of responding, the Union should build capacity in the region to respond to 
terrorist attacks� This should include helping to empower civil society, including 
developing crisis management tools, to enable them to respond to attacks that 
target their communities�
34 Council Regulation (EC) No� 11570, 2015, available at http://europeanmemoranda�
cabinetoffice�gov�uk/files/2015/09/11570-15�pdf, accessed 1 February 2016�
35 We present the most striking developments of these points included in this strategy�
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The Annual Report 2015 to the European Parliament by the High Representa-
tive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy suggests some guidelines 
to follow, to deal with the terrorist threat posed by the ISIS� The document sup-
ports the global coalition against the Islamic State and its efforts to fight militarily 
against it� Federica Mogherini’s document also stresses the urgent need to counter 
the use of the Internet by jihadi groups for recruitment and propaganda� Finally, 
she insists on the need to increase international cooperation and cooperation 
within the EU, designed to prevent extremists from traveling to Syria and Iraq to 
join the jihadist fight�
As to the recent initiatives to combat terrorism in general, in their Statement on 
counter-terrorism of February 12th, 2015,36 the members of the European Coun-
cil set out an ambitious agenda based on three pillars: ensuring the security of 
citizens; preventing radicalization and safeguarding values; cooperating with our 
international partners�
7. Conclusion
The EU’s institutions have reacted to new international events, and this, in itself, 
should be considered a positive development� It is an entirely different matter 
whether such reaction, and that of Member States, has been effective� It largely 
depends on how Member States are implementing the relevant anti-terrorism 
policy� Terrorist groups are capable of reinventing themselves on a daily basis�
One of the weak points of the strategy to counter terrorism is, in my view, the 
protection of the victims� The instruments studied in this work express much 
concern for victims but lack specific measures to address their needs and the chal-
lenges posed by their protection� The EU and its Member States must face these 
issues as soon as possible if victims are to enjoy adequate protection�
In all legal instruments, especially the most recent, a great concern for the issue 
of foreign fighters is detected� However, other measures which, in my opinion, are 
of vital importance – such as those related to the control of exports in order to 
prevent terrorists to divert, so that terrorists can divert weapons, goods or dual-
use technologies – are missing�
Another striking fact detected in this work is that although there are rules and 
policies designed to prevent the funding of terrorist activities and to establish lists 
36 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government, Brussels, Statement by the 
members of the European Council, 2015, available at http://www�consilium�europa�eu/
en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-
terrorism/, accessed 1 February 2016�
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of individuals and groups involved in terrorism, rules governing the exchange of 
information are scarcer, even though the need for such rules is a pressing one�
Cooperation with the third countries and international organizations is intense 
in the field of prevention� This is evidenced by the agreements with the United 
States and the accession of the European Union and the Member States to in-
ternational instruments, such as those related to weapons of mass destruction� 
The relation between the EU and the UN revolves around two different issues: 
an acceptance of a series of principles, notions and standards adopted in both 
organizations, on the one hand, and an active promotion of the EU and the UN’s 
policies, with a view of developing a global strategy�
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The Islamic State’s Political Organization. 
The Political Impact of Jihadist Terrorrism: 
Consequences in the European Union
1. Introduction: The Arab Spring
The “Arab Spring” is the name given by the media to a series of popular and 
political demonstrations that took place in the Arab region starting at the begin-
ning of 2011� Most of them were a consequence of the extremely grave economic 
and financial situation in the region, and of the absence of political freedom that 
precipitated the government breakdown in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and caused 
instability in Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq and Syria�
These revolts have no precedent in the Arab world� In fact, in their history there 
have been many secular and republican revolutions, but all of them were born 
from military coup d’états and gave birth to new, often authoritarian governments, 
supported or not by the civilians� The difference in the present situation is the 
claim of democracy and the substantial improvement of living conditions� Given 
the nature of their claims – democratic freedom, political and social change – 
some European observers associate them with the European revolutions of 1830, 
1848 and 1989 in East Europe, after the fall of the Berlin Wall�1
The third democratic wave, from the mid-seventies to the nineties of the 
20th century in the southern and eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia-Pacific, 
had not run through the frontiers of North Africa and the Middle East� The Arab 
world became the exception� That is the reason why revolts were received with 
optimism by those who believe that democratic transitions are produced in phases 
and affect simultaneously several countries in the same region�
1.1 Causes
The Arab Spring was a popular reaction against the ongoing abuses perpetrated 
by authoritarian regimes� In spite of the existing differences between Arab coun-
tries, most of them are characterized by a lack of political freedoms; a systematic 
1 S� Mangana, Las protestas en los países árabes son en respuesta al inmovilismo político, 
“Vadenuevo” no� 31, Montevideo 2011, available at https://www�vadenuevo�com�uy/
index�php/faq/105-entrevistas/2064-31vadenuevo01, accessed 20 January 2016�
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violation of human rights; restrictive legislation; evident gender inequality (being 
a result of the religious context, but also of the patriarchal values prevailing); and 
emerging laws created under the pretext of fighting external threats, as in the cases 
of Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Saudi Arabia�
The most neutral analysts believe that the causes of the initial demonstrations 
were the consequences of the economic crisis in a region that had put all its eco-
nomical expectations on petrol� Those specialists, who are more aligned with the 
movement, describe the “Spring” as the product of the social maturity in socie-
ties which fight against inequality and search for people’s higher participation in 
political decisions�
The popular uprisings took place as a consequence of several structural causes: 
corruption, inefficiency and repressive eagerness of the regimes in the area� The 
permanent dissatisfaction in terms of basic needs from a wide percentage of the 
population – mostly young and with no expectation of developing a dignified 
life – is a structural component of a situation which explains the present mobi-
lizations�2
We can differentiate various factors explaining the emergence of these revo-
lutionary movements:3
•	  Historical: the loss of three wars against the State of Israel, that forced some 
countries in the region to accept peace and cooperation agreements with the 
United States, thanks to which the United States acquired control of the petrol 
resources and at the same time committed to maintain despotic leading figures 
in power, such as Mubarak in Egypt�
•	  Political: the establishment of single party dictatorships, which silenced the 
population�
•	  Economic: the 2008 Wall Street financial crisis obliged many countries to adopt 
unpopular financial measures�
•	  Social: the existence of a very young population with high unemployment rates 
and the impossibility of immigrating to Europe, given the obstacles imposed 
by European countries�
2 J� Núñez, Apuntes de urgencia sobre la oleada de cambios en el Mundo Árabe, Instituto 
de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria (IECAH), Fundación Carolina, 
no� 18, 2011, pp� 39–43�
3 I� Ramonet, Cinco causas de la insurrección árabe, “Le Monde Diplomati-
que” 05�03�2011, available at http://www�monde-diplomatique�es/?url=edito-
rial/0000856412872168186811102294251000/editorial/?articulo=8ca803e0- 
5eba-4c95-908f-64a36ee042fd, accessed 20 January 2016�
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1.2 Consequences
The consequences of the Arab Spring movements and revolts have been many and 
of a very different nature� The governments that have collapsed or been brought 
down had a model which was similar to the Soviet style countries, with a single 
party that was maintained by powerful security structures� The Arab monarchies 
have stood better than other systems in the area (Jordan, Morocco and the Persian 
Gulf); perhaps they guessed that establishing changes, even small changes with 
almost no repercussions, would be an important step for avoiding popular revolts� 
Another important consequence is the need for the United States to change their 
foreign politics in the Middle East, and the map secretly drawn by the UK and 
France during the First World War is apparently disappearing�4 The deep social 
and political transformations in the Arab world, the emergence of the general 
populace as an important political actor, the simultaneous demands placed on the 
authorities for accountability; and the increasing public debates about these Arab 
societies’ futures, which were exposed as the main consequences of the movement, 
have not been completely resolved�
Four years after the Arab Spring, we do not have many reasons for optimism� 
In Egypt, a general reduction of freedoms has taken place since el-Sisi arrived in 
power� The Muslim Brotherhood, the winning party in the legislative elections 
of 2011 and in the presidential elections of 2012, have been removed from power 
and banned, accused of being a terrorist group� An anti-protest law has been 
approved to prevent large demonstrations such as those in Tahrir Square� Also, 
various activists have been condemned to long prison sentences for questioning 
that law� The Social Affairs and Justice Ministry has given an ultimatum to all the 
associations registering under the very restrictive law of 84/2002, allowing the 
authorities to dissolve associations, block their funds and even put their leaders 
in prison, if they are a threat to national security�5
In the case of Syria and Iraq, we encounter two sectarian regimes trying to 
exploit religious heterogeneity to their own benefit� The civil conflict in both 
countries has caused many non-state groups to challenge the legitimate monopoly 
of the use of violence by the central power� Armed militia and jihadist groups have 
empowered themselves by taking control of significant areas of territory, which 
4 VVAA�, La Primavera Árabe y sus consecuencias, “Journal Alif ”, no� 98, 2011�
5 T� Cartalucci, 2011: Year of the dupe 2011, Land Destroyer Report, available at http://
landdestroyer�blogspot�com/2011/12/2011-year-of-dupe�html, accessed 1 December 
2015�
Juan Manuel Goig Martínez and María Acracia Núñez Martínez264
in some regions implied a retrograde interpretation of Islamic law or Sharia and, 
in some cases, the persecution of religious minorities�
Yemen and Libya, where the former leaders were kicked out of power, have 
now embarked on a dangerous “journey to nowhere” as a result of the central 
power’s breaking down� 
Faced with the social changes in the North of Africa and the Middle East, several 
analysts have defended the birth of a new “democratization wave�” However, we 
cannot refer to it as a “democratization wave”, but we should rather describe them 
as a “wave of political change”, within a certain region, with very different effects 
depending on the nature of the Arab regimes� Of all the democratic transitions, 
which were opened in 2011, the only democratic regime has been established in 
Tunisia�6 Other Arab countries have undertaken political liberalization processes, 
which have not caused substantial changes in the authoritarian nature of power�7
In Tunisia, the democratic transition continues forward, in spite of the political 
clashes, the social gaps, the economic crisis, the regional instability and the terror-
ist threat� However, it may end up being unviable if the current regional situation 
carries on, not only because of the jihadist threat inside and outside its borders but 
also because their history has proven the structural dependence of Arab societies 
on each other�
Will the societies, in which this movement was born, fight for their citizenship, 
for viable civil societies, for democratic and transparent political institutions? It is 
unlikely that social movements can survive if local institutions and social groups 
are not flexible� Democratic development depends on the consolidation of a mid-
dle class – a social class generally not present in the region, with the exception of 
Turkey�8 A strong, independent civil society is vital, as democratization processes 
depend on it�
Another important consequence is the deepening schism between the two 
branches of Islam, which has led to alarming levels of sectarian violence� And, cer-
tainly, the most important reason has been the increase of regional instability after 
the beginning of the struggle for power in the majority of the affected countries�
The irruption of the Islamic State (IS) means a new destabilizing factor� The 
above-mentioned group, which controls several Syrian and Iraqi provinces and 
6 P� Morillas, Lo que queda de la primavera árabe, cuatro años después, “Política Exterior” 
no� 163, 2015�
7 VVAA�, Escenarios post-Primavera Árabe: actores y dinámicas de cambio, “Journal 
CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals”, no� 109, 2015�
8 B�S� Turner, La ciudadanía árabe: la Primavera Árabe y sus consecuencias no intencio-
nales, “Sociología Histórica” no� 1, 2012�
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governs over millions of people, is trying to restore an Islamic caliphate� Their 
practices include flagellations, amputations, crucifixions, torture and summary 
executions, and they are not only applied to their enemies, but also to those who 
drink alcohol, commit adultery or steal� The Islamic State has brought into the 
spotlight the treatment of minorities, together with deportations of Christians and 
the elimination of the Yazidis, including Muslims themselves, as they call Shia 
apostates, and of all those who dare to question their fanatical interpretation of 
Islam� In this respect, it is worth remembering that massacres have been perpe-
trated in recent months between various Sunni groups that rose against them and 
various ulemas who refused to swear obedience were executed�
The Arabic Spring has been analyzed from a Western perspective as an attempt 
to embrace freedoms and democracy by the people, but we cannot really deny that 
the power vacuum left in many countries has helped terrorist groups to operate 
with total impunity� Salafist networks occupy an important place among them� 
A considerable part of the rebels believe that fighting is a part of Jihad� As such, 
the Arab Spring has turned into a race between radicals and kleptocratic govern-
ments trying to organize themselves, when they are not yet prepared to govern 
under the norms of political reasoning, very different from religious thinking� 
The consequences of the problems in the power structures have strengthened the 
loyalists of Al Qaeda, and other diverse groups are also in search of the imposi-
tion of Sharia law�
2.  The Development of Fundamentalist Movements.  
Islamic State Jihadism
In June 2014, on the first day of Ramadan, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi proclaimed him-
self in front of the world the Islamic State’s (IS) caliph, also known by its acronym 
in Arabic as Daesh� And as such, since his very first public appearance in the Iraqi 
city of Mosul, al Baghdadi has called Muslims to follow his postulates� The politi-
cal entity that is the IS, is first and foremost, a war machine, and wants to revive 
the religious and spiritual leadership of the Umma, the Muslim community of 
believers, by recovering the caliphate, the symbolic institution extinct since 1924� 
In the 21st century, the institution of the caliphate irrupts again, claiming to be a 
source of legitimacy for the IS, to support its dark plans of conquest and terror�9
9 Ataturk provided the “coup de grace” to the Ottoman Empire, and allowed its seculari-
zation and modernization getting rid of its political and religious leader, the Caliph�
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2.1 The Caliphate: origins and development.
The subject of the Caliphate goes all the way back through Muslim history, oc-
cupying a central role in debates about the organization of Islamic power�10
The Caliphate was born to solve a specific political problem, the power vacuum 
left after the prophet’s death� The continuity of the “Mohammedian” project was at 
stake, and with it, the birth of Islam, still at an embryonic stage, hence the election 
of the “successor” in the immediate aftermath of the prophet’s death� In the religious 
hierarchy, the caliph is the “supreme guide” in charge of protecting and spreading 
the divine message, the first officiant of the collective prayer, and the guardian of the 
religion and holy places� In the political sphere, he manages the empire’s adminis-
tration and names his subordinates and representatives in the different provinces; 
he is in charge of providing justice, manages taxation and is the supreme chief of 
the armed forces� Since the beginning of the Institution, the Caliphate has been an 
ideal concept, adapted in different moments and circumstances� The restitution of 
the Caliphate has taken place in heterogeneous situations throughout history� The 
source of all legitimate power in Islam, as the “successor” of Mohammed, the caliph 
represents the umma, from which the importance of its symbolism derives� It is 
therefore in the Islamic State’s interest to carry through its reinstitution�11
2.2 The Caliphate: organization and division of power
The term “caliphate” was originally used by Mohammed’s disciples to continue 
with the religious system established by the prophet, known as the Rashidun’s 
Caliphates� A “caliphate” is also a state implementing this type of political system�
The Caliph’s power is similar to the Roman kings’ power, which concentrated 
all authority in a single person: the king is the religious, political, military leader, 
justice administrator and interpreter of the divine will� The Caliph is the high-
est spiritual leader� The Sultan is the leader of the armed forces, he is in charge 
of war and financial matters� The Emir is responsible for the administration of 
justice� The chamberlains have the same functions as the sultans and emirs; they 
are equivalent to other countries’ prime ministers� Visirs maintain control of 
their territory inside the Caliphate by force� They were instituted by the Caliphate 
to avoid further disagreement� The visir’s limits in his territory are determined 
10 In his Prolegomena, a historian and sociologist Ibn Jaldun (1332–1406) highlights the 
Caliph’s double role, political and religious, as the prophet’s successor�
11 D� Alvarado, El Estado Islámico y la reinvención del califato, “El Universal”19�04�2015, 
available at http://www�eluniversal�com/opinion/150419/el-estado-islamico-y-la-rein-
vencion-del-califato, accessed 20 January 2016�
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according to his military strength� The visir’s powers are delegated partially or 
entirely by the sultan�12
Regarding the central Muslim administration, the divan (group of secretaries) 
work in territories� They are classified in two branches: “the quill group” and “the 
sword group�” The divan is presided over by the visir or hachiv� The Muslim system 
has two different bases: donations and tribute� Donations are divided in two groups: 
one of them is aimed at charity and the other one is for social aims� The tribute 
comes from conquered regions� The Azaque taxes annually income and goods and 
the percentage is calculated according to what is taxed� The mucus taxes foreign 
goods at 10%� Any other tribute imposed by the prince, not having a Quranic base, 
is illegal� The Muslim treasury is backed up by the prince’s personal fortune, and the 
prince is the one who pays the principality’s administrative expenses�
In terms of juridical Islamic organization, the juridical power was given by 
God to Mohammed and by Him to the Caliph, which is then delegated by a judge, 
known as a cadi� There are two instances and two competences for each part of the 
law� There are civil judges, called cadi, and penal and religious ones, known as za-
baxorta, lastly those of the court of appeal that had executive functions� The judges 
were assisted by a caliph and assessed by two witnesses whose honorability was 
guaranteed by the mozaqui� After that they were named official witnesses� Each 
judge had a hachiv who carried out the procedures and was paid by the litigants�
The way to adapt Muslim law to the present world, and also link their leaders to 
those under their command, is based on the custom, conventions, juridical strata-
gem, fiction and the prince’s legislation� The Conventions’ goal is to modify the 
original pact� The legal strategy and the narrative are created, so that the Muslim 
does not disobey the law nor violate Allah’s precepts� The prince is not allowed 
to legislate or to create tributes� However, the law acknowledges that, without the 
measures imposed by him, the state would be ungovernable and the prince would 
not fulfill his mission� For this reason, in parallel to the religious nizam, there is a 
derivative of the King called ganoan, who establishes a type of counterweight to 
religious rule�
2.3 The Islamic State (IS). Development and Ideology 
The Islamic State is a terrorist, rebel group of jihadist Sunni nature, a self-pro-
claimed caliphate, settled on a broad territory� Technically, the group is organized 
12 M� Gaudefroy-Demombynes, El califato musulman, “Revista de Administración Pública”, 
no� 6, 1951�
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as a non-recognized state,13 declaring the intention to create a caliphate that would 
extend throughout the whole Muslim world� Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is designat-
ed as its highest authority, the self-proclaimed “Ibrahim, iman and caliph of all 
Muslims�”14
With this intention, the group was renamed Islamic State, in response to their 
desire for expansion: “the legality of all emirates, groups, states and organiza-
tions is rendered null and void after the expansion of the Caliph’s authority and 
the arrival of his troops�” In practice, they call themselves a caliphate following 
the model of the former Islamic kingdoms, but it is a terrorist group which has 
managed to capture territory and establish a prototype of a de facto state�15 Just 
like many other jihadist groups, IS is a radical, Salafist group�16
Salafism is a Sharia (Islamic law) school, derived from Wahabism� The Salaph 
were the first three generations of Muslim believers – under the Rashidun cali-
phate, and according to them it was the ideal Islamic State, pure in its composition� 
The most radical Salafists want to impose that idealized order on every Muslim�17 
Its main characteristic is to be a plebeian mass rejecting the traditional Islamic 
elite, because they believe it is corrupted� This means that religious interpretation 
13 Originally known as the Organization for monotheism and jihad, it was born as a ter-
rorist organization, close to Al Qaeda, to face the Invasion of Iraq (2003)� It was led 
by Abu Musab al Zarqaui� After his death, the new leader, Rashid al-Baghdadi, under 
the tutelage of Osama bin Laden, expanded through those governing Ambar province, 
Nínive, Kirkuk and a big part of Saladino, and also, but in a smaller measure through 
Babilone, Diala and Baghdad� During that time, it was proclaimed the Islamic State of 
Iraq, and its headquarters were in the city of Baquba� The Islamic State renewed dur-
ing the Syrian Civil War becoming the Islamic State of Iraq and the East or their Arab 
acronym Daesh or Daech� Their following and current leader, Bakr al-Baghdadi, cut 
relations with Al Qaeda and declared in 2014, their Independence and their sovereignty 
over Iraq and Syria, proclaiming himself Caliph under the name of Ibrahim�
14 Historically, we can recognize four previous periods in the development of the current 
Islamic State: Islamic militia: Ŷamaʕat al-Tawhīdwal-Ŷihād ( since it was born until 
2003); Direct dependence on Al Qaeda: Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn 
(2003–2006); Indirect dependence on Al Qaeda: Islamic State of Irak (2006–2013); 
Syrian Civil War and independence from Al Qaeda: the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
East (2013–2014)�
15 P� Cockburn, Isis. El retorno de la yihad, Planeta, Madrid 2015�
16 F� Soní, ¿Es ISIS realmente un Estado?, 15�10�2015, available at http://revistafal�com/
es-isis-realmente-un-estado/, accessed 20 January 2016�
17 F� Aznar, Doctrina y acción política. Pugnas sobre el islam verdadero. El salafismo, in: 
Yihadismo en el mundo actual, Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa, Ministerio de 
Defensa no� 62, 2014, pp� 17–42�
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would not be in the hands of ulemas and Sharia experts, but in those of the fighters 
themselves, which means that, due to their ignorance in Islamic law (Fiqh), their 
interpretation of the Quran and Sharia is based exclusively in these texts and in 
the Sunnah (the verbally transmitted teachings of the prophet), which makes it 
possible for them to be radically textualist� The Salafists make accusations of apos-
tasy and heresy (takfir) against other Muslims (mainly Shias), which, in turn, are 
used to justify their attacks and atrocities committed against the Salafists� In this 
way, IS justifies attacks against anyone who is not loyal to the Caliph�18 Salafism 
is opposed to nationalism because the imagined community they feel a part of is 
the umma (the community of all Muslim believers) and even if conventional Islam 
does not see any contradiction between nation and umma, it is not compatible 
for them� Nationalism in the Middle East has been secular�19
The name jihadist describes those who, feeling to be at the vanguard of Islam, 
pronounce themselves in favor of armed struggle, instead of religious preach-
ing� Jihadism is a Western neologism used to name the most violent and radical 
branches of political Islam, characterized by the frequent and brutal use of ter-
rorism, in the name of a supposed jihad, called by its followers a “holy war” in the 
name of Allah�20 Jihad, as a basic concept of Islam, is a debated question� It has two 
accepted definitions: the “lesser jihad” of violent inspiration, where the jihadist 
tries to legitimize himself, and the “greater jihad” of spiritual interpretation, repre-
senting the effort that every believer needs to make to be a better Muslim, a better 
father, mother, spouse or person� Ideologically, jihadism as a political doctrine is a 
theoretical and totalitarian group of ideas with an anti-liberal and anti-democratic 
viewpoint which, according to its critics, “systematically disregards human life�” 
That is the reason why it is considered by many as one of the most serious threats 
faced by liberal democracies, particularly in Western countries�
Jihadism as a derivation of Salafism is a heterogeneous phenomena in which 
diverse interpretations about how to return to Islam’s origins coexist� All these 
doctrinal principles agree on restoring the grandeur of Islam, re-Islamizing Mus-
lim societies to the most strict orthodoxy and the aspiration of creating political 
structures looking out for and promoting the achievement of these principles� The 
18 B� Rougier, Qu’est-ce que le salafisme?, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2008� 
19 Atatürk in Turkey, Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Hafez al Assad in Syria and Mohamed 
Reza Pahlevi in Iran, all tried to “de-islamize” their societies and remove the clergy’s 
power, and it caused a clerical and conservative reaction, like the Salafism promoted 
from Saudi Arabia against the Arab republics� 
20 S� Amghar, Le salafisme en Europe: la mouvance polymorphe d’une radicalisation, 
“Politique Étrangère”, no� 1, 2006�
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acting environment may only be regional but all the lines coincide in that they 
wish to achieve every the union of all Muslims and the will of extending Islam all 
over the planet� The priority given to each objective and the methods to be used 
to achieve these objectives, depend on the historical and political characteristics 
of each region, which define the differences between groups�21
Their objectives are generally gradual and, in the medium term, they involve 
the overthrow of governments ruled by moderate Muslims, that they consider 
apostates, impious and corrupt because they are half-hearted, hypocritical and 
friends of Western countries – these are most of the Muslim countries, Saudi 
Arabia included, which has been targeted by jihadists trying to overthrow its 
monarchy� They try to consolidate power in like-minded states since from the 
beginning their objective is expansion, and they intend to recover the Islamic 
territories “taken from them illegitimately,” and re-create a radical Islamic order 
over the whole world�
In recent times, the most radical doctrines aiming at the global jihad – whose 
priority is to fight against Western countries until death – have been consolidated� 
For the theorist of radical Islam, inviting those responsible for the new age of 
religious ignorance, or jahiliyyah, to be a part of Islam is unacceptable� The only 
way to rehabilitate Westerners is by killing them in such great numbers that their 
conversion and submission will be real and humble�22
Islamic terrorism has manipulated the concept of jihad with ideological fun-
damentalists affirming an international plot against Islam coming from the most 
powerful Western countries� Under this argument, the radical Islamists have ma-
nipulated jihad to the degree of translating it into a totalitarian ideology justify-
ing brutality and considering it an obligation of every Muslim to spread terror 
in Western countries, destabilize the governability of those states and weaken or 
destroy its liberal democracies�23
Politically, without forgetting the lack of separation between politics and reli-
gion, IS defends a theocratic system. Theocracy (from Greek θεός [theós], ‘god’ 
and κράτος [kratos], ‘power’, ‘government’) is a form of government in which 
governmental leaders coincide with the leaders of the dominating religion, so that 
21 G� Arístegui, La Yihad en España, La obsesión por reconquistar Al-Ándalus, La esfera 
de los libros, Madrid 2005�
22 M� R� Torres, El eco del terror. Ideología y propaganda en el terrorismo yihadista, Plaza 
& Valdés, Madrid 2009�
23 M� Espino, Yihadismo, una amenaza mundial que puede estar operando en México, 
Friends of Israel Initiative, No� 27 2015, available at http://www�friendsofisraelinitiative�
org/uploads/papers/pdf/FOI_Paper27�pdf, acceseed 20 January 2016�
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the governing politics are identical with, or much influenced by, the principles 
of the main religion�24 A theocracy [theokratian] confers power and authority 
to God, author of all the good things�25 The umma, or community, is the basic 
political unit of Islam� Its main mission is religious: the propagation of the divine 
message� However, to obtain this goal, it needs to organize itself from a political 
point of view�26 The political authority is inscribed in the same line, as the one in 
charge of supervising that the observance of sacred law provides the umma with 
the capacity of observing its divine mission� Sovereignty, therefore, does not reside 
in the political establishment nor in the religious one, but in the word of God 
himself, specified in the form of Sharia�27 But it is also a totalitarian theocracy�
In spite of the difficulty in establishing adequate terminology, autocracy can 
be defined by its opposition to democracy� Autocracy, if it is in a significant de-
gree, invades all the fields in the political and social life of a country, and its main 
characteristic is that of the concentration of power in a single person, an ethnic 
or religious group or in a “movement” or party, and the subsequent diminishment 
or annulation of the citizens’ freedoms� Considered from a legal establishment of 
rights, or should we say the lack or repression of these, we find ourselves in front 
of a totalitarian regime in which a person is not treated as an “end in itself but as 
a piece of a whole, an instrumental sable mean�”28
Totalitarianism or totalitarian regimes differ from other autocratic regimes in 
that they are led by a political party that claims to be – or, in practice, acts as – the 
only legitimate party having control over all state institutions�29 These regimes 
exalt, in general, the figure of a leader who has an unlimited power, reaching 
into every aspect of society and manifesting itself through its authority exercised 
hierarchically� They drive a mass movement in which the intention is to remake 
the whole society (with the purpose of forming a new person in a perfect society) 
24 Wikipedia, available at https://es�wikipedia�org, accessed 20 January 2016�
25 F� Josefo, Antigüedades y guerras de los judíos, Editorial Luarna, Madrid 2012�
26 M� Ayoob, Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, 
University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2009�
27 P� Crone, M� Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986�
28 A� Torres Del Moral, Estado de Derecho y Democracia de partidos, SPUCM, Madrid 
2010, p� 288�
29 J�J� Linz, Sistemas totalitarios y regímenes autoritarios, Centro de Estudios Públicos y 
Constitucionales, Madrid 1977�
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and they make intense use of propaganda and other means of social control and 
repressive mechanisms like the secret police�30
Totalitarianism is a form of State, a way of organizing the four components 
of the State itself: territory, population, government, power, and, according to 
the author, also the law and the judicial system� Totalitarianism is not simply a 
type of government, it is an organization around the people in power, a type of 
non-democratic state� Authoritarianism has as its main characteristic the lack of 
acknowledgement of freedom and human rights� However, the difference between 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism is that, in the former, is characterized by a 
privation of freedom and individual rights, non-recognition of the human beings’ 
dignity, and turning the social classes into masses�31
Totalitarianism considers the state as an end in itself, and therefore seeks to 
maximize it� Given that power exists for other things to be achieved, it follows that, 
if the State is considered an end, these two components of politics are correlative; 
as a consequence, a larger state gives us more power� In this way, the power of the 
totalitarian state can do everything because it is an end in itself, which contains 
everything� Mussolini (who used for the first time the term “totalitarianism”) cre-
ated the slogan “everything in the State, everything for the State, nothing outside 
the State, nothing against the State�” It is not the state for people, but the people 
for the state�
In its political aspect, totalitarianism implies political monism because all the 
power structure turns around political power, concentrated generally in a single 
leader who absorbs all the political powers and denies those who oppose him or 
are independent� Unlike in democratic states, where political power is just one of 
the powers, which in a hierarchy is on top of social power, in totalitarianism that 
hierarchy does not exist because there is only one power, a total political power� A 
primary characteristic of the state is the exaltation of an omnipotent or totalitarian 
state, bringing respect for the leaders almost to a level of “a cult of personality�”
In the sociological aspect, totalitarianism defends the sociological monism, 
because its ideology rejects the concept of person as an free-will possessing indi-
vidual in favor of another concept in which subjectivity is reduced to the status 
of a part of society� In light of this conception, human being is human precisely 
insofar as he/she is a member of society, and not an individual�
30 G� Hermet, Totalitarismos, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico 1981�
31 R� Aron, Democracia y totalitarismo, Seix Barral, Madrid 1968�
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2.4 The Islamic State as a State?32
The State has resisted a clear definition� Its complexity determines that, in the at-
tempt to define it, it is necessary to turn not only to legal aspects but also to historical 
and ideological events, and to the way power is executed� The global jihadist project 
is inspired by the desire of driving the Muslim world to a new wave of progress and 
expansion at all levels: political, economic, cultural, religious, etc� These aspirations 
lead to a double and essential purpose: to unify the whole Islamic community and its 
territories under a single flag, and to install a new caliphate supported by the strict 
principles of the Salafist ideology� At the same time, achieving these goals would 
require previous completion of three other long-term objectives:33
‪  To reduce or eliminate the influences of non-believing governments over the 
Muslim world, particularly those influenced by Western nations but not only� 
‪  To bring down the present apostate governments established in Muslim coun-
tries and replace their political institutions of Western inspiration by theocratic 
regimes, ordered according to the jihadist Salafist interpretation of Islamic law 
or Sharia�
‪  Re-conquer the territories that were a part of the Islamic world� This would 
include, naturally, Palestine and Israel, wide regions of Spain and Portugal, the 
Balkans, the Mediterranean islands, Greece and the south of Italy�
The caliphate does not accept other political or administrative frontiers than those 
imposed by the sharia� If, according to Torres del Moral,34 the state is the insti-
tutional organization of a national community with a sovereign political power, 
can we consider the model established by the IS as a state? Given that its goal is 
to build a new state, it seems reasonable to question how closely the caliphate is 
being built into a State� A state needs to be a sovereign political institution with an 
administrative and legal frame maintaining the legitimate monopoly on violence 
inside its territory in order to maintain the established order�35
In the long term, once the conflict is stabilized, it would be possible to analyze 
if the caliphate is a sovereign or not, if sovereignty is understood as the capacity 
of a State to act in the international system in a relatively autonomous way� The 
32 F� Soní, ¿Es ISIS realmente…op�cit�
33 L� De la Corte, Yihadismo global: una visión panorámica, in Yihadismo en el mundo 
actual, Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa, no� 62, 2014, p� 49�
34 A� Torres Del Moral, Estado de Derecho y Democracia de partidos, SPUCM, Madrid 
2010, p� 288�
35 M� Weber, Economía y sociedad. Esbozo de sociología comprensiva, FCE, Mexico 1964�
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limits of sovereignty are the acting capacities of other states� Therefore, the most 
powerful states are also the most sovereign ones, but even the weakest state keeps 
some capacity to act in an autonomous way to define its internal politics� The IS, 
however, is acting as if it were a de facto sovereign state, with no fear of contra-
vening international laws or human rights, which implies that at least its internal 
politics is defined in a completely “sovereign” way�
The first condition to establish a state is the monopoly of force� In the first in-
stance, it is not necessary that it is legitimate, as eventually legitimacy is obtained 
by virtue of the interest of whoever monopolizes the use of the force, benefitting 
out of it in the long-term within its territory, and promoting in this way the es-
tablishment of order in the territory that increases economic growth� One could 
expect that, by monopolizing the use of violence, the IS, n by means of peace and 
economic benefits, would build an administrative system allowing it to raise taxes 
and become legitimate in the eyes of the population�
To monopolize the use of violence and to take measures to institutionalize it, 
the group establishes its Islamic courts according to Sharia and organizes jihadists 
to carry out the work of the police� What is more, it establishes a secret police to 
control the population in a more efficient way� However, the radical application of 
Sharia – which imposes punishment such as mutilation, executions, crucifixions 
and slavery – could cost them legitimacy� In spite of the price of their atrocities, it 
should not be forgotten that these methods have facilitated the conquest of many 
cities, such as Mosul, where the Iraqi army ran away instead of facing this jihadist 
group, which executes its prisoners on a daily basis�
Islamic State combines both charismatic and traditional domination� Regard-
ing traditional domination, the IS bases the control of the conquered territories in 
pacts with the local tribes, promising in exchange economic benefits depending 
on the resources which it controls (water and petrol) and organizing the ad-
ministration according to Sharia� It searches for legitimacy by means of populist 
measures, such as the redistribution of wealth, the sharing out of food and petrol 
and the prosecution of commercial abuse�
The survival of this de facto State is yet to be seen, both because of the warring 
situation and the adaptations they would have to make to a government structure 
which is based on 7th century laws, the share of the power and the resources with 
their tribal allies and the tensions between Iraqis and foreign fighters whose in-
terests are divergent� These adaptations will provoke tensions in the Salafist move-
ment, because of the possible “deviation of a radical Salafism when re-interpreting 
Sharia to make it applicable to a functional state�”
In an attempt to conceptualize the state phenomena, we speak of a state when 
a certain population, living permanently in a delimited territory, is subjected to a 
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group of rules and concrete institutions� Analyzing the previous attempt of defi-
nition, the existence of various elements or compounds of the state phenomena 
can be obtained� The three elements we have highlighted in the State, and without 
which the State would not exist, are: people, territory and power� 
However, it needs to be considered that the State is not a simple arithmetical ad-
dition of these three elements, but that they reach a determined interaction when 
connected with each other, creating a unit that cannot be considered separately and 
this is what, in particular, gives sense to the State concept�36 Heller refers to the State 
as a domination unit, independent in its internal and external matters, which acts 
in a continuous way, having its own means of power, and clearly delimitated�37 In 
this way, as Heller indicates when analyzing these elements of the State, we must 
not forget in any case that it acquires full activity and reality only in its reciprocal 
interrelation� The previous affirmation does not mean that these three elements 
cannot exist separately, creating certain situations, but that these situations do not 
determine the existence of a State� That is the reason why the State elements must 
not be mistaken by the State� That is the reason why the State’s elements should not 
be mistaken for the State itself�
In general terms, power is the capacity of a person or a group to impose his will 
and decisions within a certain community� In this first approach to the term, we 
can highlight several substantial aspects which we consider necessary for its execu-
tion� In the first place, it is worth highlighting the capacity and strength to execute 
a certain will or decision and, in the second place, we should point to the target 
group’s acceptance to obey what is ordered� But power – political power – needs the 
legitimation of its acts, and this legitimation, in today’s democratic societies, cannot 
be anything other than the “Rational” legitimation, which means the existence of a 
series of rules which are accepted by the community, and according to which power 
is executed� It is therefore a society that has its base in the law, and the law canalizes 
the relationship between leaders and those who are governed� Thus, it implies a 
high degree of institutionalization of power� Faced with this legitimation, traditional 
legitimation is based on the respect and the trust that the community has in its 
ancestral customs and habits, which determine the adequate execution of power�
Faced with these forms of legitimacy, we find “charismatic” legitimation, 
whose base is in the special characteristics of those who execute power� Those 
who hold power need to have a certain personal and prestigious conditions 
36 C� Núñez, J�M� Goig, M� A� Núñez, Teoría del Estado Constitucional, Editorial Univer-
sitas, Madrid 2010, p� 18�
37 H� Heller, Teoría del Estado, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico 1955� 
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which differentiate them from the rest of the community members, such as re-
ligious values, ethical values, etc� It has an autocratic nature and it corresponds 
to the historical phase of the personal, not institutionalized power� It is typical 
of underdeveloped countries and autocratic regimes and dictatorships, and it 
is in this environment that we would place the legitimacy the IS finds in the 
execution of the power, which is acquired through force�
In traditional Islam, the concept of state, government and, in general, the public 
is rigorously theoretical� After fourteen centuries of existence, this has generated 
hundreds of sects and excisions� Although the belief that sovereignty belongs to 
God, and not to the people, is not exclusive of this religious practice, and in a 
historical phase many cultures have based their political systems in the divine 
right, only in the Islam (the meaning of this word is “surrender”, “submission”) 
this school of thought has been kept until today�
The consequences for Muslim societies, particularly in the present, of the theo-
cratic dogma, have been a complete disaster� Due to the fact that sovereignty 
belongs exclusively to God, the adverse effects multiply themselves: if the leader 
is the Creator’s direct agent, he is exempted from accountability for his actions 
over the governed� Only God can judge its public administration� This argument 
has served historically to justify the autocratic regimes, and in the specific case 
of the Islamic State it is still working to reject the democratic system and accuses 
it of being against divine sovereignty� At this moment in time, Islamic revivalists 
of the 21st century, conservatives and revolutionaries are reclaiming the divine 
sovereignty’s dogma to justify autocracies� What is more, they add that this dogma 
is an inalienable part of the so-called “Islamic identity�”
The IS does no defend a Muslim state, but an Islamic state: a state not defined 
by the fact that those in power confess to being Muslims, but because the whole 
system is structured on the basis of real Islamic law� The absolute sovereignty has 
its roots in Allah (al-hakimiyya) and therefore humans can only apply this sacred 
law which is superior and fairer than any other system created by humanity in the 
human history� There will be three pillars in the new Islamic State: the priority of 
religion in all aspects of life (din), the superiority of the community of believers 
over the differences of race, skin color or social condition (umma), and the absolute 
submission to Allah, as any power is executed by the people only insofar as they 
participate in the divine revelation (hukm)�38
38 J� Cepelledo, Modelos de organización política de la umma en la historia del pensamiento 
islámico, “Cuadernos electrónicos de Filosofia del Derecho” no� 22, 2011�
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3. Jihadi Consequences on the International Order
The IS has come to stay� It has the organization, the strength and the support 
needed to go on with its activity for a long time� It has a territorial base to start 
working and building its goals� The proclaimed Islamic Caliphate controls the 
territory, the roads, the economy, the society and has enough popular support to 
consolidate its power� Unlike other terrorist groups that Western countries have 
fought against recently, the IS has decided to unite the Muslim world under a 
single flag, though through its methods it has no morality in the eyes of humanity, 
anything goes which follows Islamic laws, or at least their interpretation of them� 
Their fundamentalism makes them unique�
This has some unexpected consequences, which, in turn, may lead to unknown 
outcomes� The consequences can be found on different levels: economic conse-
quences, political – not merely within its territory but everywhere, in internal and 
external security, and in the field of human rights – and regional and international 
consequences�39 IS terrorist consequences reach the whole planet and this reflects 
the need for a holistic response from every state’s powers and a solid and properly 
built international cooperation faced with a “shared” threat� This fight cannot only 
focus on repressive action, since the international community is facing a terror-
ism with new features that requires fast and effective response� The fight against 
violent fundamentalism still holds a key role in any effective response strategy� 
It is essential to develop wide fighting strategies against violent extremism at an 
international level, to fight radicalization� The foreign terrorist fighters present an 
important threat to peace and security� The jihadist flow to conflict zones has been 
widely expanded� But the worry is not only how it feeds the international lack of 
stability� The greatest fear in the long term is that they can return to their countries 
of origin trained and with orders to attack� To break this cycle, the members of the 
United Nations Security Council urged to reinforce the international cooperation 
to identify them, chase them and to adopt measures to prevent radicalization�
The Security Council adopted, as promoted by the United States of America, 
a resolution that established a legal framework to respond to the growing threat 
posed by foreign terrorist fighters� But, despite the adopted measures, the flow of 
terrorists continues and that is why some new measures need to be adopted to 
stop a phenomenon that knows no borders�
39 I� Fernández-Molina, Islamismo y Relaciones Internacionales, in: Actas de las I Jornadas 
de Estudios de Seguridad de la Comunidad de Estudios de Seguridad, UNED, Madrid 
2009�
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The Resolution 2178 (2014) is another piece in the fight against jihadism, 
and requires all Member States to prevent entry or transit through their territo-
ries of any individual about whom that State had credible information of their 
terrorist-related intentions� It also urges the exchange of information about ter-
rorist suspect lists or criminal investigations� As recently stated by the United 
Nations (S/2015/358), there is no single, simple solution to this multifaceted 
problem� Disrupting the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and the threat that they 
pose presents an unprecedented challenge and will involve significant expense 
for Member States� Preventing radicalization in the first place and successfully 
screening, monitoring or rehabilitating returnees are at the heart of an effective 
global response� So too is the immediate need to improve analytical understand-
ing of the problem and operational information and intelligence sharing within 
national Governments and between the Member States; in particular, by taking 
further steps to share watch list information on individuals of interest� Privacy, 
data protection and sensitivity of information concerns complicate this vital pri-
ority� The full implementation of preventive measures under Security Council 
resolution 2178 (2014) would be a major step forward� Intensified efforts with 
regard to prevention and returnee policies, including further work in relation to 
the Internet and social media, are crucial� 
4. Europe Faced with Jihadist Terrorism
The attacks to the United States on September 11th, 2001, exposed the gravity 
and the seriousness of the jihadist threat to the Western world’s collective sub-
conscious� Since then, the European Union member states have tried to offer a 
coherent and collective response in the face of this transnational threat to thus 
guarantee the security of its citizens�
These efforts were reflected in theEuropean Security Strategy, approved in 
2003, and in the European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2005� 
Overall, these documents have articulated the general strands of the European 
Union’s response against a jihadist threat that, since its appearance on the interna-
tional scene with the attacks of 2001, has been clearly determined by the actions 
of a specific organization: Al Qaeda�
Faced with the new situation caused by the emergence of IS, or ISIS in cur-
rent British usage, the EU has reacted formulating two interrelated strategies: the 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular focus on foreign 
fighters, and the regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Daesh threat�
Although the Lisbon Treaty, approved in 2007, does not directly make signifi-
cant changes to resources nor to the existing general lines of the strategy against 
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jihadism, many of its regulations open the door to potential improvements in the 
capacities and possibilities of action against jihadism abroad:40
•	  By conferring a specific legal personality on the Union through article 47, it 
is allowed that, from now on, the EU can sign international agreements about 
terrorism with other countries�
•	  The treaty contemplates, through article 43, that the EU may carry on civil 
and military missions to support third countries in the fight against terrorism�
•	  The introduction of the mutual defense clause, article 42�7 TEU, and of the 
solidarity clause, article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, leave the door open so that the EU can mobilize all the necessary 
instruments, including military resources, to respond to a potential terrorist 
attack�
After the jihadist attacks in Spain, London, Denmark and France, the countries 
that make up the European Union adopted the challenge of reinforcing their 
internal and external control mechanisms to avoid new terrorist actions� The 
terrorist threat has fostered “the political opportunity” to get measures off the 
ground that had been tucked away, for their possible violation of human rights, 
and that now are more likely to be launched� The Regional Strategy for Syria and 
Iraq and the Daesh’s threat, adopted by the Council on March 16th, 2015, has a 
twofold objective: countering the threat from Daesh and other terrorist groups 
in order to get regional and international stability, and creating the conditions to 
achieve an inclusive political transition in Syria and sustainable stability in Syria, 
Iraq and the wider region� One of the aspects that the International Community 
and groups concerned with International Human Rights law have been most con-
cerned with is the use by the United States of restrictive human rights measures 
under the protection of the security against terrorism�
The legislative reforms in matters of terrorism adopted by different countries 
have followed common guidelines: extended pre-charge detention time, judicial 
reorganization processes, with amendments to the appeal system and the pres-
entation of evidence, reduction of secret telephone and cybernetic communica-
tions, even allowing the interception of telephone communications without a 
warrant, or admitting “preventive interception�” Secret service and police powers 
have also been expanded to fight against terrorism, facilitating the exchange of 
40 F� Ruiz, La estrategia de la UE contra el yihadismo en tiempos de ISIS, Instituto Español 
de Estudios Estratégicos, no� 17, 2005�
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information between different agencies, and the access to certain personal data 
without a court order�
This set of actions has resulted in the reinforcement of the State, with the con-
sequent emergence of murky areas, where the fundamental rights and freedoms 
result, in some aspects, more fragile and precarious than in the past, offering 
weak protection to individuals against the pressure applied by terrorism,41 and 
such regulations may collide with the international standards that regulate the 
restrictions of rights, according to which, every measure to repeal, suspension or 
restriction of civil rights and freedoms must strictly accomplish certain require-
ments: that the rules are accessible, foreseeable and precise; that the restriction 
on rights is justified; that the restriction is necessary in a democratic society; that 
it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons that motivate it; 
and that it is not discriminatory�
Security and the fight against terrorism are interests shared by all the European 
Union member states,42 as well as respect for human rights and democracy� As a 
result of the Arab Spring, a massive migration toward Europe, mainly by sea, took 
place from the countries involved, becoming the largest migrant wave known in 
Europe� In response to the situation, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
was reviewed, with the establishment of new elements, such as: 1�The so-called 
3 Ms: “markets, money and mobility;” 2� the “more for more” principle (advance 
more with the neighbors that progress more); 3� the principle of differentiation, 
to “adapt” the Neighborhood Policy to the context in each country�
The review of the European Union’s political strategies toward North African 
Mediterranean countries had proven the urge to support the strengthening of 
some very incipient democracies to guarantee sustainable economic growth, with-
out thereby having to renounce the strong frontier control to prevent the massive 
entrance of migrants� The European Union implemented the new external border 
surveillance system called Eurosur with the aim of improving the fight against 
irregular migration and organized crime, and at the same time, reinforced the 
frontier controls through Frontex, whose promotion and reform has been gradual 
and progressive�
41 M� Fernández, La amenaza terrorista en la unión europea: reacción legislativa común 
y estatal, “Revista Aequitas” no� 2, 2011, pp� 113–153�
42 A� Aixalá, La estrategia de la Unión Europea ante el terrorismo internacional y la de-
fensa de los Derechos y Libertades, in: Política exterior y Parlamento Europeo: hacia el 
equilibrio entre eficacia y democracia, M� Barbé, A� Herranz (eds�), 2007 available at 
http://www�recercat�cat/bitstream/handle/2072/204360/6%20cap%204�pdf?sequen-
ce=6, accessed 20 January 2016�
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4.1 Common European immigration and asylum policies
The EU has created a common asylum policy so that asylum-seekers rejected in 
a country cannot apply again in another Schengen country� This common policy 
was implemented with the Dublin Convention in 1990 and followed with the 
execution of the EURODAC system and the Dublin II Regulation IN 2003 and 
nowadays is still in use� In October 2009 two European Commission propos-
als were adopted, to provide for a single asylum procedure and the equity of 
a uniform status, valid throughout the European Union: the parts for the final 
construction of a for international protection� The Stockholm Programme, adopted 
by the European Council in December 2009, establishes the EU measures and 
priorities regarding international protection between 2010 and 2014� 
With its adoption in June 2013, the European Union recast asylum procedure; 
the Member States will begin the process for the modification of national legisla-
tion so that it reflects the agreed changes� The EU, through a long and difficult 
process, has tried to face the migration policy as a European policy, establishing 
common elements to an array of regulation that has included many aspects: legal 
migration, irregular migration, asylum and refuge as well as integration policies� 
However, there is still a long way to go until the EU adopts a true common policy 
on the subject� Recently, terrorism and illegal migration are threatening one of 
the EU’s most important principles, free circulation, and for that reason we need 
to address the way to manage the security in our frontiers without damaging the 
rights and freedoms of the immigrants, and without betraying the European Un-
ion’s principles� Recent events may contribute to putting together the fight against 
terrorism, the European common foreign policy, especially toward the Middle 
East, border control, free circulation, the fight against irregular immigration and 
the integration in our societies of minorities from different cultures or religions�
In 2015, there was an increase of irregular immigration, boosted by different 
factors such as: the wave of conflicts in the Middle East (especially the problems 
in Libya and Syria); the demographic pressures in Africa; the increase in human 
trafficking as a result of the development of organized crime; the economic emi-
gration from the Balkans, and the EU’s own difficulties in managing in a consistent 
manner its frontiers� To all these factors we need to add the challenge of jihadist 
terrorism, that may require greater controls inside and outside our frontiers, and, 
above all the adequate management of the refugee claims in the EU’s territory�
Besides the defense and diplomacy principles, and an adequate asylum and 
refugee policy, it is necessary to strengthen European foreign policy, so that it 
develops a proper cooperation and development policy with our neighbors, a 
crucial element for an adequate migrant policy� However, the area in which the 
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EU must remain determined is regarding free circulation, to maintain the political 
and civil project developed over a long process, because free circulation of people 
is a fundamental right that assists the EU’s citizens according to the Treaties The 
Schengen agreement, as part of the EU’s judicial and institutional framework, has 
gradually expanded to include the majority of the member States and some non-
EU countries, and is expressed through the area of free movement, security and 
justice without internal frontiers� The suppression of internal frontiers implies a 
stronger management of the external frontiers of the Union as well as the regula-
tion of the entrance and residence of people from the non-EU countries through 
the use of measures like the common asylum and immigration policy�
The fourth dimension of the European project refers to its role as global actor 
in an international system characterized by fast and intense changes in its sur-
roundings, the source and the rules of the distribution of power� The State Mem-
bers, and the EU as such, would only manage to stay relevant and promote their 
interests and values abroad through a common foreign policy, and in particular 
through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Com-
mon Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)�
The global and integrated perspective for the Community Policy on Migration 
suggested by the EU, and formally supported by the governments of the State mem-
bers, is revealing itself as a declaration of principles� In fact, in recent years, the 
EU has demonstrated a total incapacity of developing a joint policy on migration, 
coherent and multidimensional: the migration management is still characterized 
by the outsourcing of Community frontiers, the fight against “uncontrollable” im-
migration, and the definition of different and discriminating legal status amongst 
the migrating community� This vision has shown itself to be more incomplete and 
one-sided each time, as well as insufficient and incorrect� The control of the EU’s 
borders at any price is leading to a lack of criteria of transparency, legality and hu-
manity, and to violations of the legality and human rights of migrants�43
The Opinion of the Committee of the Regions – “The efforts to promote genuine 
solidarity on a real European migration policy” (2015/C 019/12), of 21 January 2015, 
recalls that fifteen years after the first attempts to draw up a common migration 
policy, there is still a wide gap between practice and the principles and stated values� 
There has been insufficient recourse to Article 80 TFEU for adopting measures 
implementing solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility with regard to mobility, 
including its financial implications, between the Member States� Commitments 
43 E� Bazzaco, La Unión Europea frente a los procesos migratorios: lejos de una política 
integral, “Papeles” no� 104, 2008/2009�
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concerning mobility, migration and repatriation have been entirely voluntary, and 
considers that, in such a sensitive and strategic area, the European Union and its 
chief institutions should shape a genuine migration policy and assume the political 
responsibility for its implementation� This task should not be left up to individual 
states, particularly the border States�
The European Union migration policy regarding the control and management 
of migratory flow, can be looked at from multiple perspectives� Besides the eco-
nomic dimension, the defensive aspect states the need to secure frontiers from 
irregular migration in order to ensure both security and law and order� Also, the 
social aspect needs to be considered, acknowledging the immigrants’ rights and 
freedoms according to the Constitution, and the need to integrate immigrants 
through rights and obligations�44 The economic crisis and its social effects, as 
well as terrorism, are causing the implementation of more restrictive policies in 
the EU regarding asylum and migration, bringing into question the founding 
values of the Union and the Lisbon Treaty on the subject of Human Rights� The 
5th Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2013) from the Commission has 
expressed the need to take action at the EU level to support Member States tackle 
the challenges of responding to migratory pressures, in full respect of migrants’ 
fundamental rights�
Regarding the establishment of a Common Asylum Process, the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System (CEAS) has claimed to be a maximum priority for the EU� 
The CEAS intends to provide better access to the asylum procedure for those who 
seek protection; lead to fairer, quicker and better quality asylum decisions; ensure 
that people in fear of persecution will not be returned to danger; and provide 
dignified and decent conditions both for those who apply for asylum and those 
who are granted international protection within the EU� In an area of open borders 
and freedom of movement, the EU must apply a joint approach to asylum across 
the EU, since asylum is a fundamental right and granting it is an international 
obligation under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees�
New EU rules have finally been agreed, setting out common high standards 
and stronger cooperation procedures to ensure that asylum seekers are treated 
equally in an open and fair system — wherever they apply� This set of rules is 
integrated by several regulations: the revised Asylum Procedures Directive; the 
revised Reception Conditions Directive; the revised Qualification Directive; the 
revised Dublin Regulation, and the revised Eurodac Regulation� The modified 
44 A� Solanes, La política de inmigración en la Unión Europea. Desde tres claves, “Arbor” 
no� 713 (181), 2005�
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legislation has the potential to substantially contribute to harmonizing the asylum 
systems throughout the Union� If they are properly incorporated into national 
legislation and applied according to the principles governing the CEAS, the recast 
legislation could provide an adequate identification and qualification of people in 
need of international protection�
In 2015, more than half a million asylum-seekers arrived in Italy, Greece and 
Hungary by land and sea� There was, and there is, a consensus that the three states 
cannot face the economic, demographic and political challenge, since we are in 
what could be the worst moment of forced displacements since the Second World 
War� Action must be taken, but the EU has not been up to the task, it has been 
overwhelmed when dealing with refugees, and disagreements have arisen at the 
heart of the EU� Germany, Sweden, Spain, the host countries and France, are in 
favor of the distribution quotas and are accepting, or will accept, all the refugees 
requested by the EU� At the same time, however, Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia have blocked the development of an asylum policy according to 
European principles� International law says that every refugee – who is actually 
a refugee – that arrives to European territory has the right to be granted asylum� 
Nonetheless, the fragility of the asylum systems in the EU needs to be clarified�
The centrality of the refugee crisis is due to the fact that Europe’s foundational 
values are at stake� Either the EU is able to provide an effective and supportive 
response to the refugees’ arrival or it will not be what it always meant to be and 
what the rest of the world thinks it is: a civil and humanitarian power; a terri-
tory that was able to convert the most terrible violence amongst neighbors into 
a beautiful experiment in peace, where respect for human rights is a natural part 
of civic society� Recent events showed that the EU’s legislation on asylum has not 
been applied consistently throughout the Union to date� The divergent national 
legislations and asylum procedures question the global objective of granting equal 
and dignified life conditions to the refugees� Basic rights such as health, education 
or work are clearly under question� The limitations and restrictions imposed turn 
the asylum seekers into second-class citizens�
The current refugee and immigrant crisis can only be managed through a com-
mon EU emergency response� The individual measures taken by each country will 
not solve the problem and will worsen an already chaotic situation, increasing 
people’s suffering and the tension among states at a time when Europe needs more 
trust and solidarity� The restrictive measures recently adopted by some States, 
especially Hungary, and the way they are being implemented, extraordinarily 
limiting the refugees’ access through the border, including the use of dissuasive 
measures, would infringe the international law and European jurisprudence� At 
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the beginning, the EU played an important and brilliant role in the asylum and 
refugee crisis: Greece, despite its profound economic crisis has received the thou-
sands of people who have overflowed on its coasts and ports on a daily basis and 
Germany initially assumed an historic role in terms of solidarity� The two of them 
have joined Italy, who has taken on a fundamental role in the Mediterranean 
rescue process� The Commission and the Parliament also requested a European 
response, based on the European principles and values� However, recently, there 
has been a profound modification in EU policy regarding immigration and above 
all asylum and refuge�
The Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on 9 November 2015 estab-
lished the need to modify the registration process, ignoring the asylum seekers 
free choice (most of the refugees still prefer Germany or Sweden, States with 
a more generous reception program)� It also addressed relocation – States like 
Finland, Luxembourg, France or Spain have already received the first refugees, 
although at a very slow pace – and another key subject was border protection, 
laying bare the border control policy that defines the European migration policy� 
In that last point, it was agreed to reinforce Frontex, and the Commission even 
presented a proposal to create a border guard before the end of 2015� The Migra-
tion summit held in Malta on November 11th and 12th, 2015 has outlined as its 
final objective to limit the economic and security problems caused by the current 
migration flow� The Valletta summit has consummated the policy of border clo-
sures� The idea of how to help the refugees has been replaced with how to prevent 
new arrivals; the refugees’ security focus has also been replaced with ours; there 
has been a change from the protection of the right to life or the recognition of the 
right of asylum, to our right to have safe borders� It is not anymore about how to 
integrate the immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers, but how to send them back 
to their countries of origin�45
Instead of placing the foreign and development policies at the service of the 
European project, a new border policy is adopted, with a prevalence of security in 
general and in particular, the security of each European state� This tendency has 
increased since the jihadist attacks against France on November 13th� However, 
we understand that using walls and barriers is not the answer, and the use of scare 
tactics, putting the security and well-being of some in favor of the rights of others 
is also not the solution� Recent events have influenced again EU policy against 
45 J� I� Torreblanca, Cierre, “El País” 13�11�2013, available at http://elpais�com/el-
pais/2015/11/13/opinion/1447432847_417991�html, accessed 20 January 2016�
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terrorism� IS has exported to the heart of Europe the most inhuman methods to 
spread terror�
On Friday (November 13th), six attacks took place in Paris almost simultane-
ously: four shooting, a bomb attack near the Stade de France and a hostage-
taking at a concert hall� The IS claimed responsibility for the 130 deaths and 352 
wounded� France responded by declaring war, declaring a state of emergency 
and establishing strict border controls by security forces, and the suspension of 
the Schengen agreement� France’s initial response has been extended to the rest 
of the EU� The EU’s behavior should consider two facts� The first of them is to 
properly address the debate around Islam’s role in our societies� Islam is based on 
a series of ideological aspects of great significance: Islam’s incompatibility with 
democracy; Muslim integration; the role of religion in public places; identity; 
multiculturalism and the need to control the migration, asylum and refugee flow� 
The second fact lies in the need to combine resources to face jihadist terrorism, 
turning to the rule of law; security forces, intelligence services, court access, etc� 
without giving up on the proportionate use of force, according to the idea that 
democracies have the right to defend themselves from these kinds of acts� In the 
EU, the solidarity clause introduced by Article 222 of the TFEU, anticipates the 
competence to mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including military 
resources, in case of terrorist attack�
The Paris attacks follow the ones against the Charlie Hebdo magazine and a 
Jewish grocery store, also in French territory, and the Mali hotel hijack� They 
all expose that jihadist terrorism, especially from the IS, plays a significant role 
not only causing instability in Iraq and Syria, but it is also able to hit at the heart 
of Europe and, together with the territorial conquest – the goal of taking over 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia – the imposition of a tax system in the areas under its 
control, and the creation of new external operation units, all these aspects show 
its power and political organization�
Without reaching the complexity of the attack against the United States on 
September 11th, 2001, jihadism has used bombs again to target Europe, in this 
case Paris, but previously Toulouse and London, the biggest attacks since the ones 
in March 11th, 2004 in Madrid� The necessary conditions to face this problem are 
not to be carried away by outbursts that could mix up defense from jihadists with 
coexistence with Muslim communities, and not putting into question the basic 
freedoms that make the difference between Europe and its attackers�
Unrest in Africa and the Middle East has affected Europe in two ways: as an 
asylum and refugee crisis whose magnitude has never been seen before, and with 
an unprecedented terrorist threat, that requires an effective response� This response 
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has to face the mistakes in the current European policy, it has to provide asylum 
and refuge to those persecuted by the IS, and it has to improve the intelligence ser-
vices and the legal and police resources, without forgetting the diplomacy to force 
a negotiation, and harassing the IS with financial, military and supply measures�
The first consequence of the Paris attacks has been the creation of a support 
front for France, from Moscow, the USA and the EU, to French and Russian 
bombers attacking IS in Syria� The EU will provide France with military support 
to face the terrorist threat and have, on November 17th, activated the duty of mili-
tary assistance amongst States regulated in art� 42�7 of the Community Treaties 
which establishes that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its 
territory, the other Member States shall have toward it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in their power,” a mechanism that has been used for 
the first time since its existence and that demands bilateral offers�
The Paris attacks have also struck at the heart of the difficult process of receiv-
ing refugees in Europe, fueling the States who are reluctant to receive the asylum 
seekers and refugees and sowing fear in the rest� Hungary is the State most in-
terested in establishing a link between terrorists and refugees and its parliament 
has already passed, on November 17th, a law that allows to the appeal against 
the European Court of Justice the Community decision of the program for the 
distribution of foreigners despite the fact that, until now, Frontex has dismissed 
the hypothesis that there is any hint suggesting that jihadists are using the routes 
into Europe that the asylum seekers are undertaking�
Another important effect from the attacks is the abandonment of the concept, 
supported by several democratic States in its relationships with the Islamic world, 
of putting forward safety as a priority, to the point of even defending tyrannical 
leaders or dictators, followed by a good governance, believing that stability is at-
tractive regardless of which is the political model that ensures such stability� On 
the contrary, at present it is advocated that good governance is decisive for long 
lasting stability, and that this governability requires organic development whose 
model could possibly be the Quartet for the national dialogue in Tunisia� 
In terms of rights and freedoms, the attacks have also had a great impact� After 
the Paris attacks, President Hollande, declared a state of emergency, but French 
law established that this could only be maintained for 12 days� In order to extend 
it to three months, the French Government submitted a project, approved in the 
National Assembly and the Senate which, in the name of the fight against terror, 
includes important limitations to civil liberties, among them the possibility of home 
searches at any time, with no need for a legal authorization, including the possibility 
of copying any computer data or data which is kept in any other format, without any 
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previous legal authorization; it could also dictate house arrest and being detained 
incommunicado for those on suspicion, and an electronic wristband could be placed 
on those who are recidivist in order to assure their confinement� It is also allows the 
banning of meetings and assemblies in public places, as well as dissolving associa-
tions or groups that participate, facilitate or encourage any type of act that might 
threaten public order, and establishes the possibility of blocking certain web sites 
and social networks� The basis for this legal modification, justified by the idea that 
the “state of emergency is not against the rule of law but that it tends to protect it” 
should reconcile security with the proportionality of its measures and their time 
limit, and in the necessity of maintaining and defending the freedom of information, 
with the exception of the essential restrictions, in order to allow the mass media to 
be instruments for highlighting any eventual abuses or malfunctions in the applica-
tion of the emergency measures� A state of siege has also been declared in Brussels, 
where the Belgium government has already announced a legislative reform package 
in similar terms to the one done by France�
It is without doubt border control, where the attacks have had the greatest 
impact� The Council of Ministers of Justice and Interior has, on November 20th, 
2015, agreed on a series of measures that directly affect one of the pillars of the 
EU: the leading measure is to review Schengen; an automatic registry has been 
activated which includes the fingerprinting of nationals from third countries that 
come illegally into the Schengen area, whether they might be migrants or seeking 
international protection, there will also be systematical controls in critical points 
within the Europe Union and, in addition to that, the immediate creation of the 
PNR, passenger name record, which will store the flying data for at least one year�
The UN has passed a resolution to fight ISIS with “all necessary measures” in 
compliance with international law, in all territories controlled by ISIS as well as 
any other groups, individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda and any other 
terrorist group, condemning in its “strongest terms the continuous, extended and 
systematic abuses of human rights and humanitarian laws�” Although the reso-
lution does not call on Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which is what 
would provide it with a legal basis for the use of force, it does acknowledge that, 
in accordance with art� 42�7 of European Treaties, all Member States shall have 
toward it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power, accord-
ingly to art� 51 of the United Nations Charter�
The last measure proposed by Brussels is to transform Frontex from being a bor-
der control coordination body into a kind of European Agency of Border Guards, 
equipped with numerous agents who can be mobilized by the EU to alleviate the 
border crisis – up to fifteen European countries border either by land or sea on a 
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non-Schengen country� Even though this measure could clash with the fact that 
most of the immigrants are refugees, the fact is that the EU measures, who is moving 
in a vague and rash way, have the common goal to restrict the rights of immigrants 
and refugees – and, in some of them, to their own citizens, as well as to increase 
the sovereignty given to the States at the expense of a real foreign policy for the EU�
5. Conclusion
To the new situation that has led to the emergence of the Islamic State, the EU 
reacted by formulating various strategies regarding terrorism jihadist in Arabia, 
Syria and other African States, although it is accurate to say that the terrorist 
threat has led to “the political opportunity” related to adopting measures that 
were reserved or hidden, as they constituted possible violations of human rights 
under the aegis of the Defense against terrorism�
At the same time, legislative measures on terrorism adopted by different coun-
tries, such as France, United Kingdom, Holland, Hungary, Sweden, etc�, have fol-
lowed common guidelines: increasing the time of duration of pre-trial detention, 
reorganization of the judicial process, with changes in the system of resources and 
presentation of evidence, attenuation of the secret of the telephone and cyber com-
munication, allowing even the interception of telephone communications without 
a warrant, or admitting the “preventive interception�” Faculties, both intelligence 
and police, have also increased in the fight against terrorism, facilitating the ex-
change of information among the various agencies and access to certain data of 
a personal nature without judicial authorization�
This set of trends has been the reinforcement of the Member States, a common 
position of the EU, and the birth of situations of tension, or breach, which rights 
and freedoms are, in some respects, more fragile and precarious than before, of-
fering weak protection to individuals against pressures exerted by terrorism, and 
it can collide with international standards governing the restrictions of rights, in 
virtue of which, any measure of suspension, limitation or restriction of rights and 
freedoms must comply strictly certain requirements: that the standards are acces-
sible, predictable and precise; to justify the restriction of rights; that restriction is 
necessary in a democratic society; it is provided with the objectives pursued and 
the reasons that motivate it; and that it is not discriminatory�
Security and the fight against terrorism are interests shared by all European 
States, but so are the respect for human rights and democracy�
Today, it is essential to harmonize the resources to deal with jihadist terrorism, 
and is at the moment in which, without renouncing the use provided force (the 
clause of solidarity referred to in article 222 of the TFEU, foresees the mobilization 
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of all available means, including the military), in the event of a terrorist attack, 
on the idea that democracies have the right to protection against such acts you 
have to resort to the instruments of the rule of law (security forces, intelligence 
services, courts, and respect for human rights)�
The economic crisis and its social effects, and jihadist terrorism, are leading to 
that in the EU are applied, too, more restrictive policies on migration and asylum, 
to call into question the fundamental values of the Union and the content of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in the field of human rights�
Instability in Africa and the Middle East has affected Europe in two ways: as a 
crisis of asylum and refuge of a magnitude unknown so far, and with a terrorist 
threat without precedent, which requires you to build an effective response that 
happens, once found mistakes in European policy, to asylum and refuge to the 
persecuted by the ISIS, and improving intelligence and police and judicial, not 
forgetting the activation of diplomacy to force a negotiation, and harass the EI 
with financial measures and supply, as well as military�
Although it has been, without doubt, in the control of borders, where jihadist 
attacks have had greater consequences, we cannot ignore that, in terms of rights 
and freedoms, the attacks have also had an important consequence� 
The internal and external security cannot be the argument for taking dispro-
portionate measures restrictive of rights and freedoms� International law rights 
remain an important canon of protection� A community’s “foreign policy” has 
to be common and co-ordinated with other intergovernmental entities, which 
fight against jihadist terrorism, promoting policies of co-development in different 
States and respecting all rights and freedoms�
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Daniel Przastek and Elżbieta Borowska
Theme of Terrorism in Art of the 21st Century
1.  Introduction: Terrorism as a form of Political Theatre
Contemporary art is a reflection of reality, of the world outside our window� The 
phenomena of contemporary culture are meaningful only when they relate and 
refer to the issues, which are current and relevant to us, issues which demonstrate 
that the substance of art is not detached from the life of society� Artists themselves 
tend to avoid topics that are not connected with the present-day world� An ar-
tistic creation has more to it than only offering entertainment, with greater goals 
than purely portrayal of beauty or presentation of artistic skills� The main aim of 
artistic works is to refer to social phenomena that affect the life of both the local 
and global community� Artists, being part of these communities, react to their 
maladies and in their artwork they depict the world as they see it� Referring to the 
life of other citizens as well as topicality constitute important elements of artistic 
life� Thus, the notion of political theatre should be mentioned here� It is commonly 
believed that political theatre was first introduced by Erwin Piscator,1 a German 
stage artist and producer, one of the exponents of the great transformation of thea-
tre that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century – the Great Reform 
of Theatre� It was then that the stage producer became the key person in theatrical 
production� Those artists staged plays with all means available, making actors, 
scenery and music work toward a single goal, namely – a spectacle� Piscator chose 
to fill the stage with current politics� His style of work was rooted in his historical 
experience� His performances were in the form of graphic collages showing the 
absurdity of war, social inequality as well as injustice and denigration suffered by 
the man in the street� From then on social issues were widely present in the world 
of theatre of the day� “Truth and nothing but the truth” became the theatre’s main 
motto� Theatre portrayed the rhythm of the streets, its pounding and atmosphere� 
This pulsating rhythm and topicality started to take more and more space of the 
stage� All contemporary technical novelties were employed – screens, cinemato-
graphs, light and shadow effects� This convention echoed newspaper pages, full 
of political slogans and brutality of everyday life� It became increasingly common 
to grip the audience with extremely suggestive images, in order to depict the 
1 See: E� Piscator, Teatr polityczny, Wydawnictwa Artystyczne i Filmowe, Warsaw 1982� 
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maladies of the contemporary world� This picture forms the basis for a defini-
tion of political theatre� According to a dictionary, it is “a theatre form dealing 
with specific political events and representing a specific political agenda� Artists 
practicing this form of theatre use various stage means and types of text� (…) A 
radical form of political theatre is agit-pop, propaganda theatre� (…) In its broad, 
metaphorical meaning, political theatre encompasses works and performances 
portraying the mechanisms of political life and concerning the moral aspects of 
power, etc� Through an analysis (…) they invite the viewers to look at the real-
ity from the political perspective�”2 At the time the above definition was created, 
that is in the 1990s, the issue of terrorism, signaled in this article’s title, was not 
among the most urgent political concerns of the world� It was not a global but a 
niche phenomenon, and hence treated as marginal also by the artistic world� The 
experience of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 caused 
artists to take a closer interest in this area� The theme of terrorism was broadly 
introduced to the public debate� 
In order to specify the scope of the theme of terrorism, for the purpose of this 
article the definitions described below have been adopted� The word terrorism is 
derived from the Greek word treo, which means to tremble, to fear, to funk, to 
escape, the Latin word terreo – to inspire alarm, and oris – to inspire fear� This 
demonstrates that the aim of terrorism is to inspire dread and fear� Intimidation� 
In the contemporary perspective, terrorism should be distinguished from ter-
ror – that is methods used toward own citizens in order to operate a system of 
repression, use of violence by government bodies and security services, invigila-
tion� Terrorism, instead, involves planned and long-term use of violence toward 
specific government structures and social groups�3 Its victims are defenseless 
people, regular citizens and random passers-by that happen to be at the place of 
the incident� Its objective lies not in the sheer use of violence� An important aim 
of terrorism is spreading specific ideas through mass media which provide a broad 
commentary on any terrorist attacks� 
The issue of international security is nowadays in the forefront of the minds 
of contemporary politicians all around the world� The strategies to ensure com-
mon security and fight terrorism are discussed among politicians of the highest 
rank and each incident is instantly covered by the mass media� This issue affects 
and inspires artists as well as art critics� Violence, conflict, abuse of force have 
2 M� Semil, E� Wysińska, Słownik współczesnego teatru. Twórcy, teatry, teorie, Wydaw-
nictwa Artystyczne i Filomowe, Warsaw 1990, p� 357� 
3 See: W� Dietl, K� Hirschmann, R� Tophoven, Terroryzm, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 
2009� 
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indeed always been an important motif in artistic work� This may be viewed 
from a twofold perspective� On the one hand, in terms of inspiration to artists 
who in their works deal with the subject of brutal social phenomena� One of the 
first to use war trauma as an art motif was Francisco Goya, a Spanish painter 
working for the Bourbon dynasty� In his series The Disasters of War he showed 
the consequences of Napoleonic battles� The works by Pablo Picasso or poet Blas 
de Otero, inspired by the bombarding of Guernica in 1937, are in a similar spirit� 
Both of them created anti-war pieces in homage to the murdered� Analogically, 
nowadays artists in their works make artistic use of acts of terrorism� However, 
there is also another aspect of violence in art� It concerns limitations imposed 
on controversial work� In such a situation it is the art of work that falls victim to 
violence� For instance, Olympia by Edouard Manet, painted in 1863, portraying 
a nude prostitute wearing only expensive jewels and a pair of shoes slipping off, 
meeting the viewer with a provocative stare� Such a thing could not be accepted 
by the audience in the second half of the nineteenth century� The outraged audi-
ence in protest stabbed the painting with umbrellas� Similar behavior was ob-
served in Poland, and already after 1989� The exhibitions in the National Gallery 
of Art “Zachęta” should in particular be mentioned here� In November 2000, a 
famous Polish actor, accompanied by journalists, damaged with a sabre some 
works being part of the exhibition by Piotr Uklański, The Nazi� The installation 
combined 164 photos of famous actors wearing Nazi uniforms from the movies 
they played in� The photos were displayed without any caption or commentary� 
A month later, during a jubilee exhibition an installation by Maurizio Cattelan, 
The Ninth Hour, was presented� It consisted of a sculpture of Pope John Paul II 
smashed to the ground by a meteorite� This sparked an outrage among right-wing 
journalists and MPs� At first, the figure was covered with a white sheet (shroud) 
by a journalist and traveller, Wojciech Cejrowski, and later the rock was removed 
by members of the Polish Parliament – Halina Nowina-Konopczyna and Witold 
Tomczak� Thus, the work of art was damaged�4 The incidents described above 
reveal a broader tendency to limit freedom of artistic expression in Poland� They 
can be deemed violence against artistic activity� They are a consequence of inter-
preting and assessing art according to moral and religious standards instead of 
aesthetic categories� This results from an insufficient level of cultural education� 
Artistic events are analyzed in a direct manner, without necessary perspective or 
4 The account of actions aimed at limiting the freedom of artistic expression in Poland 
can be found in: J� Minałto (ed�), Kronika wypadków cenzorskich. Ostatnie lata, „No-
tatnik Teatralny” no� 39–40, 2006, pp� 9–23�
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background� Though it is an important problem related to artists’ freedom and 
independence, it does not constitute the central topic of this article� The main 
subject of this article is artists’ involvement in the analysis of phenomena from 
the world of politics, namely the issue of terrorism�
This concern stems from several reasons� The modern world is full of anxieties 
and dangers and thus a fertile source of inspiration for artists� Social consequences 
of terrorist attacks constitute an important feature of emotional and personal 
accounts as well as a significant factor behind motivation and behavior of indi-
viduals – both victims and terrorists� In this way they create one of the forms of 
political theatre – the theatre of fact, presenting real events filtered through emo-
tions of the artist� The analysis presented below will focus on modern forms of 
artistic activity referring to the acts of terrorism that took place in Europe in the 
20th and the 21st century� It will refer to the works by Torsten Buchsteiner, Simon 
Stephens and Małgorzata Sikorska-Miszczuk, who in their plays deal with the 
issue of the threat posed by terrorism to the contemporary order of our part of 
the world� In their works they invoke the events related to German terrorism, the 
conflict between Chechnya and Russia and the events that took place in London 
in 2005�5 Their works do not constitute, however, a grand political variety show, 
characteristic of Erwin Piscator, but are rather intimate dramas aimed at show-
ing the emotions and behavior of individuals� What they all have in common – 
although one of the works bears some grotesque undertones – is an attempt at 
drawing the viewers’ attention to the struggle experienced by individuals, their 
feelings and attitudes toward the tragic events�
The thesis points out that artists, being part of society, in their works deal 
with various problems that are crucial to the way the community functions� The 
diagnoses formulated by them, conveyed through multi-layered metaphors, sig-
nificantly add to creating social awareness and constitute an important element 
of the discourse on contemporary terrorism, as well as its place and meaning in 
relation to art� It is also extremely relevant and important documentary work, 
performed far ahead of the efforts of historians and journalists� Such plays take 
on a deeper meaning during onstage performances, when the presented facts 
are clashed with the interpretation proposed by the stage producer, and with its 
reception by the audience� Thus, the works enter the public domain and become 
a lasting element of culture� This, in turn, develops awareness among the viewers� 
5 The analysis of plays presented below includes theses and arguments from a disserta-
tion written under my supervision: E� Borowska, Obraz terroryzmu w europejskich 
dramatach XXI wieku, Warsaw 2011� 
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Hence, a social bond is created, demonstrating that the issue of terrorism does not 
concern only the narrow circle of politicians but affects also artists and audiences 
of artistic events, and in a broader perspective – the entire society�
When analyzing the phenomenon of terrorism in the context of art, one more 
possible interpretation is also worth mentioning� The words by an American ex-
pert on security, Brian Jenkins, will form a good starting point� Jenkins claimed 
that: “Terrorism is theatre (…) directed at those who are watching (…)� Terrorist 
attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic 
media and international press�”6 An act of terrorism becomes a spectacle which 
through its form is aimed at drawing the attention of public opinion to certain 
facts and demands made by attackers� Based on the above observation, terrorism, 
under a radical approach, may be called performance art� Indeed, it is a demon-
strated, exhibited activity and its actual presentation� It is a specific behavior, that 
is, what people do when they are actually doing it� This thesis was put forward by 
an American performance studies professor, academic, editor, theatre director and 
critic, Richard Schechner� According to Schechner, terrorism is a specific kind of 
multicultural social drama, and in the globalized world it affects more and more 
people�7 It involves actors, a clearly planned scenario and, as a result of media 
coverage, a mass audience� 
The phenomenon of terrorism was fittingly presented by a Lebanese artist 
Rabih Mroué, who translated it into the language of theatre in a form of a per-
formative lecture, with elements of film, editing and documentary work� His tril-
ogy is a fascinating unmasking of terrorists, showing how their political activity 
is based on self-creation� The video footages with the last words of terrorists who 
were about to make a suicide attack show how they manipulate with words for the 
purpose of self-creation� The posters with jihadists placed around Syria turned out 
to be fabricated� Photos of uniforms were used as a base, and smiling faces of dead 
militants were pasted on them� Not only are acts of terrorism performances but 
they also inspire further performative action� The same happens in the context of 
writing drama� The real events of terrorist attacks become an inspiration for drama 
works and later on, staging activity in the form of a theatrical performance� Thus, 
a double performance appears� The one from the real life, being a presentation of 
certain activity in the form of a terrorist attack becomes an artistic phenomenon 
6 W� Dietl, Terroryzm…op�cit�, p� 14�
7 See: R� Schechner, Performatyka. Wstęp, Ośrodek Jerzego Grotowskiego, Wrocław 
2006, pp� 299–318�
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within a closed space of the theatre building� It is worth underlining how real 
events become fictional and affect social attitudes�
Acts of terrorism are the subject of theatrical pieces more and more often� 
As already mentioned, this theme should be viewed as related to political thea-
tre, however, a certain difference may be observed� The model of stage activity 
practiced by Piscator was aimed at social change� His performances were sup-
posed to inspire the viewer, make him rethink his opinions� This was the objective 
of the various forms of propaganda or revolutionary theatre which propagated 
specified values or were directed at transforming the old order� In this context, 
in the contemporary theatre the theme of terrorism functions as a commentary, 
as presentation of certain phenomena� It is not used as an important component 
meant to influence the audience or achieve specific attitudes� One of the first plays 
dealing with the issue of the attack on the WTC in New York is Happiness by 
Laurie Anderson, written in 2002� It is by no means an enthusiastic propaganda 
work, but rather an account of feelings experienced by society after the attacks 
of September 11th, 2001� Contemporary plays dealing with the issue of terror-
ism do not create the same universe as the historical political theatre used to do� 
Here, art is supposed to caution against the idea of combat and its consequences� 
It becomes a warning, a question mark� These artworks are also an effect of fas-
cination with specific figures involved in terrorist organizations� An example of 
such an object of fascination may be Ulrike Meinhof, co-founder of the German 
Red Army Faction� Today, she is treated as a pop-cultural phenomenon and an 
inspiration for playwrights� 
2. Rote Armee Fraktion in Pop Culture
The way the terrorist movement developed in West Germany at the end of 1960s 
derived from the social landscape of that country� On the one hand, during 
years 1966–67 the country suffered an economic recession, which significantly 
challenged the myth of it being an economic miracle and disturbed the sense of 
economic stability among its citizens� At that time, one of the most urgent prob-
lems, both for the Western Europe and the United States, was the birth rate – a 
consequence of the end of the Second World War� The young generation had its 
ambitions, dreams and own idea of how their life should look like, and they ex-
pected broad access to education, more liberal moral and social rules and more 
places at universities� This type of mind-set gave rise to the student movement of 
the 60s� Moreover, there was one more unresolved problem with which the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany struggled – namely, the attitude toward the past� The 
young were very suspicious toward the generation which had been involved in 
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the functioning of the Third Reich� Denazification had not eradicated all former 
Gestapo officers and SS members from society� Some of them still held public 
offices, with the tacit approval of the community� History was a taboo and many 
pretended not to remember the times of war� Eventually, children turned against 
their parents, demanding to hear the truth about the past�8 The youths expressed 
their protest against their teachers and role models� The state authorities were 
castigated as incapable of introducing changes in the country, and the foreign 
policy was criticized as well, for the lack of a clear stand condemning the US 
operations in Vietnam� In such a climate, on 2 June 1967, Ulrike Meinhof, a 
33-year-old journalist, published an article in which she objected to the visit of 
the Iranian shah, Reza Pahlavi� As a result, a student protest was organized, during 
which Berno Ohnesorg was shot to death in unexplained circumstances� It was 
this event that the first terrorist organization in Germany named itself after – the 
2 June Movement� As an act of revenge, this extremely leftist group set fire to 
several shops in Frankfurt am Main� This is the origin of the Red Army Faction, 
led by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof� Meinhof joined the group in 1970 and 
became their main theoretician� She gave up her quiet life of a mother of twins 
and went through a training organized by the Palestinian organization of Al Fatah� 
Engaging in bloodshed combat, proclaiming radical, extremist slogans, robbing 
and murdering, at the same time she maintained that all this was in defense of 
oppressed and unaware masses� This left-wing journalist underwent an incredible 
transformation� Once renouncing violence as a means of political strife, she then 
turned into a symbol of one of the most savage gangs which considered armed 
struggle the only just method of action� A criminal act thus became a political 
act� And since combat required victims, innocent people were killed in the name 
of more and more radical slogans� In 1976 Meinhof committed suicide in a cell 
after being sentenced to life imprisonment�9 The history of the RAF is a source 
of many legends and myths but it also became a mirror of certain trends which 
can still be found in the mass culture� Evil has always been appealing� Medieval 
witches burned at the stake or public executions by beheading always attracted 
crowds of onlookers� Baader and Meinhof are a contemporary version of Bonnie 
and Clyde – young, risk-seeking, breaking all the rules and ready to commit to 
an all-or-nothing fight in the name of some abstract ideas, vague to all but them-
selves� The aura of unlawfulness, defiance and madness impressed the young and 
8 See: M� Tomczak, Terroryzm w RFN i w Berlinie Zachodnim, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 
1986� 
9 See: V� Grotowicz, Terroryzm w Europie Zachodniej. W imię narodu i lepszej sprawy, 
Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 2000� 
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stimulated their imagination� There was one more reason� As observed by Ewa 
Wójciak, actress and leader of the student Theatre of the Eight Day which per-
formed at the same time the RAF first terrorist acts were carried out: “Our small 
group disapproved of the fact that there was a general acceptance of the way the 
system treated people� There is this sort of helplessness and despair which creeps 
into the minds of young persons when they cannot reach out to society to voice 
their dislike for certain things� In such a situation, any action aimed at helping 
people shake off indifference and apathy seems worth considering�”10 These words 
appear extremely fitting as they point to the profound powerlessness experienced 
in everyday life when the only thing left is the struggle for the cherished ideas and 
values, even if most people do not share them� The aura of unlawfulness, rebel-
liousness and lunacy the RAF was surrounded by stirred the minds of the young� 
The spectacular form of terrorist attacks, their bravado and creativity, attracted 
a growing audience, and also guaranteed media coverage� In this way the media 
boosted their profits and ratings among their audiences� The popularity of the 
Baader-Meinhof gang has had its impact also on artists who today still refer to 
this story� However, a certain pattern can be observed� In Poland, emphasis is put 
on the figure of Ulrike Meinhof, her life story of a person forced to take decisive 
actions and stand up in the name of certain values� In Germany, the RAF is seen 
from a different angle� It is considered one of the unresolved problems regarding 
own history and identity� Similarly to the awareness that the Nazi period was not 
properly accounted for, the terrorist incidents are analogically interpreted as a 
result of the process which breeds violence� Individual motivation is treated as of 
secondary importance� What becomes important is the sole terrorist activity – 
however, devoid of any deeper interpretation or reasoning� Coercion and abuse of 
force are pictured as a pastime enjoyed by the gang members� This has been well 
interpreted by Elfriede Jelinek� Her play Ulrike Maria Stuart directed by Nicolas 
Stemann at the Thalia Theater in Hamburg11 suggests that the ideological combat 
was not given primary importance at all� The play focuses instead on the conflict 
between Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin, representing the figures of Maria 
Stuart and Elisabeth I, who clash not over political ideas but rather over the atten-
tion of Andreas Baader� In one of the scenes the director chose a satirical musical 
form to portray the heroines as two giant vaginas arguing over whom of the two 
the terrorist prefers� This depicts a certain struggle for femininity and the right 
10 Statement by Ewa Wójciak from an interview with E� Wójciak, Ł� Drewniak, Z� Jakubows-
ka, G� Laszuk, M� Liber, Jak nie być Ulrike Meinhof, “Dialog” no� 5, 2007� 
11 See: A� Krzemiński, Dzieci Hitlera?, “Dialog” no� 5, 2007� 
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to express one’s sexuality� Madness and private goals obscured the once valued 
ideals� Jelinek’s text was one of the voices in a wide-ranging discussion on the real 
motivation behind the RAF’s activity, which opened new areas of interpretation� 
This also demonstrates how well-rooted the phenomenon of the German terrorist 
group is in the public memory� However, its perception bears no insight – it is 
rather an element of pop culture� Just as t-shirts with the image of Che Guevara 
or Lenin are a common sight, there is a whole clothing line named “Prada Mein-
hof ”� These promoted products generate profit as part of the capitalist system, 
which Meinhof, paradoxically, once combated� What is left today in the collective 
memory is just the imprint and the gang’s logo, yet, without any awareness or 
knowledge about the terrorist group and atrocities it committed� The traumatic 
experience of the 70s has been trivialized� The way the RAF is perceived may 
resemble the medieval image of Robin Hood who robbed the rich to give to the 
poor� This perspective is of less interest to politicians but remains an inspiration 
for those creating music, visual arts and plays� Despite the noticeably superficial, 
and possibly negative, reception, this should be considered a success, since this 
creative work points to the real role and meaning of this terrorist organization� 
It builds social awareness – not through a factual account though, but through a 
metaphorical narrative�
In Poland, the figure of Ulrike Meinhof has received particular attention� In 2006, 
theaters Usta Usta from Poznań and TR Warszawa, in cooperation with the Artistic 
Centre M25, announced a competition for the best play under a title: Being Ulrike 
M. The winning work was by Małgorzata Sikorska-Miszczuk, a playwright and 
scriptwriter� Her play, titled The Death of the Squirrel Man,12 is a grotesque piece, 
echoing the style of Monthy Python or the animated sitcom South Park.
The play by Sikorska-Miszczuk presents a vision of budding evil which origi-
nates precisely from a distorted idea and which transforms its followers into kill-
ing machines� However, violence returns to the protagonists and hits them twice as 
hard, leaving them only shadows of who they used to be� The presented story poses 
questions about the reasons and results of aggression visible in society, politics or 
the theatre� The play’s central figure is the eponymous Squirrel Man� He is a law-
abiding, hard-working and obedient citizen� He pays his taxes, worries about his 
loan and unwittingly supports the regime� He dies every day but then every day 
he is reborn, full of trust and love toward his tormentors� Just as in the real world, 
the terrorists show no mercy to their victims� The Squirrel Man has to suffer, for 
the common good� He represents the society which, especially at the beginning of 
12 The text was published in a monthly “Dialog” no� 5, 2007�
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the 70s, admired the members of the Baader-Meinhof gang, secretly wishing they 
would have enough courage to follow in their steps� Germans were simply willing 
to compromise, happy to live their consumerist lives and create their everyday 
reality� A reality that was built on the harm inflicted on many nations�
Similarly as in Jelinek’s work, here Ulrike and Ensslin also discuss the sexual 
aspect of their lives� Although Ulrike wants to renounce the physical needs, she 
admits that at nights she longs for their satisfaction� At the end of the play, Ulrike 
starts to be fond of the Squirrel Man� She confesses that she did not listen to him 
earlier, and smiles at him flirtatiously� At this moment it probably starts to dawn 
on her that something has gone wrong – that the fight she is fighting and the 
way it is handled are not right� Together with her victim they tie a rope which 
Ulrike plans to use to hang herself but eventually this does not happen� Instead, 
the Squirrel Man hangs himself with his tie, captivated with Ulrike till the very 
end� The RAF has more victims� One of them is a soft-hearted Policeman – he is 
later shot in his soft heart but at the end has a new one� Despite being repeatedly 
mocked and laughed at by Andreas Baader and both women, at the beginning 
he sides with the terrorists� He carries out his duties meticulously but at the same 
time smiles at the terrorists and chats with them� The Policeman is delighted to 
have the honor of arresting the famous Andreas Baader, a great thinker and vision-
ary� At first, Baader introduces himself as a Anti-human, a person from whom no 
one and nothing can hide, an all-knowing being� 
The author has thus in an interesting way demonstrated how the RAF terrorist 
attacks affected the police actions� At first, these were indeed limited� In the first 
years of its activity, the group had many supporters among academics and high-
rank figures� Meanwhile, after the Second World War German police did not enjoy 
much respect among the citizens, similarly as was the case in Poland after 1989� 
For Germans, a police uniform still cast the shameful shadow of the SS, SA and 
Gestapo officers� This possibly explains a certain slowness and clumsiness of the 
actions taken against the gang members� Only later, when the terror escalated and 
the number of victims increased, decisive steps aimed at reinforcing the system 
were adopted, this time with the full approval from society� Analogically, in the 
play the Policeman first expresses his affinity and admiration, only to be deni-
grated and later shot in the heart� Then, a new Policeman is born – with a new 
heart� And this one knows no pity or compassion� He performs a brutal X-ray 
on Ulrike and then locks her in a cage, as well as feeds Andreas and Gudrun the 
corpse of their political enemy�
The play by Sikorska-Miszczuk searches for the truth about the source of evil 
and about what lies hidden in the human soul� The Squirrel Man is not merely 
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one of the RAF’s victims – he is the sum of all victims, a society that is being ex-
perimented with� He believes in the lofty goals of the Baader-Meinhof gang and 
tries to understand what drives its members� However, after some time he realizes 
that something is wrong, something has failed� How can thus the world be healed 
if even such restrictive means have come to nothing? This question is addressed 
to every one of us and each of us has to find an answer to it on one’s own� How 
do we want to protect ourselves against aggression and break the vicious circle 
of hypocrisy, of turning a blind eye on own sins and wrongdoings� The play does 
not dwell into the motivation of Ulrike, Andreas and Gudrun� It only prepares 
the ground for further discussions on aggression which lurks somewhere deep 
in every one of us� 
Are we able to function without violence? As mentioned above, violence at-
tracts people and many find it fascinating� The Baader-Meinhof myth would not 
be a lasting mass culture phenomenon if the same ideals were presented during 
peaceful protests� This is a recurring topic of the performance by Natalia Ko-
rczakowska, prepared at the Cyprian Kamil Norwid Theatre in Jelenia Góra in 
2007� The spectacle is like a revolution, full of surprises and unexpected turns� It 
involves a play within play, with a multi-layered plot� On the one hand we wit-
ness theatre rehearsals, on the other hand – the story of Ulrike Meinhof (Lidia 
Schneider), Andreas Baader (Piotr Żurawski) and Gudrun Ensslin (Magdalena 
Kuźniewska)� A new figure is also introduced – a rather shallow female director 
(played by Anna Ludwicka) who continuously tries to control what is happening 
at the stage� Korczakowska does not attempt to justify the use of force – be it in 
everyday life or in the theatre� She poses a question though: is there anything 
that is inherently evil and corrupted? She tries to compromise the myth of ‘Prada 
Meinhof ’ precisely with a peculiar fashion show� The actors flirt with the audience 
just as the terrorists at first flirted with society� However, the aggression spirals and 
is incessantly re-enacted� The terrorists look as if they have just left the catwalk 
as well – they are hip, well-dressed, confident� This underlines how the legend of 
the RAF is depicted in the contemporary pop culture�
The presented portrayal of the German terrorist organization shows that dra-
matic art seeks to study and understand how a group functions� These works do 
not provide factual accounts or documentary view on the events� Their main 
purpose is examination of individual motives and their social impact� Theatre, 
being an intimate meeting between the artist and the audience, employs real 
events to create own narratives, precisely as in the case of the RAF story� While 
historians interpret the events, the stage becomes the place where legends are 
forged or demythologized�
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3. Women’s Tears – Dubrovka 2002
The Chechen-Russian conflict dates back to the late eighteenth century, when 
Tsarist troops began to subjugate Chechen territories� The Russian determination 
to maintain domination after the collapse of the Soviet Union provoked a severe 
conflict that officially ended in 2002 in a victory for Russia which then introduced 
a normalization plan� The Republic of Ingushetia, while formally stabilized, con-
tinued to witness guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks� Drive for independence 
as well as a sense of pride and freedom are characteristic of communities of the 
Caucasus� The right to self-determination gave rise to one of the most dramatic 
terrorist acts of the early 21st century�
On 23 October 2002, a Chechen commando of 42 militants led by Movsar 
Barayev seized the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow, with 800 spectators watching 
the musical Nord-Ost as well as 122 performers and staff members inside� Apart 
from Russians, there were several dozen foreign nationals among the audience� 
The terrorists planted explosives throughout the theatre, threatening to blow 
up the entire building unless Russia withdrew from Chechnya� On the third day of 
the siege, the Russian special forces stormed the theatre, having pumped unknown 
paralytic gas into the building shortly before the raid, which sedated the terrorists, 
rendering them unable to detonate the explosives� Apart from the Chechens, the 
operation left 130 hostages dead� The Russian government acclaimed the opera-
tion as a great success�13 Initially, it was not the theatre but the buildings of the 
State Duma and the Federation Council that were targeted for the onslaught, as 
admitted by Shamil Basayev, who had conceived the attack and trained the com-
mando� The operation had been prepared since the spring of 2002� The choice of 
play was not a coincidence; it was symbolical, as the musical cheerfully evoked 
fond and nostalgic memories of the Soviet times� Prior to the attack, the terror-
ists conducted reconnaissance while attending other performances held at the 
theatre� Their equipment was perfectly prepared and could kill everyone inside�14
The incident has also a different, purely theatrical, dimension� Invoking the 
principles of performance art, one should note that the terrorist attack on the 
13 As cited in: M� Wojciechowski, 57 godzin strachu, available at: http//www�gazeta�pl, 
accessed 21 December 2015; Theatre programme for Motortown by S� Stephens; Bu-
chsteiner, Nordost, directed by G� Kania, Teatr Polski in Bydgoszcz, Bydgoszcz, 2007, 
p� 15�
14 Noteworthy publications on the 2002 Dubrovka theatre attack include: A� Zaucha, 
Moskwa Nord-Ost, Wydawnictwo Bosz, Olszanica, 2003, and M� Kuleba, Szamil Ba-
sajew: rycerski etos a powinność żołnierska, Fundacja Odysseum, Warsaw, 2007� 
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theatre evolved into a particular kind of spectacle� The audience who came to see 
the play unknowingly became heroes of a wholly different piece� The terrorists 
directed a new drama, with the entire world watching in the belief that the tragic 
event would reach its happy ending� This is what served as the basis for a drama by 
Torsten Buchsteiner� A German actor, playwright and scriptwriter, he named his 
work after the musical staged on that fateful October day at Dubrovka, Nordost. 
However, it is not a musical spectacle, but an understated small-audience piece 
focused on presenting the characters and their motives; a close-up of the attack as 
seen from three different angles, three points of view, three pairs of tearful eyes� 
Three women, which was not a coincidence, given their involvement in the ter-
rorist attack, of different social status and views became entwined by the drama of 
the place� Different reasons brought them there� Zura is a Shahid participating in 
the terrorist attack and a widow of a Chechen named Aslan� The second woman 
is Tamara, a Latvian-born internist, widowed by a Russian named Nikolai; she 
helps the victims of the attack� The third woman is Olga, a Russian accountant, 
married to a Russian named Oleg, who came to watch the play with her husband 
and daughter� While each story is unique and personal, they share certain simi-
larities� All will become widows, and tragedy and despair is identical for all three 
women, regardless of their nationality and social status�
Zura used to be a laboratory assistant back in Chechnya� A Shahid with the 
same name was involved in the actual attack of October 23rd, 2002� She was Movsar 
Barayev’s aunt, a widow and a strictest Muslim, who even did not reveal her face� 
The heroine, much like the majority of women from that region, got married very 
young; however, she was lucky to marry the love of her life� Her husband was 
gunned down by a Russian in Grozny in wartime� The trauma that she experi-
enced was severe, her husband being everything to her; and not only because she 
loved him dearly, but also because a widowed woman is hardly worth anything 
in Chechnya� After being rejected by her husband’s family and society, she met 
Sela, a long-lost friend of hers� Because of her, she became a terrorist� She was 
motivated by one thing only, and that thing was love� Chechen women tying ex-
plosives to their hips want to reconnect with their husbands, restore their honor 
and secure themselves a place in heaven� When her husband died, she experienced 
her own death as well� A sense of helplessness took her straight to the Moscow 
theatre� Deep in her soul, however, she wanted to live a normal life� The story of 
that Chechen demonstrates the everyday dilemmas of women struggling with the 
reality, which only seemingly is a realm of men�
Tamara is a doctor from Moscow� While she was born in Latvia, she lives 
in this city because of her Russian husband, Nikolai, who served in Chechnya� 
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As a result of wartime bloodshed and atrocious reality, he could not cope with 
himself any longer, ultimately committing suicide� Her story illustrates to what 
degree a lack of physical intimacy and, most importantly, a lack of acceptance and 
reciprocity in a relationship may affect the human psyche� Every woman wishes 
to be satisfied, which includes intimate sensations, although it may sometimes 
cause embarrassment�
Olga enjoys the most settled life of the three, working as an accountant and, 
like thousands of other Moscow women, living a simple life together with her 
beloved husband and daughters� The play is a long-awaited event for her, and an 
important moment for each family member� Her marriage is peaceful and based 
on trust and mutual respect� Dedication to her family is the joy of her life rather 
than great sacrifice�
The tragic events of the Moscow theatre unite the anonymous women in spite of 
many differences between them� The strength of the drama manifests itself in how 
it shows that while people may be different, they all react identically and experience 
the same when their loved ones’ lives are at stake� After the peaceful initial part, full 
of melancholic reflection and reminiscences, the true spectacle begins� Surprise and 
disbelief among the audience is striking; initially, it is neither fear nor hate� Who are 
the terrorists? For Muscovites, the war in Chechnya is a remote campaign, which, 
according to official communications, has been concluded� The play brings a clash 
between the two sides, the oblivious Russians and the resentful Chechens� They do 
not understand each other, with words unspoken and silent mutual accusations, 
signaled by nothing more than meaningful glances, permeating the atmosphere� 
No one feels understood� The spectators are terrified, having no idea of what is 
expected from them and what they have to do with all this anyway� The problem 
remains, however, that it is impossible to tell the villain from the innocent� People 
believe that they are safe at home and, again, their sense of security is shaken� A 
crucial issue addressed by the play is shame, a human reaction� Both the shame of 
a woman, when Barayev demands that Zura take off her chador, and the shame of 
physiology, when the hostages need to relieve themselves into the orchestra pit� In 
order to do so, they have to stand in a long queue and endure other people’s stares� 
A person is thus subjected to humiliation and animalization� 
In Nordost, the author raises an important problem of humanity� One may ask: 
where does the fight end? Where are the boundaries for the fight against terrorism 
and the fight for freedom? The conclusion one may arrive at while watching the 
play is hardly optimistic� Human nature is so cruel that there is no such boundary� 
There is always someone for whom the other person means nothing� One of the 
central issues of the drama is the fight for another person; both the fight during 
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the theatre attack and the struggle put up by Tamara for her husband’s acceptance� 
The women fight for their husbands and children� At that moment, nothing is 
more important, even their own lives� Looking closely at the terrorists, one can 
notice that women are those who are ready to make the ultimate sacrifice� Men, 
conversely, have an escape route planned� The drama shows women who, in the 
name of Allah, are ready for the ultimate sacrifice and for 12 months had been 
trained to lay down their lives� A woman who fights for her loved ones thinks 
of nothing else, being entirely devoted to the fight, and fights until the end� Like 
Tamara, who fought for her daughter Tanya and her mother; like Olga, who fought 
for her husband and her daughter Maya; like many other women on that day� This 
is often a lost fight, but the fighter does not surrender� Many people died upon the 
raid, children included� Although the separatists released foreigners, they did not 
want to free children� Twelve-year-old boys were once taken by Russian troops; 
likewise, Russian children were to suffer punishment for government policies� 
Most of them had been separated from their parents and located in the upper 
circle� Thus, given the chemical agents used by the special forces in the raid, 
many of them were saved, as the heavier gas did not manage to make its way to 
the balcony so rapidly� Eventually, almost two days into the siege, it became clear 
that the attack from which the Chechens were supposed to benefit became a 
trap� The men were prepared for the escape, while the women had no idea what 
to do, being entirely objectified� They have been exploited, no one was going to 
care about them� Zura took it very personally, as treachery� This bitterness and 
disappointment gave her strength to run away and take revenge on Movsar, who 
seemed very close to her not a moment ago� As the Russian Spetsnaz proceeded 
to pump the gas into the building, she gave in to panic and started to fight for 
her own freedom� The final scenes are truly abrupt, with the entire play gaining 
momentum and spinning fast� After the special forces rush into the building, the 
execution follows, no captives spared; the order was to kill the militants subdued 
by gas and show no mercy to those who were still conscious� Tamara is looking 
for her daughter and mother� She no longer suppresses her emotions, looking for 
what is dearest to her — her loved ones� The epilogue poses the question whether 
the special forces were right in their actions� Once again, Russia has proved that 
it will yield to no one� The Russians, in turn, will not be able to rise from their 
knees for a long time� It would appear that the “Black Widows” took their revenge� 
Russian women lost their husbands and children� More women to be widowed 
and more tears of suffering to be wept�
Buchsteiner’s play constitutes a very realistic image of what transpired in the 
Dubrovka theatre in October 2002� The author incorporated memories of those 
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who took part in the attack� It is a classic theatre of fact, where the real events have 
only been minimally amplified by the author’s fiction� Rather than recount the 
events themselves, it presents an account of feelings accompanying the attack� We 
are looking at the same event through the eyes of a terrorist, a hostage and a rescue 
worker� Three women, three equal stories and the same pain caused by the loss of 
love� With all the differences in character and experiences, the ability to experience 
feelings is similar� Initially, the narrative is cold and distant� As the story unfolds, 
it continues to gain momentum until it becomes a cry of women entangled in the 
terrorist attack� In Buchsteiner’s play, a woman is a reflection of the entire society� We 
believe that the husbands are the victims, but for terrorists those who die are only a 
means to inspire panic and fear� Victims are not those who lose their lives, but those 
who survive and must live with the trauma� That women are heroes of the play is not 
a coincidence, as they are capable of bringing out the deepest meaning of tragedy, 
the social pain, not to mention the political causes and effects� A view on violence 
and aggression gains greater sharpness� The questions posed concern morality of 
some moves, the ethic behind actions of policymakers rather than technical means� 
One can see the simplicity of the motives that drive the women when they rescue 
others, make sacrifices or take revenge� It is a story about love, despair and pain�
In Poland, the task of staging the play was taken on by Grażyna Kania at By-
dgoszcz Polish Theatre� The play premiered on November 23rd, 2007 as part of 
the project entitled Terrorism/The Prisoners of Despair� A theatre without theatre, 
a minimalist performance, it offered the audience a matter-of-fact account and 
rhythmical monologues� The first part features three displays and a dry account 
from three women� Each tells her story, complementing one another, thus allow-
ing the audience to understand their message� Actual acting is only introduced 
in the second part� Kania primarily shows people, their emotions and feelings, 
rather than a problem of the contemporary world, namely the Russian-Chechen 
conflict� A depiction of the issue of terrorism, unfamiliar to most spectators, was 
combined with what everyone could relate to, i�e� the feelings of commitment, 
anxiety, regret, fear and anger – emotions experienced by people who are intimate 
with each other� The spectacle terrorized the audience, forcing them to listen to 
the three women and their stories; making them reflect on their own sense of 
security, which turns out to be, in fact, very shaky� It is a psychological drama 
which appeals to the deepest and simplest impulses behind human actions� The 
audience are being emotionally blackmailed and forced to feel, at least for a while, 
as if they have lost everything of value in life�
A woman as a victim and a culprit, the entanglement of feelings and individual 
sensations become one of the most interesting artistic experiences when it comes 
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to employing a terrorist act in the theatre setting� Pain and tragedy of the indi-
vidual participants of the events deeply affected the audience� In a quiet theatre 
room, the voice of three women for whom love and sacrifice means more than 
life revealed the trauma of a terrorist attack� 
4. Terrorism and Pornography 
Thursday, July 7th, 2005 shook London with a series of terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on public transport� The suicide bombers were British citizens; three of 
Pakistani descent and one Jamaican� They all came from the industrial city of 
Leeds in West Yorkshire, Northern England� It is a very peculiar city� Of all ethnic 
minorities, the Pakistani account for a staggering 40%� Despite a well-developed 
manufacturing sector, almost a half of these people are unemployed, the reason 
being predominantly a lack of relevant experience� Each of the attackers grew up 
in penury; it follows that a certain kind of isolation, a lack of prospects and the 
stark contrast in the standards of living in Britain led those practicing Muslims to 
confront their reality� Britain does not pursue any detailed minority assimilation 
policy� Certainly, a major cause behind the 2005 attacks were the international 
affairs as well� A shift in policy following the September 11 attacks on the WTC 
resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and intensified operations in Afghanistan� 
Many European Muslims fell victim to false accusations, profound distrust and 
derision� Such treatment, as in many other situations where worship is threat-
ened, prompted Muslims to improve their knowledge of the Quran and deepen 
their perception of faith as well as to strictly observe the top-down principles of 
religious conduct� This time, a sense of alienation from the particular community 
triggered off the massacre of July 2005�
The four young suicide bombers are commonly referred to as the new inde-
pendent generation of Al Qaeda, the so-called third generation� A Scotland Yard 
investigation helped establish the identity of each of the suicide bombers� The 
mastermind behind the operation was the 30-year-old Mohammad Sidique Khan, 
who also recruited the remaining three men to carry out the attack, Shehzad Tan-
weer, Hasib Hussain and Germaine Lindsay�15 While preparing the attack, they 
travelled to Pakistan and studied the Quran assiduously� One should note that 
their communities pointed out that each of the attackers had undergone a deep 
spiritual transformation as regards their life and behavior prior to the bombings� 
15 W� Dietl, Terroryzm…op�cit�, p� 163� 
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Their conduct had diametrically changed, and this re-evaluation resulted in the 
objective they accomplished on 7 July 2005�
Britain seems to be a country where confrontation with violence is not a distant 
topic� The combat against Irish extremists has continued for decades� That was 
not the first time when London witnessed bombings� Yet, despite all the experi-
ence and apprehension about the possible strike as a consequence of the British 
involvement in the anti-terrorist coalition, the attack came unexpected� The main 
targets were the London Underground network and a city bus� In a time of eupho-
ria and glee, which the Londoners experienced after their city had been declared 
host of the 2012 Olympics, the trauma of a terrorist act crept in� The timing was 
perfect, the aim being to intimidate society and appear in the media� Executed in 
no time, the attack brought four explosions on public transport within an hour; 
three bombs were detonated on the underground and one on a double-decker� 
Responsibility for the attack was claimed by a previously unknown Al Qaeda 
group, the Secret Organization of Al Qaeda in Europe� Devised in response to 
the British engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the attack took 57 lives and left 
700 people wounded�
The 7/7 bombings provided the setting for Pornography, a play by Simon Ste-
phens (b� 1971), a British playwright and one of the most interesting young-
generation writers of the time� As noted by the author, “the play arose from a deep 
doubt in our culture, from the observation of chaos in which we live: not from 
honesty�”16 The drama reflects on what people feel, how to reconcile the knowledge 
of being alive with the knowledge of death� The terrorist attacks recede into the 
background, being only a distant echo in everyday life� While affecting individu-
als, their attitudes and relationships, they are not the main subject of the play, 
which is full of convoluted thoughts, reminiscences, random dialogue and words 
left hanging in the air� Unwittingly, we begin to spy on people and their dilem-
mas� Out of this nonsense, we start to recognize figures, distinguish contours, and 
define the existing order of things� For the author, information overload, being an 
inherent part of the contemporary media, has become a reflection of the modern 
society and human relations� The information revolution witnessed in recent years 
has significantly depleted our reservoir of ways to communicate� Nowadays, our 
conversations resemble a fast food meal; they are simple, quick, superficial, and 
very bland� Idleness and freeloading, so prevalent these days, have caused those 
meals devoid of nutritional value and those bland and colorless conversations 
16 As cited in the Programme for the spectacle by S� Stephens, Pornography, directed by 
a team of directors, Teatr Dramatyczny in Warsaw, Warsaw 2008�
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to become the norm� Simon Stephens sees a great similarity between those con-
versations and the eponymous pornography� Vulgar and hackneyed formulae, 
conversations without depth, instant satisfaction of simple needs; this is what con-
versations now look like, not only between colleagues at work, but also between 
relatives, married couples and friends� In this hectic world, there is not a moment 
of respite for a deeper reflection� Our existence comes down to a mere consumerist 
indulgence of the body, with spiritual fulfillment becoming a rarity of secondary 
importance� One may venture to call them “controlled conversations�”
The play was written after the London Underground bombings, when the Brit-
ish capital, only just intoxicated by the vision of the 2012 Olympics, suddenly lost 
stability of everyday life� Society had to redefine its sense of security and reflect on 
the London events� The heroes are random people who, just as anyone, at the time 
of 7/7 were struggling with problems of everyday life� Snatches of conversation, 
while seemingly lacking emotional involvement or sense, are in fact filled with 
incomprehension, longing, and sometimes sorrow� The play itself is extremely 
flexible, allowing for any number of actors on stage, which only proves that it is a 
social analysis rather than a story about specific people� The first piece of dialogue 
introduces a young couple� Both avoid being honest, and they do not understand 
each other� Their replies are either arrogant and aggressive or terse� In the next 
scene, we see a mother� This is the character on whom the author focused most� 
Once again, a woman was given a central role in a drama� Her words emanate 
sadness and weariness� Her monologue is substantially more emotional than the 
preceding dialogue, and yet there is something missing� What is absent is close-
ness of another person, the father of her child� One can hear her quivering inside, 
slightly overwhelmed in a rush of everyday matters� The problems emerging in 
her life are brushed aside and masked with ordinary, trivial everyday concerns� 
However, she cannot abandon the feeling of suspicion and distrust toward her 
partner Johnathan� Every day she goes to bed beside him, and yet she does not 
trust him and cannot muster enough courage to have a candid conversation with 
him� The completely unrelated strands of thought are intersected by the reflections 
of her entire relationship, devoid of trust and understanding� The only actual joy 
in her life is her son, who nonetheless cannot offer her support and with whom 
she cannot talk� Although she is not alone, she is very lonely� The third act in-
troduces a young half-Italian boy, who lives with his parents and his elder sister� 
Undergoing puberty, feeling neglected by his family and misunderstood, he is a 
typical teenager of today� Fascinated by a school teacher, he neglects his educa-
tion� A sense of being misunderstood, a lack of stabilization, possibly including 
financial instability, spark his aversion to ethnic minorities he encounters at school 
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and in the street� There is no place for an open conversation at his home, with his 
mother sidestepping his questions about his father’s violence toward her� They 
pretend that there are no problems, in the false hope that those will simply fade 
away� The boy’s aggression and anger well up; he does not feel masculine enough 
and attempts to comfort himself by imagining his power� He retreats into his 
own world� Then, one day, as he enters the underground with his sister, he finds 
himself standing next to a boy with a rucksack, the bomber� Thus unfolds a scene 
of hell, a scene filled with silence� There is also a story of an incestuous relation-
ship� Another couple cannot get along with each other, yet they maintain sexual 
relationship, seeking physical closeness, since spiritual intimacy is out of their 
reach� Thousands of people, thousands of problems, reflections and emotions� 
Everything is incoherent, imprecise, beyond comprehension� What can be sensed, 
however, are human emotions: anger, sadness, sorrow� When the attacks come, 
there comes fear� All of a sudden, it turns out that despite the persistent feeling of 
loneliness, everyone becomes worried about someone, and panic begins to creep 
inside� A man on a train suddenly feels the need to talk to his wife, make sure 
that his children are not late for school� Then comes another scene that shows 
London shortly after the bombings� Everything is calm and quiet� The city seems 
desolated, a rare view in London� Most amazingly, among this chaos, disorienta-
tion and panic sweeping through the city, two people manage to plant a seed of 
understanding, a feeble sign of healthy communication based on positive human 
emotions� Each person is full of dilemmas and problems, which represents the 
contemporary world, brimming with words unspoken and emotions concealed�
5. Conclusion
The view on culture we have come to live in makes us doubt whether humanity’s 
internal development keeps pace with technological progress� Superficial conver-
sations are held properly� Somewhere deep down, however, the true emotions are 
repressed� At the moment of the catastrophe, the barrier cracks slightly, but does 
not break down completely� The fact is that only some people are able to overcome 
it� The world today resembles a crystal ball which, granted, does look impressive, 
but it effectively separates us from the rest, isolating us completely� 
Terrorism sobers us up, offering food for thought and acting as a catalyst for 
certain changes that man needs to undergo in order to heal the entire society� The 
terrorism presented in Stephens’ drama is a background, on which the author 
raises questions about ourselves� What is crucial this time is the attitude not to-
ward the attack or the attackers, but toward the loved ones� Wondering what the 
everyday reality looks like in this fast-paced world, and whether one event can 
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upset what society has laboriously built, the author asks about the things that are 
most important to us at the moment� In pursuit of material well-being, people 
irrevocably lose the ability to communicate with each other� One-time shock can-
not change and redefine everything, but it certainly is a slight impulse to stand 
back and reflect on oneself�
The analyzed contemporary dramas show terrorist attacks being used to build 
autonomous artistic universes� The stories are not simple accounts of events� 
Brought to the fore is the human being, their motivations, feelings, thoughts 
and communication with another person� The contemporary drama, in reaction 
to what reality brings is trying to observe it, yet remains far from being a mere 
commentator� Authors become creators of our human worlds, for each of us may 
fall prey to this 21st century plague – a terrorist attack� 
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